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ABSTRACT
This ~csis dcs~ribcs an invcstigat[on of information systems development and practice
in a privatised state owned enterprise (North-West Cement Company Limite<l or
NWCL) in Sri Lanka between 195!!-2000. The objectives of my ~tudy were: (1) to
understand the apprcrnchcs used by NWCL for information systems development; (2) to
understand how these approaehcs relate tu the organi s11tional, socio-cultural, economic
nnd political realities of organisaiions in Sri Lanka; (3 J to outline a theory to better
understand information systems de11clopmcn! and practice for organisations in Sri
Lanka; and (4) to make recommendations which could be used to improve infonnation
systems development and practice for organisations in Sri Lanka.
Five research questions were examined. ( 1) What impact did the state control policies
have on i,nfonnation systems development and practice within NWCL, particularly in
the conte~t of organisational socio-cultural lifcworlds? (2) What impact did the nco·
classical iconomic policies introduced by the government have on information systems
development and practice within NWCL, particularly in the context of organisational
socio-cultural lifcworlds? (3) What approaches were taken into consideration by
NWCL management when developing and using information systems in the
organisation? (4} How much were cultural, social, economic. and organisational
contt:xts taken into consideration by NWCL management in information systems
Ji

development and practice in the organisation? And why? (5) How can such findings in
the above areas contribute to the theory and practice of information systems
development?

To study the social phenomena, contextualised, interpretive one, with critical case study
methods congruent with Habennas's critical social theory perspective has been
employed. This study is a holistic one in that ten episodes of information systems
development are critically examined within the historical context of institutions in Sri

Lanka. I have made observations by iterating theory with empirical data and by
reflecting on each episode in an endeavour to gain an in-depth understanding and
meaning.

. \' .; ~\
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The research reveals that infonnation systems development at NWCL cx.istcd within

broadly related hut inK'l'locking socio-cuhural, economic, ond political and
administnitivc structures in Sri Lanka. These social structures both influenced and were
influenced by information systems development ot NWCL and thus shaped !he

org11nisalion's renlity.
Both state controlled policies and neo-classical economic policies impacted on
information systems development and the engendering of the socio-cultural lifeworlds
of employees. !nfonnation systems development followed a positivist approach with
values embedded in Western society. The techno-scienlific, instrumental, strategic,
economic and purposive rational approaches logcthcr with a highly institulion111iscd
bureaucracy and r,olitical apertures arc shown to be in conflict with the social reality of

NWCL and this has hampered information systems development. As a result, NWCL
was largely unable to develop iJUtovativc infonnation systems to better the organisation.

Infonnation systems development requires representation of socio-cultural norms,
values, and expectations which are used to guide the thinking process of people in a
~untry. Such elements arc integrated in employee lifcworlds and embody tacit

understanding and knowledge. If infomiation systems arc developed including such
tacit knowledge, employees, management, NWCL itself and the wider society benefit
together. Such a process can be achieved through increased use of communicative
action in information systems development. Such findings would enhance the theory
and the practice of information systems development in NWCL and other organisations
in Sri Lanka. The central message of this thesis is that communica,ivc action remains as
an attnlctivc option for NWCL trnnsfonnation.

(j

··\,·,

-vi-

Admowledgment

PhD Thesis

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to acknowledge to many people, without whom, this thesis would not have been
renliaed. To my most w-0ndcrful and extraordinary principal supervisor, Dr Mark
Campbell Williams, for his driving efforts, encouragement, tremendous help both in
academic and in personal life, and his tremendous dedication in getting my final thesis
ready. Truly spccking, he is an out~tanding scholar. I am fortunate to have Dr Mark
Williams as my principle supervisor. 1ever remember what Dr Mark Williams has done
for me. I am indeed indebted to him. He is an gentleman in every inch. To my associate
supervisor, Associate Professor Dr. Bill Hutchinson, for hi~· valuable advice, guidance,
motivation and pati'.!nce, nod tremendous hdp. To Professor Janice Bum who offered a
tui~ion fee Scholarship. I shall never forget what Professor Janice Bum has dcnc for me.
I am particularly thankful to Mr. Glen Jones, USA, who helped me giving some
financial assistance as a result of an infonnal discussion had with Mr Jones by my
principle supervisor at the GATE conference Ul Melbourne, Australia. I never want to
forget the help Mr. Jon~s has done for me when I was really in trouble in finance. ! am
special!y, thankful to Associate Professor Brynjulf Tellefsen of Norwegian School of
Management, for his constru~tivc and very useful comments and help in preparing the
final draft of the thesis. To Professor Rudy Hirschhcim of the University Qf Houston,
USA, for his valuable suggestions an<l comments on the overall thesis. I am also
thankful to Professor Samaranaycke of the University of Colombo for his valuable
insights and help on the initial stage of data collection. I never want to forget professor
Karummayeke (Dean of the Graduate Faculty) and Professor Wilson (fonncr ViceChanccllor) of the University of Sri Jaycwardenapura for their encourngemenl and
valuable suggestions. 1 am grateful to the Chainnan and the CEO and my research
participants at NWCL. I am particularly gratcfu1 to Dr. Judith Rocheooustc who has
willingly undertaken the editing the final draft of this thesis. At \as\ but not least, to my
ever [Q,ving parents, brothers and sisters who encouraged and helped me in various
way~ both in my personal and academic life and. ;,sever, my wife, Lanka Darshani, and
my grate son, Pasan, who sacrificed much of their life in calming me in the maelstroms.

-vii-

Thesis Contcn1~

PhD Tne.,i..s

THESIS CONTENTS

DEDICATION

ii

DECLARATION

iii

PUBLICATIONS

iv
f!,

ABSTRACT

V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

vi

TABLE OF FlGURES

xv
xvi

LIST OF t.BBREVIATIONS

,,
,'

Ii.'',

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.0 lntrlMn~tion
·., .. ,,

.')

l.2 Definitions of Key Terms
1.3 Overview-Reflection on a Study

6

1.4 Statement of the Research Problem

l3

15

1.4.1 Research Questions

1.4.2 Limitations of the Study

16

1.5 Significance of the Study

)8

1.6 Objectives of the Study

, 21

1:1 Organisation of Chapters

22

CHAPTER TWO

ii

LITERATURE REVIEW

:11

2.0 Introduction

25

2.1 Underlying Assumptions in lnfonnation Systems Development and Practice

26

The.!ls Content:;

PhD 17resi•

2.1.1 Ontological Assumptions

26

2.1.2 Epistemology

27

2.2 Positivist Appronch-Underlyiog Assumptions in [nfonnation Systems Development
and Prnctice

27

2.2.1 Ontological Assumptions

28

2.2.2 Epistemological Assumptioos

28

2.3 Infonnatioo Systems Development Research within Positivist Approach

30

2.3.l Problems of Positivist Approaches

33

2. 4 Interpretive Approach-Underlying Assumptions in lnfonnation Systems ,
Development and Practice

41

2.4. i Ontological Assurr.ptions

42

2.4.2 Epistemological Assumptions

43

i4.3 Problems of Interpretive Approach

44

2.5 Critical Theory Approach-Underlying Assumptions in Infonnalion Systems
Development and Practice

47

2.5.1 Ontological Assumptions

48

2.5.2 Epistemological Assumptions

49

2.5.3 Haberrnas's Critical Social Theory in Infonnation Systems Development

51

2.6 Conclusion

56

CHAPTER THREE
CRITICAL SOCIAL THORY-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3. 0 Introduction

58

3.1 Critical Social Theory

58

3.2 Habennas's Theory of Communicative Action

62

3.2.1 Lifeworlds and Systems

65

3.2.2 Colonisation of Lifeworld

70

3.2.3 Human Knowledge Interests

72

3.2.4 Human Rationalities

73

3.2.5 Human Action

74
- iK -

ThesU Contems

PhD Thesis

3.2.5.1 lnstrumental Action

74

3.2.S.2 Strategic Action

75

3.2.S.3 Communicative Action

76
78

3.2.6 Universal Validity Claims

80

3.2. 7 Ideal Speech Situation

" 82

3.2.7.1 Breakdown in Communication
3.2.8 Ratinnal Society through Communicative Interaction

84

3.4 Conclusion

87

CHAPTER FOUR
SOCIAL CONTEXT: SOCIO-CULTURAL,
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS
4.0 Introduction

89

4.1 Role ofinfonnation Technology and Information Systems

89

4.1.1 lnformation Technology and Information Systems in Developing Countries 91
4.1.2 Problems of Information Technology and Information Systems Adoption in
Developing Countries

93

4. 2 Information Systems Research and Practice in Developing Countries

96

4.3 Social Context in Sri Lanka

101

4.3.1 Socio-Cultural Lifcworlds

118

4.4 Modernisation through Science and Technology in Sri Lanka

121

4.4.1 Modernisation through Information Technology

122

4.4.1.1 Government Policy on Information Technology

123

4.4.J.2 lnfunnation Technology for Socio-economic Development

124

4.4.1.3 Problems in Information Technology Adoption

126

4.4.1.4 Transfer of Information Technologies

131

4.4.1.5 Information Systems Research

132

4.5 Conclusion

138 '

_,.
'·

The.,I!! Contents

PhD Thesis

CHAPTER FIVE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5.1 Introduction

139

5.2. Research Methodology

139

5.2.1 Reseurch Method

140

5.2.2 The Holistic Approach

143

5.3 Research Process

145

5.3.1 Research Site

145

5.3.2 Research Participants

146

5.3.3 Access to the Research Site

146

5:3.4 Dnta Collection, Documentation and Validation

147

5.3.5 Data Analysis and Reporting Results

150

5.4 Conclusion

150

CHAPTER SIX

,c,NWCL CEMENT COMPANY:
CASE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS
6.0 Introduction

151

6.1 NWCL Cement Company and Industry Background

152

6.2 Information Systems Development and Practice under a State Control Model: Phas~
·1a 9) (between 1958-1976)

158

6.2.1 Budget as a Steering Medium in a Shift System: Episode 1

159
166

6.2.1.1 Reflection on Episode I
6.3 Information Systems in the Regulatory Paradigm

168

6.3.1 The Punch Card System: Episode2

168

170

6.3.1.1 Reflection on Episode 2
6.4 Information Systems in the Financial Control Paradigm
-:<i-

172

Thesl1 Con/ent.1

PhD Thesis

173

6.4. l Budget with the Punch Card System: Episode 3

177

6.4.1. J Rctlcction on Episode 3

179

6.S P.cflection on State Cml\n-,l Phase 1a {bctwL'Cn 1958-1976)

6.6 lrifonnation Systems Development and Practice under the State-Control Model
with Open Economic Policies: Phase I h (between 1977-1993)

180

6.6.1 Wang Computerised System for Management Accountability: Episode 4

181
I 95

6.6. J.l Rcflcction on Episode 4
6. 7 Preventive Maintenance System for Management Accountability: Episode 5

200

6. 7.1 Reflection ,m Episode 5

209

6.8 Reflection on State Control with Open Economic Policies Phase 1b
(between 1977-199))

213

6.9 Preparation for Privatisation

;: 214

6.9.1 Privatisation ofNWCL

215

6.10 Information Systems Development and Practice after Privatisation: Phase 2a
(betweenl994-1996)

217

6.10. l Refledion on Y awakknl Management at NWCL

220

6.10.2 Computerised Time and Attendance System after Privatisation ofNWCL:

Episode 6

221

6.10.2.1 Reflection on Episode 6

228

6.11 Information Systems Development and Practice after Privatisation: Phase 2b
(between 1996-2000)

232

6.11. J Cement Competition in Sri Lanka in the late 1990s

234

6.11.2 Restructuring ofNWCL

236

6.11.2.1 Organisation ofWork

236

6.11.2.2 Vision and Objectives

237

6.11.2.3 Budget and Cost Centres

'I

238
,_, 240

6.11.2.4 Retrenchment Policy
6.11.2.5 Management Techniques

241

6. \ J.2.S. J Dialogue

241

6.11.2.6 Management-Employee Relationships
6.11.2.6.1 Green Area Meetings

244

247

6.11.3 Organising of Information Technology Function

249

6.11.4 Implementation of Computerised Time and Attendance System

250

-xii·

),1

Thesis C.011/ents

PhD Thesis

6.11.4.1 New Work Shift-f'lan in Computerised Time and Attendllf!ee Information
251

Sys\cms: Episode 7
6.11.4.1.1 Reflection on Episotle 7

256

6.11.5 MAC System for Factory Maintenance

259

6.1 \ .6 Computerisetl Work-Ortlcr Information Systems for Factory Maintenance:
Episode 8

-~, 262

6.11.6. \ Reflection on Episotlc 8
6.11.7 Management Information for Factory Control: Episode 9

)

266
270
274

,.. --6.11.7. J Reflection on Epis1Jdc 9
6.1 i.8 Outsourcing Information Systems; Episode JO·

276

286

... 6.11.8.1 Reflection on Episode 10

291

6.12 Conclusion

CHAPTER SEVEN
RESEARCH FINDINGS, THEORISATION AND CONCLUSION
294

7.0 Introduction
7. I Major Findings from NWCL Case Analysis

294

7.2 Theorising Information Systems Development from Co1"!lm_v.;iicative Actions 296
7.2.J Fallacy of Scientific Neutrality of Positivist Approach

297

7 .2.2 Communicative Action antl Tacit Knowledge

302

7.2.3 Tacit Knowledge antl Lifeworlds

303

7.2.4 Communicative Action, Tacit Knowletlgc and Social Context in Sri Lanka

304

7.2.4.1 Tacit Knowing

305

7.2.5 Lifcworlds, Systems and Information Systems Development

310

7.2.6 Human Development, Communicative Action, and Information Systems
Development

311

7 .2.7 Communicative Action and Innovation of Information Systems

317

7.2.7.1 Innovation through Reflective Learning

318

7.3 Problems and Limitations of Applying Communkative Action

l21

7.3.1 Cultural Problems

321

7.3.2 Economic Problems

326
-xiii-

The.ris Conl.,nls

PhD Thesis

327

7.3 .3 Power as Extcmal Forec
l Other Variants ui· Power
7.3,J.
·,

328

7.3.3.1 Education-Prnbl ems

331

7.3.4 Linguistic Problems

333 \

7 .4 Conclusion

335

7.4. ! Rccommcn<latiuns for Successful Information Systems Development and
Practice

335

7.4.2 Conclusion about Research Questions: lmplication for Informati~n Systems

Research

339

7.4.3 Overall Conclusion

344

7.4.4 Futu, c RcseMch Opportunities

347

REf'ERENCES

349

·'.> :·,'

·. · (/\\-:-1
,.,.··
!J

,:i)
']

-xiv-

Table of Figures

PhD Tksi.<

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1:

The Validity Claims ofCommupJcativc Action
(after Habcnnas, 1984) (Adap.,~·~ from Mingcr.i, I 995, p. 298).

Figure 2:

Systematically Distorted Communication (Adopted from
Habennas, 1984, p.333).

Figure 3:

78

83

Habennas' s Theory of Societal Deve \opment through
Communicative Interaction (Adopted from Pusey, 1987).

,,'
i'f

!!

- XV•

85

List of Abhr<'l'/tlllons

PhD Th,•.,is

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
I. State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
2. Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
3. Vice President (VP)
4. North-West Cement Company Limited (NWCL)
5. Tokyo Cement (TC)
6. Mahavali Marine Cement (MMC)
7. Maintenance of Cement (MAC)
8. Data Base Management Systems (DBMS)
9. Computerised Time and Attendance Information Systems (CTAIS)
10. Computerised Preventive Maintenance Information Systems (CPMIS)
1 l. Computerised Work-Order Infonuation System (CWOIS)
12. Integrated Information Systems (US)

· xvi-

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.0 Introduction
Human actions based on misinterprc!ation and misguided perceptions of what is "right"
for a group of geographically, socially or politically connected people, are part of the
core study ofmy work. An exploration of the symbolic structures and tbemes, coupled
with interpretative research aimed al realising the potential of improving mutual
communication and influence, through the political activities and interests in the Sri
Lankan context, are integral factors in this discourse.

I attempt to investigate the balance between individual and collective interests, and how
the application of instrumental and strategic actions can detriment, or compliment,
communication, meaning and purposes of socio-cultural, economic, and political
contexts in which the chosen information systems function.

Jn this chapter, beginning with a description of some of the key terms, I give an
overview of this work by reflecting on research conducted by Williams and Gunatunge
(1999a). Following is an explanation of the overall statement of the research problem
with description of the specific research. A description of the significance of the
research is provided, followed by an explanation of the objectives of the study and a
structural outline of the thesis.

2.0 Definitions of Key Terms
The following operational definitions ofkey tenns are used throughout this work.

l. Information Technology

'
The term "infonnation technology" in this research refers to the computer-based
technology used for acquisition, processing, storage and retrieval, presentation and
dissemination uf information, and includes computers, telecommunication and digital
electronic technologies.

2. Information Systems

The term "infonnation systems" is used to describe all different sorts of infonnation

systems from payroll to group-decision support sy:,~s (Lyytincn, 1992, p. 160).
Information systems in this study is defined as "a computer-based organisational
information systems, which provides information support for management activities

andfimctions" (Ives, Hrunilton & Davis, 1980).

Infonnation support broadly includes infonnation storage, transmission, manipulation

and deliveiy of symbolic representations that are relevant to, or shape, organisational
action. Management activities and functions are assumed to apply to all organisational
participants whether or not they are called managers. The focus and problem
formulations of infonnrition systems are generally associated with the idea of
technological change in infonnation systems and generic problems of information
processing (Lyytinen, 1992, p.160).

3, Information Systems Develo!}mcnt

3

Information systems llcvclopmcnl is a .1·ocial actfrity that operates within social

contexts as a social procl.'ss (Newman & Robey, 1992; Hirschheim, Klein & Newman,
1991; Hirschhcim & Newman, 1991) of shafCIJ learning. Social contcxt includes

organisation, {ifewor/ds, nnd economic and political contexts of a country.

The information system can be either an in-house developed system or an out-sourced
information system. An in-house developed system is one that has been developed by

staff employees within the organisation. An out-sourced information syst~m is one that
moderates its systems features to suit the information requirement of the organisation is
also considered as a social actil'ity that operates within the social contexts as a social

process. Within this interpret3tion 'lifeworlds' is defined as the world of consciousness
and humanly created meaning. In '\ifoworlds' conte:ii:ts, people create and attach their
own meanings (self-understanding) to the world around them and to the behaviour they
manifested in that world (Habermas, 1987b, 1979).

4, Social Process

\:,
The social process of information systems de•,~!opment consists of certain kinds of
activities that go into information systems solutions to solve organisational problems.
These activities consist of effective deign, delivery, and usage of information systems in
organisations and society (Keen, 1980, p.10). !n this social process the goals, strategies,
policies, methods, procedures, resources, norms, motives, and values of infonnation
systems and development activities need to be openly discussed by al! the participants.
This occurs through communicative interacti011, which is genuinely oriented to reaching
an understanding as a process of shared learning in a distortion free group discussion.

4

5. Participants

The participants of information systems <lcvclopment arc considered as intelligent

social or organisatio1wl actors who critically assess whatever infonnation they receive
through the communicalive actions in the activities of the information systems
development process. These participants can include a person or 1,>Toup of persons
(stakeholders) (e.g. politicians, managers, employees, customers, community members'

etc.) who directly or indirectly may have communicative interests in the infonnation
systems development process and the outcome of information systems projects.

The discussion of information systems development activities is oriented towards the

critical reflection by each participant about the inter-subjectively and shared knowledge
of the activities of information systems development process. Jn this self-reflection,
participants draw meanings from the '!ifcworlds' as cnntexts for their commw1icalil'e

actions and communicative interactions. The emergent information systems solution ns
n result of this interaction is defined as the communicative rationality of information
systems development. This commrmicative rationality is based on the communicative

interests of all the participants, thnt would lead to success of information systems
solutions for organisational problems, otherwise failure of both information systems
development and information system use would result.

6. Tcclmlcism

Technicism is an over-emphasis on teclmica/, in~rrumental or strategic techniques or

actio1is to the detriment of wider human communication, human values or human
purpose (Adorno & Horkhcimcr, 1990; Dryzck, 1990; Ellul, 1990; Habcrmas, 1987c;
Mnrcuse, 1969,1964). Persons thinking in tcclmicist ways wo.:!d tend to define all
human problems in terms of rational and technical solutions, thus leading to an undue
emphasis on the science. In more general contcxL~. this way of thinking is referred to as
an insln1men/a/ rationality (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1990; Dryzek, 1990) or a strategic

rotionaltty (Habennas, 1987c). It can also be referred to as technocratic consciousness
or technocratic rationality (Habennas, 1987b, 1987c).

In this context technology encapsulates a form of making and conlrol!ing as well as the
mechanics used in these processes (Habennas, 1987b, 1984). Scientism means
knowledge defined by what the sciences do in the methodological analysis of scientific
procedures an institutionalised form of reasoning, and pr1rposive rationality, rationality
with regard to purposes or ends (Habcrmas, 1987b, 1984). Instrumental and strategic
actions are two basic instances of a more general action type, which Habermas calls
purposive-rational.

7. Purposive Rational Actions

Purposive-rational action is action directed at attaining only rationally detennined
objectives. Here the actors, or participants, attempt to achieve measurable objectives,
and measure the success of their actions by how they achieve, or nearly achieve, their
objectives and how efficient were the

means deployed. Purposive rational action

applies technical rules that have satisfied some empirical test of the efficiency and
effectiveness of the means (Lyytinen, 1992).

6

8, Communicative Rationalities

Habermas (J 987b, 1987c) provides a useful categorisation of instrumental, slratcgic and
communicative rationalisations, which can be listed as:
(1) Instrumental rationality - a technical or instrumental knowledge used to control

nature
(2) Strategic rationality - the inappropriate use of instrumental rationality in social

situations by persons or groups to control others by manipulation, coercfon,
propaganda, threat or by raw power
(3) Communicative rationality - a self-reflexive, inter-subjective and consensual
apnroach /o obtaining what is true or just or free, based on freedom from both inner
an~ external coercion or unjust authority. Communicative rationality is ori~(~ to

,,

\\

inter-subjective understanding and the achievement of true consensus through fr~~.

\\

open dialogue with honesty and respect shown by all participants in communicatil

~--

interaction.

Habennas's (1987b, 1987c, 1984) use of the tenn, communicative rationality is a
mindset or way of thinking that is most clearly demonstrated in language and 'Selfreflection, especially of an ethical or moral character. There is a common concern with
justice for all participants involve in the communicative interaction and freedom from
internalised or outer coercion or unjust authority.

9. Communicative Actions

7

Habcrrnns ( 1987b, 1987c, and !984) categorises human action in the following ways:
(I) Instrumental action as a human activity oriented towards success or control over

objects in nature, mainly for the technical interest. It stems from instrumental

rationality
(2) Strategic action as a human activity or interaction oriented to instrumental success,
control or domination over other people by manipulation, coercion, propaganda,
threat or raw power, mainly for the technical interest. It springs from strategic

rationality
(3) Communicative action as a human activity oriented to reaching an understanding in

an. inter-suajcctivity

shared communicative interaction, mainly for the practical and

emancipatory interest. lt emanates fonn communicative rationality.

10. Human Knowledge Interests

Habennas 1987b, 1984; Outhwaite, 1987; Pusey, 1987) categorise human interests as:

(I) Technical human interest seeking technical or instrumental knowledge of human
actions for controlling the nature using the knowledge generated by empirical
natural sciences. It is mainly manifested in work.
(2) Practical human interest aims to gain practical knowledge whkh is oriented towards
henncneutic or historical understanding of human actions from the meaning
ascribed by social actors. It is manifested in language
(3) Emancipatory interest, which is mainly manifested in self-reflection and self-

understanding of human actions. It concerns with the emancipation from intemali~cd or
outer coercion or unjust authority. lt orients towards truth, freedom and justice of
human existence. The self-understanding means a person or group's own interpretation
of its motives, norms, and goals (Habermas, 1987a, p. viii).

"
3.0 Overvlew•Reffcction on n Study

I use a r~'Search paper (Williams & Gunatunge, 1999a) presented nt the 4th Global

Alliance for Transnational Education conference held at Melbourne in Australia in I 999
and subsequently published in Higher Education in Europe (Vol. XXV, Number 3,

2000b) to txpound the background of this research study.

I perceived a dominating technicism or instrumental actions in the information systems
development process when the Head of a School of Management in a university in Sri

Lanka attempted to design a database system for recording students' personal data. The

aim of the database development, as explained by the Head of the School, was to
respond rapidly to students' queries and to better control of students within the
university. The attempt failed because students did not support the Head of the School
in the requirement identification stage of the development

The students interpreted the database as an instrument through which the school
endeavoured to control their behaviour within the university. They resisted this control
of their behaviour by the government's effort to privatise universities with the support
of the World Bank. For example, students argued that the school attempted to introduce
recent educational reforms of the government through the database. They suspected that
the recorded information in the database system would be directed to the authorities in
the government and that the government would seize their benefits (Williams &
Gunatunge, 1999a).

The database development project failed due to

an overly technical approach taken by

the Head of the school He considered students as passive objects who could be
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controlled through the database design to achit:vc his rational objectives. Habermas
(1987n, p. 57) u~es the term "technology" to mean situations like this sci<.'fltifically
rationalised control of objectified processes. From a Jungian perspective, Scgaller &
Bergman (1989) assert that: "life is very widely dominated still by the belief that
rational solutions exist for all problems, and that problems which don't respond to
reason cannot be real" (p. 38). This is a facet oftechnicism taken up by Bowers (1988)
" when he asserts that persons influenced by technicism: "view al! aspects of human
experience in terms of problems that require technical solutions" (p. 8).

The result of a technicist way of thinking is a naive faith that science and technology
can solve all problems, opening the way to utopia. Persons under the influence of
technicism come to an over-emphasis on technique and a naive trust in the science and
technology of modernism - to the detriment of human values, and human purptlse, and
meaningful communication (E\lul, 1990).

The Head of the School over emphasised the application of instrumental and strategic
actions to the detriment of communication concerning meaning or purpose or sociocultural, economic, and political contexts in which the information systems
development process was embedded. There was neither significant dialogue nor open
communication with the students in regard to the database design. There was no
opportunity for students to self-reflectively understand the objectives of the database
design. Moreover, no alternative perspectives and approaches were considered in the
development process.

The Head of the School did not examine the social context of students' .social

behaviour. He did not understand that the social behaviour is determined as a result of

JO

the interaction between the students' and the context that they draw meaning for their
social actions. In other words, he did not examine the subject mater of the database
design, the students' 'lifeworlds' or other contexts within which communication

functions. For example, the Head of the School did not examine, why and how students
interpreted database design as an instrument to control their social behaviour within

university.

Students opposed the database design, drawing meanings rrl~inly from broader social

contexts such as:
(I} Their poor living conditions within the university (the majority of students who

come from poor families receive government bursaries, although !he amount is not
. . sufficient to balance their day to day living expenses)
(2)/I'he government's attempt (through recent educational reforms) to run the university
'~s a market place treating students as commodities in that market
(3) Withdrawal of freedom to freely exchange their views with university
administration.

A narrow technical interest in database design was concerned with the efficient
techniques and methods used in the development process to achieve predetermined and
rigidly set goals of the Head of the School, to control and to dominate ~tudents'
behaviour within the

university. The instrumental rationality, unbalanced by

communicative rationality, dominated in the database design attempt in the human
capacity for reasoned thought and action. Cor.scquently, economicaliy rationalistic
attitudes and managed instrumental rationality surfaced in the actions of the Head of the
school as he attempted to dominate students' 'lifeworlds' through the database design
(Williams & Gunatunge, 1999a, 2000b).

JI

1bis database example illustrates the need for the focus of this research; a quest for a
better model that could improve infonnation systems development and use practice in

organisations, particularly in Sri Lanka. Habermas' s ( l 987a) thesis ... "how can the
power of technical control be brought within the range of the consensus of acting and
transacting citizens?" (p. 57) stimulated me to start my research with the implicit
supposition, that "information systems development should be considered as a social
activity of shared learning by the participants". Therefore, I reviewed the literature to

look for approaches alternative to the existing technical approach.

Readings of Myers (1997), Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), and Chua (1986) helped me
to find out usefui schema for categorising research approaches to information systems
development and practice in organisations. Their main categories arc the positivist
approach, the interpretative approach and the critical social theory approach.

On further reading of such authors as Avision, Wood-Harper, Vidgcn & Wood, 1998,
Myers & young, 1997, Wilson, 1997, Hirschheim, Klein & Lyytincn, 1996; K,lc,in &
Hirschheim, 1996; Walsham, 1995; Walshmn, 1993; NgWenyama, 1991; Hirschheim &
Klein, 19119; Habcnnas. 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1984, 1979, 1975, 1973; Lyytine~1_;.&
Klein, 1985; Klein & Lyytincn, 1985), I realised fuat fue positivist approach (technical
approach) can be flawed when using overly narrow technical interests based on
instrumental and strategic rationalisations.

Drawing rules of Jaw for social sciences from the natural-science model, positivistic
infonnatioo systems development approaches have shown to be repeatedly flawed in
their application to the infonnation systems development within the contexts of
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'lifoworlds' in orgar.l~ations (Avision et al., 1998; Wilson, 1997; Myers & Young,

1997; Nb>wcnyamn ;~ I.cc, l 997).

In my jOumcy of searching for a better model for information systems development, I
perceived that many systems development projects were abandoned, or failed, due to
little or no communication with the social actors or participants. There was a failure to
achieve consensus due to misunderstandings or mistrust about the development process
(see Williams & Gunatungc, 2000b, !999a; Klein & Hirschheim, 1991, 1989; Lyytinen

& Hirschheim, 1987). For example, Gibbons (1987, p. I) states that "the concepts
present in the language of the positivist research philosophy cannot reflect the everyday
\a.,guage usage of the study partir.ipants, as these arc considered too ambiguous and
subjective. l realised that irreducible values underpin the 'lifowor\ds' contexts within

,,'

which social practice of information systems development functions. The understanding
of social reality in social actions requires understanding of bow practice and meanings
are fonned and informed by the language and tacit norms shared by humans workirlg
towards some shared goals (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991 ).

Recognising the limitations of the strict application of the natural science model to
information systems development, I further examined the interpretivist research

' Klein &
perspective as an alternative approach to the positivist research tradition (See
Myers, 1999; Myers, 1994; Walshnm, 1993; Orlikowski, 1993; Orlikowski & Buroudi,
1991; Chua, 1986).

The interpretative tradition explicitly addresses information

systems development issues in the contexts of 'lifeworlds' so as to come into a mutual

(r'

understanding, a shared consciousness among actors in human communication.

I

IJ

.,1,

The aim of the intetllretntivc research is to firstly understand how members of II social
group, through their participation in social processes, enact their particular realities and

endow them with meaning. Secondly, to show how,"- these m'!anings, belief~ ,111d
intentions ofthe members help to constitute their socia1,·action (Orlikow5ki & Baroudi,

1991). The interpretative perspective attempts ,:io understand the inter-subjective
meanings embedded in social life ... to ex'plain
,, why people act the way they do"
(Gibbons, 1987, p. 3). The understanding of ..:--0mmunicative acts are enhanced by

interpreting the meanings of actior.s.

•.
'-'-,

"'<·--~

\:,....

.,

However, the interpretative approach does not· address the -i~~l!CS that underpin

'\

distortions in understanding and communicative interactions arising &o):,:

\\

'

I. Socio-politico-economic forces which are often external and whi~h giveft~se to
\~..)/
.

-

certain meanings and experiences

2. .'Jnintended consequences of actions which shape social reality

3. Structural conflicts within society and organisations.

4.

II

Historical construction of social reality in organisations. (Fay, 1l~~7.-cp. 92). The
,_.,

interpretative approach does not address the question: "how can human actors free
themselves

from

understandings

arising

from

distorted

communicative

interactions?"

After reading critiea\ so,,;ial theory literature, I decided to employ Habermas's theory of
communicative action to research information systems development and practice by
organisations for the following reasons.

I°'., Ha berm.. as' s thinking is considered to have more relevance and impact on the
\'
\I,,. information systems discipline than any other criticill school of social theory
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(Ngwenynma & Lee, I 997). The theory is a powerful framework to understand
information ~ystems dcvc\opmcnl and prnclicc as a social activity and process

(Newman & Robey, l 992; Hirschheim & Newman, 1991 ). Habcrmas's theory has a
broad and encompassing nature, which makes it seem capable of subsuming most
other social theories within itsclf{Lyytincn & Hirschhcim, 1988).

2. Hnbennas's model enrib!es an understanding of how technical systems, such as
management information systems (MIS), tend to dominate the prominent social
systems. Habennas argues for a need for exposure to both concepts and their

• interrelatioru;hip, in any given context. (Laughlin, 1987).

3.

Habennas's model provi,des a detailed process, different dimensions, human
[subjective world], social [inter subjilctively shared world] and technical [objective
world], which are all interrelated. These allow not only an understanding about the
nature and interaction of social, human, and technical systems but also the
possibility to engender change and development in these systems (Laughlin, 1987).

4. Habennas's model enables a theoretical and practical understanding of the
appropriateness of particular changes, such as privatisation

policies

on

organisations and information systems within a broader spectrum of societal
development (Broadbent, Laughlin & Reed, 1991; Laughlin, 1987).

5. Habermas's model has an openness with which critical appraisal can be undertaken.
As Giddens (1982, p. 332) points outs "enlightenment is not joke" implying that the
enlir.htenment project of transferring the world to be more just and democratic is
not to be laughed at. Broadbent et al. (1991) asserts that modem world could

"
become more calightcncd with llabcrrnas's thinking of societal development [than

any other critical soc.:ia! theory perspective).

Habcrrnas's ( 1987b, 1984) theory of communicative :ictions is concerned with values,

meaning or purpose that makes more conscious and explicit the process whereby

relevant personal beliefs, personal concepts and ideas, metaphors, feelings, emotions,
personal values and goals are openly communicated in a process of information systems
development in organisations. Thus, it is part of the self-reflective process by which
social actors come to understand each otl,er's actions and interactions as a process of

shared learning.

.

,-,_ .,.

4,0 Statement of the Research Problem

In developing countries, one broad but important phenomenon that needs to be
investigated is the interaction between development policies of governments and
infonnation systems development practice in organisations. Sri Lanka, as a developing
country, gained independence in 1948. Until 1977, Sri Lanka followed state-controlled
policies and approaches for industrialisation based on public ownership. State owned
enterprises (SOEs) were introduced as major development programs following the
industrialisation policies of the government (see chapter four). Infonnation systems
were introduced as steering medin (techniques and strategies) in some SOEs for
improving efficiency and effectiveness. These infonnation systems had tremendous
impact on socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' in these organisations.

!n 1977, Sri Lanka opened its frontiers allowing neo-clnssical development policies to
be operated. Neo-classica! policies have provided market-driven approaches such as
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privatisation of S'OEs and economic libcralfaation (Colombagc, 199.1; Knrunatillcke,

1993). The primary objective of such libcralisc<l approaches was to introduce
i.:0mpctit1on in the hopt: of reducing cost and improving the productivity of

organisations (Kc\cgama, 1993), and accelerating economic development towards

improving the living conditions of people (Rondinceli, 1993).

These approacbes have had profound effects on both processes and structures in
organisations in thl!se countries. For instance, when SOEs in developing countries are

privatised, organisations usually have to introduce new business visions, objectives,
strategies, policies, structures, decision making processes, and management control
systems (Wickramasinghe, 1993).

Computerised infonnation systems (computerised infonnation systems) are some times
introduced as steering media to direct these organisations (Myers & Young, 1997;
Broadbent et al., 1991). These newly developed infonnation systems can become one
of key instruments by which senior management can achieve the desired objectives of
the government's reforms. Such situations can be complicated particularly, due to the
culturally and socially s.pecific imperatives in these countries (Myers & Young, 1997;
Kelegama, 1993; Broadbent et al., 1991). These provide rich contexts for infonnation
systems development research in organisations in Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka is considered as a low-income economy (World Bank, 1990; IMF, 2000). In
this country, policy makers have introduced market oriented development approaches
in 1977. Sri Lanka was expected to gain newly industrial county status in the year 2000
(lndraratne, 1993). One of the striking policy measures embraced by recent government
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induced reforms is increased privatisation programmes. Al the end of 1998 about 60

SO Es have been privatised with the agenda to increase ctlicicncy and effectiveness.

It is reported that many of these privatised compw,ics in Sri Lanka are equipped with
newly introduced information systems to help them cope with competitive markets
(Samarnnayake, 1999, 1989). These systems have been developed following Western
prescriptions and are considered to be technical and rationalistic follwing a Western
thought and mindset (Avgerou, 1996; Kirlidog, !996). These information systems

could be at odds with the organisational and the socio-cultural reality of Sri Lanka. As a
result, a number of organisations have realised that these systems need to be considered
within broader organisational, social, cultural, economic contexts that reflect the
specific characteristics of Sri Lanka (Gray, 1991).

Case studies in infonnation systems development in Sri Lankan organisations could
help lo throw light on the issues of broader organisational, social, cultural, and
economic contexts. Therefore, the proposed study is based on five fundamental
research questions.

4.1 Research Questions

Based on a single in-depth case study ofa Sri Lankan organisation:

I. What impact did the state control policies have on information systems
development and prncticc in the organisational socio-cultural 'lifeworlds?'
2, What impact did the neo-classical economic policies have on information systems
development and practice in the organisational socio-cultural 'lifeworlds?'

'"
3. What approaches did the management take into consideration

WhL'11

developing and

implementing infonna!ion systems in the organisation?

4. How much were cultural, social, economic, and organisational contexts taken into
con~ideration by the management in infonnation systems development and practice

in the organisation and why?
5. How did such finr!ings contribute to the theory and practice of iilformation systems
development?

4.2 Limitations o£the Study
The first limitation of this thesis is the time frame studied. Though I examined
infOrmation systems development and practice within an historical context, data

description and analysis was carried on after 1958 and due to the (NCCL's) long
history, it was unable to trncc back data prior to the l95B.

The second !imitation of this thesis pertains to the information gathered through the indepth interviews with the participants {see section 5.3.2 of chapter five for the number
and the type of participants interviewed) of a privatised industri."a! organisation (NCCL).
:[

The historical construction of the data gathered rest on the int~~ty and knowledge of
II
I\
the interviewed participants.
'\\

··,·,,,,.,

The third limitation of this thesis involves a lack of focus on freeing and changing the
social attitudes of participants.

The use of Habermas's communicative actions in

research involves not only to reveal empirical evidence and interpretive understanding
of information systems development and practice but also to free social actors who arc
constrained. This involves revealing constraints, thereby motivating participants to
engage in conscious political actions in systems development. Moreover, it involves

I

"
liberation of repressed seeking through dialogue to make social participants aware of
oppressive structures. It also involves changini.; social attitudes of participants to make

, them awafe of the problems of the current practices. Time and distance cunstrnincd in
engaging in such a critical study. However, [ engaged in critical discussions with
managers and other employees. I made them aware the present problems and reasons for

/I

failures of information systems development and practice at NCCL.

The fourth possible [imitation is related to the participants interviewed. This study is an

in-depth in the subsidiary (NCCL) based on data produced by internal participants of
NCCL and few out side participants (sec section 5.3.2) for soci0-cu!ture, economic and

political contexts, government involvement, single owner and the multinational
Company. Key owners of Goldembank located in the Company head quarters,
customers, suppliers and competitors were not interviewed.

The fifth limitation of this thesis is that it was conducted using national socio-culture as
wtique phenomenon throughout the history of Sri Lanka. However, the study casts
doubt upon the notion of cultures being a national concept. For example, Sri Lanka had
been ruled by foreign dominations over five and half centuries (see section 4.3 of
chapter four). The impact of this foreign language, religion, arts, administtation,
technology was to have a tremendous impacts on changing socio-cultural attitudes of Sri
Lankans. Had this study been focused and conducted on ethnic and religious basis, then
the results would have been different. A more detailed study focusing on language,
religion, and ethnicity within original communities may well have revealed segments of
socio-cultural values, economic and political contexts between families, political
groupings which might have impacted on the modem Western cultural values, rather
than the reverse,
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The sixth limitation is that the whole research, its findings, conclusions and
recommendations arc based solely on a Sri Lanknn context even though parallel
d\\cussions arc developed and analysed (sec chapter four) within the contexL~ of
developing countries.

5.0 Significance of the Study

,,,
The present study is relevant to both developed and developing countries alike as they

introduce market oriented economic reforms into SOEs (Evaristo, 1998; Myers &
Young, 1997; Broadbent et al., 1991). The then government of Sri Lanka introduced
liberalised economic reforms in 1977. These economic reforms have resulted in
significant expansion of the private sector, a reshaping of hierarchical structures, and
transition ofSOEs to the private sector.

One fundamental but important phenomenon in this transition is the change of
ownership, which frequently leads to a change of infonnation systems. Onl'. of the
problems in the change process is the need to face a competitive environment
incompatible with the older socio-culture of the organisation (Evaristo, 1998).
Therefore, how change of ownership impacts on change of information systems
development provides a fruitful context for empirical investigation. In order to fully
understand the current practice of information systems development in organisations in
Sri Lanka, this study investigated the changes resulting from the introduction of
information systems that occurred before and after privatisation of a state owned
industrial enterprise; namely, NCCL in Sri Lanka.

"
The intentions and actions of key participants in systems development processes were
examined to understand their impact on the development and practice of infonnation

systems. The social context into which policies were being imp!cmcntcd, and the
change processes enacted within wider contcxt.'l, has also been investigated. A critical
social theory, particularly works of Habcnnas communicative actions. has been used as
the major theoretical framework of this study.

Infonnation systems development has been studied within a social setting using critical
social theory by various researchers at organisational level in developed countries but

no! in developing countries (see section 2.5.3). Sri Lanka as a dctJcloping country
prO\·ides rich contexts for infonnation systems research (sec chapter four).

The

literature on the Hahermas's critical social theory in infonnation systems, thounh
growing in quantity and depth, has mainly adopted critical theory as it is 'received' in
the philosophical literature (Lyytincne, 1992). Moreover, many of works an::
fragmentary (Lee, 1990; Ehn, 1988; Flensburg, 1985). Most research studies in the
infonnation systems field use critical theory in a rather mechanistic way by reiterating
the key atguments of Habcnnas's thinking (e.g. Lyytinen & Hir:schl1cim, 1988;
Lyytinen & Klein, 1985). Jn these studies, authors often merely offer Hebennas's
actions· typology/human interests to organise and evaluate research in infonnation
systems.

While these researches can be illuminating, they fail to look at infonnation systems
development issues in their totality. These studies often ignore the exploration of
concrete situation; in real world problems and studying how infonnation systems
actually function within a broad social context of a country.

"
Only n few studies have focused on how broader social issues, ~uch as privatisation
policies, intlucncc informntiun systems dcvclopmcrt (sec for example, Myers &
Young, !997). Even in this study, authors did not study infom1ation systems
development within a historical framework. Ck:ncrally, Haberrnas's concerns about
societal development within a broader socio-economic and political context, have been

partially neglected by information systems researchers both in developed and
developing countries.

Focusing on organisational and information technology contexts alone fails to
acknowledge the degree to which information systems development plays a role in
social transformation in organisations. For example, how different social settings
engenders certain kinds of government policies such as privatisation and how and why
these changes in tum reinforce or transform structural configurations over time bas
scarcely been examined in the literature. In other words, research studies have largely

failed to locate information systems dovclopment within broader socio-cultural,
economic, and political contexts of the country within which it is embedded.

For example, in critical theory, the understanding of tho society must embrace the
totality of objective and subjective worlds before analysing elements of organisations
(Murray & Ozenne, 1991; Held, 1980; Burroll & Morgan, 1979). One curront hindrance
in making critical theory a more credible research area is the lack of empirical studies
that emphasisos the societal totality (Lyytinen, 1992). The emphasis of totality in
research emerges from the idea that facts can not be scparatod from values in the
process of social development. Therefore, the presont research has si!,'llificant
implications for information systems research and it addresses this lacuna hy examining

it in a Sri Lankan context for information systems development. The study examines

2)

real-world L'J}isodes to gain an understanding about real-world i~sues in relation to

information ~ystcms development in developing countries such as in Sri Lanka.

6.0 Objectives of the Study

,,,,;:
Information systems development in most organisations in Sri Lfjnka lacks a llieoiy,
which guides information systems teve!opment practice. Systems professionals and
management still follow the positivist approach in information systems development

'

i.:(Williams & Gunatunge, 1999a, 2C00a, 2000b; Gunatungc & Williams, 2000). This
po:~itivist approach to systems development is often inconsistent with the social rnd

organisational reality (sl-e Tinker & Yuthas, 1994). lhey do not take into consideration
broader social, cultural, economic, and political aspects of a country within which
information systems development is entrenched. As a result, many efforts to transfonn
organisations through infonnation systems development, not only in developing
countries but also developed ones, have failed (Williams & Gunatunge, 2000a, 200Gb,
1999a; Gunatunge & Williams, 2000).

, Organisations in Sri Lanka have experienced massive failures in information systems
.development and implementations. However, there appears to be no declared
commitment to address these issues in an empirical research. Therefore, there exists a
wide knowledge gap in the literature between the desired and existing states of
information systems research. The present research study is built on the above
consideration by using Habermas's critical social theory. It aims (o reveal empirical
and interpretative understanding of infonnation systems development and practice at
NCCL in Sri Lanka. More specifically the objectives of the study are:
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I. To understand the approaches llst:d by organisations in Sri Lanka for information
systems development.
2. To understand how these approaches contradict with organisational, socio-cultural,

economic, and political realities of organisMions in Sri Lanka.
3. To provide a theory to understand information systems deve!opment for

organisations in Sri Lanka.
4. To mnke recommendations for successful information systems development an~.
practice in organisations in Sri Lanka.

7.0 Organisation

or Cha piers

In this chapter, definitions for key terms used in this research have been given. An
overview is provided reflecting on a failure of the data base system development in a

University in Sri Lanka. Reflection on this research compelled me to investigate
alternative approaches to information systems development in organisations.

Chapter two provides an in-depth examination of three approaches to information
systems development practice using the framework of Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991).
Orlikowski's & Baroudi's (1991) three approaches arc the positivist, the interpretative,
and the critical social theory. Recognising the limitations of the positivist and the
interpretative approaches, I use Habennas's critical social theory in this study to
understand infonnation systems development practice in organisations in Sri Lanka.

Chapter three describes the theoretical framework uses in this study. Critical social
theory in general and Habcrmas's theory of communicative actions in particular is

"
explained. Habcnnas's approach requires an understanding of the social phenomena

within broad socio-cultural, cconomk, aml political contexts of a country.

A critical review of sodo-culturnl, economic, ancl political contexts; the social context
of Sri Lanka, for information sy~!cms dcvdopment is provided in chapter four. An
explanation is given about how information systems development in organisations is
si.tuated within a broad social context. This requires understanding of information

systems development within a holistic framework.

Chapter five explains the research methodology used in the study. In line with the

critical social theory, I cxpbin how in-depth critical case studies provide a rich
understanding about information systems development in organisations. Jn particular, I
explain how an in-depth single case study can be used to understand the totality of
infonnation systems development and practice to generate knowledge closely related to
the research participants and how that knowledge can link theory with empirical
evidence.

Chapter six provides the case description and analysis at NCCL. The theoretical
constructs and social contexts in Sri Lanka are used to describe and provide context to
the analysis of empirical data. In line with critical social theory, the study is conducted
within historical contexts of the evolutions of institutions in Sri Lanka. Thus ten
episodes ofinfonnation systems development are examined and analysed. Reflection on
each episode is given at the end of.1,:ach episode.
(,'.

"'
Finally, chuptcr seven provides a summary of each episode. I then reflect on current
practice of information systems development at NCCL. Major research findings from

the case analysis arc discussed.

Theorisation of information systems development from the theory of communicative

actions is given incorporating literature from several disciplines. Problems regarding the
application ofHabermas's communicative actions to organisations in Sri Lanka arc then
discussed. Finally, the chapter provides recommendations for successful information
systems development in NCCL, conclusion for each research qucstil':1, and overall

conclusions of the thesis with some recommendations for future research.

1F·
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.0 Introduction

Since the pioneering work of Hirschhcim and Klein (1989), there has been increasing
interest in philosophical assumptions underlying Information systems development

approaches

(see Hirschheim, !ivaii & Kicin, 1997; Iivari & Hirschhcim, 1996;

Hirschheim, Klein & Lyytinen, 1995; Hirschheim & Klein, 1992; Orlikowski &
Baroudi, 1991; Iivari, 1991). A common finding of Hirschhcim and Klein (1989),

",,

Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991 and Iivari (1991 ), was the identification of a single set

of dominant philosophical assumptions about the nature of information systems
development and what constitutes valid knowledge about the phenomena to be
associated with information systems development and practice (livari, Hirschheim &
Klein, 1998).

In this chapter, I present a review of existing liternturc in information systems
development and practice in organisations referring to the framework outlined by
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) based on the underlying research epistemology which
guides the research. This framework is developed following Chua's (1986) works in
classifying research epistemology in the accounting field. Orlikowski and Baroudi's
(1991) research in information systems posit three perspectives:

I. The positivist approach
2. Te interpretative approach

.',i

~-------------------3. Tc critical social theory approach. This framework has been used by Myers ( 1997)
to classify qualitative research in information systems and Ngwcnyama and Lee
(1997) to study C!1mmunication richness in electronic mail.

The use of Orlikowski's and Baroudi's (1991) framework in this research will guide the
study of various assumptions about knowledge made by researchers during information
~ystems development in organisations and will facilitate understanding of the ways
such knowledge can be obtained (Hirschheim, 1992). I discuss each approach in light of
its ontology, epistemology and the relationship between theory and pmctice, together
with information systems research conducted within each perspective. The chapter is
organised as follows.

Firstly, underlying assumptions in information systems development and practice are
examined. Secondly, the positivist perspective is examined. Thirdly,

the interpretative

perspective is examined. Finally, the critical social theory approach is examined. For
each I discuss on the underlying assumptions oriented to infonnation systems
development and practice and the problems inherent in the approaches themselves.

2.1 Underlying Assumptions in Information Systems Development and Practice

2.1.1 Ontological Assumptions

Ontology is concerned with the structure and properties of "what is assumed to exist",
the basic building blocks that make up the phenomena or objects to be investigated
(Iivari et al., 1998). Ontology refers to the nature of the world around us; in particular,
that slice of reality which the researchers choose to address. Rcse~rchcrs ontologically
assume that the objective in any social science research, including the infonnation
systems filed, is to discover the underlying social realities (Orlikowski & Baroudi,
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1991 ). Such a discovery becomes the output of the research and is presumed by the
researcher prior to the discovery. The researcher has a general understanding about
what really exists in social systems and how this reality affect the status of research
outputs (livari et al., 1998; Burrell & Morgan, 1989; Chua, 1986). Such assumptions or

belief-structures arc philosophically termed "ontological assumptions". These vary
between the various theoretical frameworks.

2.1.2 Epistemology

While ontology deals with the reality of knowledge, epistemology concentrates on how

such knowledge is obtained. Generally, epistemological assumptions are concerned
with the nature of knowledge and the proper methods of inquiry (livari et al., 1998). In
other worlds, epistemology is concerned with the ways and means by which we can
obtain knowledge (Hirschheim, 1992). With the determination of the ontological
position, it is necessary to design a consistent mode of obtaining knowledge about the
assumed reality. The way in which knowledge is obtained is philosophically termed
epistemology and consists of concepts of the researchers' knowledge discovery,
research methods, and the nature of data (Orlikwski & Baroudi, 1991; Burrell &
Morgan, 1989; Chua, 1986). As in the case of ontology, epistemological positions vary
between researchers.

2.2 Positivist Approach-Underlying Assumptions in Information Systems Development
and Practice

Positivist perspectives to information systems development reflect much of empiricalanalytic research agenda bas,.rl on the views of positivi~m, with a focus in the

JO
fimctionalist paradigm of objective worldvicw of society (Hirschhcim et aL, 1995;
Orlikowski & Barou<li, 1991; Hirschhcim & Klein, 1989; Chua, 1986; Burrell &
Morgan, 1979). The term empirical-analytic refers to an organisational sriencc based
on the natural science approach, the aim of which is to "establish general laws" which
can serve
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instruments for systemntic explanation and dependable prediction (Nagel,

1979, p. 450).

2.2.1 Ontological Assumptions

Ontologically, positivist approaches to studying the social world rely on objective
views of the world. The position adopted by the positivist is realism, which postulates
that the universe is comprised of objectively given immutable, objects and structures.
These objects and structures exist as empirical entities, on their own, independent of the
observer's appreciation of them. For oxamplc, positivist information systems
researchers assume that there exists an objective physical and a social reality
independent of human and whose nature can be relatively easily understood,
characterised, and measured. Within this perspective, people arc viewed as passive
objects that can be studied using the laws of natural science (Negwenyama & Lee,
1997;Chua, 1986, p. 604).

This approach assumes that organisations have structures beyond the reality of the
actions of who make lhe reality. Therefore, the role of researcher is to discover this
objective and social reality that exists external to the creators of such reality, who have
a passive role in the phenomena being investigated {Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991;
Orlikowski, 1991; Chua, 1986; Mingers, 1980; Bourrell & Morgan, 1979).

3l

2.2.2 Epistemologic11I AsSl1mptlons

Epistemological!y, the positivist approach is based on reductionism, It is concerned
with the empirical testability ofthcorie~ to be verified or falsified through the logic of

hypothetical-deductive reasoning of the phenomena being investigated.

Methodologically, research methods such as !argc-sca!c sample surveys and laboratory
experiments and sometimes descriptive case studies (whose purpose is to formulate
hypotheses) are used for the gathering of valid empirical evidence. It is assumed that
valid knowledge can be obtained following these methodologies. Dm'a analysis is
preceded referring to inferential statistics whose objective is to discover causal laws.
The result of the analysis is used as true knowledge (considered as rational knowledge)
for the explanation of the behaviour of human affairs of the world.

Accordingly, prediction and control of physical and social reality can be made from the
Research results of {Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Orlikowski, 1991; Chua, 1986).
The assumption is that scientism and its nomothetie (reference In laws or nlies that

pertain lo the general case, rather than the individual) belief in the scientific methods
arc necessary and sufficient for discovering the truth (lntrona & Whitley, 1997;
Feyerabend, 1993).

Positivists often claim the positivist approach is the only form of valid knowledge and
the only rational knowledge. In the last century, rationality and reason came to be
identified with scientific knowledge and understanding. This empiricist-analytic form
explicitly rejects value-judgements in the interest of objectivity. It is assumed ends are
value free and limited it to technical questions; value questions become detached from

scientific thinking (Habcnna.~, l987b, 1984). If practical questions concerning nonns,
values, and objectives urisc they arc considered as irrational and eail not be resolved
scicntificolly and that rcsenrchcrs should not get involved in moral judgements. For
example, DeMarco ( 1979) writes,

"political problems aren't going to be solved. The

most we can hope for is to limit the effect of disruption due to politics" (p. 13).

Posithist researchers strive to be fully independent from the actual situation of the
study. Moreover, it is a widely held belief that researchers can objectively evaluate
social actions or social processes. Attempts to deal with practical problems (or
conflicts) in research often in some arbitrary methods such as using strategies (as
means) in the fonn of appropriate controlling systems to achieve desired goals in the
most efficient manner (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Chua, 1986, p. 611; Mingers,
1980, p. 42).

2.3 Information Systems Development Research within Positivist Approach

Initially, systems development methods were concerned with mainly technical issues of
the systems development process, programming, design, and the detailed analysis of
data and functions to be handled by the technical system (Reijswoud, Mulder & Dietz,
1999; Doherty & King, 1998; Wilson, 1997; Avgerou, 1996; Hirschheim et al., 1995).
Examples of this approach arc Gane and Sarson, (]979~ DeMarco (1979), Weinberg
(1980) and Yourdon (1989). In this approach, infonnation systems development and
practice were thought of as mechanistic views within organisations (Spaul, 1997, p.
79).

Using mechanistic views, the infonnation systems development and prac,1.icc i,· viewed
as II technical proces,1:s in which systems arc built from the requirements clicitcd by the
systems analyst from the users through a variety llf approaches. The user requirements
nre generally considered to be straightforward processes in which users simply state
their needs (Hirschheim et al., 1991, p. 588). Systems development approaches hased
on this way are referred to as "classical approaches" (Hirsehhc1m L't al. 1991), "second
c.~ third b'Cneration systems development approaches" (Hir~chheim, Klein & Lyytinen,
1995; Couger, 1982), "traditional approaches'' \Wood-Harper & Fitzgerald, 1982), or
the "positivist approach" (Myers, 1997; Orlikwski & Baroudi, 1991 ). Jn this study, ! use
the term "positivist approach".

Some research studies using positivist approaches recognise behavioural consequence
of system development processes and describe the actual use of information systems
(Lyytinen, 1992; Hirschheim et al., 1991). Many of these studies have relied on
established sociological schools to study organisational life (Kling, J980).

In these

studies, behavioural elements were managed using a variety of strategics such as
implementation ar.d counter-implementation techniques (Keen, 1981). Issues such as
wer-friendly interfaces and ergonomically sound design became key concerns of
development in these approaches.

Following the behavioural consequences in systems development process, some
structured ap 11roaches include tools for promoting user involvement (Hirschheim et al.,
1991, p. 588). Consequently, socio-technical methodologies of Bostrom and Heinen
(\977), Mumford and Weir (1979), Oppelland and Ko!f (1980), Mumford (1983), and
Mumford and Beckman (1994) attempted to include substantial user participation in
the systems development process (Hirschheim et al., l 99l ).
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Research using positivist perspectives to infonnation systems development und practice
appears overwhelmingly concerned with rational image to information systems (sec

Steinmuller, 1984; Kling & Scucchi, 1982; Shneiderman, 1981). In most infonnation
systems research, infonnation systems development is regarded ns a means for making
the data processing tasks of an organisation more efficient and effective (see Senko,
1975, pp. 3. \J). Engine~ng the information systems dcvc!oprncnt activities in order to

achieve organisational goals by influencing the responses of members of the
organisation were seen as instrumental and strategic actions (Kendall & Kriebel, 1982;
Bariff & Ginzberg, l 982).

Research using positivist perspectives usually assume that the information systems
development process embodies a set of efficiency-maximisation imperatives
determined by managers' perceptions of market forces. The concentration on efficiency
and effectiveness stress from the ideological legacy of the 'enlightenment', which
sustains the general belief that things can always be made more efficient (Probert,
J997).

For example, management infonnntion systems in general focuses on the

instrumental approach to design and development of computer basd itifonnation
systems to realise mana~cment goals that are rational to the point of excluding nonrational behaviour of human experience (see Gordon & Gordon, 1999; Davis & Olsen,

1985).

Much of management information systems research is technical, combing the
theoretical work of computer science, management science and operational research
with practical orientation toward building systems and applications (Laudon & Laudon,
1998; Foster & F\ynn's, 1904). These models are mech1U1istical\y and technically

oriented {Avgcrou & d Cornford, 1995) and do not take count of any coomcts of
interest between participants in the systems development process (Klein & Hirschheim,
\991,1989; Lyytincn & Hirschheim, 1987). More generally, in these approaches,
rationality is instrumentally interpreted through the instrumental actions of actors in
organisational events {Klein & Hirschhcim, 1991, 1989).

The !~dmical and instrumental apprnachcs almost always emphasise mathematically
sound, normative systems to study infonnation systems as well as the physical
technology and fonnal capabilities of the systems using discrete entity models
(Walsharn, 1993). For example, discrete eotity models focus

otJ

explicit economic,

physical and infonnation processing features of the technology (see Kling, 1987) being
heavily based on scientific methods that attempt to derive "law-like generalisation"
(Hirschheim & Klein, 1992; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

Technical ways of thinking about associated nomothetic techniques and methodologies
has dominated the infonnation systems discipline since its technological inception
(lntrona, 1996, p. 20). An almost universal assumption over the last 30 years is that an
increase in scientific, natural, and social knowledge could be applied in an instrumental
and technical manner to infonnation systems development and practice (Wilson, 1997,
p. 187). For example, structured analysis, structured design, structured programming,
object oriented design and programming has resulted in a logical progression in
information systems development methods that have roots in the engineering discipline
and technical rationality (Avison et al., 1998, pp. 124-5).

What is common in the field of infonnation systems development including up to the
present is the emphasis on teehn.ical-rational methodolOb>ies such as infonnation
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engineering and computer-aided sofiwarc engineering (!ntrona, J996, p. 20). However,
this technical rational approach creates problems when applied to development and

practice of informatinn systems in dynamic and emergent contc:ds, because the systems
arc often not flexible enough to cope with change (Hirschheim et al., 1995).

2.3.1 Problems of Positivist Approach

i'.
The limitations of the positivist approach to information systems development and use

are widely discussed in information i;ystems Jito!fature (see for example, Avgerou, 2000;
Torvinen & Jalonen, 2000; Avison et al., 1998; Standing, 1998; Wa\sham, 1995, 1993;
Westrup, 1994; Orlikwski, 1993; Hirschheim & Klein, 1992; Orlikowski, 1991;
Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Eas•:m (1988) notes that structured design methods are
devoted to the design of technical systems and give little recognition to the range of
organisational changes that arc also to be designed. Concurring with Eason (1988),
Homby, Clegg, Robson, McC\arcn, Richardson and O'Bein (1992) point out that these
methodologies are still very technically oriented and they ignore the inclusion of
humans in the development process. According to Hirschheim and Klein (1992), the
ontological and epistemological background of information systems development
methodologies often reflect the positivistic paradigm in that the world is seen as an
objective reality characterised by order rather than a conflict. From this perspective,
social structures of reality are found, observed or modelled rather than interpreted or recreated (Torvinen & Jalonen, 2000, p. 16).

Moreover, it is a wide1y held belief among systems professionals that organisational
issues are not of concern to them (Homby et al., 1992; Newman, 1989).

These

positivist approaches tend to disregard the interaction and actions of key players, the
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process by which new systems are implemented and used and the soda! and contextual
aspects within which such events occur {Avison et al., 1998; Orlkowski. 1993). They
often ignore historical and contextual conditions as possible influences on human action
(Orlikowski & Bnroudi, 1991, p. 12). The everyday language usage of the study
participants are not included in the development process (Gibbons, 1987, p.l) and
people arc generally discounted as self-interpretative beings whose input into these

structures is not important (Habcrmas, 1987b).

Technical approaches can lead to an over emphasis on the design and constructions of
computer-based activities (Avison et al., 1998, p. 125), whilst ignoring the social ar.d
organisational dynamics of system development

(Westrup, 1994). For instance,

mechanistic view of organisations often tends to consider infonnation as a way of
scheduling and automating procedures. Their application leads to systems development
being overly formal and rational, placing little reliance on human intuition, judgement,
politics and social processes. Politics is seen as irrational as it interferes with maxima!
efficiency or effectiveness (Hirsehheim & Klein, 1989).

Researchers who acknowledge the existence of politics in infonnation systems
development view these systems as instruments for supporting the exchange process of
comrol and co-ordination within an organisation (see Ciborra, 1984, 1981). They have
not understood the actual functioning of information systems development within
organisations and the interactions between such organisations and socio· cultural,
economic and political context of the society (Gunatungc, 1998). These mechanistic
and bureaucratic approaches originated systems development frameworks through
"academic assumptions" but not through "real" social controversies (see Tinker &
Yuthas, 1994).
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Habcrrnos criticised the accepted knowledge of science and its justification for what is
being "truth". For Habennas, the principle tenant of science is the accepted view of the
world and it is based on the reductionism, the logic of control and prediction based on
the empirical facts. In thts way science establishes its grounds on knowledge generation
and the purpose of which is to formulate truth about the natural world (Scheffler, I 967,

p. 8). Habennas ( 1979), observing the way that science seeks to establish rationality

~1d truth of knowledge, suggests that science legitimatcs official inteivention by
introducing neutrality into political action. The positivist form of inquiry dominates
reasoning in practical questions and thus reduces the intentional human actions of
subjective actors to technocratic reasoning (Haberrnas, 1979).

Habermas (1987b, 1987c, 1984) suggests that the technical approach, emphasising
instrumental action, is too narrow and not sufficient for the helpful intervention of
social situations, thus tending to create rigid and inflexible systems which are ill suited
to the need of adapting to changing circumstances (Wal sham, 1993). The rationality
inherent in this approach is guided by the purposive-rational or instnunenta\ and
strattgic action (Klein & Hirschheim, 1991; Habermas, 1987b, 1987c, 1984, 1979).

The instnunental rationality of information systems methodologies tends to ignore
conflict situations and social debate on the ambiguous goals of systems development
activities, because most information requirement analysis methods have an inherent
bias to preserve the status quo. This is a beneficial outcome for those who already
possess power (Robey & Markus, 1984). Moreover, the assumption is that any conflicts
are solved through the use of managerial power (Newman & Noble, 1990; Lyytinen &

Klein, 1985, p. 227). Much of the rescarcl.• that takes a positivist view about
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infonnation systems development and practice, reflects a techno-scicntific and

economic rntionnlity of organisational processes and social issues (Walsh am, !993).

lnforr.,.:ti<m systems have been overly dominated by technological and technical

consideration at the expense of recognition of the human context in which information
systems arc used (Mingers, 1994). 11te most commonplace rationality is that of an
objective reality of the world that exhibits cause and effect relationships, which can be
discussed by structured objectives (Lyytinen & Klein, 1985).

Kraemer and King

(1990) state that

Supply-push view of technical development, coupled with a ratiorml
economic interpretation of managerial behaviour has dominated in
management information systems research. These explanatory
perspectives have considerable power, and have yielded u.seful results.
However, they do not explain the variance observed in the patterns and
process of adoption and routinization of information technology in
various tasks, or the differences in successful use of the technology
across organisations (pp. 582-3).

Historically, the development of technology and organisation alike has reflected the
increasing pervasiveness of objective forms of knowledge, as part of the Enlightenment
of the rationalisation of society. The fundnm-;intal principle in II modern Western society
is the belief that the human condition can be improved by reason alone (Touraine,

1995). Technology has long provided a model for the pursuit of objectively efficient
forms oforganisation (Corbett, 1992, p. 18). The key issue is the extent to which this
growth of technical expertise and use of computer-based technologies leads to a
rationale which places too much emphasis on technocratic modes of organisational
control (Habcrmns, 1979). For example, the "term office automation" is commonly
used to describe the ?~~ess of introducing computers and computer based information
systems into offices. However, the current success of such automation is limited. A

dctaikd understanding 1Jf social and organisational context is now widely recognised as
essential companion to the technical view of the orgunirn1ional dynamics (Hirschhcim,
1985), The solutions to problems in orgunit111tions' infonnation systems oHcn have farreaching consequences within organisations and society (Probert, 1997, p. 23).

Lyytinen (1987, 1985) criticises the exclusive use of scicntism that focuses on laws
based on natural science and the application of engineering and technical knowledge to
designing social systems problems such as infonnation systems. Lyytinen (I 987, 1985)
argues that in order to obtain a better undr.rstanding of the context of infonnation
systems, a move away from the technical view of infonnation systems and a rational
decision-making view of the organisation is essential. This is because successful use of
the appn•ach itself depends on a broader tacit understanding of the worldvicws of
p<1rticipants in the development process ([ntrona & Whitley, 1997, p. 31 ).

The strict application of a natural sdence modt:l to infonnation systems tends to ignore
the human dimension sm :, as 'lifoworlds' and social contexts within which
communicative interaction functions (Ngwenyar.m & Lee, 1997, p. 5).

Habennas

(1979) argues that the exercise of power in this process can prevent the open and free
discussion necessary for the success of human relationships. Therefore, the emphasis
in decision-making &bout how t'J manage and organise human and material resources
would benefit from broadening the focus from that usually employed positivist
approach in infonnation systems research (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992a, p. 437).

A broad social process allow researchers nnd practitioners to anticipate, explain, and
evalu~tc difiCrent experiences and consequences following the introduction of new

'
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technologies, such as new infonnation systems, in trganisations (Orlikowski, !993, p.

26).

Despite the growing importance of the nature of information systems development as a
social activity, few have attempted to define them in explicit terms (Clegg, Warr,
Green, Monk, Allison & Lansdale, !989; Eason, 1988). Even those who have altemptcd
to define them explicitly did not properly addrcsse<l them in the information systems

,,
I

development process (Homby et al., 1992; Clegg et al., 1989; Eason, 1988). The
systems dc"clopment within a complex, intertwined set of social and political
interactions bas been generally ignored (Myers, 1994, p. 188; Klein & Hirschheim,

1991,p.158).

;I
UKAIS (1995, p. 3) argues that "the study of information systems and their
development is a multidisciplinary subject which addresses the range of strategic,
managerial and operational activities involved in the gathering, processing, storing,
distribution anci' use of information and its associated technologies both in the society
and the organisation. For Keen (1987), the mission of infonnation systems research is
to study ''the effective desig11, delivery, use, and impact of information technologies in
organisations and society". However, there is only a few research studies which address
the social, organisational, political and economic contexts, processes and their
interaction and implications for systems development as a process of shared learning
(see Torvinen &Jalonen, 2000; Beynon-Davies, 1994; Newman & Noble, 1990).

The neglizcn.:c of social and organisational context contributed to the following:
1. Systems failures, undesimblc results and the abandonment of infonnation systems
development activities

(see Williwns & Gunntunge, 2000a, 2000b, 1999a;
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Lyytincn & Robey, 1999; Lchaney, Clarke, Kimberlee & Matthews, 1999; Ahn &

Skudlnrk, \997; Hayes, 1996; Myers, 1994; Ewusi-Mensah & Prlasnyski, 1994,
1991; Hornsby et al., 1992; Lyytinen et al., !991; Kclin & Hirschheim, 1991; Clegg
et al., 19S9);
2. Poor pcrfonnancc of systems (Poulymcnako & Holmes, 1996)

3. Difficulties in implementation of information systems in real world situations
following institutional forces which inhibit dramatic changes in existing work
habits (Olesen & Myers, 1999, p. 331)
4. Lack of acceptance by the organisation's management and/or employees (Headrick

• & Morgan, 1999, p. 20)
5. User dissatisfaction, stress, quality of work life and other work-related outcomes
significant to the productivity and efficiency of operations (Ryker & Nath, 1995;
Robey & Azevedo, 1994; Kidwell & Bennett, 1994; Keen, 1991,; Nelson, 1990;
Newman, 1988; Markus & Robey, 1983; Alter, 1980; Bjorn-Anderson & Hedberg,
1978). For example, these researchers delineate the fact that the information systems
development process is socially bound so that organisational performance are not only
a consequences of technical validity of the systems but are a!so an outcome of social
and organisational interactions with the systems (Joshi & Lauer, 1998; Markus &
Robey, 1983).

Hirschheim et al. (1996) argue that the changes associated with systems developments
are emergent, historically contingent, socially situated and politically embedded. The
design and use of information technologies in organisations is essentially entrenched in
social contexts, marked by time, locale politics, and culture (Hirschheim et al., ! 996,
Orlikwski & Baroudi, 1991; Hirschheim & Klein, 1989). Hence the basic assumptions
about the rationality of the participan\5 and the social process they eng.. g,;; in need to be
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critically npprai~ed (Hirschhcim & Newman, 1991, p. 29). This is not to say that there
is no place for technical rationality in information systems development. For example,
Fitzgerald ( 1996, p. 5) identified a number of arguments for fonnaliscd information

systems development methodologies. Avison et al.(1998, p.

125) argue that the

technical desire to reduce the complexity and uncertainty of information systems
de~clopment is understandable, however, there is a dan1:;cr tlmt the information sys!~'lt15
1·1

req,'1ircmcnts of the organisation are displaced by the information systems development
methoC: as the focus of attention (ibid, p. 125). In such situations, practitioners can
avoid making a real engagement with the problem (Wastcll, 1996, p. 34).

The idea of information systems development as a social activity within organisations
requires a reconstruction o:"the knowledge that provides a social re-conceptualisation
of information systems. Therefore the theories, methodologies and techniques of
systems development need to be changed through this re-conceptualisation (lntrona,
1996, p. 20). These changes gives practical form to what Mumford refers to as the
philosophy of humanism, by providing employees with an opportunity to influence
the work systems that surround them (1997, p. 309).

2.4 Interpretative Approach-Underlying Assumptions in Information Systems
Development and Practice

The interpretative approach asserts that the positivist approach generally attempts to
increase the predictive understanding of human behaviour through testiag theories in a
hypothetical-deductive manner, conceiving the world ns a fixed construct by which to
make sense of reality. Positivist approaches attempt to apprehend, characterise, and
measure organisations, groups, and social systems in some objective way to discover an

objective reality lurgcly independent of human subjectivity. lnlcrprctivist researchers
reject this objective or factual interpretation of events and situations (Klein & Myers,
1999; Lee, Licbenau & DcGross, 1997; King, 1997; King, 1996; Orlikowski & Baroudi,
l991, p. 5; Hirschheim & Klein, 1989, p. 1205).

In contrast to the positivist views, the interpretative approach attempts to understand
human behaviour through social constructions such as language, consciousness and
shared meaning from the participants who assign meaning to phenomena (Myers, 1997;
King, 1997; Deetz, 1996; Boland, 1991, 1985; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991 ). According
to.Klein & Myers (1999, p. 69) " ... our knowledge of reality is gained only through
social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, documents,
tools and other artefacts". Interpretative research docs not generally predefine
dependent and independent variables in a tight research design, but tends to focus on the
cc,mplexity of human sense-making as the situation emerges (Kaplan and Maxwell,
1994). This view of interpretative approach to study social phenomena is consistent

with many researchers (see Walsham, \.'}95,1993, 199!; Lee, 1991; Boland, 1991;
Chua, 1986; Linc\n & Guba, 1985; Burrell & Morg1m, 1979; Berger & Luckman, 1967).
For Burrell and Morgan (1979), interpretativism seeks an explanation within the realm
of individual consciousness and subjectivity. Within this frame of reference "social
roles and institutions exist as an expression of the meanings which men attach to their
world" (Silverman, 1970).

,.The interpretative approach explicitly recognises the subject matter of inquiry, the
'lifeworlds' contexts. The social phenomenon is examined in a natural setting to
discover a mutual understanding among participants in human interaction and action

(Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997, p. 6). Practitioners can usually better relate to interpretative
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research as the research is close to prn.::ticc, involves actual case studies, involves real
people in real situations, and is undertaken in real world settings (Klein & Myers,
1999). A collection of information systems research conducted using interpretative

approach can be found in Myers (1997).

The interpretative approach is often aimed at understanding the inter-subjective
meaning embedded in social life to explain human behaviour and takes into

consideration the everyday language of human communication {Gibbons, 1987, p.3). It
is assumed that reality should be understood from the perspective of the participants

who make sense of situations and that social reality is interpreted by the researcher wl:u
examines it. The interpretative approach asserts that human knowledge of reality,
including the domain of human action is a social construction by human actors and that
this applies equally to researchers (Walsham, 1993, p. 5). Consequently the social
reality is conceived ns an emergent social process, as an extension of human
consciousness and subjective experience (Burrc1! & Morgan, 1979, p. 253).

2.4.1 Ontological Assumptions

The ontological position adopted by the interpretative tradition of research is based on
the premise that reality is a subjective construction of the mind. Jnterpretivism is Jinked
wltlt the idea that as socially transmitted concepts and names direct how reality is
perceived and structured, reality therefore varies with different languages and cultures.

The question posed is ''what is objective reality when experience is necessarily
subjective, being apprehCnded through the observer's mind? (Chua, 1986) The actor

"intrinsir.ally endows human actions with si.tjectivc meaning and, always intentional,

'"
actions cannot be understood without reference to their meaning and intention that arc

grounded in social and ]1istorfoll prneticc" (ibid, p. 613).

Interpretative approach

focuses on the idea of participants as intelligent human being.~ who create and recreate

their reality through their interpretation and interactions of symbolic action in the
process of reality construdion (Mingers, 1984, p. 85; Morgan, 1983, p. 396). Humans
reinforce this social reality through their action and interaction (Orlikowski & Baroudi,
1991, p. 14). Research in this tradition concentrate on the study of ways in which social

reality is meaningfully constructed quo (Klein & Myers, 1999; Burrell & Morgan, 1979,

p. 254).

2.4.2 Epistemological Assumptions

Interpretative approaches generally operate from an epistemology that understanding of
social processes involves getting inside !ho world of those involved it. The approach
asserts that there is a relationship between everyday social practice and the every day
language in which social practice arc embedded. Therefore, understanding of social
reality requires an understanding of how practice and meanings are formed and
infonned by the hmguage and tacit norms shared by humans working towards some
shared goals (Klein & Myers, 1999; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, p. 14).

Research methods such as in-depth field studies (case studies, ethnographic studies, and
J,'articipant obseivation) are used to generate knowledge. The researcher talces an
actively involved role in the research process to derive meanings of human actions and
human interaction to understand the social reality (Wa\sham, 1995).
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The interpretative npproach recognises the questions of value-judgements in the procl.$!>'
of human communication. and that value question becomes implicated in the process of

inquiry (Ngwenyama & Lee, l 997). The researcher begins with understanding
assumptions, beliefs, values, and interests, which shape the process ofinvcstir;:ition. The
researcher's assumptions and values are generally thought to be deeply involved in the
\

rescari::h phenomenon {Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

Interpretative knowkdge can be used to reveal to people what they and others are doing

when they act and speak as they do (Fay, 1987, p. 88). By highlighting the symbolic
structures and taken-for-granted themes that pattern the world in distinct ways,
interpretative research aims to enrich participants' understanding of the meanings of
their actions, thus increasing the possibility of mutual communication and influence
(Chua, 1986, p. 615).

2.4.3 Problems of Interpretative Approach

Several authors pointed out the limitations of an interpretative approach whilst studying
information systems development and information system use in organisations (see
Probert, 1997; Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, Hirschheim &
Klein, 1989; Gibbons, 1987; Fay, 1987; Chua, 1986; Minger, 1983; Burrell & Morgan,
1979; Giddens, 1979; MaCarthy, 1978). For example, Maccarthy (1978) suggests that
the interpretative agenda is as suspect as the natural science approach because it, too,
employs a monological form of reasoning of phenomena, which may exe\ude certain
topics of discourse. The subjective approaches are especially vulnerable to bias implicit
in the culturally conditioned perspective of the research (Steffy & Grimes, 1986, p.

323).

Habcnnas (1979) contends that the interpretative approach seeks to understand
organisational Jaws through some fonn of "pure subjectivity", free from cognitive or
motivating interests. The interpretative approach is unable to evaluate critically the
fonns of life which stl!e observes and is therefore unable to analyse fonns of false
consciousness and domination that prevent the actors from knowing their true interest
(Habennas, 1979). Moreover, it fails to be an "inquiry of change" (Habcrmas, 1979;
McCarthy, 1978). For example, in the interpretative approach, the systems analyst
reproduces a causal reflection of his internal perceptions of his own will rather than
critically understanding the ~ituations being studied (Probert, 1997, p. 48).

In this

sense, the interpretative approach resembles a natural science approach (Steffy &
Grimes, 1986, p. 325). Thus, both natural science and interpretative approaches assume
some dominant fonn of reasoning (Dallmayer & McCarthy, 1977).

The interpretative approach can easily ignore political activities and interests attempt to
destruct a balance between individual and oollective interest (Hirschheim & Klein,
\ 989, p. 1206). For example, interpretative research generally avoids conflicts in goal~
and attempts to achieve consensus among participants in the process of infonnation
systems development (Hirschhcim & Klein, 1994). Such an attempt is considered as a
"naive consensus" because the process docs not look at how human understanding is
distorted through false consensus, manipulation, and domination (Habennas, 1984).

The infonnation systems development process within interpretative approaches is
uncritical in that certain groups such as management, can manipulate and distort the
communication to realise hidden objectives. Distortions in information systems

development can arise from biases and the limits of language use because "our implicit
beliefs and assumptions cannot all be made explicit" (Winograd & Flores, 1986, p. 32).

Interpretivists generally fail to suggest what to do or how to improve matters in
practice. Consequently, mutual understanding in the interpretative research tradition
does not usually lead to improvements in social problems (Gunatunge, 1990). For
example, interpretative approach generally fails to recognise the limitations and barriers
to the improvement of the quality of the human conditions.

Fay (1987, p. 92) recognises four weaknesses in the interpretative research tradition.
I. It does not examine external conditions, which gives rise to certain meanings and

experiences
2. It fails to explain unintended consequence of human action, such as action which
reinforces the actions, roles, beliefs, and relative power of members of a group in
order to sustain the structure and practice of that group as a whole over time
(Giddens, 1979)
3. The interpretative approach does not usually address the structural conflicts that
exist within society and organisations, thereby often ignoring endemic issues
related to social sysl<:ms (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992a)
4. It neglects to explain historical change such as how a particular social order came to
be, what it is and how might vary over time. Thus, an interpretative flpproach can easily
overlook the possible structures of conflicts within a society, and the symbolic
structures that would generate change through the symbolic interaction of participants
(Fay, 1987, p. 96).
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2.5 Critical Theory Approach-Underlying Assumptions in Information Systems
Development and Practice

In contrast to both positivist and interpretative approaches, the critical social theory
perspective attempts to understand socfol contradictions and conflicts inherent in

existing social structures of organisation and society through self-reflection in the hope
of human emancipation (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992a, p. 434; Orlikowski & Baroudi,
1991, p. 19). It assumes a non-objectivist understanding of ontology and epistemolo1,,y
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Critical social theory asserts that established systems of
domination, which alienate people from self-realisation, restrict human potentiality
(Chua, 1986, p. 619). It takes into account the human construction of social fonns of
life and the possibility of their recreation in a historical context (Ngwenyama & Lee,
1997, p. 5; Ngwcnyama, Truex & Davis, 1997, p. 2; Ngwenyama, 1991, p. 268). It
aims to lay the foundation for explorations in an interdisciplinary research context of
questions eonccmir:ig the conditions which make possible the reproduction and
transformation of society, the meaning of culture, and the reldtion between the
individual, society and culture (Held, 1980, p. 16).

Research using this perspective to social science phenomenon contains both an
empirical-analytic and interpretative component, however each is placed within a
reflective system of epistemic inquiry (Steffy & Grimes, 1986, p. 325). Neither
approach adequately analyses the actuality of information systems practice (Probert,
1997, p. 48). For er.ample, referring to information systems research, Ngwenyama and
Lee (1997, p. 7) identify four 9erspectives, differing from the positivist approach that in
critical social theory is:

SI

I. Sensitive to the 'lifcworlds' of the organisational participants and is oriented to
interpreting and mapping the meanings of their actions from their pcrspr,ctives
2. Adopts pluralistic methods of inquiry such as participation, observation, and the

analysis of contextual data

3. Does not separate the subjects of inquiry from the organisational context within
which they arc situated
4. Recognises that the organisational context is not only important to meaning
construction, but to social reality as well. Moreovcr, unlike the interpretative research

approach, researchers in critical social theory endeavours to emancipate organisational
participants from false or unwarranted beliefs, assumptions, and constraints in addition
to the research quest for mutual understanding (ibid, p. 7).

Critical theory aims both to critique ideology in social theory and method, such as the
ide_11tity of scientism and to develop an organisation science capable of changing
organisational

processes

through

dialectical

approach

(Adorno,

1973)

or

communicative interaction (Habennas, 1987b, 1984). [ts main tasks arc to bring to
light the restrictive and alienating conditions of the status quo and to help to eliminate
the causes of alienation and domination (Myers, 1997, p. 5). It explicitly states its
purpose is to minimise the "objectification of organisational actors" life through
restrictive conditions (Habermas, 1987b).

Critical social theory focuses on the

liberation of people from unnecessarily restrictive conditions, ideologies, assumptions,
power relations and identity formation that inhibit or distort opportunities for
~"tonomy, or clarification of genuine needs and wants. It hopes to contribute to greater
/

~, ... '

/

and lasting satisfaction (see Fay, 1987; Habennas, 1987b, 1984; Held, 1980; Marcuse,
1964).

)J

"

2.5.1 Ontologicnl Assumptlnns

Ontologicnlly, critical social theory asserts that social reality is historically situated and
that reality is produced nnd reproduced by people through their interaction (Myers,
1997, p. 4). Unlike the positivist approach, critical theory docs not assume that socidl
relations are stable and orderly but are w,derb>oing constant change (Habermas, 1987b).

Human actors are not se~n to be restricted to exist in a particular state and thus their
being and their object world (material environment) nre not cxl1austed by their
immediate circumstances (Held, 1980, p. 234). Instead, human participants have inner
potentialities which arc alienated through various forms ofrestrictiw mechanisms such
as social, economic, and political domination (Chua, 1986). Therefore, the material
environment can only be understood through a study of their historical development
and change within the totality of relations (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

Critical theorists understand empirical reality as characterised by objective, real
relations, which are transfonned and reproduced through subjective interpretation of
human participants (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 298). Human intention and rationality
is critically analysed because of a commitment to understand in false consciousness and
ideology. Critical theory assumes that fundamental opposition, conflicts, and
contradictions are endemic to contemporary society. These conflicts arise "because of
injustice and ideology in the social, economic, and political domination, which obscure
the creative dimension in people" (Chua, 1986, p. 622.).
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2.5.2 Epistemologicnl Assumptions

Epistemologically, critical theorists generally assume that knowledge is intersubjectively shared and context bound and that knowledge is grounded in social and
historical practice (Orlikowski & Baroudi, l991, p. 20; Chua, 1986, p. 620). The belief

that the knowledge and social reality is grounded in social and historical contexts,
historical, ethnographic research and in-depth case studies are more commonly used to
identify the social reality. In this way, knowledge about social reality is obtained and
analysed critically through the particular theoretical framework adopted by researchers
to.conduct their wcrk (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991, p. 21). For example, researcher
needs to critically examfr1c how power structures and knowledge interests are affected
by information technology (Ngwenyarna et al., 1997, p. 2).

In critical social theory, theory has a critical imperative in that the identification and
removal of domination and negative ideological practice is highlighted in existing
social orders of societies and organisations (Chua, 1986, p. 622).

Ngwenyama et al.

(1997) slates that:

Critical theorists seek to improve human conditions and they should not
limit themselves to critiquing the idcolog'y behind certain styles of
information systems research. Rather, they need to become involved with
real life situations where power is manifested, for example, issues of
power may be observed in situations ofinfonnation systems development
orinfonnation use. (p. I)

Four basic assumptions of critical social theory are generally recognised.
1. It is assumed that people can change their world and that organisational participants
and/or researchers have the capacity to transform organisational situations

"
2. All social knowledge is ·~slue laden, and all scientific knowledge !s a social
construction

3. Reason and critique m-e inseparable and arc reflective in practice.
4. 1beory and practice must be interconnected (Ngwi~yama, 1991 ).

Habermas (1973} diOCrentiatcs bctw~cn the use of critical theories to iniiiatc a process
of self-reflection among human participants, as compared to the actual sdcctio:i of
appropriate po!itic:il action. His critical social theory, the theory of communicative

\

action, can be fruitfully used to elucidate social phenomena in practice through critical

;;
reflection. Habermas (1973) asserts that the critical researchers can be responsible for
initiating a proccs!I of self-reflection but that only participants in the community can
1986;
carry out the m:ceS'sary political action to change the existing structures ((~!Ja,
,,
McCarthy, 1978).

,:

The foli'.:>wing section outlines infonnation systems development research co~ducted
using Habennas's approach. In order to avoid the duplication of work, section 7.~ in
\'.-

chapter seven provides critical reflection on problems and limitations of applying
Habermas's critical social theory to sys\f.ms development in organisations.

\

"

2.5.3 Haberf?,1as's Critical Social Theory in Information Systems Development

The application of Habennas' critical theory to information systems development in
organisations is becoming increasingly popular. For example, Williams and Gunatunge
(2000a, 2000b, 1999a), Gunatunge and Williams (2000), Myers and Young (1997),
Ngwcnyarna et al. (1997), Hirschhcim et al. (1996), Kelin and Hirschheim (1996),
Hirschheim et al. ( 1995}, Hirschheim and Klein ( 1994), Truex ( !993), Lyytinen'(; 992,
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1986), Hirschhcim and Newman (1991), Lyytincn, Klein an<l Hirschhcim ·(]991),
Ngwcnywna, (1991), Lyytincn et a!. (1991), Hirschht.'im and Klein (1989), Lyytincn
and Hirschhcim (1988), Klein and Hirsch.bcim (1987), Lyytinen and Klein (1985),

widely discuss the use of Habcrrnas's critical social theory perspectives in information
systems development, and their \mplicathms to organisational life.

Several authors (Lee, 1990; Ehn, 1988; Ngvenyama, 1987; Lyytincn & Klein, 1985)

use Habermas's critical ~Ocial theory in discussing and evaluating the positivist research
perspective. Most of this work emphasises that the practical interest in

mutud(

understanding is necessary if one wants to grasp how organisational agents actually use
information systems in making sense of their cnvirorunent (Boland, 1980). Until
recently, there bas been little discussion on work place autonomy and the empowerment
of the employee in information systems development Lyytinen, 1992).

Lyytinen and Klein (1985) use critical theory to take into account the 'lifeworld',,:i."1<'1
the social context in which infonnation systems development and practice is situated in
organisations. These authors ao,;crt that mosi information systems focus on the
technical aspects of systems design, seeing the outcome of the design merely as the
delivery of a teehniccl system without considerations of necessary organisational
change. It would therefore be said that most information systems devekipment and
practice come under a model of purposive rationality in Weber's (1978, pp. 24-6) sense.
Most of the infonnation systems research follows scientific research, which ttmds to
ignore the social context ofinfonnation systems development because these approaches
arc based on purposive-rational actions (Habennas, l 987b, 1987c, 1984).

"
Lyytineo and Klein (1985) contend that the narrow technical approach is airr,•.xl at
increasing efficiency am! effectiveness, al the expense of general human concerns to

l(·~·c;rthc vested interest !'f certain b>TOUp~ in power. from a narrow technical approach,
··infonnation systems become purl of the rational-technical approach to our society,
which is derived from the ideology of sc;cntism {McCarthy, 1978, Habcrmas, 1973).
Therefore, it is necessary and important to look at information systems as means of

h'..::reasing human under£tanding by foster criticism and reflection and as means to frei.l'·
people from undesirable constraints, distorted communication, misapplied power, and
repressive domination (Lyytincn & Klein, 1985, p. 219).

Critical social theorists contend that for particip:lllts to come into a shared
understanding should base rationality on communicative interaction, through the "force
of better argument". Moreover, human '\ifcworlds'
communicative

rationality

in the

information

influence the forms of

systems development

process

(Ngwenyama et al., 1997, p. 2). Such an approach tries to reflect and critically examine
the conditions and scope of our practical "tacit'' knowledge of how to engage in
organisational conversations and constitute our social world (Dietz & Lyytincn, 1998,
p. 2). It emphasises what people do while communicating, how they create common
reality by means of language and how communication brings about the co-ordinatio'n of
their activities (Reijswoud et al., 1999, p. 118; Kdin & Hirschheim, 1991, p. 166}'., 1

Central to communicative rationality (Klein & Hirschheim, 1991, p. 166) is mutual
understanding and consensus formation in the form of symbolic interaction.
Information systems form constitutive elements in organisation?\ conversations in
which actors establish shared social worlds (Thompson, 1982, p. 123) and represent
themselves to others and themselves (Dietz & Lyytincn, l 998,.rd).
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The communicative process is one in which any knowledge daim of partit..ipants is
open to challenge {Spaul, 1997, p. 83). In this reflective inquiry, participants achieve a
therapeutic self-understanding which also contributes to improving knowledge, feeling,

and practice (Lyytinen & Klein, 19)!5, pp. 229-30).

Hirschheim and Kelin (1989) discuss four roles of the information systems analyst as
systems expert, facilitator, labour partisan, and emancipator. The first of these relates to

'

the purely technical role of the systems analyst in developing systems to agreed
specifications. The second role of the analyst as facilitator is an approach which would

be. natural when using methodologies such as effective technique and human
implementation of computer systems (ETHICS) and consensual versions of soft
systems based methodologies (for example, Checkland, 1981 ).

From this perspective, Hirschheim and Kclin (1989) assert that any system that then
meets with the approval of the affected parties is legitimate. Jn the third role, the
systr,ms developer acts as an advocate of labour to redress the balance of power
between management and labour. This third role can be argued as a mornlly superior
course of action. The need for a labour partisan aspect of analyst's role is explained in
some of the infonnation literature (Newman & Noble 1990; Robey & Markus, 1984).

The final role of the analyst fo that of emancipator. In the role of emanicpator, the
analyst makes an effort to create conditions for free and open discussion that lead to
shared understanding. This discussions must include a critical examination of existing
barriers to emancipation such as authority and illegitimate power, pe1."r opinion
pressure, social diffcreTitiation, ~nd the bias and limitation of language use (Hirschheim

& Kelin, 1989, p. 1208_).
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Lyytinen et al. (1991) argue for a social action perspective to understand office
information systems development. These authors suggest that most of the existing
office information systems and development methodologies assume that system
development is a sequc1,ce of inslrumcntal actions to achieve predefined ends. Thus,
they propose that "office information systems should be analysed as social action
systems, the behaviour of which is strongly affected by social detennined forces and
constraints such as the behaviour-channelling influences of authority, norms, customs,

habits and precedence" (p. 56).

Hirschheim (1985) desires to see information technology adopted in the office, with a
focus on a plurality of benefits demonstrating social and ethical responsibility.
Hirschheim contends that ~n authentic consensus can be achieved in its proper use and
objectives if a participato~J approach is used during design and implementation of
information systems.

Lyytinen et a!. (1991) analyse office information systems referring to Habennas's
classification as social actions of instrumental, strategic, communicative, 1md
discursive, in the context of technology, language and organisation. Further, these
authors propose that, in order to be successful, office information systems must handle
the informal nature of office activities, which include conversations, friendly and
adversarial social relationships, spontaneous interaction, and organisational culture
which embraces myths and rituals in a distortion free environment. Lyytincn et al.
(1991) assert tliat the informal nature of office activities result "spontaneous social

interaction that contributes to creativity and lcaming"(p. 42). These authors argue that,
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by adopting 1hc social action perspective of I labcrmas, a better understanding of both

the otlicc and oOicc information systems <lcvc]npmcnt is possible.

Klein and Hirschhcim ( ! 987) call for the explicit use of emancipatory research that
focuses on human well being and emancipation in infonnation systems development
and use in organisations. Hirschhcim and Klein ( l 994) argue for a plurality of rational
argwnents in the infomiatinn systems development process suggesting that traditional
infonnaticm systems development practices are too functionalist concentrating merely
producing designed systems (sec Burrell & Morgan, 1979) for their theoretical basis
(Hirschheim & Klein, 1989, pp. 1203-4).

Hirschheim and Klein (1989) suggest that relying solely functionalism fonn positivist
perspectives promote the ideals of efficiency and effectiveness in infonna)\on systems
development. lr'"1nnation systems development comes to be seen as instrumental
reasoning of human behaviour making organisational We overly rationalistic.

Rationalism leads to merely choosing the best instrumental means as the primary
emphasis for achieving given ends. Jnfonnation systems development approach follows
the rules of scientific method, which ideologically attempts to improve a technical
solution on complex human problems (pp. 1203-4). Moreover, the systems analyst
adopts inappropriate value neutrality with regard to goals. The design system becomes
one of concealed use of power in the development process by certain groups to realise
their often concealed objectives, particularly narrow economic objectives at the expense
of other participants (Myers & Young, 1997). In contrast to the functionalist approach.
neohumanistic approach takes into consideration human values, nonns, and perceptions

'"
of all the participants in a free and open discussi'ln that Jcads to shared understanding
(Hirschhcim & Klein, l-994, 1989: Burrell & Morgan, 1979).

Consistent with these ar!!umcnts, various methodologies have been proposed in systems

design. For example, Flood and Jackson (1991) identified the "critical systems
heuristic" as a means of opening up and making tr:msparcnt the manner in which

systems practitioners ITamc and manage problems in social systems design. !n
information systems development methodologies such as institutional democracy
design (Hirschheim et al., 1996), consensual communication development (Hirschhcim
&.Newman, 1991), rational argument design (Klein & Hirschheim, 1996; Hirschhcim

& Klein, 1994), and participatory approach (Hirschheim and Klein, 1989; Hirschhcim,
1985) have been proposed.

Fundamental to all these rOethodologies is that their focus on reducing barriers to
emancipation such as distorted communication, power and psychological compulsions
and social constraints. They also deal with change and emancipation of human
potential. These methodologies stress the role that different social and organisational
forces play in understanding change through the effective development of information
systems in organisations {Wilson, 1997, p. 103).

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I present research accounts of the thrc<! approaches to studying
information systems development and practice in organisations. The positivist approach
is premised on the assumption of objective worldvicws to design information systems
for controlling hum,m behaviour through instrumental and strategic actions in the

"
development process. The social conlext, within which infommtinn systems
development functions, is often ignored.

The interpretative approach is based un

subjectivist understanding of human behaviour in organisations. This approach

recognises the 'lifcworlds' context in information systems development and practice.
,1
_/

The interpretative approach is aimed to reaching mutual understanding among
participants in an inter-subjectively shared worldvicw of participants. However, the
approach lacks critical bite. Finally, the chapter discussed the ontological and the
epistemological positions adopted in critical social theory approach to information

systems development and practice.

Critical social theory approaches attempt to understand social contradictions ancl.
conflicts inherent in existing social structures of organisation and society by including
self-reflection

while

taking

non-objectivist

understanding

of ontology

and

epistemology. Human construction of social reality of human life and the possibility of
their recreation in a historical context are taken into consideration. A further account of
critical social theory and Habermas's theory of communicative action is presented in
chapter three.

62

CHAPTER THREE
CRITICAL SOCIAL TIIORY-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3.0 Introduction

The chapter d~scribes the theoretical framework used in this research. The chapter
begins with an general ex.position of critical social theory perspective in referring tv the
work of the members of Frankfurt School of social research. Secondly, is an explanation

of the major theoretical underpinning expounded by Jurgen Habermas in his theory of

communicative action. He describes the major themes of 'lifeworlds' and systems,
colonisation of lifeworlds, human cognitive interests, human conscious rationalities,
human actions, universal validity claims of spcc.::h acts, ideal speech situation,
breakdown of communication, and rational society through communicative interaction.

A final concluding chapter ties these th~ories anad concepts together as whole.

3.1 Critical Social Theory

Critical social theory refers to the work of members of the Frankfurt school of social
research. The most prominent figures in this tradition arc Max Horkhcimer (18951973), Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), Erich Fromm (1900-1980), Herbert Marcuse
(1898-1979) and currently Jurgen Habcrmas (1929-) (sec Held, 1980). Their concerns
have been to better understand and provide meaning for human conditions taking
different positions to mainstream traditional social theorists, whose ideas arc, especially
these based on positivism. Haberrnas convincingly argues that positivism is not, as it
claims, the one and only non-biased' application of CO!:,'Tlitivc mental filnclions tri the
knowledge and control of nature in order to obtain human betterment and progress
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(Habcrmas, 1987c). The critical social theory focuses on umlcrstanding human social

actions within a bron<l social contcx:t extending observation into a reflective viewing of
unwarranted and inequitable conditions of social situations from which people stck
relief(Ngwcnyamn & Lee, !997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 199J;Hirschheim & Klein,
!989).

The adjective "critical" refers more to self-reflective examin;,.tion and an unmasking of
pretences rather than to that which is critically important or to criticism as such

{Habcrmns, 1987c, p. vii)). The concern of critical social theory has been to understand

and help better a twentieth century plagued by mass war, cruel totalitarianism,
technocratic exploitation, vast inequality and, now, ccologica! collapse. They have
provided powerful insights by advocating critical self-examination, by constantly
unmasking unexamined pervasive ideologies in capitalism and communism and, more
recently, especially in the work ofHabennas, by evaluating the social importance and
fr•undation of everyday language. For example, it can be argued that the "free market"
is profoundly not free, "rational bureaucracy" has an instrumentally unbalanced
rationality, and "democracy" is not only partial and fragmentary but increasingly
determined by technology and mass media (Park, 1991, p. 174). They have worked
together from the 1930s to produce a viable alternative secial theory to fascism,
authoritarian socialism and capitalism. Their shared concern has been to provide a new
way to use reason, a liberating reason, to promote equity, freedom and an outworking
of the good in human affairs. As such their social project is still basically within that of
the enlightenment project of creating a bell er society through the :ipplication of reason.
At the inaugural address of the opening of the Institute for Social Research,
Horkheimcr (1937) outlined the goals of critic:il social theory as follows.

The critical theory of society on the contrary [to the positivist views of
socidl science] has its objects men as 1hc producers or their total
historical forms of life. The Cllnditions of reality from which science
starts <Jilt, appears to it not as given lo be established an<l calculated
purely on the basis of laws of probability. What is in each case given,
depends not solely upon nature but also upon perception, the statement
of the problem and the interpretation of the answers are created from
human activity and the dq,'fcc of its power (cited in Ngwenyama, 1991,
p. 268).
Following insights from Marx and Hegel, critical theory contends that the domination
of nature and people through scientific consciousness was at the heart of the intellectual
world of the enlightenment (Held, 1980, pp. 151-2). They ar1,,ued that the
enlightenment was associated with the various intellectual movements, which
contributed to and infonncd political fennents, such as the French revolution, in
Europe, the !ate eighteenth century. In Dialectic of E'nlightcnmcnt Adorno and
Horkheimer explored why the enlightenment project, with its scientific agenda, has
created "a new kind of barbarism" instead of "a truly human condition" (Adorno &
Horkheimer, 1992, p. xi). They understand magic, Olympian Greek mythology, and
certain ways of understanding Judaco-Christian religion and elements of the
Rcfonnntion and the Renaissance, as early expressions of the unbalanced dominance of
instrumental rationality.

ii

This unbalanced instrumental rationality became a strategic rationJlity let(ding to
coercion and social manipulation for ulterior purposes of certain dominant persons or
classes. Although initially liberating from superstition and repression, the seeds of

,,

totalitari~ism and repressive orthodoxy were located within this instnuncntnl
rationality and universal teclmocratic consciousness which came to dominate an
increasing number of areas of everyday life.
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A common tenet of critical social thought has been that the vulucs associ11tcd with
instrumental rationality have increasingly and destructively dominated business,
industry, government and education in modernity (Agger, 1991; Held, 1980). Adorno
characteristically illuminates the kernel of instrumental rationality in his famous essay,

"Education after Auschwitz"; "First, men become th,~ kind of persons who make
themselves in some degree the same as a thing. Then, if it is possible, they make others
into things, too" (cited in Young, 1989, p. 60).

Horkheimcr nnd Adorno (1972) related instrumental rationality to n!I forms of
positivism and even empiricism, which they claim simply accept the societal status
quo. There is no critical self-reflection in this acceptance which serves and endorses the
radica\Jy diseased instrumental domination of modernity. Civilisation bas thus been
threatened by the cancerous growth of a technology driven by the instrumental
rationality of the empirical sciences with declining discourse on human values. Adorno
spoke of the rise of instrumental. or "means-end", rationality as a part of standardised,
opaque, and overpowering social processes (Held, 1980, pp. 65-70). Marcuse likewise
asserts that; "Not only the application of technology but technology itself is domination
(of nature and man) - methodical, scientific, cali.::ulated, calculating control" (Marcuse,
1969, p. 223).

Instrumental rationality· abstracts persons from the world and from others, it blocks
them from truly experiencing life to the extent lo which it is adopted. Zlauddin
Sardar, speaking of Western domination of other cultures, asserts that instnuncntal
reason: "unleashed ruthless violence, in the shape of instrumental science, capitalist
tecltnologics, agribusiness and instrumental nation-states, at trnditional societies"
(1993).

"
However, there is a common hope in the work of! lorkhcimcr, cert11inly Marcusc and
even Adomo, that there is a "possibility of a fully liberating reason" (Held, 1980, p.

157). Although reason bas been used as a capitalist weapon of social control (Adorno &
Horkheimcr, 1992), there is a way open for the destructive domination of instrumental
rationality to be tempered and even balnnccd by critical reason. Within this usscrtion,
Habcnnas's theory of communicative action (1987b, 1984) builds a fruitful theoretical
foundation for empowering human communication lo enable what he tenns a "countcr-

factua! reconstructed practical rationality." This is u type of balanced rationa!ily, a fully
liberating reason, in which technical, ethical and emancipatory human interests arc
appropriately balanced through a free interpretation (in unrestricted social interaction)
of situation under consideration (Pusey, 1987, p. 92).

3.2 Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action

A fruitful platform for thinking of information systems development practice in
organisations is provided by Jurgen Habcrrnas's theory of communicative action
(1987b, 1984). Habermns's theoretical approach is derived from his theory of social
evolution.

Habermas's critical theory is most succinctly defined as nn empirical

philosophy of social institutions (McCarthy, 1978). As the lending contemporary
thinker in critical social theory (Held, 1980), Hnbermas argues that, with the growth of
industrial society in science, technology and rigid bureaucracy, reason itself is now

!I

used in a narrowly instrumental manner. Reason is no longer liberating, as it was during
the enlightenment when thinkers used reason to expose the oppression and debased
authoritarianism of the decadent European monarchies and institutional religions (Park,
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199!, p. 174). Reason, Habcrmas contends, is no longer usc<l for discovery, or to

gcncrutc meaning or values. Rather, reason is used 11s a means of a new oppression and
authoritarianism with modernity characterised by positivist scit.'t1cc and dominating

technocratic consciousness {1987c). Thus it is untenable to suggest that facts and values
can be rigidly separated, as the case in positivist philosophy, and that science can be

apolitical and value-free-truth. The truth and knowledge arc interwoven with political
context and can emerge only from freedom to dialogue and exchange ideas

(Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1984, p. 87).

H~bennas contends that only by using open, free and uninterrupted dialogue can valid
knowledge come about in a balanced rationality, which takes account of all areas of
human interest and action (Abercrombie et al., 1984, p. 99). In his recent work (1987b,
1984), Habermas develops his notion of a liberating reason by giving fundamental
insights into the unconsciously understood 'lifeworlds' and into the nature of an
undistorted communicative action (Dews, 1986, p. 151 ). The use of balanced reason in
human affairs can be freed from its overtone~ of complicity in positivist, technocratic,
bureaucratic, hegemonic domination.

Habennas understanding was that positive and constructive change could only occur
through social movement~. He asserts tliat the current major social problems lie in areas
of cultural reproduction, sociaiis.ation, and social integration con,.;e!!ling "the grammar
of forms oflifc" (Habennas, 1987b).

Habcrmas provides a fruitful theoretical position for this discussion of the politicosocio-economic and cultural context for information systems research within
modernity. He understands his task as developing foundational theory on which can be

,,s
based specific practice

Ill

help marginalised people free themselves from domination

(Held, 1980, p. 250) and in helping deal with social problems isuch as "social
reproduction of society".

,,

The basic question that Jfabcnnas has grappled with, has been how to understand
modernity (in panicular the capitalist modernisation of society) by dr:iwing jointly on

the resources of philosophy and 1he social sciences. Habennas is a rationolts1 in that his
project is to ground a balanced practice of reason in inter-subjectivity, notably applied

.

to truthful communici:,rion, rather than in the individual subject. By balancing

.

,,

instrumental rationality wiili intersubjectivc communicative interaction, his project has

c>
, been to provide a positive platform from which to apply _social theory.
0

/

.

Crucial to critical lhetJ!)" .;:' reflection

and

.

u .

self-understanding. Haberm.rJ commends

self-reflection as this "leads to insight du~ tc/the faCt ~at wliat has p,eviously }"/{

_.,.

unconscious is made conscicus in a manoer rich in consequences.' .. "(19i3~
.

p: 23). I
\'i

He for sees a .situation in which a balanced ratioil.i.lity, or liberating re.?.son, can occuf: ·
In this _ C()mmunication is free of domination; Self-reflection and practical itction
1
fruitfui\y combine in democr~t,ic political awareness and action; pco,ile think and act in
a balanced rational way to deter 1ine the shape of their own lives individually and in
'•,\

co,;;munii.'); in·, a fully intcr-subjcc!i\'e way. Thus communicati\'c action that

,.

.,,

,,

,

•I

complements instrumental action as people, gro~"'·'·a'11ld nations discourse and act\\ a
_lbalanc~, rational approach through communi~ti\'e interaction, throu~ action that is

' . o~cntcd to reaching an undcrst~ding (Pussey, 1987, p. 120).
gCnuin'ely
1··

'

•"•

Haberrnas's theory attempts 10 resurrect a major theme of the enlightemncnt - tlint of
•· providbg a potentially empowcri:1g thcnrclica\ framework for a balanced rationality

,.,'

within public debate. This could, he hopes, he part of the process of enabling
individuals, groups and whole commu:1itics lo free themselves from coercion,
-

l

/.'

oppression and domination by destructive hegemonic ideologies. Such an ideology is
technocratic consciousnes, in advanced capitalism marked by technocratic and

,,/,

instrumental solutions.

Questions of justice, or of freedom, or of truth ~ccrn increasingly unreal as economic
rationalism defers to technical solutions to guarantee minimum welfare, manage the

'i

economy and sustain economic growth. The end result of technocratic consciousness is
a society autonomousiy governed by technical cybernetic systems control mechanisms
concealing the dominating interests of certain groups and classes (Held,! 980, pp. 64-5).

The notion of discourse, within communicative interaction, in the context of\ifeworlds

,,

is centrally important in his theory. This is part of his 'linguistic tum' to address, along
with most eontemporruy social theory, the problem of lan!:,>Uage rather than the flawed
problem of consciomness (Held 1980. pp. 132-3). Discourse is undei;tood as that

acfr:!ty in w~ich humans commuoicatc with an expectation of umlerstanding and with
the hope of reaching a genuine consensus.

Inherent in this is attentive listening am! opens an explanation of, both verbal and nonverbal, of outer observation and inner values, goals and und:_.'fll1~ndings. The overall
goal is nan inte-rsubjcctive mutuality of reciprocal understanding>~\are<I knowledge,
mutual trust, and accord with one :mother" (Held, 1980, p, 3/1), Human
cowmunication can be distorte<I by communicative incompetence, by dominati~'q or by

,,

'\.

\~

'

unbalanced ·~trateg;,c imcrnction' of indoctrination and propaganda. ln the ideal,

i,'

'

10

agreement should be rcacl'.cd by an acceptance of the position that has the bet!cr

argument (Held, 1980, chapter 12).

3.2.l 'Lifeworlds' and Systems
•:,

"

Central to Habermas's theory of communicative action (1987b, 19!14) i5,.'lifeworlds'

nnd systems. Every human group has its 'lifeworlds'. 'Lifeworlds' contain the
background knowledge that is share,! by the members of a group. lt is the background

L'Onsensus of everyday life and often the storehouse of knowledge that is passccl from

I'

ol!e generation to the next. This includes common understandings - "what every~ne
knows". as well as common beliefs ancl feeiiilgs. Language is a part of •ijfoworlds'.
Particular colloquialisms can be part of group 'lifcworlds. For Habennas (1984) a

lifoworlds is:

//'

Anjimplicit knowledge that can not be represented in an infinite
number of propositions; it is a holistically structured knowledge, the
basic elements of which intrinsically define one another; and it is a
knowledge that docs not stand at our disposition, inasmuch as we can
not make it conscious and place it in doubt as we p\c:isc". (p. 34)'

Every humar. has 'lifoworlds' understandings, which may differ from group to group.
Even to be vcrba!!y understood in a group means that some 'lifcworlds' understandings
mus\ be common. To be fully accepted by a group one must share 'lifcworlds'
1

understandings. Furthermore:

Each actor draws from a common stock of ki,ow\cdge, which is
provided by a cultural tradition shared witl1 others. It is this
background-knowledge which represents the context of the lifcworlds,
and in which any communicative interaction is cmhcdded
(Hahcrmas, 1980, p. 129)
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For Hnbennas, the 'lifoworlds' is the context within which communicative actions
occur and the horizon within which pl:oplc refer to aspects of the three worlds as an
interpretative framework for their situation definitions of communicative interactions.
;,

'

\\·~·~They are the objective, the inter-subjectively shared social world and the subjective
world of individuals and other collectives. Habr,rmas ( l 984) contends that:

It comprises more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background
convictions which serves as a source of situation definitions that are
presupposed by participant as unproblematic and it also stores the
interpretive works of preceding generations. (p. 70)

In its border sense, 'lifoworlds' are the communicatively formed (overtime) life
experiences and beliefa. (consciousness and humanly created) which guide attitude,
behavior and action (Broadbent et al., 1991; Myers & Young, 1997; Ngwengania &
Lee, 1997). In Haberrmrrsian term, lifeworlds is a type of cultural space, which gives
meaning and nature to social life (Laughlin, 1987). It is the context in which social
actions and social structures are manifested (Pusey, J987, p. 59).

In modem society, the 'lifeworld~' is undergoing a profound process of rationalisation
in the spheres of culture, society and perso11ali1y. Thompson (I 983, p. 285) interprets
,,:
these as the 'symbolic space', as it were, within which cultural tradition, social
integration and personal identity are sustained and reproduced. Habermas (1987b, p.
138) understands the three elements of 'lifoworlds' as follows.

The term culture for the s\ocK oi knowledge from which participant~ in
communication supply themselves wilh interpretations as they come to
an understanding about something in the world .... the term society for
the legitimate orders through which participants regulate their
membership in social groups and thereby secure solidarity. [111e term

n
personality for] the competences th,it make a subject capable of speaking
and acting, that put him in a position lo take part in a process of reaching
understanding and thereby lo assert his own identity.

The cultural reproduction of the 'Jilcworlds' ensures that newly arising situations are
connected up with existing conditions in the world in the semantic dim~nsion. It
secures a c/Jntinuity of tradition and coherence of knowledge sufficient for daily
practice. Continuity and coherence arc measured by the rationality of the knowledge

accepted as valid. If not situation would be created disturbances of cu\turnl
reproduction leading to loss ofmeming {Habcnnas, 1987b, p. 140).

The social inti;:gration of the 'lifeworlds ensures that newly arising situations arc
conne1:tcd up with existing conditions in the wo~ld in the dimension of social space. It
takes care of coordinating actions by way of legitimately regulated interpersonal
relations and stabilises the identity of groups to an extent sufficient for everyday
practice. The coordination of actions and the stabilisation of group identities arc
measured by the solidarity among members. If this docs not happen, situation would be
the disturbances of social integration, which manifest themselves in anomie and
.,._ corresponding conflicts (Habcrmas, 1987b, pp. 140-1).

!:''
The socialisation of the m~mbers of a 'lifcworld' ensures that newly arising situations
'

arc connected up with cx.isting situations in the world in the dimension of historical
time. It secures for succeeding generations the acquisitiun of generalised competence
for action and sees to it that individual life histories are in harmony with collective
forms oflifc. Interactive capacities and styles oflifc are measured by the responsibility

~

i\

'Gf persons. If not this happen situation would be the disturbances of socialisation ..

,,ii

73

process, which arc manifested in psychopathologics and corresponding phenomena of
alienation (Habennas, 19H7b, p. 141).

The systems emerge from the 'lifoworlds.' These systems are expressions of
'lifcworlds' as functionally definable, tangible organisations. According to Habcnnas,
the principle systems are ll1e economic and administrative systems. The behaviour of
these economic and administrative systems is guided by 'lifcworlds.' They arc tangible

expressions of the cultural 'lifewor!ds.'

These systems are held together and

coordinatec! by steering media such as money and power, which take over areas of the
'lifeworlds' and then reconstitutes them as the objects of control. " It is these two media

(money and power) that shape and extend the technocratic consciousness over
lifeworlds" (Pusey, 1987, p. 107). Acr.ording to Habermas (1987a), that:

The technocratic consciousness reflects not the sundering of [particular]
ethical situations but the repression of 'ethics' as such as a category of
life. The common positivist way of thinking renders iner1 the frame of
reference of interaction in ordinary language ... as the refined models of
the sciences migrnle into the socio-callural lifoworlds and gain objective
power over the latter's self. understanding. The ideological nucleus of
this consciousness is tb.c elimination ,~r the distinction between the
practical and lh.e technical. ... Technocratic consciousness makes this
practical interest disappear behind the interest in the expansion of our
power of technical control. (pp. 112-3)

Systems as sclf-rcb'l!lating action contexts, which coordinate actions around specific
mechanism or media become concretely represented in and through defined societal
institutions (Broadbent et al., 1991, p. 3; Thompson, 1983, p. 285).

In capitalist society, the economy through money and market and the state through
power and bureaucracy constantly subjugate the '!ifeworlds' to the colonisation.
Through the ~ieering media of money and power, socio\ relations in the 'lifcworlds arc

.,.
moncturiscd uml burcuucrntiscd and adapted to the functional requirements of the
sys!cm (Pusey, l987, p. 107).

However, individuals- develop thci: language skills which enables them to__diffcrcntiatc
'

.'

,i,;

of the 'lifeworlds' and systems and the development of both (Lauw:,lin, 1987).
Habennas undcr,;tands that tlu: societal evolution takes over time through a process of
increasing diffcrcntiatir:n and increasing discursive skills when the elements of the
'lifeworlds' develop, leading to shifts in both steering media am) institutional systems.

3.2.2 Colonisation of 'Lifew<lrlds'

Central to Habemms's theory of societal development is internal colo11ization of the
'lifeworlds' (Habcrmas, 1987b, p. 332). This is the situation where what Habcrmas
calls that the steering media 'get out of hand' and steer the systems into domains, which
are not locked into, or reflecting 'lifcworlds' demands (Broadbent et at., 1991, p. 5).
The result will be the appearance of pathological side effects, loss of meaning, loss of
hope, alienation, depression, stress, anomic and withdrawal of legitimation and these
become the nonn. Ho.hennas fl987b) noticed the situations in advanced industrial
societies and state that:

Modem societies attain a level of system differentiation al which
increasingly autonomous organisations arc connected with one
another via ddinguised 'llcdia 'Jf communication: these systematic
mechanisms-steer a social intercourse lh::.t has been largely
disconnected from nonns and values, above all in these sub systems
of purposive rational economic and administrative action . . . have
become independent of their moral-political foundations. (p. !54)
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When stccr11lg media begin to colonise suU systcmr l>ccomc more and more complex as
a result of cupitalist growth and pP.nctrate deeper into the symbolic reproduction of the
'\ifeworlds' representing society as a social confusion (Habcnnas, 1987b, p. 367).
,;i

·;,-·

Further Habcm13s deeply looked at the colonising tendencies; whether or not the
steering media is of a "regulative" or "constitutive" character tl,at constitutive form has

more colonising potential.

Rq,,u!alivc rules TC),'Ulate some pre-existing, on-going

activity whereas constitutive character consists of some form of activity. Regulative
rules arc c!aimr.d to be "frccdom-guilfnntceing" (Hnbermas, !987b, p. 367). They
moderate systems behaviour to reflect existing 'lifcwor!ds' norms and values.

Constitutive e!Tccts deemed to be 'freedom-reducing' and actually reflect attempt to
ir.odcratc behaviour through clmnging the aee~ted norms and guiding 'Hfcworlds'
(Habermas, 1987b, p. 361). The constitutive rule of Habcr,nas concerns whether the
steering media can be either amenable to "substantive justificatioo" or can be only
J::

"legitimised through procedures" (Habcnna~. 1987b, p. 365). White (J 988) summnrises
this situation as follows.

[For regulative rule], since law is embedded in the lifeworlds context, it
is more comprehensible to the average individual and musl be defc;uicd
by elites on material grounds. [For regulative rule], Jaw becomes far less
comprehensible and easier to defend purely on the grounds that it has
been appropriately enacted by competent and responsible elites. (p. 115)

Broadbent et al. ( 199!, p. 7) suggest that ofiicials or elites will direct all steering media.
If these arc understandable to "average individual", it wih not need much dctending by
the elites and they are amenable to substantial justification. If these circumstances arise,
the particular form of steering media will be following 'lifhworlds' demands. If the

particular legislation is for less comprehensible with more que,tion., rniscd nbout the
appropriateness of the elite to formulate the rules, Habermns believes these particular
media have colonising potential.

/ Ii

Habermas (1979) commends that systems world is made up of the abstract sysl~ms that

I)
shape human intera~tion is controlled by rational scientific and teclmical dccisioo using
normative rules, procedures and structures. The defining feature of this growth of
technical expertise and so much control, which is placing over the faiths of '\ifewor!ds,'
can be justified rationally. Habennas (1979) argues the c,cercise of power in this
process limits free and open discussion necessary for human development. Therefore
human beings have a 'practical interest' for mutual understanding and an 'liberating
interest' in freeing from constrained imposed them by power structures that results
human beings seeking processes of participatory democracy to control their own
sincerity which could genuinely represent their own free-will (Wilson, 1997).
\,'

3.2.3 Human Cognitive Interests
,;

Springing from 'lifeworlds,' Habermns sees three fundamental human interests arising
from work and communicative intcrn~tions. It should be noted that thb categorisation is

,,

seen as helpful in clucidatiJig his rece\'.t work in ar!,>Uing for a balancing on instrumental
action with communicative action ·(Habermas, 1987b, i984; Outwait, 1987). Thus
human i11tcrests can be categorised into three areas - tee/mica/, practical and

emancipatory.

11

TI1c technical interest is based on empirical analytical knowledge, which is aimed at

prediction and control of cvcn1. The technical knowledge is used to maniptllatc human
knowledge (Habcrmas,

1973). The practical knowledge constitutes historical

hermeneutic knowledge ,·,.hich is aimed at achieving inter subjective communicative

(symbolic) understanding within an ethical aml political dimension.

The technical and practical interests arc organised as formal knowledge. The
emancipatroy interest aimed at liberating from act of naturalistic interventions and
constrains. The emanicpatory interests emanate from imbalance in social relation of
power, domination and alienation and seek the realisation of autonomy and freedom
from distorted influences such as distorted communicntion.

11te emancipatory interests are concerned with the basic morale pursuit of human
emancipation. As part of methodological approach, it criticises the power and ideology
ir existing social arrangements that distorts morn\ relations within social interactions,
unnecessary and non-transparent constrains on human freedom and wdl being, the
liberating interests.

Habennas

(1973, p. 22) c;,i;plains this situation as the

cmanicipatory interests can develop to the degree to which the repressive force, in the
form of negative e;,i;ercise of power, presents itself present permanently in structures in
distorted communications- that is to the c;,i;tcnt that domination is institutionalised.

That knowledge and rationality guided by the technical and practical interests will
locate reasons it self (Habcnnas, 1987!1). Therefore, there is

m1

internal dcmJnd for the

conditions of free am1 open communication. Habennas (1987c) contends 1hat an
adequate cpistcmn!ogical understanding of the empirical-analytical sciences must
include the e;,i;istcncc of open community of self-critical inquires.

'"
3.2.4 Human Conscious Ratioonlltics

Habermas (1987b, l 987,, nod ! 984) provides a useful categorisation of instrumental,
strategic and communicative rationality. He categorises h~an conscious rationality as
instrumental, strategic, or communicative. If instrumental rationality, necessary for
work, is not balanced by communicative rationality people are led into misguided
strategic rationality to dominate and control people as if they were mere objects. As

Habcrmas (1973) rather scathingly contends, under the prcs~1rc of unbalanced
instrumental rationality:

The hitherto undisputed attempts of the great theories to reflect on the
complex of life as a whole is henceforth itself discredited as dogma ..
. the spontaneity of hope, the act of taking a position, the experience
of relevance or indifference, and above all the response tG suffering
and oppression, the desire for adult autonomy, the will to
emancipation, and the happlness of discovering one's identity - all
these are dismissed for all time from the obligating interest of reason.
(pp, 262-3)

Habermas thus conttnds that a consciousness dominated by instrumental rationality
reduces human reflection, hope, witness and self-discovery. An ideology of
'technocratic consciousness' becomes dominant which 'not only justifies a pa:;tic11lar
11

class's interest in domination and represses ano1her class's partial need for
emancipation, but affects the human race's emancipatory interest as such" (Haberrrills,
\987a,p. lll).

//

((
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3.2,5 Human Actions

'
Habermas's (1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1984) emphasis on communication was in response
to., critique of the philosophy of positivism, which he understood as buttressing and

reinforcing scientific and technocratic consciousness. For Habcnnas, the nl11eteenth and
twentieth century's "preoccupation with science

and, in philosophy, with an

examination of its methodology, impaired the underst{nding of the 'meaning' and

'import' of knowledge" (Hold, 1980, p. 300). In reinstating ~e importance of these·1
notions, Habcrmas makes the fundamental distinction betwcCii instrumental, strategic

and',::ommunicative actions.

3.2.5.1 Instrumental Action

For Habermas (1987b, 1987c, 1984}, instnunental action is behaviour which treats
natural objects as instruments to achieve success by accomplishing set goals in the most
efficient way. For example, the person who uses instrumer:tal action expects to hehave
o.thers according to his wishes. The objective of this action simation is to control .md
m~·l1ipulatc human heh:.viour in social situations fur achieving rational goals that will
serve the actor's sdfintcrcst while ignoring the human qualities (Lyytincn et al., 1991;
Lyytincn & Hirschhe\m, 1988). People who subject to the instrumental actions attempt
to enact coherent meaning for th.e action and the action situation and will normally
refle,.;t upon the contextuality er appropriateness of the action. Fr_r instance, the person
,, \._ who rer.eives order asks whether the person who has i~sued the order has an authority
or knowledge to issue orders or actions (Ngwcnyama & Lee, 1997).
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3.2.5.2 Strategic Action

For Habennas (1987b, 1987c, l 984) strategic action is an improper use ofiostrumcn\11\
,;
action (purposive rational action) in human communication, which involves II person's

desire for influencing and transforming the behaviour of others. People who use
strategic action make use of best strategies to achieve their rational objectives for their

self-interest or the organisation or the institution concern (Lyytincn et al., 1991;
I

'

Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 1988).

People who are involved in strategic actions manipulate organisati?nal processes,
influence policies, and 'rules of the game' to their advantage (Ngwenyama & Lee,
1997). The type of rationality associated with this model is the "cob'llitivc-instrumcntal"

rationality of a subject capable of gaining knowledge about contingent environment and
putting it to dfective use in intelligcntl.v adapting to and manipulating that environment
(Habennas, 1984, p. xi).

Strategic actions ma.y be overt or hidden. The well-known eKample for strategic acti~n
is organisational politics. When actor:; are engaged in strategic actions they make use of
their personal and other sources of power and status to manipulate the opponents. When
a strategic action is issued as an order, tho actor being an intelligent person wl10
receives the order reflects on it claiming its contextual validity. Strategic actions

"· deemed

legitimate and valid when it confirms to organisational norms, policies,

au:hority structures and the unwritten rules of the game. When it does not confirm, the

)1

..

,,

pcrs<in who is subject to the action can conside'i" it 'dirty trick' (Ngwcnyama

II
1.997).

·''

\'

&Lee,
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3.2.5.3 Comnmuicativc Action

Communicative action is n system of reference that cannot be reduced to the framework
of instrumental action (Habcrrnas, 1987c, p. 137). When instrumental action is used to
control nature without self-reflection, :.m unbalanced instrumental rationality can

eventuate. Communicative action springs from communicative rationality. It is oriented
to reaching understanding while being marked by openness of discussion (no hidden
agendas), freedom to speak and be heard, and the reaching of consensus through the

validity of the arguments (Habcnnas, 1987b, 1987c, 1984; Pusey, 1987). Reaching

understanding is considered to be a P~ces·~:, of reaching agreement among
communicating partic1pams that meets the conditions of rationally motivated agreement
to the content of an utterance.

A communicatively achieved agreement has a rational basis; it can not impose by either
party (Hnbermas, 1987b, pp. 286-7). The objectively obtained agreement by forcing
participants or influencing opponents or use of violence is not counted

11s

genuine

agreement. Agreement reached on common conviction (i.e. recognition or rejection of
speeeh acts vf participants) can be used as rational reasons for potential decisions
making. Communicative action takes place through language and sign systems in
genbral (Lyytinen et al., 1991; Lyytincn & Hirschheim, 1988).

.

•• 11

Communicative interaction is that type of structured human activity involving·language
and reflexivity necessarily within a moral framework (Held, 198( ~. 259). It embodies
a moral -=oncem for the rights of· participants to. remain free from coerei"'.O and
distorting influences while participating in a discourse that aims to attain genuine

''

"'
·;,, understanding and consensus (Pusey, 1987, p. 81 ). Communicative actions arc drawn

0

)~p from our shared lifcworlds. They arc".historically slrm;turcd nnd on!y umenahlc tu
consciousness because it is ever 'behind our backs' (Pusey, 1987, p. 84) .

.. For Hnbennns (1987b, JC.i°87c, 1984) communicative action is inter-subjective and coo~J;1tivc iet1exivity in building mutual understanding and co-operation towards, that,

,,

which is true, free, just, and fair. It is the most comprehensively rational fonn of
communication, which is oriented to redching an undcrslancling across all the three

dimensions (objcctiw, social and subjective) of the worl<lvicws of 'lifcwor!ds.' The
understanding is arrived based on the recognition of corresponding validity claims of
comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness. and rightness .

, coming to an understanding

about something in the world is the pmccss of bringing about an agreement on the
presuppose-cl basis of validity cbims tha: can be mutually rcr.ob,nisc<l. Coming into a
fully understanding of aclion situations delimit in the areas nf incomprehension and
misunderstanding, intentional and involuntary untruthfulness, concealed and open
discord; and, ... pre-existing or achic·,ed consensus (Habennas, 1979, p. 3).
)!

,,;

So,cia\ actt'.:rs are engaged in communicative action, in every day activi'ties, in social
context and they communicate with each other about the state of affairs, decision taken,
organisational events and the like. They use a common language and shared
understanding fium a background consensus pertaining to those intc:;m,;ations taken
for granted among particiµants (Habe!lllas, 1979, p. 3). For exnmple, in communicati\'e
5itu11tion ! when the listener or reader fails to understand the communicative acts of
senders, the listener would reflect upon it and try to enact so cohcn;:nt meaning for it.
This process of eu.ic:ing coherent meaning from the 'text' is a crucial reflection cycle in
which the rcad1:r/!istener ,est the validity claims of comprehensibilitylintelligibi!ity,

"'
truth, truthfo)m:ss and lcgitinmcy (rightness/upprnpriatcncss) associated with the type
of communicative action (Ngwcnya1na & Lee, 1997). In ordinary, simple conversation
these four elnims arc usually taken for grunted, lmwcver they tend to he highly
problematic when addressing complex social issues such as design ideals for
iiifonn11tion systems devclopmco1 (Klein & Hirsehhcim, 1996}.

3.2.6 Uuivl'rsal Validity Claims

Habermns argues that linguistic meaning is constituted communicatively. Jn every
ii

utterance

:i.

speaker milkes entails its own specific validity claims or assessment that is

raised in speech-acts. With every utterance a speaker makes a tntlh claim relating to the
.,

\\

\\

.

objecl1w._. world of.}\ates of affairs, rightness claim concerning the rightness,
appropriatcn~ss, or ::',egitimacy of his speech acts in relation to the social world of
,:,

'

normatively rcgulate'd .; interpersonal relatlons (i.e. intersubjectivity}. It includes
truthfulness or sinceriry claims relating to the subjective world of experiences to which
the speaker has privilege access {i.e.. sincerity or authenticity in regard to the manifest
expressions of the speaker's inner intentions and feelings in the subjective world
,~Habennns, 1984). Mingers ( l 995) summarised the validity claims of communicative

··-, .\

actions as follows.
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, The Validity Claims of Communicative Actions (after llabermas. 1984) (Adapted from

'

Mingm, 1995, p. 298).

Habermas says they nre universal formal fcaturei of linguistic wm;nunication. The
validly that is claimed cannot be restricted to .. validity for the speaker." or '"\'alidity for

a specific group". Validity means validity for e\'cry subject capahle of speech and
action (1992, p. ix). Ill ordinary, simple conversation these claims arc usually taken for
granted, yet th?y l<.:i1d to be highly problematic when addressing complex social issues
such as designing ideals for information systems for a wider acceptance to interested
parties (Klein & Hirschheim, 1996).

In social int~ractir,n situations, when doubt arises about the validity claims of any
interaction. these validity claims can be contested, criticised, defended nnd revised in
the hope of reaching to an understanding using reasons or grounds along to gain
intcrsubjcctive recognition for the validity claims (1-lahcrmas. 1984). The social actor
tests

the validity claims of an issue(s). drawing upon knowledge from the social
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conteic.t, the particular action situation itself, and the nricntntion of the other person
whose action is being disputed. In this manner, by critically reflecting on the validly
claims, the actor can free himself from false or unwarranted beliefs and assumptions

about the action whilst redeeming the claims through personal reflection (N1a,,wenyama
& Lee, 1997).

The task of the self-reflection is to achieve a new definition of the situation, which all
participants can share. If the actor fails his attempt to free from the action situation,

then communicative actions do not continue and the action is called into an open debate
to.regain the validity claims.

3.2.7 Ideal Speech Situation

In the context of "ordinary communication", questions are raised when the truth or
correctness of background validity claims become disputed by speakers lllld when the
mode of interaction of actors shift to discursive actions whilst testing every word that
the speaker utters referring to the validity claims of communicative interactions
(Ngwenyama & Lee, 1997). In the situation of discursive action. actor's agrr!lllcnt
about a shared background is no longer taken for granted, but various assumptions
concerning communication background arc carefully examined, clarified and their
validity tested. In this situation, legitimacy of moral value choice can be checked, or as
Habenm1s puts it, the claims underlying such choices Cllll be "redeemed". These
principles relate to rational discourse.

In relation to information systems, a rational discourse can legitimise the selection of a
design ideal because it assumes that the arguments of all interested parties are heard

and that the choice results in nn informed consensus ahout the design idea!. ll is also
understood that the formal value choice is made hy the force of helter argument (Klein

& Hirschhcim, 1996). The ultimate idea of such discursive communicatior1 is lo come
into a common understanding through a critical debate while treating all the parties
equally. Ab>recment is b,1sed oo recognition of the corresp()nding validity claims of
comprehensibility (uttering something understandable), truth (giving [the hearer]
something to understand). truthfulness (making himself thereby understandable), and
rightness (coming to an undcrsl,tnding with another pcrsou) (Habcnnas, l 987b, p. 120).

When actors take part in argumentation, they must assume that certain norms hold in
order to ensure that arguments and discussions have a particular form inasmuch as the
participants reciprocally assume the right to question the grounds and motives of those
who affirm contrary positions to their own.

In an argument situation, actors arc

allowed to express fully their opinion and must honour the outcome of open rational
debate. The situation is defined as "ideal speech" (Kelin j., Hirschhcim, 1996), it
constitutive of following ru!cs. Klem and Hirsehhcim (1996) outline:

I.

All potential participants in a rational discourse must have an equal
opportunity to begin a discourse at any time and to continue it by making
speeches and rebuttals and by questioning and answering. Habcnnas calls
this an equal chance to use communicative speech nets.

2.

For all participants there must be an equal opportunity to interpret, to assert.
to recommend, to explain and to justify as well as question to give evidence
for or against the validity claim of any of these forms of speech. The
purpose of this condition is to nssure that in the long run. no presupposition
or opinion can escape from becoming the centre of discussion and criticism.

3.

All participants are presumed to he equally ahlc lo express their attitudes.
feelings, and intensions. These I lahcrmas calls representative speech acts.
They serve as a guarantor against self-deceit, illusions, and insincerity of
members among the speech community towards one another.

4.

All participants arc presumed tu be equally able tu give and refuse orders, to
pennil and prohibit, \o promise or nsk for promises, to account am! ask for
11ccounting, ck. Habcnnas refers to these as regu!alivc speech acts. They
guarantee that the fomial chance of LXJUal distI"ihutinn of opportunity to
begin or continue a discourse is realised. (l!abermas, 1973, pp. 255-6)

The debate situation is ncc<lctl to occur in perfcclly symmdrical an<l reciprocal
rel11tionships between participants who neither <lominatc nor deceiv~ one another. Jn
such a situation. Ha hennas ( !975) writes:

The bracketed validity claims of assertions, recommendations, or
warnings arc the exclusive object of discussion; . . participants,
themes, and contributions arc not restricted except with reference to
the goal of testing the vali<lity claims in question; ... no force except
as a result, all
that of the better argument is cxcrcisc<l; and .
motives except that of the cooperative search for truth are excluded.
(pp. 107-8)

Jn an ideal speech situation, all participants in the dchatt:. must have an ambition to
achieve a rationally valid agreement and such agreement is arrived only through the
consensus. This is a fonn of democratic political decision-making in which all
decision5 arc made equally, i.e. rationalising decisions is arriv~d at through discussion
free from domination (Hal:-ennas, 1987h, pp. 7-10).

Habcnnas further says that ttwe

need to bring both attitudes of human actions and motives to a critical <liscussion to
disclose the mix of basic methodological assumptions an<l action•oricnting sclfunderstanding" (self-understanding means a person's or group's own interpretation of its
motives, nonns, and goals) (Habcnnas, 1987b, p. 10). This is the area where intersubjectively shared backgroun<l knowledge of participants is critically examined.

In this discussion, the consensus is arrived through shared knowledge and mutual trust
between participants defining the formal properties of the specific mode and level of
discourse but not by the domination or cxerei~e of power over one another (McCarthy,

"
1978, p. 291). Habcnnas conclu<lcs "we can be .~urc that conscnsu~ about a
recommendation to accept n nonn .

. expresses a 'rational will' in rclnlion to a

common interest ascertained without deception. The interest is common bccm1~c the

constrnint free-consensus pcnnits only what all can want (Habcnnas, 1975, p. 108

3.2.7.1 Brcakd01rn of Communication
The problems arise when distortions resulting from selfish motives of participants and
breakdowns of communication occur. Breakdowns of communications can occur due to

concealed strategic action of a participant who .i~ so assented to instrumental success

that manipulation occurs. On the other hand, not appreciating the unconsciously
understood lifeworlds, can also systematically distort reaching an understanding among
participants in communicative interaction (Habermas, 1987b).

Breakdown in

communication can also occur when an actor in communication fails to observe the
norms or fails to apprehend the actions of others arising from false, incomplete.
insincere or unwarranted acts.

Habermas's systematically distorted communication

within a.framework of communicative action can be seen in figure 2.

In social situations of concealed strategic action, at least one of the participants behaves
with an orientation to success manipulating others. In unconscious dccep:ion, at least
one of the participants is deceiving him~elf about the fact that he is acting with an

,,4;c· ,/
attitude oriented to instrumental success and only keeping up the appearance of
communicative action (Habermas, 1984, p. 332j.
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Figure 2. Systematically Distorted Communication (Adopted from l[abem1as, 1984, p. 333).

Habermas (1979) says that cvtn in the most distorted of communicative situations there
remains something of the basic impulse behind all utterance:

"1he intention of

communicating a true proposition ... so that the hearer can share the knowledge of the
speaker" (p. 2). !-labermas says the ideal speech situation could be approximated if we
can eliminate coercive intentions such as deception or manipulation through discourse.

Habermas (1984, p. xi) asserts that "If we assume that the human species maintains
itself through the socially co-ordinated activities of its members and that this coordination is established through communication-and in certain spheres of life, through
communication aimed at reaching agreement-then the reproduction of the species afro
requires satisfying the conditions ofa rationality inherent in communication".

3.2.8 Rational Satiety lh;r,~ugh Communicative lntcraeiion

As I understand it, li~b~rmas's rationalisation of society through communicative
interaction in the sphere of 'lifeworlds' context is sehcmalieally depicted in figure 3.
Habcrmas argues that communicative rationality can only be achieved thro1.1i:;h

communicative interaction and communicative action that is genuinely oriented to
reaching an understnnding as a process nfshared learning (sec figure 3). This can be
achiev1-'li through discussions oriented towards challenging systems rationalisation
through technocratic cnn~~iousncss and Hfcworld understanding of symbolic structures
of communication can he expressed through ordinary language arising from
hennencutic interpretation of the subjective world view of participants. In other words,
in these discussions, intcrsubjcctivcly shared knowledge of participants is sought based
on "rational" arguments in a distortion free-environment (middle box in fi&,ure 3).

In. this discussion have a particular form inasmuch as the participants reL1procally
assume the tight to question the grounds and motives of those who affirm contrary
positions to their own. Moreover, the discussion and the level of justification become
reflective. The interaction 1e~11lts in an emergence of communicative rationality {two
solid lltTows from the middl~ box to systems and lifeworlds in fib,ure 3); the consensus
expresses a discursively formed

"rational will" for all the participants who have

msisted distorting factors such as technocratic consciousnr.ss, manipulation, deliberation
and domination. That communicative rationality can onl~ arise in the 'lifcworlds as an
achievement of communicative reason.

Ii

The communicative reason might eventually, lead to m4)rc "rational structures" as
alternative to the existing "structures of domination" and to changed organisational
pri~ciples that would be based on the interests of all and so deserve the genuine
legitimacy of consensual agreement rcached:.'at the discussion.

"·'\,
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Flg,,re 3. Habcrmas's Theory or Societal Development through Communka1ive Interaction (A<.lopled
from Pusey, 1987)

Moreover, the newly emerged systems structures have to be re-appropriated through
communicative action into the 'lifcworlds.' In this manner, the problems between the
'lifcworlds' and the systems will be resolved through improved adaptation to
'lifeworlds' demands

that

reduce distorting

influence such as

technocratic

consciousness, deception, domination, illusions, and deliberation (the big arrow from
systems to Jifcwor!ds in figure 3).

The communicative rationality that surfaces from 'lifeworld' understanding may,
through new forms of communicative action, produce new "communicatively achieved
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ngreements" with new "structure-forming effcci:.i" with "motive-forming thought" in

'\ifcworlds' contexts bringing system and lifcworlds into balance (the big arrow from
'lifeworlds' to systems in fi~,urc 3) (Pusey, 1987).

Instrumental and strategic actions usually from a technocratic consciousness exerted in

the current practice of information systems development could be counterfactually
restated as communicative rationality, a balanced state of rationality that lakes into
consideration the bctte!' arguments and wor!dview understanding of participants. This

communicative rationality is achieved through an increased under~tanding and
kn_owledge among the participants in an open discussion as a process of shared
\eaming.

The "troth" generated in this manner about the systems development process is the
"true-knowledge" where participants could free (emancipation) themselves from a!l
forms of constrains such as inflexible bureaucracy, purposive rational actions, distorted
communication, inner and outer conscious or unconscious distortions, delusion,
illegitimate use of power and domination.

In an open, distortion-free communicative interactions people develop on clarity of
self-reflection whist developing a mutual understanding and trust of each other. This
situation could be defined as a state of collective autonomy in which the participants
have the power to determine rationally and freely the nature and directions of their
collective existence (Fay, 1987, p. 205). Consistent with these arguments, Fay outlines
three basic claims about human existence that:
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(a) humans are typically unfrce, dominated by conditions which they neither understand
nor control, a situation which results in their leading unsatisfactory lives
(b) human life need not be this way
(c) An increase in knowledge is the way the oppressed can liberate them and thereby
better their lot (Fay, 1987, p. 203).

Habermas holds that an adequate theory of society must integrate philosophy and
empirical social science to alleviate social problems (Habenm1s 1984, p. ix). Such a
theory which aims and guides improvement of human conditions is important for
researchers as they have vested interest in providing solid theoretical foundations for
societies including the areas of management and use of iofonnation technologies in

organisations (Zmub, 1995).

3.3 Conclusion

In his theory of communicative action, Habermas explains a rational approach to human
communication through communicative interaction. He introduces communicative
rationality with communicative reasons as a balanced approach that takes into
consideration all the major fonns of human interests in human communication. He
discusses both the problems of technocratic consensus and unconsciously understood
Jifeworlds in communicative interactions.

Habcrmas's theoretical f.ramewotk helps solve the problems between technocratic
consensus and '!ifeworlds' in a manner rich in consequence where an the participants in

"
communicative

interactions

free

themselves

through

critical

reflection

and

understanding.

Habennas's theory of communicative action focuses on freeing participants through
critical reflection of conditions arising from domination, misapplied power, alienation,

bureaucracy, distortion in communication and other unequitablc situations within the

social contexts associated with systems development process. His approach promotes an
understanding of the systems development process within a distortion free environment
as a shared learning practice, ·whose aim is to design a system based

Ol!

th.:: genuine

consensus of the demands of all fue partir:iriants, in the activities of development

through communicative action and interaction~·

Thus the theoretical frame work outlined in this chapter, and the social context of Sri
Lanka explained in the chapter four, iterate with empirical data developed into an indepth cas at NCCL in chapter six.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SOCIAL CONTEXT: SOCIO-CULTURAL,
ECONOMIC AND POLJT1(;AL ENVIRONMENTS

4.0 Introduction
This chapter explores the social context for information systems development in Sri

Lanka in the context of developing countries. This chapter examines ,he role of
infonnation technology and information systems in conjunction with information
systems development and practice in developing countries. This is followed with a
critical examination of information systems research and practice in developing
countries, accounts of socio-economic, political environments and cultural contexts for
information systems development in Sri Lanka, with a conclusion about modernisation

of Sri Lanka through information technology and information systems.

4.1 Role of Information Technology and Information Systems

Advan.::es in infonnation technology have played a promin(lflt role in improving
organisational effectiveness (Robey & Azevedo, 1994). Jn particular, infonnation
systems in organisations have come to be seen as strategic resources, which provide
potential competitive advantages (Lauden & Laudon, 1998; Feeny & Willcocks, 1998;
Earl & Sampler, 1998; DiRomualdo & Gurbaxani, 1998; Ross, Beath & Goodhue,
1996; Roclcrt, Earl & Ross, 1996; Porter, 1985; Porter & Millar, 1985).

Infonnation systems can deliver better _quality products, enhanced control, reduced
costs, and increased flexibility (Odedra-Straub, 1996). They can be used as a strategic

weapon to defeat or frustrate competition fscc Laudon & Laudnn, !998: Applegate,
Cash & Mills, 1988). o/gwiisations can helter survive using infonnation systems, and
hopefully thri'. ~•}nan increasingly r.ompetitivc environment (Doherty & King, 1998).

lnformation/.systems have profound cOi:cts on organisational structures, processes,
s;ultur,, ai:id working procedures (Doherty & King, 1998). Moreover, these infonnation
systems hive ·an impact on most aspects of human lives, especially in' economic
activities, education, entertain~ :mt and communication.

i'(

The US Labour Department announced in early December 1999, that productivity has
risen by 4.9% in the third qu,lrter of i 999, its biggest gain in almost seven years (cited
,,in Splettstoesser & Kimaro, 2000).

Consequently, many businesses tend to view

information systems development as shaping their future (Keen, 1991). Additionally,
prospects of using new information systems techniques to achieve a grc~ter

'

organisational effectiveness have impacts on quality of work life and )!.en'era\
eKpcctations of socio-economic development (Davison, Vogel, Harris & Jones, 2000;
Robcy&Azevedo, 1994).

Many nations all over the world, particularly in Western societies have adopted
infonnation technology for socio-economic development in their countries (Corea,
2000).

Application of infotmation technology is considered as or,e of the most

significant

forces

of

modernisation

(Avgerou,

2000).

Computer-mediated

communication networks, such as the Internet and World Wide Web, offer tantalising
~orsibilitics of global communications (Ess & Sudweeks, 2000).

,,,,,,
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Information technology has also been inc)(tricably linked with economic prosperity and
power, exerting revolutionary impact on the way t!H1t the world <foes business and the
way in which its citizens communicate (Davision et al., 2000). Individuals and
government~ arc using information technology to gain political and economic advantage
(Hnwkridge, 1991).

It has the potential to narrow the gap between the advanced

indUSaial nations and those developing, in that developing countries coul!I leapfrog
developmental stages (Odcdra-Straub, 1996).

4.1.1 Information Technology and

Information Systems in Developing

Countries

In the current discourse on national development, there is assertion that policy makers
and managers in developing countries sl1ould focus on achieving pervasive information
and communication technologies so that societal benefits will permeate to equivalent
degrees of saturation as in developed countries (see Talcro & Gaudette, 1995). A belief
in the direct social and economic value of computerisation (Kling, 1996) presumably
informs such counsel.

Most developing countries exploit the potential benefits of use of information
technology for improved results in productivity, organisational effectiveness, and
business competitiveness

(Avgerou, 1996). Researchers and practitioners both in

developed and developing countries assume that the use of information technology
together with information systems lead to improved management decision making in
productivity, effectiveness, and competitiveness because information available to
decision-makers reduce uneertJinties that confront managers (Splettstoesser & Kimaro,
2000). In developed counl!i..s, usually Western societies, the development and use of

'"
information systems is al igncd with their cultures, value systems, norms, capacities to

a!Tord the technology, and the market dynamics of individual economics (Corea, 2000).

Policy makers and managers in developing countries focus on achieving socioeconomic development in their countries using information technology applications

(Bhatnagar, 2000; Wacma, 1996; Avgcrou, 1996).

Information technology is recognised as a means for offering more efficient socioeconomic development in the least developed countries (Meso & Duncan, 2000). Both
information technology and information systems are often identified as the key to the
re-invention of the governments in developing countries in a free market, following
failures

in

the

state

bureaucratic

models

of socio-economic

development

(Samaranayaka, 1999). For example, information technology can facilitate economic
development through availing information to make choice of development priorities
easier and to plan and manage development activities better.

Information and communication technologies are considered as new possibilities and
enabling technologies to attack problems of rural poverty, inequality, and environmental
dcb,radation (Human Development Report, 2001; Bhatnagar, 2000). It is believed that
development of information systems such as document management, electronic data
interchange, group ware for computer supported group work, and Internet and intranets
in thc~e countries, can lead to improve service quality. They make planning more
effective, and thus become a means of empowering citizens (Bhatnagar, 2000; Kiangi,
1996; Traunmuller & Lenk, 1996) and

"infonnate" employees to play a more

substantial role in their organisations {Zuboff, 1988).

"
4.1.2 Problems of Information Techuology and Information Systems Adoption
In Developiug Countries

In contrast to the developed countries that have been steadily capitalising on the rapid
puce of information and communication technologies, a large number of developing

countries, particularly low-income countries have failed in the adaptation of these
technologies. This is mainly due to prevalent constraints in cultural, socio-economic,

and political contexts (Wacma, 1996; Avgerou & Cornford, 1995).

Developing countries may be seen to be missing out on the much vaunted potential of

computer technologies to promote product and service quality (Davenport, 1993), and to
permit implication in a global economy increasingly penetrated by technology based
information flow (Odedra-Straub, 1996). Moreover, it is a well-known fact that
information systems implementation often creates states of flux which challenge innate
and established ways of functioning in organisations in developing countries (Powell &
DiMaggio, 1991).
I

I
I

I

""

One of the most important problems of information technology, information systems
development, and implementation in developing countries is the difference to the
dominant Western culture (Thanasankit & Corbitt, 2000; Jayasuriya, 1999; Madon,
1992;Walsham, Symons & Waemn, 1990). For example, culturally formed structural
human characteristics can inhibit information systems development and implementation
efforts in most of the developing countries. Avgcrou and Cornford (1995) note that
various structural and behavioural obstacles restrain many of the information systems
development and implemcntatioos projects in developing countries.

HJO

Common obstacles to he found in developing countries arc omcial restrictions for
security reusons as well us 1he rigidity aml compartmcntalisatio!l of gov..,rnment
burcuucrncies, \\hich consider ccr1uin types of informatioo ns their property (Fox,

1991 ). Azad and Erdem ( l 998) note that in many cultures, information is still equated
with power, which restricts personnel willingness to share data and information through
inteb>ratcd databases and systems. Usually databases arc managed on the basis of
infonnation being secret rather than a valuable source of information that could be
readily accessible (Soficld, 2000).

Power and politics has been widely discussed in infonnation systems literature (see
Standing, 1998). Some examples are:

I. The politics of organisational change related to information systems (Marks &
Pfeffer, 1983)
·,:.

2. Power in the decision and implementadon of accounting and control systems
(Marks, 1983)
3. Post implementation politics related to material requirement planning systems
(Kling & Iacono, 1984)
4. The type of power that information systems professionals exercise over users
(Marks& Bjorn-Andersen, 1987)

5. Political activities and the use of power in the fonnulation and implementation of
infonnation systems (Waema & Walsham, 1990)
6. Use of computerised information sys1,.1ms to serve the interests of those in power
(Danzingcr, Dutt..-.n, Kling & Kraemer, 1982) and as a tool that changes the power
balance (Barley, !986)
7. Colonisation of 'lifcworlds' in organisations through infonnation systems
(Broadbent et a!., 1991)

,m
8. Realisation ofhiddu agendas of managers in organisation through the development
ofinfommtion systems {Myers & Young, 1997).

Simi\nr[y, a case study of implementing a computerised rural information systems
project in India reveals that infmmation systems served to reinforce the cultural context

maintaining the power of the higher levels over the lower levels of administration
(Madon, 1992). This case study reveals that infonnation systems by itself cannot force

the abandoning of Jong established ways of administration (Jayasuriya, 1999). To
successfully implement a computerised system, the implcmentofl! identified that a key
factor was the need to reinforce the organisational (administrative) structure whereby
issues of power and territory had to be taken into account (Foltz, 1993).

The appropriateness of the technology and the creation of an environment favourable to
the introduction of t~-chnology were considered critical in Foltz's (1993) study.
Hofstede (1991) identifies, in most of the devr.loping countries, present greater power
dependence by subordinates on bosses {a greater power distance) and a higher degree of
collectivism ns opposed to individualism than in the dev~loped countries. People arc
mainly unwilling to take risk in these countries and thus uncertainty-avoidance
behaviour is predominant (Hofstede, 1980).

Compared to developed countries, communication via information systems and
language differences can also trigger some information systems development and
implementation failures in most of the developing countries {De Boer & Wa\beek,
1999; Klflidog, 1996).

The majority of managers in developing countries have

paternalistic and authoritarian attitudes (Jaeger & Kanungo, 1990). Consequemiy
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infonnation flows arc mainly from top to bottom in the form of directions and
commands (Kirlidog, 1996).

Most developing countries have the difficult task of intcmolising the procedures and

products of alien cultures. PL7haps the most important realisation is that tcchnolol,,y is
not culturally neutral, which points to the importance of the social, cultural, economic,

and political conte:i.t of technologies {Castells, 1996).

Although the value of information technology infrastructure in business has been well

recognised (see Brancheau, Janz & Wctherbe, 1996; Broadbent, Weill, O'Brien & Neo,

1996; Duncfill 1995), many developing countries arc disadvantaged by lack of
advanced technology such as telecommunication infrastructures (Kirlidog, 1996).
Additionally, developing countries are characterised by shortages of managerial skills,
lack of computer knowkdgc, fear to use modem technologies, socio-economic and
political illstabi!ities, economic depression, low per capita income, lack of development
policies, and persistence: of market failures (Davison et al., 2000; Palvia, Palvia &
Zigly, 1992; Hoselitz, 1964).

4.2 Information Systems Researc!J. and Practice in Developing Countries

Before examit1ing the information systems research environments of developing
countries it is important to explain the meaning given to the term "developing
countries" for the purpose of this research, as it is able to be defined in a variety of
different ways. The countries referred to here are those in the so-called Third World.

)i
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The 1l1ird World rcfors to countries that do not belong to the Western world ccntrc<l on
the US (Perera, 1989, p. 141 ). Some writers even distinguish a fou1th Vl(lrld composed
of the poorest or least developed countries of the world (sec Mcso & Duncan, 2000;

Palvia & Palvia, 1996).

An examination of information systems development practice of most developing

countries reveals that they have had little chance to evolve infonnation systems
practices, which would truly reflect the local needs and circumstances. Jn many
developing countries, information systems development practice have operated under
the rubric of scientific and economic reasoning, that forms the foundation of Western

modernity (Avgerou, 2000; Thanasanldt & Corbitt, 2000; Avgcrou & Cornford, 1995).
These are characterised by a dominant positivist approach, which itself is based on
purposive-rational economic rationa!itie~ in social situations (Habermas, 1987a, 1987b,
1987c).

The important assumption, made both in the Western and in the developing countries,
is that the positivist approach used in developed countrio.:s is appropriate for developing
countries (Wiiliams and Standing, 1994; Madon, 1994). This assumption is associated
with the belief that the human condition can be improved by reason alone (Touraine,
1995).

This assumption tends to ignore or not recognise tho idiosyncrasies of

organisations in developing countries with their own socio-culture and economic and
political environments (Jayasuriya, 1999).

Avgerou (2000) notes that many of the widoly known problems faced in developing
countries arc constituted within the tcehno-cconomic and scientific rationality of
development which stemmed from the Western so~ieties' experience of modernity.

'""
This tcchno-cconomic

and scientifically rationalistic concepts dornirmte over

'lifeworlds' in developing countries (Tsoukalas, 1989). For c:,;:amplc, the ad~ptation of
a computer system by lhc State Bank of India, along with the packaged banking
software proved not to be suitable because banking practice in India is organised on a
"social responsibility" ethos, quite different from the Westen\ modernisation concepts.
The package has remained largely unuti!iscd (Banerjee, 1981).

In Sri Lanka, this sarnr, principle was evidenced in the demise of database development
effort in a Department of Management Studies in a University (Williams & Gunatunge,

2QOOb). More generally, certain indigenous managers in organisations in Sri Lanka
tend to perceive socio-culture, beliefs systems, and social values as important
determinants of success in organisations. However, these values arc often suppressed
by the purposive rationality of organisations (Gunatunge & Jayeratne, 1992;
Gunatungc, 1991). Often Indigenous managers tacitly accommodate certain sociocultural 'lifeworlds', values, beliefs, and myths in solving problems, which has seriuus
ramifications for infonnation systems development and practice in organisations in Sri
Lanka (Gunatunge, 1996).

The positivist approach developed for infonnation systems in the West and its
adaptation in developing countries is based on priori asswnptions about the research
enterprise, which do not take into account peoples' behaviour within socio-cultural and
'lifeworlds' contexts. For example, although several models of national culture are
suggested in the literature (see Schwartz, 1994, 1992; Hofstede, 1991, 1980; Schwartz
& Bilsky, 1987; Glenn & Glenn, 1981; Rokcach, 1973; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961;

Parsons & Shils, 1951), they are overly structural and suggest only narrowly
prescriptive constructs to study culture (Thanasanki & Corbitt, 2000),
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Most of the culture-based studies in management and information systems research
conducted in developing countries adopt Hofstcdc's (1991, !980) four-dimensions
framework (Le. power distam:c, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, and
masculinity versus femininity). The popularity of 1-lofstedc model comes from its large
sample and use of empirical data to demonstrate cultural differences. RcscarchcrS who

use Hofstede's framework accept the results of tlx, research on face value without a
critical reflection of their findings. These researchers tend to become 'jailed' within
Hof~tede's priori framework, which is subject to little or no critical reflection.

Several researchers recognise Hofstede's model as an insufficient framework to study all

aspects of cultural differences in developing countries (Wickramasinghe & Hooper,
2000; Rahmnati, 2000; Thanasankit, 1999a; Shore & Venkatachalam, 1996). Examples
of infonnation systems research conducted using Hofstcde'G framework can be found in
Rahamati (2000), Katz and Townsend (2000), Shane (1994), Morris, Davis and Allen
(1994), Ueno and Sckran (1992), Rodriguez (1991), Kedia and Bhagat (1988), Kogut
and Singh (1988), Tricker (1988), and Sekaran and Sm;dgrass (1986).

Within Hofstede's framework, important 'lifcworld' understanding tend to be ignored
in an institutionalistic fashion (Habennas, 1987b), resulting in information systems
failure

and

poor

p<"litica!

decision-making

(Thanasankit,

1999a,

Shore

&

Venkatachalam, 1996; Randall, Hughes & Shapiro, 1994; Luff, Jirotka, Heath &
Great batch, 1993). Alternative ways of perceiving the value of human innovation often
manifested in the social context of developing countries are poorly understood by the
researchers. Newly arising situations for the researcher, especially in the stale and
organisational situations arc often poorly understood in the conic~'.! of existing

'"'
conditions and value systems in the semantic dimension. This disorientation erodes
continuity of tradition and coherence of knowledge, which leads to a breakdown of

management and employee relations in organisations (Habermas, l 987b).

Researchers who adopt Hofstcde's framework ignore meanings of subjects, not

captured within their models, and often tend to view such information as irrational and
unimportant material. Western scientists and experts regard such understanding as
methodologically questionable or at best of merely localised importance (Brodnig &

Schonberger, 2000), or implicit and .term incognila (Ngwenyama & l,;,lcin, 1994), or
irrational (Avgcrou, 2000). The underl,,..mg and deep problems of developing countries
as a result of Western modernisation through information systems largely fails to
understand, capture, and explain using Hofstedc's framework.

In many developing countries, organisational adoption of techno-scientific and
economic rationalities of technologies has often been stifled by their perceived
incompatibility with traditional value systems, belief systems, and cultural practice
(Brodnig & Schonberger, 2000). This incompatibility can lead both m;;;mgemcnt and
employees to a loss of meaning, anomic, alienation, and a loss of cultural identity
(Hnbermas, 1987b, 1984). More importantly, socio-cultural '\ifeworlds' arc often
suppressed especially those appropriate for industrial production using information
systems in modernity (Peter, 2000). Above all purposive rational economic and
administrative action have become independent of their moral foundations (Habermas,
1984).

This incompatibility, betwec,n Western techno-scientific and economic rationality and
socio-cultural lifeworlds and their socio-economic and political contexts in developing
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countries, plague many infonnation systems development and implementation projects
(Brodnig & Schonberger, 2000; Avgcrou, 2000; De Boer & Walbcck, 1999; Jayasuriya,
1999; Wacma, 1996; Odcdra-Straub, 1996; Avgcrou & Cornford, 1995). Many of the

failed information systems projects arc constituted within the tcchno-scicntific and
economic rationality of development and knowledge, which stemmed from Wc;;tcm
societies' experience of modernity (De Boer & Walbeek, 1999).

In the context of developing countries, the techno-economic rationality of Western
modernity which is instrumental in narrowly defining a series of problems and

determining their solutions, proves to be unsuccessful in streamlining people's
behaviour (Avgerou, 2000).

Real changes in social systems such as infonnation

systems development need to spring from social context and historical experiences in
developing countries (Avgerou, 2000; Jayasuriya, 1999).

Korpela, Soriyan, Olufokunbi and Mursu (1998) suggest that information systems
development must be alib>ned with national cultures and local pra1:tice. Another study
of Palvia and Hunter (1996) suggest that promoting one methodology or a single
technique for development of information systems, within multinational organisations
operating in developing countries, is not necessarily a good idea due to culture
differences between headquarters and branches. Specifically, information-sharing
systems are not generatisablc or transported across borders (Ein-Dor, Segev & Orgard,
1993). Socio-economic and political issues in a developing country are important and
can decidedly influence the development and use of information systems (Waema,
1996; Walsham,

1992), and effective management and information systems

development require creativity, largely driven, by the interests of an organisation's
participant~ (Ciborra, 1991).
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Korpela cl al. (1998) suggi:st that the 'nuts and bolts' of information sy~tems arc likely

to be the same in industrialised and developing countries, but the users and
preconditions differ.

111c information

systems development methods

and

methodologies need to be adjusted from country to country to take the socio-economic

and political differences into account (p. 276), because every problem situation in
which a participant in systems development engages is situated within a social context.

Such innovative ideas compelled information systems researchers to explore alternative
approaches to the dominant positivist approach for infonnation systems development in
developing countries to suit the needs of these countries (Thanasankit & Corbitt, 2000).
Information systems must be developed with an understanding of\ocal factors (Barker,
1993), because culture, value systems, beliefs, myth and so on are unseen, and implicit
in 'lifeworlds' understandings. They often come most dramatically to the surface when
change at a technical or social level are suggested or implemented (Laughlin, 1987).

4.3 Social Context in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka is an island in the Indian Ocean. It

wJk ruled by Sinhalese Kings for more
I

than two thousands years, followed by 500 years of Portuguese, Dutch, and British
colonialism. Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) won independence from the British in 1948.

Presently, the country is a democratic socialist republic with an executive presidency
and Westminster-type Parliament. Since independence, two major political parties
governed the country: United National Party (UNP) (regarded as the most right-centred
party) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLPP) (regarded as the most left-centred
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party). Additionally, there arc about twenty.five minor political partit:s currently in

operation in the country. Ruling power of the country ha~· shifted between the two main
political parties with the introduction of remarkable changes in the sphere of state

affairs since independence. However, revolutionary social and economic changes were
brought about due to the 1956 and 1977 elections.

In 1956, the People's United Front (PUF), a coalition of the SLFP, formed a government
under the leadership of S.W.R.D. Bandaranayaka. Their election victory unleashed new
forces hitherto held in check by a colonial-style bureaucracy operating within relatively
detached political processes (Wilson, 1977). The PUF fought for social reforms to
restore age-old cultural, religious, cCDnomic, and social values in Sri Lanka
(Yodhasinghe, 2000). It broke the prevailing laissez-faire state economic doctrine and
led to Sri Lanka beCDming a mixed eCDnomy with an emphasis on state-controlled
sectors (Wickramasingher & Hopper, 2000).

In 1977, UNP, the main right-centred political party won the election on a manifesto
committed to the liberalisation policies of its leader, J.R. Jayewardena. They introduced
major changes for monetary and fiscal policies, science and technology, exchange rates,
trade and balance of payment policies, and the privatisation of the public enterprises
(Abeysckara, 1984). These reforms remarkably changed the socio-economic

life in Sri

Lanka (lndraratna, 1992).

Sri Lanka is presently a plural, multi-cultural society with a persistent caste system
(Samaraweera, 1977). The population is about 18.8 million. There arc three main ethnic
groups. (Sinhalcse 74%, Tamils 18.1%, Moors 7.1%) Sinhala and Tamil languages are
used for official purposes whilst English is considered as a link language (Gunasekrrn,
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J999). Although S\nlmla nnd Tamil J:mguagcs arc proclaimed as official languages,

II

most of the higher rank officials in tl.\c government organisations and the majority of
.,\'.

employees in the private sector organ/,ations (not privatised) use English in all forms of
communication.

" ",,

The majority of Sinhalesc follow Buddhism (69.3%), but other religions such as
Hinduism (15.5%), Muslim (7.5%), and Christian (7.6%) also receive an equal
recognition.

Per capita income in Sri Lanaka is S823 per annum while inflation

remains at a rate of 7.3%. The unemployment rate is l 0.4 % of the labour force but the
literacy rate remains at 91.8%, the second highest in South Asia region. Economic
growth rate is 4.7% (Cer.tnJ Bank of Sri Lanka, 1998).

Abou.t 1.2 million families,

receive (about US$ 10 per month) subsidiary benefits from the ni~jor welfare program''Samurdi"- launchcd by the government (Ratnayake, 1999).

',\

The Sinhalese and Tamils claim distinct ethnic identities with respect to their history,
language, and religion. For over two decades the struggle of 'Tamil Tigers' for a
separate state drained state resources (i.e. 26% of GDP in 1998) and constrained
development. The war between official troops of the government and Tamil Tigers
·killed about 90,000 persons including innocent civilians and the war still continues. The
efforts of both present and previous governments to arrive at a politically negotiated
solution with the Tamil Tigers have failed up till now, because the Tamil Tigers
renounced discussions with the government. Mediation from foreign governments such
as from Norway, to bring these parties together has been so far failed. Moreover,
normal life in nbjor cities such as Colombo is at a risk due to unexpected al\acks such
as suicide bombers from the Tamil Tigers.

'"
The economy is largdy agricultural (84%), but current dcvclopmcnt policies continue to
emphasise markets and industrialisation (Jmlrarathna, 1992). Sri Lanka is located
physically and culturally in South Asia but, being a trndin!.' colony, it has diverse

languages, literature, technology, arts and crafts, customs and beliefs (Pcris, 1977).

Colonialism introduced urbanisation, but Sri Lanka culture is still largely village

oriented, traditional, ethnocentric, and rooted in the institution of Kingship (Wrigglns,
1960). The later began in 543 8.C. with the first King Vijaya and ceased when Britain
annexed the last Kingdom in 1815. The Kingship institution pcnneatcd Sri Lanka
society (Kupferer, 1988}, containing three elements central to Sri Lanka traditional

culture These elements were an agricultural economy, a caste system, and a BuddhistSinhalesc ideology (Paranavithana, 1961).

An effective agricultural economy underpinned the emergence of Sri Lanka's
institutions (Paranavithana, 196!). Villages emerged alongside rivers and artificial
reservoirs. Land and water were th·e major forces used in agricultural production. The
agricultural economy was nommlly self-sufficient (Adagama, 1997). The role of Kings
was to maintain this self-sufficiency (Nicholas & Parnnavithana, 1961). As the owner
and controller of land and water, the King was responsible for efficiently providing both
for agricultural development. The King financed this through taxes on lands and water,
and was entitled to the free labour of the subjects. The King's powers operated through
traditions and customs, which entailed considerable ceremony (Silva, 2000; Moore,
1985).

Practice and beliefs associated with Kingship, which arc family based and involve
relations between land, hmdowncrs, and fnnncrs, continue today in agricultural vil!nges.
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In Wcbcrian ( l 947) tcnns they were basically family-based economic structures of
traditiona! societies. Land is a scarce resource with ownership conccntratc<l amongst
aristocratic families, Buddhist temples, and some government servants. Owners
cultiv.i.te their fields for their own profits: tenant formers working on a share-cropping
basis cultivate others. All use traditional fanning operates with simple instruments and

cultivation involves all family members. Yields depend upon the quality of soil and
seeds, rainfall, and the de!,>TCC of protection of crops from animals. Farmers usually
organise their economic activities around continuing traditional rituals deemed crucial
to villages' ev!.-ry-day life. Villagers are reluctant to change their every-day life with the

change of modem technologies (Wickramasinghc & Hopper, 2000).

Cultural practice and customs such as starting the season at auspicious times, praying
for better harvests, respecting tools, ceremonially celebrating the harvest, are still
prevalent. There was little separation between those that worked and those who owned
capital although some aristocrats paraded their wealth. The harvest was mainly for
formers' own consumption with any excess being exchanged with neighbours in a
traditional barter system (Wiekramasinghe & Hopper, 2000).

The agricultural production process was not subject to particular control or the exercise
of political power relations with ordinary villagers. Communication was embedded in
cultural values, customs and heritages. Villagers worked on mutual understanding with
each other.

Cultural collusion and integrity was deemed to have been maintained

through consensus, which prevailed in every day affairs. Villages paid little attention to
market concentrations of with other domestic affairs being deemed to be more crucial
(Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2000).

"'
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Women in these sociul units were expected to be involved in child caring, cooking,
helping on the fann, and above all, respecting and helping their husband with rice
cultivation. Villagers were tied in to cxtcrulcd family relations. The fathL'f, being the
head of an extended family, had the responsibility of caring, feeding and bettering the
family. The father's decisions were hardly challenged by the family. Day to day life

proceeded on mutual understanding and consensual manner, which still remains part of
the culture.

Every one understood the ordinary language used for communication.

The whole

family worked together to raise money if the family wanted additional income to
maintain their lives. Thus day-to-day life was embedded in work values: agriculture,
family relationships, and Buddhist cultural ceremonies, as it had been for centuries.
Industrial activities, in so far that they existed, were married to the traditional culture the most prevalent practice was the reciprocal understanding of actions by each other.
All the interactions in the agricultural society were enacted within the context of a
commonly experienced 'Jifcworlds.'

Social relations in the village were centred on feudal cast-based family structures that
originally classified people according to the service rendered to the King. The King's
extended family constituted the highest caste (Geiger, 1960; Paranavithana, 1961);
political and religious counsellors and astrologers formed the second rank; and other
ranks were based on people's crafts and occupations such as cultivation, smiths, potters,
barbers, tailors, drummers, and washerwomen. Role differentiation of these people was
not based on specialised skills. Single households of a man, wife, and children were the
basic socio-economic units within extended family relations that included grand parents,
cousins, uncles, nephews, nnu nieces. The eldest male was predomir.antly a decision-
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maker on economic issues. The family unit promoted social unity and individual
esteem, as one's social stntus was largely derived from one's caste identity rntlwr than
individual achievements. This system of social structure was maintained through
marriage, occupation, ceremonies, and social gatherings (Wickramasinghe & Hopper,

2000).

Supporting this social structure was a w,. 11 ~ndcrstood system of status and mutual
obligations between families and neighbours governed by trust relationships. For

example, employees in a paddy field were nonnally family members, though in the seed
showing and harvesting seasons neighbours help on a basis of aththam. This is where
neighbours worked for other fanncrs in a reciprocal relationship without any wage

negotiations. On the workdays in question the fanner provide,; outside employees with
sufficient food and drink. Women were busy serving, helped by their children,
grandparents, and relatives. Each working session was a cultural ceremony (Ariyaratne,

1999).

Unlike capitalist industrial organisations, social relations were formed not for extracting
surplus labour for realisi[lg the objectives of owners in a Uetached labour relation and
political process, but to maintain traditional ways of living {Hindess & Hirst, 1977). The
village was, and still largely is, a social organisation linked by reciprocal relationships.

People were conscious of one another's lives. Vi!lagcrs take pains to meet requests to
participate in activities ranging from fanning to cultural ceremonies. Unlike a capitalist
society, such human actions (communicative a..:tions in Habermas's terms) are perceived
as being part of village life rnther than constituting distinct production relationships,
economic calculation, price payments and wages. Indeed, unlike a capitalist society,
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work nm! leisure, work an(l family, and economic and social relations were not
distinctly separated but intcr.vovcn in day-to-day life in a system of reciprocal

rclati,Jnships (Wickrumasinghe & Hopper, 2000).

The ancient village culture had been based on deeply rooted value systems (Silva,
2000). The political problem-solving unit at village level was called a "Village
Council", the purpose of which was lo resolve day-to-day village problems such as
boundary disputes of land plots and other forms of disputes of villagers in the village.

The functions, respon&ibilities and the ways of solving problems by the Village Council

wCrc not documented but governed by norms embedded in the culture.

The colle1:tively available situation interpretations were stored by al! participants and
could be narratively called upon when required. This social grammar was reproduced
as n whole in every single interaction with other members in the society.

By

implication, the process was understood by every person in the village. The trust and the
mutual understanding of human actions were vested in the customs and traditions,
which formed the fundamental ideologies of human behaviour (Ariyaratne, 1999).
Villagers solved their problems by recourse to core Buddhist principles such as agreedupon consensual truth, equality, selflessness, no objectivo truth as sueh which could be
grasped by reason alone (Amarasckera, 2001).

In fact these were the core values which fonned the culture of Sri Lanka (Amarasekcra,
2001; Ariyaratne, !999). The idea of the chief of the village council was neither to
control fellow villagers nor to gain personal status but to facilitate the solving of day-to·
day problems for better life. The social structure was stamped by prestige. The Village
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Council functioned as au autonomous entity at the village level (Adagama, 1997). This

system of council worked on a fumily model and was committed to its own partially
independent process of development at the village level linking the whole society.

Buddhism was, and still is, central to Sinhalese culture. Sri Lanka's culture is the

expression of civilisation built by the majority ethnic group, the Sinhalesc over
thousands of years (Amarasckcra, 2001). Sri Lanka Kings had to be Sinhalese-Buddhist
and their role was to protect the Sinhala-Buddhist nation {Silva, 2000; Scncvirathnae,

1996). This tradition had been constant historically, was homogeneous throughout
Sinhala villages (Kepferer, 198~). People in the villages were (and still arc) religious
and believed those natural disasters such as deaths, floods, or drought could be averted
through cultural ceremonies. Buddhist festivals such as vesak (full moon day of May in
each year associated with Buddha's birth, enlightenment, and death) w~re, and still are,
celebrated intently as an integral part of peoples' lives.

People in the villages maintained important Buddhist customs, such as not working on
every full moon day and not hanning animals through rice cultivation on every full
moon day (Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2000). Buddhists believe in predestination and
reincarnation. According to Buddha's teaching, one's future state depends upon one's
behaviour in the present and previous souls (Karma). Thus there is no way ofrefraining
or escaping from suffering except by diminishing desires (Sekhera, 1995).

Such beliefs, and the fatalism so engendered, do not tally easily with moJcrn CL'ccJs of
self-improvement, change, efficiency, effectiveness, and market models presumably
being adopted in dcvoloping countries, such ns in Sri Lanka. These market modols
largely followed a Western positivist approach which is based on the doctrines of

teehnocrntic-scicntific and economic rationality or purpo~ivc rationality of managcment
in organisations {Wickramasinghc & Hopper, 2000).

Although villagcr5 do work for and appropriate economic gains, this neither dominates
daily activity nor is it necessarily linked directly to individual actions. People often
perceive their poverty from a karma perspective and consequently do not actively seek
ways to improve economic activities with the belief that "more desire for accumulation
of wealth leads to the extension of [undesirable] life" {Sekhera, 1995). Instead people
use religious ceremonies within the village to 'collect good account' for the forthcoming

life in the next soul.

Human action is purposefully geared towards overcoming miseries through the teaching
of Buddhism and this process is enacted in their day-to-day Jives (Wickramasinghc &
Hooper, 2000). Such ideas are the major obstacles to transformations of devdoping
cciuntries such as Sri Lanka through computerised information systems ar.d their
development or otherwise. Monks and well-established religious culture were, and still
are, powerful antidotes to non-conformity. The modem day discourse such as
encouragement, efficiency, and systematisation arc far from the normal life style of
, , Sinha!ese villagers (Foster, 1961).

This traditionally deep-seated culture in the traditional villages began to change due to
Portuguese, Dutch, and British colonialism which began in the early 16Ut century
(Adagama, 1997). During these colonial periods, the agricultural society changed into a
commodity-based export and import economy.

Political domination became the

crystallising nucleus of the state. The colonial states mediated the Jives of people acting
as an arbitrator through administrative organisations. However, the new political orrler

""
of the colonial states was incompatible with the social structures nf the agricultural
society. The state increasingly mediated the traditionally established customs, social
value systems. !!lld Jiving patterns of people including their day-to-day lives through
institutions, administration, education, religion, and !aw. This process constituted a new

legality and rationality, giving rise to the fonnation of new social structures based on
Western values and culture. The traditional ways of life increasingly surrendered when

the state introduced purposive rational actions and the central functions of power and
control ofhuman lifo in the villages (Adagama, 1997).

Toe colonial ruling system of control in Sri Lanka (before known as Ceylon) developed

an elite social c\a~s who imitated and embraced modernisation programs styled on the
Western countries. This social class enjoyed wealth and power at the expense of the
ordinary people. Education, often in English, was limited to a privileged group, most
notably students from the elite class that were trained in Western ways and held posts in
the administration and catered for the need of the colonial states (Yodhasinghc, 2000).
Administrative systems were constituted on bureaucractic, scientific and rational
principles. This system of administration relied upon the creeds of capitalism and
managers trained in these western principles to buttress the status qua (Gunatunge,
1994).

sri Lanka gained independence from the British in 1948, Post-colonial politics spawned
modem ideologies, often derived from the West, embracing education, industrialisation,
and changed social attitudes to urbanis1dion. The national ideological pressure to
mod~mise and industrialise began in the late 1950s following a balance of payment
crisis. It was part of the country's then industrial development policy of importsubstituting industrialisation (Vidanapathirana, 1999). This included a program for

"'
industrialisntion based on public ownership (Lakshmllfl, 1976) leading to the foundation
ofSOEs under the state ownership.

The rationale for such SOEs were outlined by the Committee for Public Enterprises as
follows: "111csc ventures had a long gestation period, a high risk element and required
tremendous venture capital" (Karunatilakc, 1987). The SEOs were ci::pcctcd to fulfil

certain social obligations:
(a) To make goods and services available at low cost to the public
(b) To assist regional development

{c) To create employment
(d) To induce industrial disci,pline among employees.
These objectives were implemented in the cx:isting political culture of the country.

Some of these state owned•manufacturing enterprises were established in rural villages.

The proliferation of SO Es continued from 1960-70. Tiie size of the SO Es as

II

share of

GDP increased from 5.7 percent in 1961 to 12.2 per cent in 1974 and to above 15 per
cent in 1977 (Lakshman, 1979). The control structure of SO Es stemmed from statutory
documents regulating from the State Industrial Corporation Act No. 49 of 1957 ancl the
ten-year plan of 1959. This defined a public corporation (public enterprise), as a legal
entity owned by the government with considerable financial independence within a
system of accountability to the public through parliament. The assumption was that
public corporations could be controlled by a "universal model" (Amarasingbe, 1978).

Fonnal!y the control of public enterprises embodied a philosophy of legal-rational
principles and bureaucracy (Weber, 1947), that owed much to the statutory corporation
model underlying the structure of British nationalised industries (Kelegama, 1991).
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Management principles followed the tcnnnL~ of scientific managcfY!cnt principle~.
Accounti'.ig systems, such as organisational budgets were used us instruments for
controlling the activities of corporations. The systems were largely manual. Computer
based infonnation systems did not appear up until this period, in the late 1960s.

A left-centred government came to power in 1965 uncommitted to expanding public
sector enterprises: instead they sought to encourage small and medium sized private
firms (Kanmatilaka, 1987). Managerial issues in public enterprises were low on their

agenda despite the large amounts of public finance diverted to this sector
(Balachandran, 1977). When another left-centred government entered power in !970,
committed to expanding public enterprises, they inherited an "empty Treasury" (Budget
Speech, 1970) and an incipient financial crisis.

This situation resulted in introducing a legal framework to control public finances in the
public Finance Act 38 of 1971, which required public corporations to have budgets and
associated financial procedures in an attempt to bring economic rationality principles to
the sector (Kelegama, 1991).

The use of computers in corporations began in the late 1960s when the first computer
was installed at the State Engineering Corporation, which was followed by the
Insurance Corporation, the Petroleum Corporation and the Department of Census and
Statistics. The rationale for introducing computerised information systems to the SOEs
was to efficiently monitor and control government funds, while exerting close control
over the workforce. They were largely installed in Acoounting Departm<!nts to process
payrolls and prepare accounting documents on a batch-processing basis. Managers used
budgets to control employees by committing them to production targets. The efficiency
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criteria used to judge the success of corporntions.

However, paradoxical social

[i

movements within corporations emerged. The budgets provided production targets and

"'\

monitors but they were difficult to implement.

,,11
)''

Employees' cultural resistance remained and became inflamed by an cconomica!!y

"

rational and unduly purposive-rational actions of bureaucrats (Karunatilnka, 1987).

Thus the modernisation efforts attempted through the SO Es model of government using
computerised information systems development, proved unsuccessful due to resistance
stemming from socio-cultural values, economic and political context in Sri Lanka.

In 1977 a new government introduced market-based open economic policy (Colombagc,
1993). The initial reasons for State ownership had e-0me to be seen as unimportant.

Technological advances required the introduction of computerisation and market forces
into previously monopolistic business areas such

as Cement manufa:;ture,

telecommunication ond electricity. The election of a right-centred govem.rnent
committed to market economics was a separntion in Sri Lanka politics and brought
fundamental changes to the industrial development policy (Karunatil\cke, 1993).

Policy makers now promoted a more ~ompetitive environment in an attempt to induce
greater organisational efficiency (Kdegama, 1993). Stimulated by !MF and World Bank
initiatives towards a policy of privatisation, the government perceived public enterprises
as a burden upon the economy (World Bank, 1987).

In general the government hoped to privatise inefficient enterprises. However, the
policy stipulated that enterprises that were visibly profitable should be given priority in
order to make privatisation p1ugrammc attrnctive. Two important legislation acts were
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enacted to support the privatisation, the Conversion of Government-Owned Business
Undertaking into Public Corporation Act, No. 22 of 1987,2 and the Conversion of
Public Corporation or Government Owned Business Undertaking into Public
Companies Act, No. 23 of !987. 111csc enactments were made in order to provide the
legal framework for the "commercialisation" ofSEOs (Kclegama, 1997).

The government changed the name of the privatisation into 'pcop!isation' to attrnct the

imagination of lower middle class voters. The UNP manifesto of 1988 stated that
peoplisation would be used as a strategy to achieve management recovery and
rehabilitation of public enterprises. Accordingly, peoplisation signified an attempt to
introduce commercial norms into public enterprises by converting them to public
companies and subsequently by transferring their ownership to tbc employees and to the
public in addition to the corporate investors (Kelegamn, 1997).

The objectives of privatisation progranune were:
1. To reduce the fiscal burden and to pennit industries to raise funds from the capital
market
2. To increase competition and efficiency which, in tum, would induce technological
modernisation and lead to better consumer service
~- To encourage widespread share ownership in the society
4. To create an enterprise culture (Kelegama, 1997, p. 457).

The government introduced a separate unit under the Ministry of Industries to expedite
the privatisation programmes. The World Bank funded the unit. In 1989, the name of
the unit changed Company from Public Investment Management Board into Public
Management Investment. In 1990, the unit trnnsfcrccd to the Ministry of Finance due to
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slow progress made by the PMIC (Jaycwardena, 1994).

Its role was to provide

institutional lcadcr.;hip to the privatisation process by preparing SOEs for privatisation
and by mirnaging them till divestiture (Kclcgama, 1997).

As part of the privatisation processes the following various measures were undertaken:

I. To strengthen the capital market
2. To facilitate labour retrenchment and compensation in public enterprises
4. To reform the taxation structure to create and maintain environment conducive to

privatisation
S•• To facilitate necessary regulatory activities (Kclegama, 1993).

However, the authorities did not provide information to the public (Jayewardena, 1994)
assuming that the move would be opposed. The government controlled the flow of
information to the public to reap the benefits of privatisation. Even nowadays the
government censors information. As a result people do not trust the truthfulness of
government efforts, particularly the privatisation programme.

Morwver, negat!ve

response by the public towards privatisation was silenced through the use of state poWl r
)I

such as the suppressio11 of public participation in discussions.

In the implementation of the privatisation process, priority was given to those investors
who had the ability to introduce capital and technology into the enterprise and to
provide access to foreign export markets. The rationality was that the issue of all, or the
majority of shares, to the public was n ·t a viable option to achieve the priority
objectives of technological modernisation (Kelcgama, 1997).

In the offer of sale of shares, 10 per cent was gifted to th~r,employees of the enterprise
on the basis of the length of their service, 30 percent to the public and the 60 per cent to

corpornte investor~

011

the bnsis or open tenders and coP1petitivc bidding. It seems that

the real motive of offering shares to the employees was to evoid employee resistance for
the privatisntio11 by giving them token ownership of the privati~cd enterprises
(Kclcgama, l 997, p. 463).

By 1994, most of the privatised enterprises were not relatively large in value. For
,example, 22 entcrp·,isr.s out of a total of 43 valued at less than Rs. I 00 million. Five
enterprises were valuL'li over Rs. 750 million, one of which was the NCCL Company.
The total estimated earning was accounted for 12 billion. This amounted to 2 per cent of
GDP and 10 percent of state revenue. 1l1c investors came from both domestics (Rs. 5.25
billiion) nod foreign (Rs. 4.07) sources in the case of the sale of the majority share
holding. This was in addition to what was realised from public share flotation (Rs. 2.5
billion). Foreign purchasers of shares in privatised enterprises came from a range of
countries including Japan, South Korea, India, UK, Singapore, Hong Kong, Pakistan,
Sw1!zerland and Norway (Kelcgama, 1997, p. 466).

The profits of privatised enterprises have increased with the modernisation and
technological upgrading including the introduction of new infonnation technologies. It

"·';i~ reported that one of the privatised companies

(of the 43 that were sold all went to

•(

corporate it1vcstors) appears to have come up with the record of best perfonnance nfter
privatisation. This infonnation Jed policy makers to emphasise the importance of having
a singie investor to creat~ strong management perfonnance (Kelegama, 1997, p. 467).

International donors, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,
made foreign aid conditional on the pace of implemcntatiot1 of privatisation. Moreover,
pressures from these donors forced the government to privatise profit making SOEs

12'

such ns NCCL and Sri Lanka Telecommunication. The government uml money from

the sale of such profit-makmg SOEs to reduce annual govcrmm.-nt budget deficits.

Although the modernisation e1T011s with open market principles led the public and
employees to oppose the government policy, the process still continues. For example, in
the par\inment, the opposition parties quest:~ncd the process adopted in privatising such

SOEs as Air Lanka, Gas, NCCL, and Telecom enterprises. Certain Ministers were
charged with corruption. The government did not impose any social obligations or any
other restrictions on private owners in the management of SOEs. This was one of the
reasons leading to greater profitability offinns after privatisation (Jayewardena, 1994).

Nonetheless, the rc1a,,ulatory framework prepared to manage the 1,rivatisation does not
address crucial socio cultural Hfcworlds problems such
in Sri Lanka.

as the traditional value systems

Rather, these legal frameworks enactcrl by the government and other

fiscal and infrastuctural facilities were based sJlcly on Wcstem-tyne narrowly
purposive-rationalist principles such

as base-line ae<:onting. The above processes were

established to support those who were in power so as to realise their rational objectives
often at the expense of =rloyees and the gc•.1cral public (Kelegama, 1997, p. 467).

4.3.1 Socio-Cultural Lifeworlds

Cultural antl1ropology

and history have produced a substantial literature

on

transformation in developing countries that meshes together cultural, political, and
economic factors (e.g. Nissan, 1997; Dannie], 1997; Schwatz, 1997; Kafcrcr, 1988;
Williams, 1981, 1958; Althusser, 1970). These researchers, often rejects positivistic

'"
science, understand culture as an important, indcpcntlcnt factor in historical and socioeconomic analyst:s of change and knowkdge creation.

McCarthy (1996) defines kt10wlcdge as "any and every set of ideas and acts accepted by
one or another social group or society of people~ ideas and acts pertaining to what they

accept as real for them and for others". Radnitsky (1970, p. i) has provided such a

broader view: "we conceive of science essentially as a knowledge improving
enterprise".

Knowledge in this sense is not limited to what can be learned from empirical data
collection or mathematical deduction, in positivist sciences, but includes rill human

insight and wisdom that can be exposed in morale discourse (Klein & Hirschhcim,
1996). Knowledge is a matter of commmity acceptance. The criteria for acceptance are
an agreed set of conventions that must be followed if the knowledge is to be accepted by
the community. The set of conventions is nor arbitrary, as in positivist sciences, but is
well thought out and historically produced knowledge claims.

In any society there are a myriad knowledge claims. Habermas contends that theory
which should be accepted are those which can be supported by the force of better
argument (Habennas, 1984). The body of thus accepted knowledge claims forms an
agreed best understanding by a community at a particular point of time (Goles &
Hirsehheim, 2000).

In Habcrmas'ss understanding, knowledge is grounded in '\ifowor\ds.' The working
premise is that social reality is in process and is fonncd out of the prevailing knowledge
of a society or group of people. In order that knowledge be a convention, it should be

relnt1-'CI to socictn! nonns, expectation~, values - whkh is used to engage in a search for
understanding (Golcs & Hirsd1hcim, 2000). The sociology of knowledge is thus the
sociology of culture, values, beliefs, and mylhs redefined and represented as a ~ynthesis
between the "social detmnirmnts" (i.e. knowledge is socially determined) and the social
"ordercrs" (i.e. knowledge coostitutcs a social order).

The social reality is not n social fact, in its own right, but somethiog produced and
communicated, its meaning derived in and through these systems of communications
(McCarthy, 1996). It is the

"greater autonomy" over how people in a society are

represented and how they can construct their own social and cultural models. In
developing nations, social reality form an inertia which prevents to some extent, a take~
over by Western epistemics and historicity (Escobar, 1995).

Snyder (1978 cited in Gales & Hirschheim, 2000) discusses science as" something that
people do. It is not a particular set of assertions or theotics, but

11

set of activities that

may or may not produce organised lileories".

Science, for all intents and purpose, is a problem-solving vehicle. Science "essentially a
process of consensus formation" (Anderson, 1983, P. 25 cited in Go\es & Hirschheim,
2000) .. The consequence of this conception of science is that virtually any scholarly
attempt at acquiring knowledge could be construed to be "science". It is important to
note this notion of science places the emphasis of knowledge acquisitioo on the
"community" (Goles & Hirschheim, 2000). Truth knowledge is therefore a communal
achievement. It is what the community agrees to bestow the label of "knowledge" or
"truth" upon (Gok~ & Hirschheim, 2000).

""
In traditional Marxist :;malysis, ideology is an clement of supra-structure and the role of
culture is de-emphasised. For Marx, culture was just an insignificant factor that
belonged to the supra-strJcturc while productive materialistic forces formed the

infrastructure on which that supra-structure rests (Amarasckcra, 2001 ).

Jn the focc of cult um I analysis, such economic determinism is questionable. If i('.eology
is the formal nnd conscious beliefs of a class, or other social groups, then culture must
be the ground for ideologies. Thus culture is more fundamental than ideology and
culture is a pre-existent and ubiquitous preunderstanding as recognised in Habermas's

conceptualisation of communicative action (1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1984) and William's
nco-Mnrxist conceptualisation (1983, 1980, 1958) which place culture as fundamental
to social systems. In this respect, culture remains as an important supra-structural
phenomenon and ideology should be understood as one of various socio-cultural
reproductions.

In his analysis of 'lifewcrlds,' Habennas (1987b, 1979) identifies culture as the first
structural component, defined as "the stock of knowledge from which participants in
communication supply themselves with interpretations as they come to
understanding about scmething in the world".

an

Culture signifies a "shared

understanding" of actors in communication, a "state or habit of mind" giving rise to a
"way oflife" and "a general reaction to a general and major change in the conditions of
our common lifo" (Williams, 1958).

Culture encapsulates patterns of meanings of

distinct peoples or other social groups (Palmer, 1994), including the processes of giving
meaning to structure, power, identity, and values {Althusser, 1970). Thus culture creates
a particular "social order" in which cultural practice and cultural rcproductior,s are the

'"
main elements through which participants regulate their memberships in social groups
and thereby secure solidarity (Hubcnnas, 1987h, 1979).

CUiture is n si!;nifying system through which a social order is communicated,

reproduced, experienced, and explored (Williams, 1981). Interest in the problem of
meaning is !inked to a methodological framework that is neither causal nor explanatory
but semiotic. The semiotic study of culture is directed towards the study of symbolic
and signifying systems through which a social order is communicated and reproduced.
These signifying systems and social practice are what make up a culture and it structure
of meaning (McCarthy, 1996, p. 20). It involves the study of the general context and
culture of communication and the shared assumptions underlying communication and
understanding (Beynon-Davies, 1994).

The study of 'lifoworlds' is crucial for understanding the role of information
technology and information systems development in social transformations in
organisations in Sri Lanka. Capitalism and industrialisation llas penetrated Sri Lanka
unevenly, leaving important segments relatively free of Western domination and
allowing traditional cultural practice, value systems, bel:cfs, and myths to survive and
predominate. These socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' may sec as major inhibitors to a wider
application of emergent Western knowledge through infon,1ation tcclmology.

Thus socio-cultural practice associated with a non-western societies, such as Sri Lanka,
provide the starting point for understanding the development of information systems
through infonnation technology and whether or not they become subsumed into n nonwestern or a Western culture.
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4.4 Modernisation through Science ond Technology b1 Sri Lanka

A nucleus of modernisation, especially through scientific and technological activities,

began to appear in an organised foshion in Sri Lanka during the 191h century within the
Department of Agriculture and the crop research institutions through the Tea Research
Institute, the Rubber Research Institute, and the Coconut Research Institute (Wijesckara
& Wijesekara, 1999). First, these scientific and technological activities were directed

towards servicing the TC(!Uircmcnts of British colonialism. Later, these activities
expanded into other institutions such as government departments, corporations, and
universities after Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948. A commitment towards
modernisation through scientific and technological activities appeared in policy
fonnulations of all the governments elected after independence (Wijcsekara &
Wijcsekara, 1999, pp. 400-14).

4.4.1 Modernisation through Information Technology

The use of computers in Sri Lanka began in the late 1960s and the early 1970s when
certain state corporations and departments introduced computers at work for processing
financial activities such as payroll, inventory, financial, and cost accounts on batch
processing basis.

The rationale for introducing computers to the state enterprises was

the efficiency principle applied to the monitoring and controlling of government funds.
Generally, during this period, infonnation systems development and practice was
largely ad-hoe, with software vendors providing systems for state corporations and
departments. These systems produced in developed countries mainly the USA and the
West, are promoted, sold, and served by agents in Sri Lanka. The state organisations
were mainly concrmcd with the reliability Md accuracy of data maintained on their

"'
systems. Many of the .~tute sector organisations began their computerisation projects
with little in-house capabilities (Samaranayaka, 1989). Concentration was given to
hardware

acquisition rather thnl'l

developing necessary

information

systems

infrastructure in-house. A number of projects introduced in this way did not have a

sib'llificant impact on the improvement of performance of government corporations and
dcpnrtmcnts in Sri Lanka.

However, the expansion of computer application for commercial and administrative

purposes in Sri Lanka began with the liberalisation of the economy in 1977, resulting in
more computers being used fer financial and business applications. For example, in the
J980s, service oriented organisations such as Banks and most of the private sector

institutions

introduced

information

technology

for

commercial

activities

(Samaranayaka, 1999).

4.4.1.1 Government Policy on Information Technology
In the mid 1980s, the need for a national computer policy for Sri Lanka was recognised.
As n result the government established fue Computer and information technology
Council of Sri Lanka (C[NTEC) by an Act of Parliament in 1984. The national
information technology policy objectives as stipulated by the CINTEC, involve the
following:

(a) To harness computer technology in all its aspects, for the benefit of the
people of Sri Lanka, and to further the socio-economic development of the
nation;
(b) To promote .and guide the development of computer-related resources and
their application, to anticipate and meet the future needs of the national
economy;
(c) To enhance nnd supplement manpower resources and increase the efficiency
11nd productivity of management and employees at all possible levels;

-~~----------------------,---~-=--·~---~~
"'
(d) To improve the quality of life of the people of Sri Lanka, including the job

satisfaction nnd working conditions of employees;
(e) To increase the flexibility and dynamism of Sri Lanka society to enable il to
successfully meet the clmllcngcs of the future, arising from the everincreasing pace of world wide scientific and tcchnolo1,,y. (CJNTEC, ! 984)

Thllse initiatives gave wide scope for information technology being used within both
state n:nd private sector organisations in the country. The apparent motivation was, and

still is, the rationalisation of work practice by the use of infommtion tcchnolo&,,y, rnthcr
thnn cost displacement (cost displacement is realised by substituting technology for
people, see Davis, 1992, p. 384).

For example, in 1986, the Administrative Reform

Committee of Sri Lanka recommended the extensive use of management information
systems and information technology to ensure efficiency in the state sector
organisations for rapid socio-economic development (Samaranayaka, 1999).

4.4.1.2 Information Technology for Socio-economic Development

Information technology was, and still is, deployed in the context of enterprises striving
for efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness in a liberalised ranrket economy in Sri
Lanka. It is conceived as one of the most sib'Tlificant forces of modernisation that drives
a "technology push" for socio-economic development in the country (Srunaranayaka,
1988).

The development of the information technology sector occupies a very important
element in the annual budget (Budget Speech, 2001). The implicit assumption is that
information technology will promote socio-economic development. Fo\lowing this
assumption, over the Inst two decades, Sri Lanka government has created an
environment to promote information technology use in organisations through various

1l3

policy mcnsurcs. For example, the government has removed tariff embargoes un
imports of computers and computer-related accessories. Certain companies on

infonnation technology related business, which engage in such areas as development of
software for foreign markets, have been granted permission to operate in the Free Trade

Zones (FTZ).

Significant progress was made in the application of di&ital technologies in Sri Lanka
during

the

1990s.

Telecommunication

infrastructure

developments

liberalisation have included an increase in land phone users (36 people

pL'l'

through

telephone),

cellular telephone setviccs organisations (currently 4 companies offering a combination
of analogue and digital networks), paging services (5 operator e-0mpanies), Internet
service providers (9 compani<!s), and implementation of modem communication
technologies such as integrated services digital network (ISDN), Frame Relay, and very
,.,small aperture terminal (VSAT). There are five web site providers, who operate as

')
tsellers oflieensed operators (Kularatna, 1999).

Presently, about five organisations are engaged in e-business and about 17214 e-mail
and Internet subscribers (Central Bank, 1999). The development of telecommunication
infrastructurr signifies an indication of the "emerging digital economy" in Sri Lanka
(Ranasinghe, 1999). However, these developments are Hmited to Greater Colombo
region. Nearly 80% of the population living in rural areas have no access to modem
information and information and communication technologies. They are neither aware
of the benefits of infonnation and communication technologies nor are able to obtain
them because of their poor living conditions.

The government hus initiated major projects with the collaboration of foreign countries
(e.g. Australia and Switzerland), to establish an institution to train skilled personnel in
information technology to meet the manpower rcquiremeat of both the state and the
private sector organisations. Moreover, the government has an;iounced the year 2001 as
»the year of information technology" to promote information technology based
economic development of the country. Recently, the government established a separate
Ministerial portfolio for information technology development within the country
(Abeywardena, 2000). The objec\ive of this new establishment

was ,.o prepare

groundwork which will serve as a firm basis for future socio- economic development
(Peiris, 2001).

4.4.t.3 Problems in information technology Adoption

The government expects to introduce information technology-based solutions in
business and administration, both in the state and the private sector, as enabling and
promising technology for the 21" Century, despite widely spread problems such as
dysfunctional bureaucracies, lack of management orientation to the market system, lack
of co-ordination and outdated work systems, and procedures in many institutions of
state departments and corporations in Sri Lanka (Budget Speech, 1996; Jayawecra,

1996). These problems remain major obstacle to the country's economic growth and to
effective implementation of social programmes in spite of the political will of
successive governments to reform organisations.
computerisation projects such

For example, some major

as the introduction of computers to schools, have proved

unsuccessful in making a modernisation impact on students using computers to date
(Samaranayaka, 1999).

"'
This is mainly because Sri Lanka lacks organisutional capacities to accommodate and
manage change to make cffcclivc use uf technology. [t a!aso lacks the ability to move
towards more modem forms of opcrntions, lack of ~kills to develop and maintain new

technology, and its inability to sec chan3c in a wider socio-coonomic and political
context of the country. For example, more than half the schools do not have adequate

infrastructural facilities such as electricity, roads, water treatment n~1works, and

telephones, nor adequate teacher trainers. Students arc taught in national languages such
as Sinhala and Tamil.

English, "the language of computers" is hardly understood by

students, particularly in rural areas, since there is no adequate teachers to teach English

language.

More generally, students seem to be reluctant to learn about computers, as they are
interested only in the formal examination subjects. Neither computer education included
as an examination subject nor adequate computers were provided for schools. Although
prevailing infrastructural facilities are inadequate, students in poor families, particularly
in rural areas, use education as a means to secure jobs to eradicate poverty in their
families. Achieving highest results in G.C.E 0/L am'l AIL is the only target of many of
the students.

In this background environment, it is hardly fair to expect students living in rural areas
to learn about computers, something they may never have heard about in their life.
Also, many school principals fear damage to the computers with student use and certain
principals use computers as symbol of status to maintain the power distance between
teachers (Snmaranayaka, 1999).

The failure of this project proves that existing

infonnation systems knowledge and professional practice arc insufficient to motivate
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stude',.;t~ to use computers in schools am:! thus to derived skills for the effective use of

infonnntion systems in Sri Lanka.

At the University level, computer-oriented programmes have been introduced, as part of
mathematics nod engineering degree courses, with assistance pro'lidcd by the British

and Japanese governments. The Departments of Computer Science, Statistics, and
Engineering at the Universities of Colombo, Peradeoiya, and Moratuwa offer courses

such as computer progrnmmiog, systems design, and systems development through
undergraduate level degree progranuncs. The University of Colombo introduced a
Master of Science (M.Sc.) in computer science in 1990. Additionally certain other
Universities, such as the University of Sri Jayewardcnapura, the University of Kaleniya,
and the Open University, offer computer courses as subjects within their social sciences
degree programmes. These courses include management information systems,
information technology, data processing, computer literacy, and computer application in
accounting, marketing, and human resources management (Various curricula in degree
programmes, 1998).

Similarly, certain MBA and M. Sc. in management programmes have also introduced
management information systems and information technology subjects as part of their
degrees. The National Institute of Business Management of the Ministry of Industries
and Scientific Affairs, offers diploma course in Computer Systems Design in addition to
the private institutions which provide computer courses in programming, systems
analysis, design, and systems development and information technology related
education.
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If [ wer~' to lo~!: back rdlcclivcly, [ would say

!hat during the greater pan of my career as a
university lecturer, Che role of a centre of

learning was understood by the local academic
community

in

terms of dissemination

The

common

feature

in

computer

education in Sri Lanka, both in the state

and the private sector, is an orientation

of

Mmodem knowledge" generated nt Western

towards teaching courses as technical

centres. This approach is more pronounced in

subjects to generate experts knowledge in

information systems areas. Th<:: emphasis was
decidedly on mere knowledge disscminaiion
rather than on contributing through knowledge

creation.

computers

(Williams

&

Gunatunge,

2000b, 1999a).

Teachers adopt expert and an all-knowing posture in teaching computers to students.
The teacher deposits knowledge into students who are viewed as empty vessels. Those
students who meekly accept the knowledge arc the better students. Such an education is
oppressive because it does not teach students to inquire actively and reflect critically
about the world ofleaming computers relating •.o practical problems.

Jn most of the universities, curricula are generally oriented towards computer science
and software engineering rather than towards infonnation systems. An information
Sfstem has not emerged as a separate discipline in all of the universities
curricula in degree programs, 1998).

(Various

There is no information systems Department in

any of the universities, nor an academic journal dedicat~d to addressing information
systems issues.

In certain universities, management information systems arc a subject

within business degree courses but the focus is in information technology rather th~n
information systems. Certain lecturers who teach management information systems

138

equate it with information technology. Most texts and teaching methods in the field of

information technology and management information systems (e.g. Laudon & Laudon,
1998) draw heavily, if nut completely, from nn analytic and instrumentally rational

notion of education. 111c-sc approaches place considerable emphasis on tccl1niqucs and
methods as the major form of knowledge required for management in this area
(Williams, !996). Tiicsc courses do not address, for example, how infonnation

·:cchnology could be developed and used for socio-economic development, rather
information technology is mealy taught as technical subjects to develop technical
information systems {Williams & Gunatungc, 2000a, 2000b, 1999a). This can lead to
staff and management problems in those organisations who employ persor.nel trained by
the universities (Wijesing.her, 1988).

'

It appears that narrow technical education al(?ne is inadequate for generating balanced

'

knowledge among students (Williams, l 996). For example, Asian Development Bank
(ADB) studirs related to Sri Lanka (1989) point out that "facility for technical training
is grossly inadequate both in tcnns of output ati.d occupations focus" (p. 23). This

'

inadequacy is p.'lrticularly due lo a tendencj' to ignore the existence of non-positivist
knowledge in Sri Lanka.
{',

Presently most organisations in Sri 'Lan!<a have introduced computerised infommtion
systems for word processing, spreadsheets and databases for payroll, sales, inventory,
accounting, marketing, and human resources managtmcnt.

Organisations sui:h as

banks, insurance, and NCCL have inlroduced management information systems.
NCCL, for example, ha~ planed to introduce enterprise models to address strategic
issues as an overall framework for the development of corporate applications and

databnses (i.e. the Genn!llle "SAP"· Enterprise resource Planning Systems1. Ahout I OOO
organisations have their own w..::,' pages in the World Wide Web (WWW).

These organisations perceive that the introduction of new information systems, largely
technical systems, acts as enabling technology to derive benefits such as systematisation
of work, increase efficiency, productivity, flexibility, sharing of infonnation across
departments, head office and branches, and competitiveness withiu the liberalised
market model of socio-economic development while employing persons trained in Sri
Lanka (both in the state and private institutions) and

foreign universities

(Samaranayaka, 1999).
1'1.

1\

There have been numerous fail~~e~ in developing information systems for organisations
in Sri Lanka (Williams & Gunatunge, 2000a, 2000b, 1999a; Gunatungc & Williams,
2000). Part of the reason is that infonnation systems practitioners tend to ignore social
·context as important determinants of success in systems development.

Infonnation systems practitioners in Sri Lanka usually evaluate information systems
success from the standpoint of technical and economic rationality criteria only. A Jack
of information systems awareness among managers and a narrow technical focus in
information technology professionals have prevented them from coming together to
identify and implement meaningful infonnation systems development for organisations.
This limited framework often results from positivist training within the dominant model
of knowledge acquisition stemming from Western societies' experience of modernity.

The dominance of the Western centred model of knowledge in information systems
dcvelopmcnl often result in a marginalisation and disqualificatio.n of non-Western

;,
"

140

knowledge within Sri Lanka society. Prnctitioncrn who ignore the existence of nonWestern values in Sri Lanka may do so partly because their training ignored the
cllistencc of non-positivist knowledge rntiona!ities, such as communicative rationality,

which could guide them beyond Western reductionistic thinking (Escobar, 1995). For
example, development studies conducted in developing countries conclude that

"systems of knowledge" should include not only the rules and values of Western
cultures, but a!so ways of knowing within the lifeworlds of indigenous communities
(Sachs, 1992).

Indigenous versions of socio-economic development and modernity arc fonnulated
according to complex processes that include traditional cultural practice, histories of
colonialism, and contemporary location within the global economy of goods and
symbols (Dahl & Rabo, 1992). Societies in developing countries may have better
chances to improve their life conditions if they recognise the limitations of the validity
of Western techno-economic rationality and pursue alternative rationalities stemming
from their socio-cultural and value systems (Avgerou, 2000).

4,4.1.4 Transfer of Information Technologies
Information tcehnolo&,'lcs together with their information systems development
approaches are transferred to Sri Lanka from developed countries. The steering media
are

transnational corporations

and knowledge transfer agencies, professional

organisations (e.g. British Computer Associntion and Australian Computer Society),
foreign consultants, text-books, graduates trained in foreign universities and institutions,
consulting projects (e.g. UNESCO mission in 1985) and aid projects (e.g. Swedish, nnd
British aids to equip and train staff in universitie~, with values embedded in the

modernity of the West.
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4.4.1.S information systems Research

Information technology and information systems research occur mostly by 1.1at1icipation
in various projects funded by Western agencies, with cxpc1tisc from countries in the
European Community such as, the U.K and Switzerland (Samaranayaka, 1999, News,
18.03 2001 Island). This is considered to be the most significant vehicle for transferring

technology from technologically more advanced countries, such as the Western
communities and North America, and for producing original research results (Avgerou,

2000).

This process results in conventional thought and practice being heavily influenced by

the rationality of modernity in organisations in Sri Lanka. For example, although the
urgent need is to deal with the management of the technology transfer problems,
venriors of information technology, mostly from developed countries, through their
agents, tend to focus on technical issues for solving information problems in developing
countries (Mohan, Belardo & Bjorn-Anderson, 1990; Samaranayaka, 1988). The results
of these interventions arc disappointing. Many projects have failed (Samaranayaka,
1988), and a number of those, which succeed to deliver a technical system, did not have
a significant positive impact on the performance of many organisation in Sri Lanka
(Samaranayaka, 1999; Wil!iams & Gunatunge, 2000a, 2000b, l999a).

Information technology vendors and information systems researchers in the West and
the North America fail to fully understand the poverty problem in developing countries
including Sri Lanka. These practitioners, not understanding the prevailing sociocultural, economic, and political contexts for information systems development, believe
their practice and prescriptions are valid for Sri Lanka. These practitioners', including

'"
information systems researchers in developed countries, arc relatively wealthy and hus
little experience of poverty of underprivileged groups in developing countries. Although

development concerns arc apparent in Western societies, their relative severity is
different from that of developing countries. For example, privatisation issues in the UK

are concerned with cost-effectiveness (Hodges & Wright, 1995}. In Sri Lanka,
privatisation is a matter of ncoco\onialisation, which cmcrged from foreign investment

mCehanism (Kelegarna, l993; Vidanapatirana, 1993).

In 'sri Lanka, the planning and implementation of information technology and
information systems have largely been chara.:terised by some form of elitism whereby
the users and affected parties are often not involved. These parties have been taken to be
passive reeipients, resulting in their further marginalisation with regard to their having
the rcqu!~i:c ~kills and experience to effectively utilise and benefit from the infonnation
technology and infonnation systems investment. For example, infonnation systems
researchers in developed countries, in general, and infonnation systems researchers in
Sri Lanka have not studied the behaviour of peasant employees in multinational
companies operating in Sri Lanka. Therefore, thfa technology does not contribute
significantly to the sectors that impact the majority of the citizenry, nflen the poor. The,.'
result is that the application of information technology in Sri Lanka, actua!ly benefits
only those who arc in power. Seen in this light, the transfonnation of organisations
through successful information systems development become illusive.

Information systems researchers inadvertently neglected, or usually forget to address
development issues in developing countries where 80 percent of the world population
lives (Davison et al., 2000). Comparison with deve\opct\ countries show, poor use of the
information and communication technologies in developing countries. For example,
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developing countries account for only 2 percent of the total expenditure on informatics

(Hanna, 1991). They are concerned about the availability of technical skills for
infonnation systems development (Jayasuriya, 1999), are focused on the reliability and
accuracy of data maintair.cd by their infonnation systems, and have a low appreciation
of the benefits and potential of management information systems {Palvia & Palvia,
1996). Conscqucutly developing countries arc unable to take up infonnation tcchnolot,,y
opportunities to the "knowledge economy" (World Bank, 1997).

For example, Internet users in all of Africa and Middle East together account for only

one per cent of global Internet users in contrast to 90 percent of Internet users in
industrialised countries, with the US and Canada alone accounting for 57 percent of the
total (JLO's World Employment Report, 2001). Despite the improvements in labour
market performance in industrialised countries and the growing potential of information
technology to create jobs and spur development, the global employment picture remains
"deeply flawed" for employees in many parts of the developing count1 ics. This results
in a widening global "digital divide" (ILO's World Employment Report, 2001 ).

Although information technology and information systems have come to play a vital
role in organisations and societies in developed countries (Avgerou, 1996; Davision et
al. 2000), and the infonnation and communication technologies revolution offers
genuine potential for socio-economic development (ILO's World Employment Report,

2001), the domain of infonnation systems research has not been adequately explored by
information systems practice in the context of developing countries (Avgerou, 2000;
Corea, 2000; Avgerou & Doukidis, 1993). In many developing countries, including Sri
Lanka, infommtion systems development was not originally a local profession, but was
imported mainly from imperialist, Western countries and the North America, through
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various steering media (Abdat & Pcrvan, 2000; Corea, 2000; Broudnig & Schonberger,
2000; Thanasnnkit & Corbitt, 2000; Jayasuriya, 1999). Although the use of information
systems development and practice is being called into question in the west and the north
(see for example, Ngwcnyamn, Truex & Davis, 1997; Lyytinen, 1992, l 986; Orlikowski
& Baroudi, 1991; livari, ! 991 ), policy makers and practitioners in Sri Lanka have used
the imported models uncritically. They have assumed that information systems
development is a neutral profession, independently functions from the socio-cultural,

economic and political contexts in Sri Lanka.

Western technocratic and economic rationality in information systems tends to ignore
the significance of socio-cultural lifeworlds, economic, and political contei.ts in Sri
Lanka's society, assuming the practice and culture of large multinational organisations
of the West. The main coocem of ioformation systems development is for narrowly
defined success in a market environment through information systems solutions with
modern information te~hno!Ob'Y·

However, there is little doubt that information

technology is penetrating -every sphere of organisational activity in Sri Lanka, even if
more slowly than in developed countries, given the socio-culture, economic and
political context of Sri Lanka (Williams & Gunatmige, 2000a, 2000b;Gunatunge &
Williams, 2000; Samaranayaka, 1999).

The validity and the socio-economic ~nd political significance of information
technology diffusion, and new information systems development and practice has, not
been critically examined in Sri Lanka's social context by either researchers in developed
countries or in Sri Lanka.

There has been no substantial research carried out to

evaluate the broad socio-economic development feasibility of the use of new
information systems, supported by information technology in Sri Lanka nor to study

'"
what impact new technology-based infonnntion systems have on organisations and
society. In effect there has been no significant thought on how to understand the ways in

which information systems could be <lcvclopcd and practised within organisations to
spur socio-economic development in Sri Lanka.

Present information systems development and practice in Sri Lanka organisations
underpin technocratic-scientific and economic rationalism to control human behaviour

for the benefits of the owners of organisations to rca~ise economically rational
objectives following the positivist approaches (Williams & Gunatunge, 2000a, 2000b,
1999a; Gunatunge, 1992). These approaches assume systematised, purposeful, effective,

unproblematic, and value-free infonnation systems development and practice in
organisations in Sri Lanaka.

However, this is questionable in the context of

'lifeworlds,' socio-economic, and political contexts of Sri Lanka.

Following Habermas's framework, I have three main concerns. Firstly, the imposition of
technocratic and economic rationality into a traditional culture may produce cultural
dissonance. A discourse that privileges a modem culture of Western valur.s, modes of
knowledge, and action could lead to discontinuity of cultural values and a fundamental
incoherence of knowledge necessary for daily practice of managers and employees in
organisations. Western-based information systems development and practice can lead to
confusion in Sri Lanka culture with unanticipated consequences leading to personal
anomie and conflicts in organisations. This process also can create disorder in the
socialisation process of employees in organisations leading to alienation (Habennas,
1987a, 1984)..
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Secondly, participants involved in systems development process and practice arc not
value-free. They arc culturally influenced and socially organised.

When culturally

determined aspects such as personal contacts and informal communication, for example,
become dominant mc,dcs of communication (Yavas, Luqmani & Quraeshi, 1992, p. 76),
communication via infonnation systems may face strong resistance. This is because in

these cultures, information is implicit in the physical context or is internalised within the
people's Hfcworlds understanding. In these cultures, resistance may stem from a
widespread perception those computers and modem ittformation systems degrade their
persona! communications (Kirlidog, 1996, p. 58). As a result, information systems
development and practice in organisations in Sri Lanka may impede rather than
facilitate the utilisation of information systems.

Firully, information systems geared to control human behaviour in these cultures resist
controls, rendering them untenable for managerial purposes and managers faced with
conflicting experiences.It appears local cultures, predominant values, socio-economic
environment, power, and politics can contribute to failure (Williams & Gunatungc,
1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b;Gunatungc & Williams, 2000; Gunatungc, 1992, 1991 ).

The question, whether or not a Sri Lanka's social context - understood as .::ulture, value
systems, beliefs, myths, symbols, and behaviour patterns (i.e. 'lifeworlds') - and socioeconomic and political contexts arc favourable to information technology adoption
through information systems development for socio-economic development need to be
further investigated. Within unique histories, cultures, socio-economic and political
contexts, how can the state become effective? Part of the a,;swer is that state should
match its roles to respomc to the needs and interests of their citizens through consensus
building in national policy fomrnlation (Stiglitz, 1998). The development programmes

'"
needs to enlarge to ie1cluck a range of people's choices and make development

participatory und more democratic (Human Development Report, l 991 ).

Within theses interpretations, Habcnnas's ( l987b, 1984) communicative action provides
a framework for analysing changes induced by cultural, socio-economic, and political
contexts of Sri Lanka for information systems development and practice. His theory of
communicative actions provides powerful framework for practitioners to understand the
focal things and practice that sustain social life and culture in Sri Lanka, to what
Borgmmm {1984, p. 29) calls for "focal things and practice" that can "centre and

illuminate our lives".

The essential point is that the state's interventions of modernity into organisational
affairs, that impact upon the development of information systems and practice in
organisations, pays little or no attention to the historically derived socio-cultural value
systems that sustain social systems (Avgerou, 2000). These socio-cultural value systems
are the implied knowledge that participants draw meaning during the systems
development process.

Meanings arc "the symbolism nssociated with specific objects or activities" (Alasuutari,
1995, pp. 26-35). Meaning is intersubjective, i.e. based on shared agreement and
understanding rather than purely subjective. Meanings are shared among different
groups of people, living different forms of life (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 8-12).
Information systems cic:ist within wider conteic:t of these meaning or sense making
(Mingers, 1995).

Looking for such meanings is crucial as symbolic relations between

people and information systems shape culture. They are important for developing
cultural patterns about the information systems being studied.
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From 'lifewor!ds' perspectives, such meanings underpin cwry-day social practice,

which have been created and recreated through cultural reproduction, social integration,
and socialisation of participants in a community (Habcrmas, 1987b, l 984). Therefore, if
the socio-economic development in a liberalised market through information technology
application in information systems is the fundamental objective of Sri Lanka, it is
imperative to understand how information systems practice have been evolved,

developed, interpreted, questioned, constrained, experienced, and used in various social
contexts of different modes of socio-economic development. Thus, policy makers and
mongers in Sri Lanka need to fully apprehend the comple;,:: webs of interactions
operating in the Jifcworlds, socio-economic, and political contexts within a holistic
framework for infonnation systems. Without these commonly agreed beliefs about
s'cicial interaction and role expectation by participants within infonnation systems
development process cculd not be sustair,cd.

If infonnaticn technology and infonnation systems arc to be used to enhance socioeconomic development efforts in a meaningful way in Sri Lanka, it is of paramount
importance to invest in the architecture of patterns of behaviour of people through
communicative action, i.e. in the 'lifeworlds contexts'. These arc oriented toward the
cultivation of various technological innovations based on the social context of Sri
Lanka. The said cultivation requires new

patterns of communication [i.e.

communicative rationality], co· operation [i.e. consensus building among participants],
and communicative interaction [i.e. shared learning]
(Kuhathasan, 2000).

necessitated by change

'"
111is unc!crstanding of infonnation systems development and practice within broader
dynamic social contexts stimulate Sri Lanka to cope with the resulting organisational
changes and to adapt information systems to avoid falling further behind and risk
exclusion from socio-economic development (Splettstocsscr and Kimaro, 2000).

4.5 Conclusion

Information technologies together with their development and implementation arc
considered as much vaunted technology for achieving socio-economic development in

Sri Lanka. These technologies and their development approaches are often devdopcd in
the West following the positivist approach of technocratic and economic consciousness.

These are exported to Sri Lanka through various steering media such as textbooks,
consulting projects, professional agencies, donor projects, information systems research,
and training programs. Consequently, infonnation technology professionals use these
imported approaches in Sri Lanka without critical examination for information systems
development.

In Sri Lanka, information systems development was not originated as a local profession.
As a result, adaptation of these imported positivist approaches has failed due to the
prevailing nature of the social context - lifeworlds, economic, and political contexts in
Sri Lanka. This is examined in chapter six developed into an in-depth case study at
NCCL in Sri Lanka.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5.1 lntroductlon

In this chapter the research methodology, holistic approach and research processes I've
employed in my thesis arc described and examined.

These include selections of

research sites, information about participants inter,iiewed, access issues, data collection,
documentation and validation, and data analysis and reporting of evidence from the

research findings.

5.2. Research Methodology

The research m,:thodology selected for my study had to be congruent with critical social
theory perspective to study social phenomena. Therefore, my research methodology was
a contextualised, interpretative one, with the techniques of critical case study methods
(Myers, 1997; Myers & Young, 1997; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Hirschheim &
Klein, 1989; Chua, 1986; Lyytinen & Klein, 1985). I studied an in-depth case at a large
privatised industrial organisation (NCCL) to reveal empirical and interpretive
understanding of infonnation $ystcms development and practice within historical and
social contexts in Sri Lanka. I critically examine ten episodes in infonnntion systems
development and practice over a period between 1958-2000. In this study, I attempt to
show how critical social theory could be seen in practice by providing evidence from an
empirical case study conducted over a period of six months.
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5.2.1 Rc~c1mh Method

I used critical case study methods (see Myers, 1997). Cnsc studies contrib~te in
important ways to our knowledge about information systems development whether
applied to analyse a single case or multiple case studies (Yin, !994; Hirschbeim et al.,
1991). Yin (1994) asserts that a single case study is appropriate where it represents a

critical or unique case (pp.38-40). My single case study approach helped me to
investigate information systems development and practice in depth to provide rich

description and understanding. It helped me to investigate and understand social
structures which existed beyond the participants' pcre<:ption (see Maseman, 1982).
Scle<:ting :. single case study for an in-dei:1th analysis for social phenomena has been
well accepted in information systems literature (see for example, Pom1. & Hirschheim,
2000; Klein & Myers, 1999; Odedra-Straub; 1996; Walsham, 1995; Hirschheim &
Klein, 1989; Lee, 1989; Markus, 1983) and for doctoral studies (Remenyi, Wi\liams,
Money & Swartz, 1998, p. 162).

Case studies arise out of. a need to under:stnnd and explain corriplcx phenomena
,,(Remenyi et al., p. 162). Case study methodology is increasingly used as a qualitative
research method in information systems research to understand and e~.plain the contexts
within which they are being developed, implemented, aod used (Darke, Shllllks &
Broadbent, 1998; Ca~ayc, 1996; Walsham and Waema, 1994). !t is the most common
qualitative method used in information ~:,stems research (Darke et al., 1998; Alavi &
Carlson, 1992). Yin ( I 994) defines the scope of a case study as "a case study is an
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context arc not
clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (p. 13 ).

··.,1

Cnse study research focuses on understanding the interactions between infonnation
technology-related innovations and the hroad social conlnts (Dru-kc et al., 1998, p.

273).

Case studies provide the best field research in understanding the rroblcms and

i.\Sues of infonnation management (foyasuriya, l 999; Craig Smith, l 990). The case
study methodology provides an opportunity to undem md organisational phenomena
(l:lifubasnt, Goldstein and Mead, !987). It has the potential to yield multiple
constructions of reality in an organisational setting (Standing, 1998, p. 7). Therefore,
the significance of employing case study method in infonnation ~ystems has now been
established.

;,)

Case study approach is often used

'

l~" infonnation systems research to apply social
"

theories in the ,;;ontext of the "whole" (see for example, Avgerou, 2000; Olesen &
0

Myers, 1999; Myers & Young, 1997; Montealegr~, 1997; Walsha._'11, 1993; Hirschh~1m
et al., 1991; Wal sham & Han,' 199 J ). In these studies, analyses are made observing the
iteration of theory with empirical evidence. rather than a superficial rejecting or
accePting of theory based on empirical data. The validity of an extrapolation from one
,;,;,~or more individual cases depends not on the representativeness of such cases in a
statistical sense, as in the case when using the positivisr approach, but on the
plausibility and cogency ~·fthe I.Jen! reasoning. This is further used in describing results
from the case, and in drawing in[crenees and conclusions from those results.

Craig Smith 1989, and Orlikowski & Baroudi (1991) make a similar point in the
specific c;mtcxt of infommtion systems research. They argue that researchers critically
'analyse social phenomena through theoretical framework which they adopt to conduct
their work. Being in line with this new trend of epistemology, Habennas's theory of
communicative action can be used as a social theory for infonnati•)n systems research

!/

,';

I!

'"
in developing countries and the holi~1ic .:asc study approach can he employed a~ its

epistemology to ovcrcomu the problems of survey methods such as questionnaire-based
research to infonnation systems.

The questionnaire-based research generally assumes an objective reality can be
discovered through a "falsification~ or "verification" process of hypotheses. This
approach to infonnntion systems research includes reliance upon the "sampling logic"

for statistical generalisation by testing hypotheses derived from predett-'ITT!incd theory
(Orlikwski & Baroudi, l991; Chua, 1986). It is commonly assumed that reality is
objectively given and can be described by measurable properties, which are
independent of the observer and his or her instruments. An associated belief is that
scientific methods enable researchers to explain and predict objective and value-neutral
records of events of the subjects investigated.

Generally, most researchers employ questionnaires in surveying phenomena Using
predefined variables by the researcher (see Doherty & King, 1998; Hofstedc 1991,
1980). The survey methods are limited in their ability to investigate the social contexts
or to obtain infonnation not specifically sought (Jayasuriya, 1999). ?or example, King
(1996) has noted how research on computer-aided softwan. development has been
dominated by survey methods arc routinely evaluated by questionnaires that seek to
elicit managers' and professionals' perceptions of the usefulness of system~· tools. The
basic assumption is that properly designed questionnaires appear to deliver valid and
reliable quantified infonnation. As he puts it "surveys do not reveal the context in
which the tools arc used" (King, 1996, p. 174).

)':,

ell

'"
In contrast to the questionnaire-based research approach, close cA.pericntial research can
generate new undcr.;tar.drng more consistent with tbJ actions, meanings, values,

,,

perceptions, and beliefs of its participants. It is focused on understanding actual
practice of informa!ion systems development in its natural setting (see Darke et al.,
1998).

Knowledge is sought through studying more closely to the participants of research and
that knowledge is replicated through linking theory with empirical evidence than tt[ogic
of sampling.tt In this way, the researcher is able to question, interpret, talk, reflect, and
iterate his data theoretically within a set of situations and issues (Myers, 1997). Such an
approach is provided by holistic research (Sea pens, 1990).

5.2.2 Holistic Approach

The holistic approach to research is based on the belief that social systems develop a
characteristic wholeness or integrity where any part of this wholeness is largely

;/,

determined by the whole social systern'./it's inappropriate to study their individual parts

'

taken out of context (Flood, 1999; Standing & Standing, 1998; Keys, 1991; Checkl8:-'ld,
1981).

Holistic research methods seek to explain this holistic quality and)/o locate social
syStems in their particular contexts (Scapen, 1990). Social reality is to be viewed as an
integrated whole, not detachable behaviour and al\ their underlying myths and
meanings are to be understood by linking them to the context (Wickramasinghe &
Hopper, 2000). Although such parts arc interrelated, the whole drtermincs al\ of th~m
(see Checkland, 1981).
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Epis','.!mo!ogically, holistic approach researchers understand the whole by, studying
interrelated parts individually and very closely, looking for analytical themes. They

find theoretical generalisations, instead of statistical generalisation (Scapens, 1990), by
applying the analytical themes to other parts of the whole system. In this way, social
reality lies not in any of the parts but in the whole. The researcher, however, is free to
attach any particular interpretation about a part until such time as it is contcKtually
validated (ibid, p. 270). At the same time, tentatively, the researcher has to depend on

the explanation of the whole system until an alternative pattern is found.

In this context, theory would act as an explanation for the whole system and through
the studying of parts, the researcher can determine whether the theory iterates or not
(Dicsing, 1972). Once researchers understand a social context in this way, they identify
universal theories emerging from comparative analysis which can determine whether
the same themes are found within the context (Scapen, 1990). This results in the
holistic "general theory" (Dicsing, 1972).

Holistic methodology can be applied to Habcrmas's theory of communicative actions.
As mentioned earlier, given the holistic nature of society, one has to understand any part
in the light of its totality in the context of historical evolution and social conteits.
Focusing on such parts, the researcher can determine whether the part is reflected by the
,total contexts. In this way, the researcher can understand the nature of information
systems development and practice embedded in this specific social context.
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5.3 Research Process

5.3.1 Research Site

The research site chosen for my study is

11

privatised industrial organisation (NCCL) in

Sri Lanka. I used anonymous names to protect the good name of the organisation and

the people. NCCL was and still is engaged in manufacturing and distribution of Cement
in Sri Lanka. It started as a government department in 1950s. It converted to a state
owned enterprise in 1958 under the State lno:!ustria! Corporation Act of 49 of 1957.
Until 1993, it remained under the ownership of the government. In 1994, 90% of it
shares were sold to a single partner; Yawakkal (Yawakkal is an anonymous name) in
India while 10% of shares were transferred to employees. In 1996, a multinational
Company; Goldembank group of companies (Go!dembank is an anouymous name)
acquired it from Yawakkal with the intervention of the Sri Lunkan government. NCCL
was selected for my study on the basis that:

(!) NCCL was one of the few industrial organisations in Sri L.1Ilka had introduced
inforr,;ation systems at some late 1960s and continued to be introduced. It
; : : :"'~ii~!\s~dy :i~f~nnntion systems development and practice within the
evolution of social institutions in Sri Lanka.

f: /
11,,

"

~~)

Change of ownership from the state to n single Owner Company, and finally,

from the single Owner Company to a multinational Company, brought
, fundamental changes to information systems development and practice at
NCCL.

'"
(3) Privatisation of NCCL was criticised by NCCL employees and the general
public. Its issues were brought to the public atlcntion through parliament

debates (Parliament Hnnsards).

(4) It was possible to ncccss and study a variety of participants who directly or
indirectly involved in systems development both in the head office and in the

factory (see below the number of participants being interviewed).

5.3.2 Research Participants

ir, - '

In order to obtain a balance view, a-faiige of particip:rnts from Chief ExCcL1tive Officer
·11
q
(CEO) to ordinary shopwfloor employees )Vere interviewed. 90 personnel paf.'ticipated in
,I
the three phases of interviews (see sectidiJ 5.3.4 below) both in the head office and in

ii

the factory. These participants included J.'enior managers (CEO, Vice Presidents (VPs),

and Chief Factory Otficer), middle managers, operations managers, engineers,
accountants, infonnation technology personnel, work superintendents, foreman,
supervisors, clerks, trade union leaders, and shop-floor employees. 3 past employees, 2
outside information technology consultants working with current information systems
projects at NCCL, and I high official (Deputy Director) in the Treasury department
were also interviewed.

·-' .'., 5.3.3. Access to tht Research Site

I became interested in doing my research at NCCL whcr. I talked to one ofmy students
who were working as an information technology consultant to NCCL. Hc·suggestcd me
some other privatised organisations but l could not secure access to those organisations.
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Initially, getting access to the rcseorch site (NCCL) was quite difficult. I contacted the
Chairman ofNCCL through a friend ofmy brother and explained him my need to do a
research and the reasons (sec above 5.3.3) why I wanted to conduct my study at NCCL.
I had a lengthily discussion with him. He then passed my request to a decision of the
CEO.

The CEO is empowered to take all administrative and management decision on behalf
of Goldembank Company. After a lengthy discussion (about forty-five minutes) with
the CEO, he allowed me to conduct rr.y research at NCCL. I have given an undertaking
that confidentiality of the information collected from the Company will be ensured, and
such information will be used only for research purposes. He circulated a letter among
al! the heads of departments informing them to cooperate with me giving relevant
support and information lo conduct my research.

5.3.4 Data Collection, Documentation and Validation

Data were collected using an iu-depth interview method, policy documents, minutes,
memos, e-mails, financial reports, Parliamentary Hansards, and physical observation.
These methods arc well accepted and recognised methods for darn collection in case
study research (Remenyi et al., 1998; Myers, 1997; Yin, 1994).

Interviews were

conducted in three phases. The objective of the first phase was to understand the issues
·of information systems development and practice and become socialised into .the
Company. One and half months took to complete the first phase.

The second phase of interviews wore focused on asking questions regarding the issues
identified in the first phase of interviews. The emphnsis was given to episodes of

''"
information systems development.

Information was sought about the history uf

information systems development and transformation of NCCL focusing on issues that
influencL'l.i and shaped information ~ystcms development, how and why and in what
ways information systems development contradicted with the social reality of NCCL.

The secoml phase of intL'TViews took another three and half months.

The third phase of the research started after seven months of the second phase of
interviews. It took me about a month to complete the third phase of interviews. The

objective of the th!rd phase of interview was to identify some unclear infonnation and to
secure views from.interviewers on the issues identified in the first and second phases

and to further validi,."te data.

Initia\ly, some participants suspected me because the CEO directed me to research
participants though I explained them the objectives of the research. I assured them
anonymity and their identity would not be included in my research. Later they agreed to
participate in the research. Interviews were conducted using a non-directive technique,
which allowed participants to focus on specific issues but permitted them the freedom to
expand on areas of personal interests and issues. Participants were encouraged to
explain the dovelopment process through critical incidents, episodes, examples,
metaphors etc. that were crucial in their view to shaping infonnation systems
development and the way they contradicted with the social context ofNCCL.

Interviews were documented. Interviews with top and senior managers, some middle
managers, and some Jnfonnation Technology Managers were conducted in English
whereas others with Sinhala {native language). The majority of participants did not
agree tape recording but allowed manual notes taking. Therefore, each intctview lasted

1(,0

about one and half-hours lo two hours. Although interviewing, taking notes ani.!
transcribing them was u lengthy process, I understood a; an appropriatc method to
collect contextual aspects of infonnation about systems development and practice.
Interviews conducted using Sinhula (native language) were paraphrased in English. 1hc
documented interviews were discussed with the participants in the following days. The
objective of this endeavour was to identify whether participants missed out infonnation
and used it as validation ofinterviews. A further validation was secured by interviewing
a variety of participants concerning the same infonnation.

Cross checking was achieved by comparing documents, financial reports, policy reports,
minutes, memos, Hansards reports, and e-mails. The extended relationship with some
research participants through e-mails enabled me to more closely understand their inner
worlds and actions.
checking.

Physical observation provided me further valuable insights and

I attended to three green area meetings and listen to interpersonal

communications (expiaincd in chapter six). Moreover, ! spent several days in the
research site listening to participants during breakfasts, luncheons, and dinners. In this
way, a triangulation of data was obtained (sec Darke et al., 1998; Yin, 1994; Walsham,
1993; Alavi & Carlson, 1992; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).

5.3.5 Data Analysis and Reporting Results

A detail case description was prepared and thi\SC data served as the basis for critical
analysis. Data analysis was perfonned by iterating theoretical constructs outlined in
chapter three and social contexts of Sri Lanka outlined in chapter four with empirical
data. Data was presented an<l analysed in episodic fonns. Thus, ten information systems
development episodes were described and analysed in chapter six between 1958-2000.
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An observation was given by refl~ting on each cpi~odc. llcsults of the analysis were
used to theorise infonnation systems development. Literature from various disciplines
were incorpornted in the theorisation of infonnalion systems development.

5.4 Conclusion on Research Methodology

The research methodology I used was a critical case study method in congruence with
the critical socinl theory approach to investigate social phenomena. I explain how
theoretical constructs could be iterated with empirical evidences within holistic research
and make observations about social phenomena. Thus in chapter six, I use this approach

to show how critical social theory can be seen in practice of infonnation systems
development in the organisation I studied.
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CHAPTER SIX
NCCL CEMENT COMPANY
CASE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

6,0 Introduction

In this chapter, I describe and analyse an in-depth case study of information systems
de_yclopment and practice at NCCL in Sri Lanka. This includes scrutiny of historical
aspects of information systems development and practice as well as current usage using

Habennas's theory of communicative action and the social contexts of Sri Lanka as

outlined in chapters three and four respectively.

The first subsection provides a background of both NCCL and the Cement industry in
general over the period 1958 to 2000. The NCCL case presented in this c~:,pter was
examined within two phases of socio-economic development of Sri Lanka.

Thus,

information systems development and practice at NCCL is examined and analysed
within historical context of:

(la) The state control phase (Phase Ja);

(lb) The state control phase With open economic policies (Phase lb);

(2) Govcn1ment privatisation which resulted in NCCL becoming a single owuer
Comp[!Jly (Phase 2a); and
(3) NCCL under the control of a multinational Company (Phase 2b).

IOJ

Within these two phases of socio-economic development in Sri Lanka, ten episodes of
infunnntion system.~ development and practice are described and analysed. Of these ten
episodes, three occurred in lhe slate control phase Ja ofNCCL:
•

(Episode l) budget as a steering medium in a shift system.

•

(Episode 2) the punch card system

•

(Episode 3) budget with the punch card system. Two occurred in

the state control

phase lb with open economic policies
•

(Episode 4) Wang computerised system for management accountability

•

(Episode 5) preventive maintenance system for management accountability. One
· occurred in the privatised ~ingle owner Company (phase 2a)

•

(Episode 6) computerised time and attendance system after privatisation ofNCCL.

Four episodes occurred when a multinational Company (phase 2b) controlled NCCL:

•

(Episode 7) new work shift-plan in computerised time and attendance system

•

(Episode 8) computerised information system for factory maintenance

•

(Episode 9) management information for factory control

•

(J::pisode JO) outsourcing infonnation systems for NCCL.

·,,,

6.1 NCCL Cement Company and Industry Background

NCCL was started as a government factory in 1950s. It converted to a Stad' O.Vncd
11~nterprisc (nationalised) corporation, based on public owncrshii: in 1958 following
national ideological pressures to modernise and industrialise, rspccially in rural areas.
The politicians had initiated large industries, unc uf which,

Wa8

NCCL, to provide

employment opportunities mainly for their political supporters !n villages. An employee
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stated. "Mr. [M] initiated this factory. He wanted to provide jobs for his political
supporters. You sec, "if he was not initiated you would have never seen a factory at

Singcrb".

The Cement factory was located at Singerb, a rural village near a suburban town centre
in the northw<;-~tcrn province of Sri Lanka. II is located about 125 kilometres away from
the head office in Colombo, the major Commercial City and capital of Sri Lanka. The

people in the village believed the Cement factory as an opportunity to alleviate their

poverty and unemployment problems.

The NCCL had a national monopoly both in manufacturing and distribution. Raw

materials were locally obtained from quanies near to the factory. Cements were
distributed through private dealers and government sector orgwtisations such as cooperative societies. Cement supply was controlled thro!!gh a pennit system during times
of shortages. Thus, the price of a cement bag was not determined through free market
demand and supply or through costs and profits calculations. The price of a ccrilent bag
was partly subject to the influence of politicians in power.

NCCL was unionised through the activities of unions controlled by p~litician.l in power.
This division of employees based on party politics led to acts of inter-union rivalry
within NCCL. A union leader, referring to a major reason for the poor performance of
NCCL commented that "our division to fulfil the various aspirations of politicians was
the kodivillaya •• '\Kodivinaya in Sri Lankan word meaning, being hold up).

Marketing, financial and personnel activities were carried out at the head office in
Cokmibo. Manufacturing was organistd under a factory manager. , Accounting
,,
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personnel,

11

human resource manger, production managers, operations managers,

maintenance managers and coginccra, electrical cngir.ccrs, and sales manage·.; were
located at the factory. Cement manufocturing was semi-automated and works in the

factory were organised on a shin basis.

Jn l 960s, the government introduced new financial regulations and tight financial
controlling crune into operation. As a consequence, the focus of NCCL,. shifted to
efficiency and effectiveness critt:,h NCCL during the corporation regime (between

1958-1993) was contro!led within state control model of socio-economic development
making an average profits of about Rs. JOO million annually.

Theoretically, during the corporation period (i.e. 1958-1993), NCCL followed a formal
hicrarchl~al power structure in organising and managing work. As will be documented,
in certain situations, the politicians influenced the fonnal decision making process such
as the recruitment of employees, their transfers, and the introduction of information
technology. NCCL oporat,!d in a legalistic and bureaucratic manner, which was typical
of the public ~ector of Sri Lanka (Kelegama, 1997). As a state owned corporatio•,;
various successive modernisation reform programmes at NCCL did not manage to
substnntially change as a better organisation but only superficially affected social
structures and work processes. The reforms wore stili'>·ened by prevailing socio-culhniil;economic and political conditions.

Since 1958, NCCL has undergone many changes in ownership, administration,
management, and infonnation technology. The changes have been somewhat more
,;

radkal 11fter 1977 when the government was introducing open economic policies
following a market model for its socio-economic development in Sri Lanka.

.'(_
II,(,

Consequently. superficial changes to the socio-cultural, economic, and political
structures ut NCCL were carried out.

hivatisution of SOEs was introduced as part of these open economic policies of tl:e
government in 1977. The government had experienced budgct_deficits in lllany years

an1 thus could no longer fund SOEs from the Trea:;ury. S0Es were identifietl"as,,a
burden to the Public Treasury due to their inefficieneic;; in the mana.;;emcnt and the poor
productivity pcrfom1ancc in operations (Kc\cgama, 1997, 1993, 199\). Moreov~r, the
government experienced pressure from thi\ donor agencies. One seni_or official in the
Public Treasury Dep:::.,mcnt in the Finance Ministry stated that "you know, what is
happefling is, the govcmn,t":nt was and still is engaged in selling public asseL~·.to close
the annual budget deficits following the rccomnibidations of the Worh:! ~ank"., :;
II .I)
,
<o
NCCL in Sri Lanka, up to the end of the I980s, occupied a monopoly dom:nating the

market for'thc manufacturing and supply of cement, for the local ,:onstruc\imfindustry.
\\ The monopoly position of NCCL started. to change in the eadf' !99cis when the
-- ,!

',

government created a corri'.)ei'iiive market allowing other competitors_ to enter into the

-

'

'

-~

'

,_.
" ,,

cement market.

I)

S0Es have been openly trumpe·:ed a~ the application of market --;~dice by· the
'

_,J.'- , ,)

governme:i.t as the 1most apprDpriate way to encourage efficiency ai ...!'Cffectivencss of

((

'
soBf As a result, Tolcyi.' -~,emcnt (TC} and Mahava\i Marine cCffiCllt (MMC) started

\\
;;
-\,
.
·~'-=>IT,anufactllring and i:listribntioii <lf Cement in Sri L?:,1ka. - Ad',iitionally, some
,,

{',

busin~ssmei1 began to import low priced cefl\cnt at a large scale from lndia, Malaysia,
Middle East Countries, and Chin&..
'!

'"

"O
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Over its history, NCC!. ]1ad gained the reputation nf being the highc,t quality cement
manufacturer in Sri Lanka. NCCL faced a severe threat from two other competitors and
from cement importers when the new open economic policy was implemented. With the
appearance of competitors' products in Sri J.anka's morket, NCCL market share began to
sbnrp!y decline. At the time of privatisation of NCCL, market share declined from
100% to an average of 50% of the total Cement market. The decline of market share
severely disrupted the internal functioning ofNCCL.

,,
The introduction of market principles into the cement industry in general, and
privatisation i~~ue specifically, was strongly opposed by most of the other political
parties, the employee unions in corporations, and the general public. Opposition leaders
opposed the move at parliamentary debates (Parliamentary Debates, 1990, 1992, 1994,
1996). Employees, through their unions. oft.en vented their anger and frustration in the
fonns of strikes and mass media. They urged the government not acquiesce to the
recommendation of the external funding agencies such as th~ World Bank and to sell
public assets to the pri.vate companies. Howeve:, the govcmment carrh.•d through its
commitments to open economic policies and the privatisation of SOEs. A former
General Managers ofNCCL commented regarding the privatisation ofNCCL:

Despite thi:. mass resistance from various intc1csts groups such as
employees, opposition party \caters and the general public. the
government had decided to priv:ttisc NCCL. You know. a mission cnme
to discuss an aid package for Sri Lanka during 1990s and forced the
government to priv~tisc NCCL. If the Sri Lanka government diC: not
listen lo the World Bank's recommendations, it wou!C not have been
b'Tanted funds for development.

',\

" Government per~eived privatisation of SO Es us essential if the organisations were to be
successful in the open economy and newly emerging ,:Ompetitive environments

""
(Kclcgama, 1997). The government privatised many SOEs, including NCCL, in
aohcn:ncc to its market model. NCCL was seen as burden to government Treasury.

In

l 993, government decldt.."<i to privatised NCCL. It was kept under the administrntion of
the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning, until the government
fot:nd a suitable partner to sell NCCL. Thus NCCL was intimately tied up with the

government's reforms.

[n privatising NCCL, the government did not appear lo consider the 'lifcworlds' of the
organisation. Privatisation was used as a steering mechanism to steer the lifeworlds of
NCCL in a direction, which was aligned, to the goals of the Sri Lanka government. The

government assumed that NCCL could be transformed into an effective and efficient
business enterprise following market principles.

In December 1994, NCCL was sr.>!d to Yawakkal, an Indian Company, fcilowing an
ij

1

'

/!

open tender procedure al a pricil 0fRs. 2.2 billion. Yawakkal, .a single Owner Compn."ly,
focused on buying and selling of cement. But as an NCCL employee commented,
"Yawakkal did not have experience in the cement manufacturing industry".

After taking over NCCL, Yawakknl appointed a Board of directors with Mr. Yawnkkal
as both the Chainnan, and the Managing Director, of NCCL. Upon the purchase of
NCCL, Indian managers were appointed ·as the chiefs of the finance and marketing
departments. Among other changes inb.uUL!eed by new manage,nent included an
introduction of two payroll systems and

il

computerised time und attendance system for

monitoring and control!ing employees at the factory.

ll,\I

Alkr major problems due to the Yuwukkal 's changes, NCCL wus sold to Goldcnhank in

1996. Goldenbank is a leading multinational Company, which comprises more tlmn RO
cement plants in 27 countries. In addition, Goldenbank hold more than 500 ready-mix
concrete and concrete ofhui!ding materials as well as variety of services (i.e. providing
management consulting) relevant to the cement and building products plants along with
more than 150 quarries. Goldenbank is considered to be one of the most advanced users
of high technology ar.d information technology in the cement manufacturing industry
(Goldenbank Polky Guide, 1998).

The changes in NCCL, outlined above, were intimately connected with infonnation
technology and its application in NCCL since the late 1960s. Advances in information
\ technology-notably,

hardware

ruid

software

capabilities,

and

communication

technology-gave rise to undertake a range ofinfonnation systems development projects
at NCCL.

Th.: above description provides a general history ofNCCL. It is important to understand
information: systems development and practice in NCCL in the historical context of
social institutions in Sri Lanka. In order to understand the history of information
systems development, the description and analysis begin with manual infonnation
systems development. Ten episodes outline below explain what happened in
information systems development at NCCL between 1958s and 2000.

6.2 Information Systems Development and Practice under a Stale Control Model:
Phase la

Indepcmlcnce iu I 948 led to a commitment to centrally plonned development following
socialist principles. A balance of payment crises in the mid J950's caused the import

,10

substituting industrialis[l.tion policy to be implemented in Sri Lanka (Vidaimpathirana,
1999, Lakshman, 1976). 111is included a program for industrialisation based 01' public
ownership {Lakshmm1, 1976) leading to the establishment of NCCL in 1958 as a

nationalised SOEs.
,'/

State Industrial Corporation Act No. 49 of 1957 defined a public corporation as a legal
entity owned by the government with considerable financial independence, within a
system of accountability to the public through Parliament. Accordingly, accounts of
NCCL were to be kept according to the Companies Act No. l 7 of 1982. These accounts

were audited by the Auditor General, and sent to Parliament. Profits ofNCCL need<xl to
be remitted to the government-consolidated fund. TI1e Ministry of ;ndustries and Public
Treasury controlled NCCL. Similar to other public corporations, NCCL was focused on
budgets for political and management accountability.

Budgeting concentrated on production and costing. The factory was responsihle for
preparing and executing budgets approved by the head office. Adminisltative matters
were governed by the general administrative regulation. Thus NCCL's controls formally
embodied" philosophy of bureaucracy, employing legal conccpL~ that owed much to the
statutory corporation model underlying the structt•re of British nationa!i~ed industries
(Kclcgama, ! 991 ). ln particular the legal and administrntivc concepts were influenccr:1,
heavily by technical, sdcntific and rationi,1 concepts. 1besc concepts did not match

with the employees' 'lifcworlds' of NCCL. !n the initial phases of this state control
model, prcparatior. of budgets, payroll, and other personnel matters were carried

01..,t

using manual information systems. Factory management used infonnntion for control nf
',\.

behaviour of employees.
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Factory management established a hierarchy of authority relationships between head
office,

the factory.

and its production departments that defined tasks and

responsibilities. ·nicir instrumental rationality gave rise to a distinctive management
culture within the factory. Employees from the village were controlled on a day-to-day
basis by supervisors from the village. Factory employees realised that the factory
management was attempting to dominate their 'lifcworlds.'

These employees negatively reacted to managers' instrumental actions that embodied
formal controls of employees' lives. Realising employees' legitimate 'lifeworlds' needs

and their

1 esistance

towards instrumental actions and fonnal controls, factory

management gradually developed opportunities that permitted employees to fulfil their
traditional commitments to the village culture, whilst meeting the requirements of
factory managers for reports to the senior management in lhe head office. Thus factory
management employed communicative rationality by allowing NCCL 'lifeworlds' to
~volve in a balanced way.

6.2.1 Budget as a Steer.;ng Medium in a Shift System: Episode I

Initially, budget was used as a steering medium to make employees' work harder in the
factory, rather than as a means of rcw,rting to head office. Thus a production budget
emerged that operationally linked supplies and production shifts daily and scheduled
working hcurs through time cards. This steering medium required that supervisors who
monitored production targets, checked employee productivity, and closely supervised
employees. As part of budget planing, a shift was defined as a slice of the budget
portioned into eight-hours of production. The control following budget as a steering
medium began to achieve the desired production during each shift.

m
l'roc!·1,ction managers encouraged employees to be committed to the shift. The shifts
became the focus of fnctory [ifo and the budget was steering medium to control of work
by using instrumental actions.

Production managers at ihe factory legitimised

the production budgets.

t
fbeir instrumental actions by employing

However, thr. employees were uncertain about their

instrumental actions of this budget ju:;tification. They found it difficult to accept the
overly controlled work patterns used by managers to dominate them. They realised that

managers using budgets altempt to threaten their trnditiona!ly established culture, values

and social pattern of their everyday living in their various lifcworlds. A shop-floor
employee commented:
We were surprised about the management, their orders and machines.
They thought we like machines ourselves. We actually did not like
production managers to control us. We used to be free within our village.
We wanted to work and cam but not in that way.

Employees continually recollected their everyday life in the village. A shop-floor
employee remembered. "Working in village life is enjoyable. Neighbours and family
members worked together without any supervision or control but we were collective and
harmonious".

Employees found it difficult to adjust to instrumental actions and control of managers
because work discipline in village life was communicatively controlled. A shop-floor
employee recalled:
We were highly controlled. People had to work inside large buildings
with mysterious machines. Timetables, bells, supervision, checking,
and above all, working without talking were difficult for people.
People wanted to work and cam but not in that way.

Employees in the village continued to define their lives by refening \;ack to traditional
ways and still wishing to engage in reciprocal village relationships and accompanying
ccremonin!s. A shop-f\om· r.mployee recalled:
We have our own lands. lfwc neglect them we do not have a living.
We used to live u[) them but we want to earn an additional income.
You know, otherwise it is di11icult to live. Living is expensive. We arc
poor people seeking extra money for our living. We really only work
here for money. Otherwise we could stay at home.

Village life is full of cultural ceremonies and factory life interfered with employees
participation in these. A shop-floor employee commented:
We can't just ignore our traditional customs such as the full moon days of
Vcsak, Poson, Asa/a Pi11kams and Bali Tho1•il. village marriages,
fimera/s, New Year, and customs are parts and part of our life. All arc in
our mind. The factory is not the only part of our life.

Culturally, cmp\~yc~s could m,t relate to a modtm Western, fast-pftced society. Many
employees had low commitment and motivation to formally define controlling n\ethods.
The factory manngers realised that they must hdp village employees adapt to factory

".

.

!ifc, especially the shift system. A fom1er factory manager explained:

It was their village. They did not bother about the new life in the factory.
Shop-floor employees wcn: uneducated and rural. Politicians appointed
some shop-floor employees. Their traditional beliefs and attitudes were
difficult to change c:i.sily. Some of our major probkms were maintaining
punctuality, continuous work by a target, preventing them from material
frauds, and cnonnous absenteeism. Putting them to a right rack of work
could not he easily done.
A production manager commented. "The problem was we should not intcrfcr~ ' in their
lives. The result was a high level of absenteeism. Shop-floor employees di no.l inform
whether they were coming for the following day work shift. It affected the pr~:duction

,,
process very much".

•
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Another production manager Cl{p[ained the effects of frequent traditional ceremonies.
"Our employees were and still arc active in all traditional C~'Tcmonics. We have to
manage our production to accommodate these circumstances". Managers also had to
recognise the anxiety of employees and their lack of commitment. A production
manager commented that:

There were unsatisfied employees. They thought they did not ha1·e a
future. The problem was we couldn't help. What we could do was that we
didn't force them to do more work. We thought about sensible amounts in
the budget.

Production managers and supervisors understood the attitudes of employees and they
discretely adjusted production targets to meet the 'lifcworlds' needs of employees in the
factory.

Generally, the efficiency of employees adversely affects Company budgets, but this did
not happen in NCCL. A production manager explained. "The production managers
knew that the employees were not efficient. So they, did not promise the top
management very much 1hrough the budget". A former factory manager explained that
"we knew when absenteeism would be high. Then we changed

OU!'

production schedule.

The production departments' targets were ~et accordin~ly". The production managers
managed external difficulties by including '\ifcworld,•' in budgets. Managers at the
fac1ory used budget lo accommodate employees' conflicts, which arose from the
different perspective of !heir 'lifcworlds' and the requireinents of management at the
head office. A production manager stated that "the budget was there but we had to
consider the demands of employees [lifcwor!ds) in the factory. They were more
important than the budget. We took into consideration employees' problems when we
prepared the budget".

·,.,,\ \

,:~
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Managers at the head office realised that good industrial relations relied on the

production manager's budget. A fonner general manager commented:

!fwc !lad differcnl views about the budgets we cordially resolved them.

Sometimes, the budget committee asked us to alter targets, as they would
not be harmonious within the factory. But bas1,.'ally, it was the production
manager who was competent at deciding budget targets [taking demands
of employees' \ifeworlds].

The factory management treated lifeworlds concerns as everyday management issues.
Strategies of everyday controls through on-going ad-hoe solutions emerged. For
instance, when employees were unexpectedly absent, duties were reallocated to other
employees. Al~hough this resulted in low production and discontinuity of work, the
factory still made profits as it had a monopolistic market protected by the government.

The head office was located far from the factory, llnd viewed employees' lifeworlds
concern as factory matters. This ignorance cre~tcd conflicts between the staff in the
head office and the staff in the factory. Factory employees believed that staff in the
head office enjoy lunury life at the expense of employees in the factory. The perception
of the head office was that it should secure financial resources for the factory through
effective lobbying in the Ministry and manage tlmiugh political intcrventioos. Senior
management in the head office realised that the key to resources and decisions lay in the
hands of politicians and that their powers were weak.

Control and power in NCCL was fornrnlly vested in Board of Directors. Howc 1:cr, the

'

Minister had ex.elusive power to appoint and to remove the Board, Chainnan, and the ·
General Manager. The ability to ~:,poir.t and dismiss people gave considerable power to
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politicians. NCCL managers could not remove any employee without the approval of
the Ministry. The Minister was sufficiently powerful to appoint political nominees to
the Board and a~ Chainnan and General Manager. A senior manager commented, "it has
been the Minister who controlled the corporation, not the Board. The Board acted as the
agents of the Minister, not the government".

Each change in govemm.!nl resulted in a new Chairman, General Manager and Board

"

membus.

Consequently Board members took Ettie interest and pain in the future

,;:levelopment of NCCL. lnstead of looking to the good of NCCL, Board membct~·
concentrated on cultivating relationship with politicians. In other words, these people
acted in the best interest ofpoliticians than NCCL

National policies directed the factory and the head office through party political
pressures to employ party support,;:rs and extend party influence through trade unions.
Most employees were appointed on the recommendation of politicians. A senior
manager commented "the number employed was much more than actually NCCL
wanted to run both the factory and the head office". In this way, an average of 2500
employees was employed in NCCL. Frequently these employees were not competent in
the jobs they were appointed for. Con~cqucntly, supervisors spent considerable time
instructing and training them, and maintaining close control. Many supervisors
remarked upon this. A senior foreman commented that

When we had new shop-flour employees we always had problems. They
were unskilled and untrained. Sometimes, tht.'Y came from another
corporation, which was complctdy different from this. But we had to
keep them with us because they were useful for politicians.

'I

ir
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Upon joining NCCL these employees became members of the government party trade
union. Managers experienced difficulties in controlling trade union employees because
ofthcir political influence.

A former factory manager remembered. ttThe employees'
\\

co-operation was difficult to achieve. On the one hand you have to tackle the trade
union's demands. On the other hand you have to make these political men 'woi-k

efficiently. It's very difficult".

,,

Evaluating the performance of NCCL was difficult as the gove-mment's )lo111icians,

whose primary concern was to fulfil promises given to voters, diri:ctly influenced

pricing decisions. As a factory cost accountant observed:

Prices of cement were very important to the Ministry (by implication, the
Minister]. They insisted us on fixing prices. Therefore, we did not rely on
our own pricing decisions. We did not have nny method of doing so.

~'een in this light, budgeting as infonnation systems failed to establish c1:i'~r operat;~nal
(,

-

i.'

goals for NCCL under these circumstances. A senior manager rer.alled that "the
management did not have such clear-cut goals or objectives. We were not in a position
to maintain them. The reason was we had to adhere to the government and Minister's
orders". Corporate pl~nning and budgeting was not effective as head office officials and

})
Board members acted in the interest of Ministers rather than plans.

6.2.1.1 Reflection on Episode 1

The above description and analyses show that the management in the head office(i'nd
the parliament ··had little interest or expertise in regarding factory problems due to
conflicts between !ifeworids and budget impkmentations. These conflicts remained as
factory matters. The Ministers approved budgets without Clmsidering their contents:

I,
,,,
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Board members approvt'<l budgets if they met ministerial concerns; and the head office
budget committee accepted them if lhl'y offered industrial pcael:. Factury managcmt11l
through production budgets sutlicicntly inc!udcd '\ifcworlds' problems in production
,~,'tjclgets to tranquillise conflicts between factory management and employees. Thus,
budgets took place within interlocking causes and relationship~ within broader socio-

cu!tura\, economic, and po!itical structures at NCCL.

','
6.3 Information Systems in Regulatory Paradigm

InJhe l~.tc 1960s, the Sri Lanka government initiated a new control discourse around a
"public financial control regulations". A control of attendance and discipline of
employees was one of NCCL's managerial issues resulted from new public financial"
control regulations instigated by the government. The managers at NCCL considered
that the need of controlling employees' attendance was essential if the factory was to be
effective with the new financial ccintrol paradigm. In essence, manually processed
infonnation systems were replaced by the punch card systems. lnfonnation systems
began to be utilised automated systems as part of the new regulatory paradigm in NCCL
since the late 1960s.

6.3.1 The Punch Card System: Episode 2

,,
The punch card system was viewed as an efficient and effective system by which
I<

\\

.

employc~' attendance e1,.)uld be controlled to implement budget targtts for each of the
,

factory shifts. In the

I'

.

,

t!fte 1960s, a newly appointed Chairman, with' the help of senior

management, intro<i~.:~d an IBM punch card batch system for recording ~d controlling
cmphyccs' attcndancr, This ~ystcm was located at the entrance of the fac\C'ry with a
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staff of twenty personnel employee.I as time and attendance clerks to process
information. The office was referred to as "time and attendance" coming under a

supervisor of the accounting and finance department.

Factory management used the punch card systere, as a management tool to control

attendance irregularities of employees. Factory personnel officer commented: '

Many employees did not report to work in time. This caused problems

for arrangh,g shifts in the factory.

Lot of employees went for leave

without taking prior approval. Some employees used to sign attendance
books without physically coming to work.
·
"

Employees viewed the punch card system as another means by which factory
management controlled their working lives. Being vi!lagers, they were dubious about
the merits of the proposed punched card system. The general sort of feeling among the
factory employees was that the -punch card system was '.:icing to further control their day
to day social life. Employees opposed the proposed systems through their party unions.

However, being a powerful representative of the Minister, the Chairman overlooked the
resistance of employees. An older shop-floor employee recollected his past experience
iegarding the punch card system:

'
\',

We realised that the management was planning to control us using a nev;,
machine. We did not know what it [the punch card system] looked like!
However, we realised it was going to threaten and dominate our social
life [lifcworlds] in the factory. Therefore, we opposed to it.

T!i.is control was anlithtical to employees' traditional working culture in the villages.
Another shop-floor employee remarked. "We opposed the punch card system but we
could not change the Chairman's dccisior,". Using Habennas's theory, the punch card

'"'
system utilisution could be described as a "colonisation" nf employees' 'lifcwnrlds' hy
the steering media of the time und attendance techniques :md tcdmology and to
objcctil)' employees' '!ifcworh!s.'

6.3.I.t Rencction on Episode 2

The punch card system was ao example: of NCCL management using purposive rational

aclion (Wth instrumental and s\rntcgic) to achieve success in regulating employees'
time and attendance. Tiiis purposive rationality emanated from the new financial control
regulatory paradigm adopted hy tl1e government. In effect, the punch card system was a

steering medium of the factory management to steer the 'lifcworlds' of employees in
directions that were alignL'<J to the goals of the i;ovcmmcnt. Through the punch card
system, NCCL managem~nt alTected the government's ecormmically rationalistic policy
in the management of the factory so as to realise push for "vaiue for money" in NCCL
(value for money concept is adopted from Beynon-Davies, !994).

6.4 Information Syitcms in Financial Control Paradigm

A new left-centred political party fonned the government in 1970. It was committed to
expanc!ing public enterprises but they ,nhcrited financial crisis (Bu<lget Speech, 1970).
Responding to these probh:ms, the new government introduced a legal framework to
control public finance through the Public Finance Act 38 of !971. The Act required
public corporations to have budgets and associated firm11cial procedures in an allempt to
bring economic rationality to the ~ector (Kelcgmna, 1997). The objectives were to
control gov~mment funds through budgets, to control production targets, and to
introduce work discipline for the factory employees.

'"'
The new framework \(, control puhlic financl.l had direct consequence for NCCL as
financial controls nml intcnml hudgcls, hccausc audited linJndal sl/l\L'ITTcnL~ in puhlic

,enterprises hccmnc legal necessities. A fac!ory cost accountant stated that "financial
controls were the major concern of the Ministry. We had to go to this otlicc every week
to seek approval or advice. So the Treasury officers were the chiefs in d-:ciding

allocations fi.1r us". O!licials in the Trc,1>u1;,· implemented the government objective of
limiting public spending anJ cunscqucn1ly cutting money granted from Treasury tu
corporations. They had to ensure tlrnl managers at corporations used government's funds
in the best interest of the public following the legal enactment stipulated in the Finance
Act. They exercisL-d power over accountants in the negotiation process.

6.4.1 Budgetary System with the Punch Card System: Episode 3

The budgeting gained legal status and NCCL had to manage the factory within
budgetary cont1ol. Committing to the new financial regulation.~. preparations of budgets
and implanting them at factory beciltne mandatory.

Production managers interpreted

that the new controlling budgetary systems were an improvement on previous systems.
M~nagers used budgets to control employees by committing them to production targets
at each shift.

The punch card system was used as a tool to control employees' shifts. Head office was
delighted with the new controls, believing that they reflected the new fina."lcial
regulatory paradigm. NCCL senior management in the head office enjoyed cordial
relationships with politicians presenting reports to the Ministry which where them
passed them to the public through Parliament.
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Paradoxical movements cmcrgctl within the factory. The budgets provided production
targets and the pund1 card system monitored employee attendance. However, these
systems were difficult 10 implement. Employees' cuhurnl resistance began to appear
with economic crisis. During this period there arose political tensions in Sri Lanka,
which impacted,

011

NC:CL through trade unions. Trndc unions organised against the

NCCL control systems by means that were not always visible. A shop-floor employee
commented:

In the early 1970s, the government prohibited a lot of important
consumer goods. Salaries were no\ sufficient for the minimum living
conditions of employees. Managers attempted to control us using modem
machines [e.g. the punch card systems]. We protested management's
actiol's via trade unions. Trade unions were very active and national trade
union leader was a Minister of the government during those days. The
national union controlled our union.

A former Factory l\11magc recalled the period:

Trade union activities were radical at that time and they had considerable
amount of power within the corporation because they were the official
repfhentatives of the Minister in NCCL. We had to listen to everything
frort1 them. I mean even for 'short leave' it was a matter for tmde unions. I
must admit that they made lot of decisions. However, budgets, and the
punch card system, were beyond their realistic targets.

The Factory Manager further said:

. :fan employee was reprimanded for his late attendance, he came with n
,'. trade union leader and questioned us. Even though the punch card system
had recorded actual lime of attendance, we could not take disciplinary
actions against employees because of the activism of powerful trade
unions and the relntionships they had with the government Ministers.
Often Ministers influenced our decisions.

-------------------------- - - - - - - - -

'"
Factory trade union leaders, often hcing the leaders of villages sought to protect their
culturnl integrity and 'lifoworlds', hy demands through trndc union agitation.
Employees' depression in the factory was linked up with a vast array of economic,
political, and cultural intricacies. ll was political hccausc trade unions were linked to
national political parties; it was economic as employees wanted freedom to supplement
their factory income hy participating in the village economy; and it was cultural as
employees wanted to protect !heir 'lifcworlds' from the economic crisis and
management control.

The situation raised broad issues of social, economic, and political contc;,;:t~ of systems
development and practice. Both the budgetary and the punch card systems penetrated
deeply into the social and cultural control of employees, leading to loss of culturally
embedded value systems of employees.

Generally, trade union leaders arc not aggressive in Sri Lanka. This is consistent with
their traditional culture. Politicians use trade unions as instruments to achieve their
politically motivated objectives. Organisations' unions arc linked up w\th national trade
unions. Either Ministers or a representative of elite groups bccomi leaders of national
trade unions. In this manner, the leaders of national unioos, being from educated and
wealthy families, find it difficult to understand and to empathise with the problems of
shop-flo;ir employees. Therefore, being from a different social class, they do not
genuinely represent employees' rights in the working places. Often, union leaders little
more than merely carry out the wishes of politicians helping to implement some
government changes in organisations while ignoring the damage these changes could
make to broad cultural and socio-political structures.
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Thus, the trade unions, whilst supposcd?y ucting as vehicle for sociul and economic
justice, in the work place, they nlso provided for access to political and exercise of

trnditionn! kinb'ship (Wickrnmnsi11£he & Hooper, 2000).

In periods of economic down town, some employees worked additional hours during the
weekdays and weekends nt the factory. l11is could always be c1one because as a shop·

floor employee remembered that "there were ad-hoe arrangements on shift.< 'in the
factory for production. In fact employees controlled tile production. In certain days, we

used to work in others' shifts by negotiating with factory supervisors". This attitude of
employees was widespread indicated by a foreman remarking that:

We knew shop-floor employees' problems. We were disappointed about
their economic problems. When we wanted 25 employees for a shift,
there were about 18 men. On the following day also we have the different
number but with different people. They had such an informal
arrangement. We sympathised about this. We could not take disciplinary
actions against this because trade unions workrd ::gai,1st us. If we took
disciplinary actions against employees, some times the Minister
questioned u.~ about these actions.

Mangers found it difficult to implement budgetary controls because of political,
economic, and cultural constraints. However, they were aware that politicians were
more concerned about political survival and responding to political dismrbanccs rather
than imposing financial rq,,ulations in the public sector. These punch card and the
budget systems were linked with the development and implementation of government
objectives in NCCL within the regulatory framework of financial control of government
enterprises.

,,
Politicians increasingly influenced fuctory affuirs thus causing difficulties for factory
managers to realise production targets using budgets and the punch card system. The

'"'
punch card system was subject to political decision making. Politicians thought that
they could provide more jobs for employees if the punch card system was removed. In

!979, the Chaimmn, whom was appointed by the then Minister of Industries and
Scientific Affairn removed 1hc punch card system and reinstalled manual ;;ystcm for
processing employees' attcodancc.

Consequently, sixty new employees were recruited and assigned to the time and
attendance office. The operation supervisor of the time and attendance section wa~
redcsib'llated as an accountant and appointed as the head of manual operations to
administer employees a\lendaoce in the factory. Employees viewed the removal of the
punch card system provided with a relief. An older shop-lloor employee recollected his
memories about the reinstallation of the new manual system for processing employees'
attendance as follows:

Removing it [the punch card system] was good for us because, we
thought machines would r,i:vcr monitor our life again, In the villages, we
are free and we are not monitored. No outsider eontro!!ed us in the
village. We control ourselves.

6.4.1.1 Reflection on Episode 3

Village life evolved over centuries. Work, family and leisure were integrated, as was
\',

ownership and control of tl:c means of production. The control resided in social
relations at the village level. Villagers were mostly unaware of the modernisation efforts
of the government. Trust, mutual understanding, and traditional kingship practice
governed village life. Forma!ly proc<!sscd information to control work. family and
leisure via machines and techniques such as punch cards and budgetary systems were
nvt needed. !nfonnation was infonna! and implicit in village culture, which operated

'"'
within a system of rcdproca! understanding. The government Minsters an<l their
representatives in the hcad office had little idea about how the activities of the factory
disturbed traditional values and connicts spawned in factory socin-culturnl 'lifeworlds.'

6.5 Reflection on State Control (Phase la)
After independence in I '148, the new Sri Lanka government introduced modernisation
and industrialisation following the state-control model of socio-economic development.

This resulted in the cstahfohmcnt of public owned enterprises in Sri Lanka following
the Western bureaucralic, scientific and rational planning methods. Politicians, to
support their political promises about cnl:anccd employment opportunities, initiated
industrial initiatives and factories. !n the minds of politicians, tl1c establishment of
factories was understood as traditional kingship rnther than a vehicle for mobilising
socio-ecooomic development in the country.

Managers used formal information systems to steer socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' of the
factory through techniques and machines such as budgetary and punched card systems
within a bureaucratic model of rational planning to realise political objectives of the
government. This approach wa~ based on technocratic modes of organisational control
with rational-legal, economic :-;nd purposive rationalities.

__ Employees interpreted budgets an1J the punch card system as instruments of domination

_y----;p

' of their lifcworlds. lnfonnatim1 systems therefore appeared to endanger the employees'
!ifcworlds inside the factory.
development

through

Though politicians promised socin-econnmic

ir,Jcstrfolisation using the

state-controlled

mode!,

their

development pinning did not adequately address broad issues of socio-cultural,
economic and po\iticn! context~ of Sri Lanka Thus information systems development
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within ihc state control model did not improve NCCL and did not assist the socio-

economic development of Sri Lanka.
6.6 information systems Development and Practice under Hie State-Control Pha~c with
Open Economic Policies: Pl111se I h

lnfonnation systems development and practice at NCCL changed once again following
the market-hasc<l model intrmluccd under the open cconomie policies by the rightcentred government which swept into power in 1977. The government commitment to

market economics brought fundamental changes to the industrial policy based on import
substitution and central planning (Karunatillcke, l 993). Policy makers believed that this
market economics policies would result in a more competiL<ve environment and thus
greater organisational efficiency (Kelegama, 1993).

This was realised in the push for value for money amongst the public sector. One of the
major components of the government ideology during !977-1993 was the objective of
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public corporations. rhc consequence of
this improving efficiency and effectiveness was the government policy was framed in
terms ofbolicfs that intemal!y generated savings should finance part of NCCL. This led
to ideas of improving the politic;;! a,id management accountability of NCCL. both of
which pointed in the same direction: more and better infonm1tion. Management was put
under pressure to improve performance and reduce opcratio,, costs at NCCL

This political and management accountability id,·,,, required NCCL to implement a
fully dcvc\u'ped managcmem budget approach. lnfommtion was clearly cast as the
currency to be used in decision-making and to monitor and improve the perfomiance of
tasks on which a new market system for NCCL was to be developed. lbese new

'""
changes were resulted from successive government's objective of limiting public
spending nnd consequently cutting money b'l'Ontcd from the consolidated funds to
corporations. However, the changes did not resonate with broad agenda~ of socio-

economic development.

The political and management accountability ideas provided a foundation for the
introduction of computerised infomiation systems both at the head office and at the

factory with the support of newly arrived information techno!ob'Y- Thus the management
introduced the computerisation project in a context of financial and pcrfonnancc
problems at NCCL Computerised inforrnation systems were c.,nsidered by NCCL
management to be techniques and strategies that would solve their problems and
decision to develop computerised infonnation systems was taken.

However, the

development of :h'.!Se infonnation systems was constrained by deeply rooted socioeconomic and political structures within NCCL

6.6,I Computcrbed Jnformntioo Systems for Accurate Jnformntloo for
Mnoagemcnt Accountability

In 1983, with a decision made by the Chainnan, batch processing Wang computer
systems were purchased at a cost of Rs. 1.9 million from DBMS, n local supplier of'
IBM computer systems. An information technology manager revealed that this amnunt
was far more than the amount what actually NCCL could be afforded during those days.
Of these computer systems, an IBM LVI' 2200 computer, compatible with BASIC
programming, was installed in the head office whereas an IBM VS 25 computer,
compatible with COBOL programming, was installed in the factory. Accordingly, two

'"'
computing unit~ for datn processing were created bolh in the factory and in the head
office.

The factory data processing unit was organised under the foctory chief accountant in a
highly secured "machine room" which dcnic<l unauthorised access. Similarly, the data

processing unit in the head oftlcc war. kept under the headship of an accountant,
designated as operational supervisor, within the finance department.

Both systems

remained under the control of the finance manger who controlled overall financial
matters of NCCL. These batch-processing systems were expected to process

applications such as payroll, supplies, sales, and accounting to provide accurate

information for newly emergant financial controls employing market principles.

Systems analysts and programmers were recruited by using an intelligence quotient (!Q)
test. However a former computer programmer, who was later promoted to a systems
analyst, recollected that "only few programmers and systems analysts passed the IQ test
and others were appointed by the Minister". Politicians were more concerned about their
party supporters than actual performance in systems development projects at NCCL

Initially, the supplier of Wang computer systems, DBMS, organised training for
accountants, systems analysts, and programmes in the data processing units who did not
have previous work experience in computer applications. 111c training, as commented
by a systems analyst "was provided about one and half months for programmers and
just two to three days for systems analysts and accountants". The training was difficult.
A programmer, who was later promoted to an infonnation technology manager of
operations, explained. "We could not understand the meanings of what the trainer was
telling us, his langUage, tenns used, data structures, data files, fields, codes, etc., not
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only computers but al! these were nc\V to us". An accountant, while laughing stated that
"we heard the tcnn 'fields' in our village paddy fields rather than in an of!ice. These new
tenns were strnngc to many ofus".

The content and manner in which the training was conducted resulted in staff not being
able to develop and use infonnation systems properly manner within NCCL. Training
was conducted with little or no interaction with purticipants, followed an instrumental

approach, with no open and free discussions which arc usually necessary for the success
of information systems development and practice. A systems analyst that participated

in. the training programme commented that "we were told rather than taught in the
course". The training was unable to properly trained trainees to develop computerised
infonnation systems. However, management entrusted the task of infonnation systems
development to these trainees.

In systems development, all the analysts and programmers adopted technical and
instrumental approaches assuming the role of "experts". These experts assumed that the
knowledge possessed by them was not available to users, or other involved parties, in
the organisation. Users and other involved parties were forced to consent to the
proposed actions of systems analysts. These experts believed that systems development
is a neutral action. They ignored social contexts operating at NCCL when developing
information systems. As a result, many infonnation systems development projects
eventually failed. Thus, management attempted to steer NCCL in !ine with the
objectives of the ruling government's market principles, through infonnation systems
development, in a direction that was not commensurable with the demands of
employees' 'lifoworlds' at NCCL.
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6.6.1.1 Wang Computerised lnformntlon System for Management Accountability;
Episode 4
111c Wang computerised infonnation systems was used to process applications such as
payroll, sales invoice analyses, inventory and supplies, and preparing statutory accounts
to streamline and rationalise NCCL 's business transcciions. Two data processing units,

with newly trnincd infonnation technology staff, were expected to generate the
necessary infomiation. Factory marmgcmcnt, using such information, was supposed to
tnmsfonn NCCL towards becoming a more effective public corporation.

The government and senior management at NCCL assumed that NCCL was thus being

transformed through new computerised information systems. However, the dynamics
operating within socio-economic and political structures at NCCL complicated the
development process in that new conflicts appeared when the newly introduced
computerised information systems began to appear and influence employees' work and
'lifeworlds'.

NCCL management realised that they needed accurate information. However, the
information systems development at NCCL, since its inception, whether manual or
computerised, has tended to he patchy and piecemeal. Each analyst was given a job of
developing information systems for a specific area such as sales, payroll, accounting,
and inventory both at the factory and the head office. All the analysts conducted their
development in a similar manner. Analysts were given information requirements by
senior management, software vendors provided software, users and other stakeholders
were not involved nor was their participation considered important, and systems
development was mainly ad-hoe.

'"
With nil of these, what is interesting is tlmt infonnation systems development was
taking pince in often highly turbulent sm.:io-pl'litica! contexts at NCCL. One
consequence of this was thnt any computerisation project carried out in NCCL had to
consider the many forms of relationships that were going to he affected by the
computerisation project and what activities had to he undertaken to ensure that those
relationships helped the project. However, there were numerous socio-economic, and
political relationships placed constrains upon information systems development and

practice al NCCL.

Since its inception, management of NCCL lacked experience in developing and
managing a computerised information systems project. Like ffi!lllY other public sector
organisations, computer technology was new to NCCl

Almost all the employees,

including senior managers, had never worked h, or been exposed to a computer
environment. Initially, wi!h the announcement of the nell' ~omputerisation project by
the sen:or management, many employees expressed opposition through their trade
unions.

A systems analyst recalled that:

Huge employees' agitation was generated against the computerisation
project. Some feared about loosing their jobs. Others thought their
importance would be reduced within organisation if computers were to
take over their jobs. Still others believed their work was going to be
taken over by the data processing unit. More employees believed that
their work would be monitored and controlled using new information
processed by the computer systems.

It has been asserted previously that, in Sri Lanka, informal communication appears as
the dominant mode of communication. Informal communication includes much tacit
information that is internalised within the 'lifeworlds' of communities. Traditionally, Sri
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Lankan communities were largely informally controlled through communicative
actions. A shop-floor employee in the factory stated, "no one controls us in the village".

Employees continued to work at NCCL in n rather informal manner. Computeri~cd
information systems were not valued, and indeed were subverted by infomml
communication of employees. Employees perceived that computerised information
systems degraded their personal communication. Employees feared that the use of
computerised information systems would lead to their being dominated by an overemphasis on technocratic modes of organisational control, which threatened their
'lifeworlds.' NCCL management introduced the computerisation project to change the
organisational culture and to improve the overall performance without considering
'lifeworlds' of employees at NCCL.

This use of power by senior management, driven by government objectives, prevented
open and free communicative discussion with employees about the introduction of
computers in NCCL. The management legitimised their introduction of computers by
asserting that their decisions were inevitable, being forced by economic circumstances
of improving efficiency and effectiveness, and thus were politically neutral. However,
employees understood that management decision to introduce computers was politically
motivated to change their conditions. Employees expressed their opposition and they
forred that computer systems would threaten their cultural values. Employees organised
against the computerisation project through their unions. Unions were thus used by
employees as a medium through which their socio-cultural value systems could be
protected from the domination ofmanagcmont.

'"
TI1e cmployer,s were dubious abu.;t the merits of the new computers. They realised that
their work-~\'.ifts would he closely mnnitnr~'l.! thornt1gh cornputt:riscd information
s~c.1ms and thu~ the factory management would control them. Employees perceived

new computerised informal ion systems as a threat to their job security. Some employees
believed that computcrisntion of their work would lower the standards of their living

patterns. Many who did overtime for additional earnings were particularly fearful and
actively opposed the computerisation project.

After the introduction of computers, many employees used derogatory terms such as
'complicated machines' and 'comJ}actor'. A shop-floor employee stated that, "they
[computers] were brought here not to help us but to threaten our lives". An infom1ation
technology manager recol!ected reasons for introducing computers at work:

Apparently, there was no identified reason for moving from manual to
computerisation of work as such. However, the idea of iotroducing
computerisation project was to introduce remarkable control over
finance, production targets, factory shifts, and everything with a
minimum number of employees rather than actually transforming NCCL
towards a better organisation.

Sri Lanka's culture reflects a collective society where members of the society construct
social structures which express concerns with each other in a well-understood system of
statutes and mutual obligations between families.

Traditionally, families and

neighbours were governed by trust relationships. They supported each other within
villages without any wage negotiation. When employees realised tlmt their jobs were
going to be tltrcatcn by new computerisation projects, they organised against the
projects, as they were concerned about their own and fellow colleagues' job security.

'"
St.'11ior management cnntrullcd employees' resistance using coven slrntcgic actions, thus
indirectly fulfilling the promises of politicians and by implication the government
objectives. They offcrcJ salary raises for those who were joining the data procc,sing

· . 'i _units, thereby supprt'Ssiag employees' agitation against the computerisation project. An
information technology manager recalled, "in order to overcome resistance from
employees, the management increased salaries for those employees who were willing to
join data processing units". As a consequence, many employees who suffered from

economic problems and were unable to maintain their families with low income joined
the data processing units as data entry clerks.

Many of those who joined the data

processing units did not have sufficient knowledge about the tasks of the data
processing units.

Employees had never seen computers before. Another information technology manager
commented that "all employees who joined with the data processing unit as data entry
clerks were concerned only the salary increase for their own interest, but not because
they liked the computerisation project or they were aware of how to work with
computers". On the other hand information technology professionals had promised
employees that the proposed infonnalion technology solutions would transfonn NCCL
into a better organisation. An infonnation technology manager stated that "unions were
opposed, but management persuaded many employees that the computerisation of
works would benefit them". In this way, NCCL management used covert strategic
actions to realise its purposive rational objectives in the computerisation project.

While NCCL's systems analysts and programmers were legitimised by management as
developers of infonnation systems, an outside specialist from DBMS was brought in by
the management and introduced software for processing payroll, inventory, sales
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invoicing, and general accoun:ing, despite a mass protest hy the trade unions. !,ithough,
the software vendor did not have prior e~perience of introducing such n large project, he
expected NCCL to modify its infonnation needs according to the processing facilities
and capabilities available in the soft.ware package.

An understanding of a nation's culture as part of requirement elicitation is considered as

an important dclenninant in the infonnation systems development suCccss (sec
Thanasnnkit & Corbitt, 1999a). There arc many researchers who suggest that during
elicitation, systems analyst should "acknowledge the social!y organised character of
work and its environment" {Randall, Hughes & Shapiro, 1994). Luff, Jirotka, Heath and
Greatbatch (i 903), suggest that inadequate attention is paid to the social context within
which computer systems function, resulting in many systems eventually failing.
However, recognition of social contexts in systems Jevc!opment did not happen at
NCCL.

Neither outside experts, nor internal systems analysts, had conducted proper
requirement identification for any of the modules of the software package introduced at
NCCL. Rather the senior management dictated the requirements. Senior managcm.cn~
was not properly educated regarding information requirements because they were
subject to whims and fancies of politicians' self interests which were not related to the
actual performance of corporations. A system analyst recollected his experience.

"Senior management expected from us to develop such n system that could meet their
infonnation requirements for controlling production scheduling and factory work-shifts,
however, they were also little aware about their needs".

Recalling traditional Sri

Lanknn culture, he said, "! didn't want to create conflicts with my superiors, because

'"
our culture is to respect thcmtt. However, the information system introduced hy the
software provider was im:ompatihlc with the information requirement of management.
A former data-controlling officer explained the process adopted by the external expert

during the introduction of a payroll system at NCCL as follows.

What happened was, before introducing the system, one day, an expert
from DBMS came to our organisation. He just asked what information
we want from the system? We gave our requirements. We thought, he

would bring u5 a system that we need, but the system, he introduced was
completely different from the one we wanted.
The software provided by DBMS was incommensurable with tht needs of NCCL's
payroll processing requirements. NCCL payroll system was complicated by massive
links operating with production shifts, targets, overtime payments, leaves bonus,
performance bonus, incentives, loan, and advance paymeots. Users found very difficult
in producing required management reports using this software system.

A systems

analyst remarked. "We also could not do much to improve the system because we were
not aware what he [the external consultant} was doing!" He acknowledged that he
lacked knowledge about both software and payroll structure of NCCL. "I also did not
have much idea about NCCL's payroll system. I had to listen to what he [the external
consultant] was telling me". However, the systems analysts had realised that users could
not generate reports. "Users also could not generate employees' pay sheets and other
reports for the use of management". A former data-controlling officer explained:

the package introduced at our organisation was originally developed in
the USA and consequently used in some other organisation before. It was
not the system we wanted. Our system is totally different. He initially
agreed us to provide our own system. Now he wanted us to adjust our
requirements according to the facilities available in the software. Can we
do that? It's going to be another nightmare.
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The consultant from the software providi:ir (DBMS) together with NCCL's systems
analyst introduced modifications to the system. "Aller introducing sr'J.warc, we had lo
introduce lot ofmodilicatfons", TlTirnrkcd /tnothcr sy.~tcm.~ analyst who was manning for
inventories and supplies systems. A systems analyst stated that ·'we didn't involve users
in designing of systems. They came to know only when we were trying to put systems
into work". He further explained his instrumental and technocratic approach, used in
systems development, stating that:

Users did not have ideas about systems development. Until users saw

the system and began to work with it, they didn't know what the
system looked like. When they began to work, then only they realised
what they wanted from the system.

Users were considered as unintelligent and passive objects to be manipulated and
controlled by instrumental actiohs of systems analysts. When users were experiencing
problems in use of systems, they were ''users who Jacked expertise" but not the systems
analyst. "Onca the system has been developed, users believe that's the end. They expect
everything to be done by computers". He further said, "they don't make any attempt to
generate anything creatively. Most users didn't have background of computing, because
those who joined data processing units were transferred from other sections where they
worked as manual clerks".

In Habermas's terms, rather than employing communicative action to cultivate
employees'

capabilities to

use information technology,

these

experts acted

inappropriately in an instrumental manner, serving their own best technical interests and
the perceived technical interests of senior managers at NCCL. In this way, they
objectified the systems development by dominating the lifcwor!ds of employees at
NCCL.
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In general, employees who joined the data processing units as data operating clerks
found it hard to use infonnation systems developed by both c,et~-mal and internal'
experts. The existing manual procedures dependent on a whole series of human
decisions and judgements for which rules were tacit and located within the lifew~·rlds of

employees. Jn such an environment, these staff members could resist any attempt to
translate their intensions and actions computerised infonnation systems. They opposed
systems development in various ways. They perceived that the te;:hnical and instrument
approach of experts in introducing comprised systems appeared to threaten their values
systems and 'lifoworlds.'

Even though they opposed the computerisation project, they believed that they were ·
ignored during the system deign and modification of the payroll system. Forced by
their economic problems to accept the higher salaried positions in the data processing
units, these employees ellperieneed cultural clashes with modern technology introduced
by NCCL's management.

Users repeatedly refused systems development projects that were dominated by syst~~
analysts, A systems analyst explained how:

I developed a credit control module as part of a sales and accounting
information system. The finance department gave the information
requirements to me. Sales clerks refused to use the system when it was
implemented. They continued to work with manual system for recording
credit information about sales.

Users and other affected parties, such as employees in other divisions, were reluctant to
change their everyday life to fit

''I

with the change of computer technology, which faced
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employees' scepticism. G.:ncru\ly, employees at NCCL proved that the <lcvdopmcnt of
technical infonnation systems were unsuccessful without their participation.

Users perceived that their participation in systems modification was essential ifit was to
be successful. However, user participation was restricted by the poW<..'l' of systems

analysts and outside consuhants. It was found that, employees perceived that a system
of knowledge lies in collective decision making where members of the community

express concerns with each other. They perceived that trust and mutual understanding of
human actions are vested in customs and traditions. In general, the everyday life of most
of.employees was built into cultural values of working as a family with equity, trust and
reciprocal understanding. This everyday life was fused with Buddhist teaching. Most of
the interactions in employees working lives were enacted within understandings, which
arose from contexts of commonly experienced '!ifcworlds.'

However, systems analysts and external consultllflts ignored this social grammar that
influenced as a whole in every single interaction between employees at NCCL. The
former data-controlling officer who worked for the payroll section recalled. "Although
we don't like to see the computerisation of our work, there is always a way forward".
Recalling how they make decisions in villages, he explained. "We were not given
opportunities to involve in the design and modifications of system nor we were
consulted for our views about the system design. It was only by experts doing
everything". If we arc involved, he explained, "we know lot about NCCL's payroll
structure. Wo know how to get it done".

Referring to the socio-cultural values of Sri Lanka, he continued to explain how

,,

information systems could be developed. "It is we who should work togctP~·r to develop

,OJ

info!Tll11tion systems". H-c understood the foct that information systems development
should be carried out as

II

knowledgc,sharing uclivity among different parties in a free

and an open environment

A great deal of criticism arose from the staff in general over the Jong development times

"
and manpower resource implications for the computerisation project. Several factors

contributed to this charge as infonnation technology manager explained.

When there were technical problems in computers in the factory we had
to bring the matter t•J the notice of the head office. Our matters were not
priority concerns within their agendas. The head office had little
undc~tanding about factory affairs. It took many days to come and sort
out factory problems. They also not took much interest because the
factory was located in a remote area. We could not work with computers
until they come and solve those problems.

Generally, ever since the inception of NCCL, employees in the head office viewed
employees in the factory as of an inferior status. The perception of factory employees
was that the employees in the head office enjoyed luxury life at the expense of factory
employees. They believed that the factory stam, but not the staff in the head office,
were undergoing hardship in cement production with the minimum facilities. This
division was reflected in the organising of data processing units in the factory and head
office.

While information technology people in the factory were struggling in developing
information systems, information technology people in the head office exercised a
considerable amount of power over the information technology staff in the factory. A
factory systems analyst recollected.

"As far as status arc concerned there is no

difference between peop-\c who worked both in the head office and in the factory, but
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they thought that they are superior to factory information technology staff, because they
had access to many information technology resources".

The control of power exercised by information tcchnolot,,Y staff in the head office, over
the information technology staff in the factory, created conflicts between these two
groups. These conflicts plagued information systems development in the factory, which
were further exaggerated by hardware and software failures. An information technolo1,,y
manager of operation explained. "We had to depend on our suppliers for maintenance".
Additionally, the factory computers repeatedly made hard disk errors due to electricity

fh.ictuations.

Moreover, information technology personnel were not skilled enough to properly
develop information systems. All these added to the slow progress made by the
computerisation project in the factory. An infonnation technology manager explained
that "infonnation technology people were and still are not competent enough to
implement change through infonnation S}Stems development. This is why many pcop\c
in other sections didn't trust ori the works carried out by the employees in the
infonnntion technology units",

The inability to develop s•Jccessful infonnation systems is mainly related to the lack of
understanding about the social context ofNCCL by infonnation technology personnel.
Since the late 1960s, computer education in Sri Lanka has been developed as a technical
profession.

Software vendors, who mainly provided standnrd Western technical solutions, used their
own experts who had been trained as tccimical staff. These jnfonnation technology/
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personnel lacked understanding about major social issues and complex intricacies
operating within NCCL. They could not appreciate the idiosyncrasies of operations
operating in Sri Lanka. A systems analyst commented that "it was very difficult for
them [ outside infonnation technology consultants] to implement their solutions because

they lacked social knowledge in systems development. That's why computerisation
projects took unusually long time to implement and some projects were abandoned".

Employees perceived that the main reason for the introduction of computerised
information systems to change in the political and economic climate in which NCCL
operated. Despite the proposed benefits of the computerised information systems, the
employees feared disruptive changes in work and social life. These employees' fears
regarding the computerisation of work became reality when management announced a
compensation plan to remove the excess staff A shop-floor employee explained:

This was what hoppened after the introduction of computcrisotion
project. The payroll section, previously 60 employees, was reduced to
two. Similarly, the number of employees in other divisions was rcduct".:l
significantly. The management removed excess staff, offering
compensation of Rs. 20000 per employee, following the government's
recommendations of removing excess staff in public corporations.

NCCL had ignored the social cost such as unemployment problem and the resultant
economic problems of employees of infonnation systems development. These retired
employees added to increase the unemployment problem in Sri Lanka woPiening their
living conditions.

i)
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6.6,1,l.l Reflection on Episode 4

One of the main claims made for the development of computerised infonnation systems
was that it provided valuable information for decision-making tasks. This idea was
inspired by the early writings of Herbert Simon (!977) who wrote that information
systems reduce the complexity of decision-making rationality by relaxing the bounds
that prohibit informed optimisation of the decision problem. M<magement actions at

NCCL were framed by Herbert Simon's conceptualisation of economics of information

processing. Their ideas were heavily influenced by the open economic policies
introduced in 1977 by the Sri Lanka government. Following these ideals, computerised
information systems were designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of

NCCL.

The introduction of Wang computerised information systems clearly adhered to these
ideals. However, management did not take into account many important aspects such as
the nature of the organisation, its social, economic and political structures, experience in
management and organisation of computerisation projects. Neither did it identify the
skills necessary for information technology professionals, and infrastructure facilities
required for the computerisation of works. It was partly unable to meet the interests of
various employee groups and assumed that computerisation of work could be
undertaken with no disruption underlying socio-cultural 'lifeworlds.'

Consequently, management ignored the importance of practical problems of employees
whose voices were suppressed by dominating managerial actions.

As a manager

explained, "computers were just introduced without considering social aspect of life of
employees". In this light, it can be argued that information systems were adopted to
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strengthen the narrow instrumental and strategic concerns of management of NCCL
rnthcr than actually to transfonn NCCL towards a belier organisation.

6.7 Computerised Preventive Maintenance Information Systems for Management
Accountability: Episode 5

In 1987, senior management recognised that maintenance of factory operation was
central to its modernisation program at NCCL. Consequently, introduction of
computerised preventive maintenance information systems for maintenance activities in

the factory plants was regarded as essential in addition to computerising the payroll,

,e

sales invoicing, inventories, and general accounting system. The responsibility for" ..

development of the eomputerised preventive maintenance information ~ystcms
remained under the factory data processing unit but took place in a highly turbulent
socio-cultural and political contexts. Factory engineers saw this new system, although
developed for their u.se, as

II

t:lfeat to their professional status and their conditions of

employment. While engineers were fighting to preserve their professional status,
systems analysts gained states as experts in the development of the plant maintenance
system.

Engineers saw the newly appeared information technology profession in general, and
?'
i{6oople who worked in data processing units, as a threat to their already established
engineering culture. This gave bir'.h to conflicts in both an organised and passionate
manner, by engineers with information technology people in the data processing unit.
Conflicts appeared as factory engineers sought to preserve their professional status
within the factory.

Engineers were considered as experts in production, maintenance,

electrical, and "iher engineering works. A shop-floor employee commented.
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When there was II problem in the plant, we always had to see an
engineer through our supervisors. Though we knew how to get the
machines to run quickly, we were not allowed, we had to wait till au
engineer came and said OK.

Engineers thus used technical, scientific and bureaucratic techniques and methods to
control work in the factory.

A significant number of engineers opposed the proposed plant maintenance system that
was to be developed to put the senior management initiatives into practice. A systems
analyst commented that engincc~· support in the development of computerised
preventive maintenance information systems as essential part of the project: "it was
essential for engineers and technical staffs to support the development of plant

maintenance information system. Their participation was also essential because the
proposed information system was meant for their use in plant maintenance".

Briefly the computerised preventive maintenance information systems was expected to
monitor breakdowns of plants and take preventive actions to effectively control
production and employee-shifts. Management believed that the introduction of the
computerised preventive maintenance information systems could provide a means to
direct attention to the maintenance of factory plans, and thereby management could
organise employee-shifts accordingly. By using computerised preventive maintenance
information systems, management believed it would get reliable and objective
information about plant maintenance activities and thereby reward employees for grater
efficiency. This information, in tum, could be used for the financial control at NCCL.
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Engineers, as users of computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems, were
annoyed that they had not bc~n consulted earlier by the senior management. However,
engineers were refused the right to participate in \he requirement identification process
initiated by the systems analyst. The genera! feeling among the engineering staff was
that computer, and by implication, people in the data processing wiit, was being used,
yet against, to further control professional people and engineering culture. Engineers
believed that systems analysts did not have sufficient understanding about plant
maintenance and that they should develop the proposed system. A systems analyst,

working with the coniputerised preventive maintenance information systems stated:
Engineers did not co-operate by giving information. They viewed that
they could develop it [computerised preventive maintenance information
systems] iftrainiag was given to them. They believed that engineers, not
computer people, should develop the proposed system. Moreover,
engineers felt that systems analysts do not have an idea about plant
maintenance to develop a better system for their use.

Engineers feared that systems analysts and the data processing unit, by way of
computerised preventive maintenance information systems development would gain
control and power of their work within the factory. They realised that their rccognitiori..
as experts would be reduced if data processing unit controlled the plant maintenance
system and, by implication their engineering expertise within NCCL. Engineers
questioned the legitimacy of systems analysts' developing system for engineers' work.
A factory engineer commented:

They [systems analysts] pretended lo know everything. Who arc they to
come and ask questions, I mean from engineers, what information do we
need from the computerised system? What they know about factory
maintL·rmnc.:? What they know about us [engineers]? They knew nothing
about plant maintenance. They might have been fwni!iar with a bit of
computing but nothing about plant maintenance. ?!ant maintenance is a
completely different busi~~ss.

'°"
TI1c development <,f computerised preventive maintenance infomialion systems in
general and the in'lolvcmcnl of systems unalys\ in the development of computerised
prc~.;ntivc maintenance infonnation systems in specific were annoyed by engineers.
This agitation was further increased when the management increased salaries of
information technology people in the data processing unit hy 40%. This salary increase
of information technology personnel went up above the salary level of cngint:.~rs and
some other executives such as accountants and technicians. An engineer stated that
"computer staff had neither gained qualification on a par with us, nor were they
competent in their profession. How could they be considered as ~upcriors to us?"

However, the fact that engineers and technician~ opposed the raise resulted in a
decreased raise of pay, which led to bad feelings and poor morale among computt-r
professionals. The computing staff perceived the decrease as a low appreciation of the
information technology function within NCCL, mainly due to structural design of the
orgunisation. An information technology manager stated:

Computing in general, and staff who worked in the sections have not
received due recognition right fiJm the beginning to now because it
[computing section] was and still is an instrument of finance department.
Managers who used information processed by the computing units were
esteemed but the p1coplc who made available such information to them
[i.e. people who produced such information while working behind the
screen], were devalued.

The information technolocy manager further said, "however, a systems analyst who had
a deduction from his salary subsequently left the Company for a higher salaried position
in an another Company".

Ii
Like other computerisation projects, the devolopmcnt of the computerised preventive
maintenance information systems was significantly affected by party politics. Factory
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employees opposed the proposed system through their trnde unions. This organised
resistance resulted in a personal clash between the senior systems analyst, in the factory

data processing unit, and the trade union leader. As a r~oult of this clash, the senior
systems analyst, who belonged to the opposition party, was transferred to the head
office on the request of the trade union leader who had ties with the Minister of the then
ruling government. A systems ana!y$1 commented that "we came to know later that
engineers also supported Mr. [X's] transfer".

The development of computerised preventive maintenance information systems
ostensibly taken a political nature.

Engineers' agitation towards computerised

preventive maintenance information systems was defeated through organised politics
within NCCL. They realised that systems analysts acting as experts attempt to
implement hidden agendas of senior management through the development of
computerised preventive maintenance infommtion systems. However, systems analyst
could not develop a type of computerised preventive maintenance infonnati~!l systems
required by the senior management, as explained by a programmer who was'\vorking

'
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the tlata processing unit in the factory. She explained that:

Senior management began to inquire about the plant-maintenance system
[computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems], but we
didn't have one ... , because we didn't receive support from engineers to
develop such a system required by senior management. However, we
developed one according to our knowledge, though it was not the same
infonnation system that the senior management wanted, so we also had
to work with a bit of frustration.

When the development of computerised preventive maintenance infonnaticn systems
was failed, the. systems analyst interpreted engineers' resistance as incapable
management b'l'OUP within factory who didn't perform in their task efficiently and

''°
effectively. 111c systems analyst in the factory explained that, "th..'j' didn't like others
[senior management) seeing !heir weakness''. However, engineers interpreted proposed

computerisL-d preventive maintenance information systems as a management-controlling
tool to closely monitor their works in the factory. Because there was no proper ways of

evaluating their jobs at that time and some engineers would have thought their weakness
could easily caught by the management and 11ccordingly they would be disadvuntaged
A maintenance manager (engineer) explained, "once infor,nation become formal, it is

easy for them [senior management] to control us within our factory life. It
[computerised preventive maintenance information systems] was totally a new
controlling device e::nanated from the government's reforms".

In 1991, with a newly promoted progranuner as a systems analyst recommenced the
computerised preventive maintenance information systems. Senior management later
realised that proposed computerised preventive maintenance information systems could
not be developed without the support from engineers. The former Factory Manager:

Engineers deeply felt that they were ignored from the decision making
process, I mean, the development of the computerised plant maintenance
system. I realised, without their support, implementing the project would
be impossible, so I fi.1ally decided to send a team, including an engineer
fortrainingn.

Realising that management decision-making proe<:ss was hampering due to lack of
infonnation about the plant maintenance, it was subsequently used such information for
financial controlling. The management had decided to send a team consi~ting of senior
engineer (maintenance), systems analyst, and programmer for a training at the
Engineering Corporation in Sri Lanka hoping that training would develop an
understanding among thc~e employees. The training was aimed at demonstrating a
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sample computerised preventive maintenance information systems that could be used in
the cement industry. Systems analyst rcco!lcctcd their training. "It was really
interesting, only for the first time !n my factory lifo, we understood each other. We
developed good relationships with the maintenance engineer".

The team together

realised Urnt the demonstrated computerised preventive maintenance information
systems would not meet the requirements of the corporation, all agreed to develop a

suitable computerised preventive maintenance information systems in-house.

Since the team members comprised from various stakeholder groups (systems analyst,
programmer, and senior maintenance engineer), the team members developed more
loyalty to each other as time went on. The same process occurred when design and
development of the system was started. Engineers continued to invest their time and
effort in the development of the computerised preventive maintenance information
systems, they spent more time in it. Seen in this light we can conclude that the team
members had employed communicative actions in understanding the problems of
demonstrated computerised preventive maintenance information systems.

Engineers began to support the development of computerise.cl preventive maintenance
information systems when their involvement and participation were recognised by the
senior management, systems analyst, and programmer.

A former programmer

commented that "the second stage of the project [development of computerised
preventive maintenance information systems] was successful hence the senior engineer
involved in the design and development of the system". With his support, "we shared
our knowledge about the development of system [computerised preventive maintenance
information systems]", and later the system analyst designed a four-mod•J\c
"
computerised preventive maintenance information systems, which comprised of
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mnchinc-maintuining module, preventive module, job catalogue module and condition
monitoring module. Engineers, systems analyst, and programmer~ 'lgfCCd on the design
proposed by systems analyst and management approved it.

In 1992; the tcnm decided to develop the first of the four-module design, i. c. machinemaintaining module. Once the team approved the design of machine-maintaining
module, a problem appeared ~· .,, where and by whom it should be developed as
maintenance engineers opposed to develop proposed system by the data processing staff
in the data processing unit. The systems analyst explained. "Engineers wanted to
de_vclop it in their section by their people, but not in the data processing unit by
information technology staff'.

Realising the importance of the machine-maintaining module, and the agitation of
engineers to develop the system in the data processing unit, senior management decided
to develop it in the maintenance section. However, management faced with a problem
of developing it on the Wang computer as it was installed in the data processing unit.

During this period, small PC's wern available in the market. In 1992, Wang systems of
the head office were converted to a PC environment but the conversion of factory
systems was excluded. Head office was delighted with new PCs and enjoyed in the head
,,,

office believing that the factory was running smoothly following newly introduced
market principles of the open economic policies of the government.

When the factory management sought approval from the head office to buy a PC to
develop a factory maintenance system, it was delayed. A factory systems analyst stated,
"they didn't worry about the tllin[!a happening in the factory. We wrote acvcral letters to
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the head office asking a J'C". Staff in the head office exercised a considerable amount
of power in use of money Bhoul the factory activities. The conversion of head oflicc
system form Wllng to PCs was rationalised along the line of high maintt'llancc cost of
Wang computer systems but the exclusion of conversion of factory Wang computer

systems into to PCs could not be rationally justified.

However with the support from the General man~gcr, the factory management was able
to secure a PC and it was installed in the maintenance section. The maintenance system

was developed using Clipper programming in a DBASE. The systems analyst
recollected her experience in the development of computerised preventive maintenance.:
information systems:

We [design and development engineer, foreman and systems analyst]
jointly developed the system [computerised preventive maintenance
infonnation systems] and it was successful, because of the participation
of engineers. Both design and development engineer and foreman had
good understanding about the computerisation of maintenance work. We
worked as a team and shart:d our views when we were working
[developing] in the system. It was good, because they knew what is really
happening in maintenance. Other engineers such as maintenance manager
[an engineer] also supported us though he did not have knowledge about
computerisation of work.

Seen in this light, the engineers were not opposed to the introduction of new system per

se rather, they were more concerned about preserving their engineering culture within
NCCL. They were more concerned about how the computerised preventive maintenance
information systems and their involvement with it would be perceived by senior
management.

Systems analyst stated that "with the inputs and support of engineers

and technical staff, it [computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems] was
later successfully implemented". This is not to say that all the engineers and engineers

'"
in the factory supported for the development of computi.-riscd preventive maintenance

information systems, but the development was legitimised by the support and
participation of engineers who did so.

The development of computerised preventive maintenance information systems by
engineers within maintenance division served to reinforce their already estr.blishcd
engineering culture whilst maintaining the power of enginrers over the production
employees revealed that information systems by itself can not force abandoning of long

established social structures within NCCL. A shop-floor employee in the factory
commented, "they [ en.ginccrs] realised that they were loosing their status. Now they can
more easily control our life within factory using computerised infonnation systems. We
become victims of the system". These ideas arc consistent with many critical accounts
of computing in organisations (sec Rule et al., 1980; Mowshowitz, 1976; Briefs,
Ciborra & Schneider, 19'83). These authors view information systems as a new device to
reinforce control and surveillance of the workforce leading to an organisational "iron
cage" (Weber, 1947) with increased alienation.

The computcriJed previ:.:ntive maintenance infonnation system was legitimised by the
senior management with the ideas of engineers' scientific and bureaucratic ideals
(culture). Information technology fused with engineers' scientific and bureaucratic
culture to control employees facilitating the modernisation efforts ofNCCL. Thus it can
be argued the information systems devclop1rtcnt served the interest of government rather
than the general interest of employees and other affected parties in the NCCL.

''
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6.7.1 Reflection on Episode S

The management purist of efficiency and effectiveness through technocratic and
economic rationality dominated over 'lifcworlds', transformed social action to context

of action bound by the requirements of the tcchnolob'Y itself, and ultimately imposed its
own authoritarian system. The adoption of technocratic and economic rationality in
information systems development in the context of modernity is a political system of

domination, which aimed to serve the interest of government's modernisation
programme.

The computerised preventive maintenance information systems project went on within
deeper political and cultural contexts within which it is embedded. Thus information
technology adoption within political and management accountability paradigm model of
modernisation for socio-economic development proved unrealistic with th..: prevailirg
social, cultural values systems, economic and politics in Sri Lanka.

6.8 ReRection on State Control with Open Economic Policies (Phase lb)

Generally, the inability to develop infonnation systems as communicative rationality
nnd become as an institutionalised practice was symptomatic to Ute existence of
scientific and

bureaucratic rationality

which

fundamentally

at

odds

to

the

communicative rationality. This scientific and bureaucratic rationality was rooted in the
historical context of management of S0Es in Sri Lanka. As many other SOEs in Sri
Lanka, NCCL followed the ideal model of fonnal scientific and bureaucratic rationality
of the Western countries to plan and manage organisational affairs. While the state was
acting as a provider of an infrastructure of services necessary for technological

'"
modernisation, the covert hut highly institutionalised and politically manipulated
apparatus for employment followed an uneven industrialisation. The politicians were

cffc~!1ve in the manipulation than the declared objectives of government's socioeconomic development. Modernisation of NCCL frustrated with the interventions of
politicians, institutionalised scientific and rational bureaucracy. These were coexisted

and hampered information systems development projects.

Generally, Sri Lanka's public service has not been structured in such a manner in
consonance with the socio-economic development needs of the country. From this
perspective, it is quite natural that employees at NCCL have been unwilling and
incapable to employ communicative actions and to sustain modernising reform
interventions of the government through information technology.

Seemingly, modernisation efforts of the government through the introduction of
computerised information systems following open economic policies did not make any
impact on transforming NCCL towards effective organisation but significantly
influenced on change of social, economic, and political structures.

Employees'

lifeworlds were insufficiently linked up with the open economic policies of the
government leading to loss of cultural traditions, customs, and values.

Additionally, availability of competitor products and inefficient management of
competition reduced market share by 50% leading to financial crisis. NCCL's machines
were obsolete. Moreover, the government had no funds to replace machinery due to
financial crisi!i of the government.

The government faced with fiscal difficulties and

with the recommendation of the World Bank, the govcmmcm persuaded to privatise
NCCL.

"'
6.9 Preparation for Privatisation
From 1993-1994, NCCL became a public Company under the Treasury supervision with
making legal and institutional arrangements for privatising NCCL and making it attractive to

potential investors. It was the first step o;' privatisation of SEOs. The secretary to the
Treasury appointed a Board of directors. During these period employees' agitation towards

privatisation was developed. It affected for poor pcrfonnance of NCCL. Market share of
NCCL reduced to an average of 50%.

Initially, the Treasury instructed NCCL management to prepare a Company profile to

attract investor~ to sell NCCL. It was considered as a document, which contained
critical infonnation about corporation to help buying decisions of investors, NCCL
management gained little experience in preparing such a document. The former Factory
Manager explained why:

Since all of us were working in a government corporation, we did not /.'
have knowledge about how to prepare a Company profile, wha(
information is to be included? How to generate information from dat:i,
and so on. Until, the earlyl990s, information requirement was not felt.
We operated in a protected market by the government.

The prevalence of an inflexible adherence to rigid bureaucracy, imprnctical top-down
approaches in decision-making and communication, use of overly authoritarian power
structures, and unrealistic intervention by politicians in corporation affairs constrained
employees to engage in critical examination and self-reflection of their work. This
rational scientific, technical decision making and control was a defining feature of
NCCL and was d<.:eply employed in the course of management practice since its
inception. As a whole, many NCCL employees were not aware of their objectification
by rational

scientific and technical decision mHkiug processes, NCCL managers became
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myopic masters of use of bureaucracy leading to a sclr-imposcd ideolo!,,Y tlial
bureaucracy is the ideal fonn of management and control of organisations. In other

Words, managers imposed distorted fonns ofrationality upon themselves by continually
reproducing the nonnuhvc, objectifying structures that distort communication and

constrain practical npplicat1 .111 of their knowledge.

6.9.1 Reflection on Preparation for privatisation

The use of power in the process of scientific and technical decision making and
authoritarian control within bureaucratic organisation of work prevented free
discussions necessary for creativity of employees in NCCL. On the other hand the
management worked in a relatively stable environment buttressing the status quo.
Bureaucratic culture employed within NCCL restricted information sharing across
departments.

This management and administrative culture of NCCL strengthened managers' power
within their departments. Information was interpreted as an instrument to be used to
control employees and to exercise political power over t::iployees rather than
facilitating to change NCCL towards a better organisation. Both manual and
computerised information systems initiated were used as devices to reinforce control
and surveillance of the workforce and to buttress the status quo than actually
transforming NCCL for an effective organisation. This culture has annihilated
employees' momentum for change through information systems development.

From

this perspective it is quite natural to believe why innovative ideas did not cultivate in
managers' minds and why information systems did not develop using communicative

actions.

"'
6.9.2 Privatisation of NCCL

NCCL was privatised under the conversion of Public Corporations and Government
Business undertakings into Public Limited Companies Act. No. 23 of 1987. NCCL was
valued at Rs. 1475 million. TI1c value based on tl,.! trading potential and adjusted for

non-perfonning assets and liabilities was Rs. 1017.2 million, however the Chief
Govcmmcm Valuer has recommended a floor price of Rs. 1250 million for the transfer

of the ownership of the Company. In 1993, calls were made for sale of 90% of the
shares ofNCCL. The balance 10% of the shares, valued each at Rs. 10, was owned by
the Treasury on behalf of the interest of employees. Employees viewed that, "free offer

of 10% to employees was

II

political trick of the govtmmcnt. It used as a strategy to

hide information about privatisation and to suppress employees' resistance towards
privatisation",

In selling ofNCCL, six: major investors who had vested interest on NCCL forwarded
bids. Yawnkkal Group of Companies offered the highest bid. Their bid was Rs. 2.2
billion (US$ 41.1 million). Other bids offered included, John Keels Holdings Limited
Rs. 1080 million 21.9 (US$ million), Go\denbank Rs. 1056.1 million (US $ 21.4
million), Gujarat Ambuja Limited Rs. '.191.9 million (US$ 20.1 million), Specialist
Centre (Private) Limited Rs. 968 million (US$ 19.6 million), and Free Lanka Trading
Company Limited Rs. 5-20 million (US$ 10.5- million).

Finally, 90% ofNCCL shares were sold to Yawakkal Group of Companies in 1994 and·.
the enjoyed selling. A letter to the President on February 1Slh 1966, the Director General
ofS~curities Exchanged Commission had stated that, "the government obtained the best
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price for the country. Twice the bid offered by the second bidder". (Cited in
Parliamentary Report 19 March 1996, p. 763)

Due to an unknown deal, Yawakka! had paid Rs. 1128.3 million (US$ 22.5 million) in
foreign currency and the rest Rs. 900 million (US$18.6 mmion) being paid in Sri Lanka
Rupees by obtaining a loan, which is known as leverage buy out. A senior manager

stated that, "even this payment had not been made up front". Purchase of shares by
using Company funds is a violation of Section 55 of the Companies Act (Parliamentary
ReporL 19 March 1996).

Section 55. "It should not be lawful for a Company to give, whether
directly of indirectly, and whether by means of a loan, guarantee a
provision of security or otherwise any financial assistance for the purpose
of or in connection of, or for any shares in the Company".

The offer to Yawakkal had violated the procedures stipulated in the report dated 18
August 1993 of the Technical Evaluation Committee of privatisation of Cement
Corporation (Parliamentary Rt--port, 19 March 196). The report says:

Section 5 (ii) ... "the entire purchase consideration should be paid up
front, on the award being made".
Section 7.2 ... "If the successful bidder is a foreign organisation, the
price offered should he paid to the Treasury in freely conve1 '.ible foreign
currency".

However, the government rationalised its selling of NCCL along in the line of
improvement of production capacities using modem technology such as the introduction
of new Cement plants and infonnation technology. The Former General Manager stated
that, "the objective of government of privatising NCCL was to increase production
using modem technologies". This purposive rationality of government was challenged
when it was unable to legitimise its actio!ls of the privatisation ofNCCL and the courses
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of actions thereafter followed by the privatised organisations. The covertly motivated

strategic actions, often hidden, of Yawakkal inhibited taking an effective transformation

of NCCL towards a better organisation thus proved lhc government's objective of
privatising of SEOs was problematic through infotTI1ation technology in a free market

economy.
6.10 Information Systems Development and Practice after Privatisation: Ph::ise 2a

Information systems development and practice at NCCL changed once again with the
change of ownership from the government to a private businessman. This change of
ownership resulted due to the r.rivrn1ment policy for 9rivatising S0Es introduced in
1977 in line with the open economic policies. Upon the acquisition, Indian
management's focus shifted to tightly control financial management and call for
analytical reports.

Information was clearly seen as instrument to Le used to aid decision-making and to
monitor the financial performance through controlling production and employee shifts.
Their concern was short-term profits rather than achieving a long-term transformation
ofNCCL. For instance, Yawakkal sold 50% ofNCCL shares to investor in Hong Kong.
Former General Manager remarked, "being a businessman, Yawakkal did not want to
transform NCCL rather his hidden idea was to se\l NCCL at a higher price later".
Yawakkal's purchase ofNCCL was motivated by covert strategic actions for realising
bis hidden objectives. The -,hortsi~~hted policies of Yawakkal in respect of NCCL
created many problems in the social context ofNCCL.

Indian management implemented various strategies to realise their hidden objectives.
For example, the selling price of a bag of Cement, which wns Rs. 182.50 prior

10

privntisntion, increased to R~. 215 nftcr privatisation.

In addition, the buyers of Cement in bu!k had to pay a deposit of half the value of
purchase, which wns refunded at the time of purchase. This money was then invested in
the bank to reduce interest payment on Company's debt (Kelcgama, 1997).
Consequently, utilising employees for higher productivity turned to their close scrutiny.
Production control using shift systems expressed through budgets was re-established.
Production manager commented that:

the Indian managers were so surprised about the ways in which the
employees used to work in the factory. Their low commitment, leave,
day-to day affairs and absenteeism were strange to them. But they
ignored them. For them, changing behaviour of employees and control of
production using shifts matter.

Yawakkal's instrumental (i.e. tunnel visioned) ar,prnach to management of NCCL
assumed employees as objects to be manipulated to realise his hidden objectives. He
considered lack of commitment and irregular panems of attendance of employees and
their relationship as causes of !ow production i11 the factory.

Additionally, factory Human Resource Manager explained, "lndi1111 managers realised
that there were some frauds in recording employees' attendance. Some employees
through their colleagues and with the support of some beads of sections signed on
attendance registers without physically attending to work". For Cl{ample, a production
manager stnted, "one <lay, a factory employee [shop-floor emp!Gyee] was marked on the
attendance registry of hie<; wedding <lay while his immediate supervise was on loave to

m
attend the snid employee's wedding on the same day". Some sectional heads and

supervisors supported such informal arrangements to work during corporation period lo
accommodntc employees' Jifeworlds within work. They nccommodatcd communicative
actions tacitly within formlllly defined production budgets tn tranquillise employees'

problems in working on formally defined production shifts in the foctory.

Yawaklrnl believed a price of cement baf determines c,:ment competition in a free
market, as low-priced cement bags were available in Sri Lanka cement market atlcr
1990. Consequently, high labour cost due to excess hours of overtime was considered
'\ critical in determining price of a Cement bag. However, factory employees worked
overtime to supplement their low salaries and to overcome economic crises due to low
salaries and increasing cost of living. Amon~ ethers, overtime cost of labour was
considered as a major isime for lowering the cost of Cement. Factory Human Resource
Manager commented:

Indian managers worried abJut high overtime cost. It was around
100000 hours per month. In fact those days [during corporation period],
employees controlled pror'.uction shifts in the factory than managers.
Some employees did ove:1irne as a habit without actually being needed.
If mnnu;,;emcnt appear ,o control their overtime work, lhat would be a
disaster, 1;e.:ause you see, you don't get adequate number of employees
to run the factory mifis in the following day. To certain extent, they used
their power to control work.

During corporation time, some sectional heads organised such informal work
arrangements to accommodate employees' socio-cultural lifeworlds to help employees'
economic problems. Traditionally, they were free in organising their work as a family.
Villagers help eaph other's work as a family within a system of reciprocal relationships
without any wage 1!eg:r;\iation. Social structure was linked with well-understood system
of statues and mutual oblignthms between families and neighbours governed by trust
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relationships. They employed communication actions in their everyday work and the
life.. \ndino management did not understand this social structure operating within
NCCL.

Indian management had realised that budgetary controls were difficult in the face of
employees' cultural resistance and feared that local managers might fonn coalitions with
the employees. These simmions led Indian managers to introduce two payroll systems,

one for executives nod another for non-executives, to seek trust from indigenous
managers for pursuing their objectives which resulted executives salaries being
increased and left their salaries confidential. Consequently, processing of accounting
functions previously done by data processing units transferred directly und.er the control

of accounting department. An accountant stated that "taking over of processing
activities from the data processing units was to maintain confidentiality of financial
matters from the rest ofthc employees".

6.10.1 Reflection on Yawakkal Management atNCCL

The push for value for money for investment and strategic rationality of Yawakkal in
the form of manipulation of employees severely affected their lifeworlds in NCCL.
Indian management concentrated on achieving proper control of production and thereby
efficiency by imposing control on production shifts rather than addressing the
apparently peculiar problems of employees' lifeworlds. Indian managers did not take
into account the internal causes of a "systematic" overloading of control capacities or of
a "structural" insolubility of control problems of employees. For instance, control of
work by employees through informal arrangements was rooted in their traditional value
systems. They did not understimd employees' problems as structurally inherent socio-
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cultural imperatives that .are incompatible with formal control linked with modem

infommtion systems. They did not understand employees' problems were linked up with
broad relationships operating within economic and political structures of Sri Lanka. For
example, nn attempt to introduce computerised information system for controlling time
and attendance of employees in the factory was challenged by ~ocio-cultural, economic
and politi,•:al conditions which were as odd as with the covertly motivated strategic

rationaiicy oflndian management.

6.10.2

Computerised

Time

and

Attendance

Information

System

after

Privatisation: Episode 6

In the mid 1995, the management of NCCL purchased hardware and software from
Barcodc Automation Lanka Limited (BALL) to introduce computerised time and
attendance information system for controlling time and attendance of the factory
employees and thereby to reduce labour cost. Group Human Resources Manager
explained, "main purpose for installing a computerised time and attendance information
systems was to reduce cost and increase efficiency by controlling employees frauds".

This purposive rationality of management in the form of control of behaviour of
employees emanated from the free-market model of modernisation programme of the
government and it was included in the computerised hule and attendance information
systems as its objectives: processing of accurate information for control of production
work. This computerised time and attendance information system once again appeared
to threaten employees' socio-cultural 'lifoworlds.'

22'

During the corporation period, factory employees used to work eight hours per shifl
including an hour for lunch/dinner leading to 48 hours per week. This law was enacted

by the Factories Ordinance of NO. 45 of l 942. Since this law was enacted, working
eight hours per shift became a norm in the factory. On the other hand, with ad-hoe
organisation of facto1y shifts to accommodate employees' culture, there mainly 19,
eight-hour shifts were operating before the privatisation ofNCCL.

Realising low commitment of employees towards production and shifts and resulting
high cost of production, the Indian management proposed new shifts-plan, each shift
consisting of eight hours per shift with fifteen minuets break for lunch/dinner. The new
shifts-plan included only five shifts instead of twelve shifts operating before.

I. 6.00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m. 2.00 p.m. to 10. 00 p.m. and 10.00 p. m. to 6.00 a. m.
for shop-floor employees.
2. 8.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. for other employees (e.g. clerical and aligned) , and
3. 8.00 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. for executives.

Employees were dubious about the merits of the proposed shifts-plan of Indian
management and it created much dissension among employees. They realised that
Indian management was attempting to dominate their lifeworlds emphasising too much
control on their work using computerised time and attendance system to realise their
hidden objectives.

Employees feared once again, that their personnel communication would be interfered
with by the formally processed information via computerised information systems. As
we've already discussed employees' traditional culture was oriented towards mutual

m
understanding through infonnal interaction. They were not subject to control in their
tmditiona! villages. A shop-floor employee rceolkcted:

Employees realised that Indian managers allcrnptcd to control their day
to day life using new machines in a new way [using a computerised time

and attendance system]. They also rcali~cd that Indian managers were
attempting to deprive their factory income through stiff control of
production by way of monitoring their time and attendance. They knew
that they would be tlisadvantagcd when the proposed controlling system
begins to appear and monitor and control their auendance.

Employees interpreted computerised time and attendance information systems as a
system of domination of their 3ocio-cultural values and lifcworlds. Scnior·managers
promised employees additional benefits from the proposed computerised time and
attendance information systems and pushed the computerisation project ahead through
systems analyst. For example, systems analyst stated that, "we convinced employees
that the proposed computerised time and attendance information systems would give
more chances to work more shifts for employees". However, employees did not trust
management explanation because they appeared as mere agents of implementing Indian
managers' covert strategic actions. Rather employees continued to work in the factory
following their traditional work practice.

Employees cultural relativism and ethnocentric attitudes appeared against the
technological domination of their every day lives.

They organised against the

introduction of time and attendance system focusing on their poor salaries and high
expenditure of Indian managers. A factory supervisor explained:

Shop-floor employees did not change their working culture after lndian
managers taking over NCCL, rather they were much more angered with
them. You sec, poor employees were not given a salary increase, but
salaries of executives and foreign managers were increased and made

unavailable to the public. How do we s1mfrc with our poor salaries?
How could we trust our managers?

Employees did not seek support from politicians, as they knew that the ownership of
NCCL rcmoincd ii:. the hands of Indian management. They did not want to close the
factory e?thcr. What tliey wanted was to opposed the unduly authoritarian actions of
Indian management. Human Rcsourci: Manager explained. "Fundamentally, employees
opposed controlling their attendance, but using it [controlJing attendance] as a reason,
they did not want to sec the closer of the factory as they knew they would be loosing
their factory income". However, Indian managers' economic rationality became
inflamed Gy political crises that linked to broad economic issues of NCCL and
employees themselves. Employees pressured Indian management through national trade
unions by focusing on their high salaries, fringe benefits, and selling of properties
belonging to NCCL. A union leader commented:

Upon purchase of NCCL, three was no proper management of finance
and their expenses, salaries, fringe benefits, foreign visits and so on were
very high. In the same time, they removed mil!ions of worth spare parts,
ion bars and metals and other valuable properties such as machines
owned by NCCL. He [Yawakkal] really made no commitment to
improve the factory rather he wanted to sell the properties owned by
NCCL and earn as much as he could do within a short period.

While employees' strong opposition towat\1~ time and attendance system was spiral!ing,
an internal systems analyst and an outside expert from BALL with the support of senior
management carried out the development of computerised time and attendance
information systems. A trade union leader stated that, "management supported them
because Indian management increased their [executives] salaries". The management
legitimised its action introducing neutrality into political action context of employees.

229

The manner in which computerised time and attendance infonnation systems was
developed and implcnwnted CUll~cd little to change employees' attitudes towards the use

for infonnation technology in their working culture and broader conditions for work.
For cxnmplc, a systems analyst with an outsirie consultant was assigned for developing

the system, Indian management gave information requirements for the computerised
time and attendance information systems. Software vendors provided software.
Employees were not involved nor they were considered as intelligent actors who could
provide sufficient knowledge for design and modification of the computerised time and
attendance information systems.

Information systems development at NCCL followed positivist approach which
assumes a seemingly objective, instrumental relatio11ship to the object of study. It
refrained from being included value judgements of employees as design ideals of
information systems development.

Tor. development of computerised time and attendPnce information systems commenced

in lhe fuctory data processing unit. Systems analyst was taken an expert role. Systems
analyst explained the process adopted in developing the computerised time and
attendance information systems as follows.

While the development was going ahead, we did not allow others to
come inside the computer room, and allowed only to the people those
were authorised. We thought employees would disturb and destroy
attendance-recording machines as they were opposed to it.

Employees were considered as passive objects to be manipulated by systems analyst's
superiority of technical knowledge. The exercise of power by systems analysts in the
designed and development of computerised time and attendance information systems

2)0

prevented necessary discussion with employees to be included in the d1$igncd ~y!.'tem.
Information systems development did not focus on the <lLmnnds of employees'

'lifeworlds.'

The proposed system was expected to link complex administrative, maintenance,

production, and payroll systems. Neither software was compatible with the needs of
NCCL nor outside expert was able to integrate these major activities together. The

systems analyst explained:

Software provider did not have a better understanding about our needs.
He did not know how to modify software to our needs. It was first time,
he introduced this software to an organisation in Sri Lanka. He used our
organisation to experiment his package hoping that it could be so!d to
other organisations later. It took long time to put into work.

The technical experts, as products of technically driven education and training, could
not understand broad phenomena operating in Sri Lanka society. The technical training
of infonnation systems development included by the bc!i-.fthosc tcclmical\y superficial
information systems outperform in organisations. These experts focused on technical
and instrumental solutions rather than constituency politics, a concern for expertise

\i

rather than employees, a conccm with available training rather than with a network of
social relationships, which might be brought into play. This technical and instrumental
knowledge is insufficient to design and develop information systems for the use of
organisation understanding the lifcworlds demands. Therefore information systems
development is understood largely as ''work" rather than "interaction" in Habermas's
sense (1987a).

"'
Hoping that computerisL'il time and attendance information systems could be
implemented, management purchased six machines for recording time and attendance
from BALL (three machines for shop-floor employees, two machines for supervisors
and clerks and one for executive managers). Machines for shop-floor employees, clerks

and supervisors were installed at an office near to the main entrance while executive
machine was employed inside the factory. Managers refused tu go to the time and
attendance office with other employees because Group Human Resources Manager
explained that, " managers have the mentality that they arc superior to others and should
be treated separately".

The superiority and imperiority which was fused with bureaucratic ideals and
hierarchical powerto C-Ontrol labour, aimf'.d at extracting maximum output to realise
objectives of organisations while maintaining high power distance between managers
and subordinate was a defining feature of management and control of work in NCCL
during the corporation period. This division of work according to management strata
separated an integration of managerial actions with tl:c requirement of 'lifoworlds' of
employees in NCCL Narrow focused of instrumental actions to management and
control of work by management had forgotten the existence of collective symbolic
structures of the lifoworlds. Rather these instrumental systems imperatives contributed
to systematically distort communication with employees.

Machines to record employees' time and attendance were linked up with two PCs
installed in the personnel office in the factory. Two data processing clerks were
employed and was expected to generate analytical report~ for controlling production and
shifts of employees in the factory. Systems analyst explained the procedure for
recording attP.ndance. "It included swiping a card using a machine readabl1: barcodc card

2J2

issued to each employee. Once card is swept, the machine automatically verifies
employee's pay code number and issues a beefing sound with a blinking light".
Management planed to implement both manual system and computerised system
concurrently as n strategy. Group Human Resource Manager explained. "We planed to

run both systems parallel about six months to reduce the resistance of employees'
towards the new computerised system". However, this computerised time and
attendance infonnation systems could not implement as was predicted by the Indian

management at NCCL.

Seen in this light, information systems were employed in the context of management

control to realise aims of Yawakkal management. Systems analyst and extemal
consultant acted technically on "scientific" basis as legitimated enablers of
transfonnation of NCCL through the development of effec.tive computerised time and
attendance information systems to aid decision making by monitoring employees'
attendance and to execute production in a shift system.

This technical expertise and use of computer-based technology lead to instrumental
rationality placing too much emphasis on technocratic modes of organisational control.
The use of power by experts in this process prevented the discussion necessary for the
success of good industrial relationship through effective infonnation systems
development and practice for the bettennent of NCCL.

The use of positivist

infonnation systems development in the manipulation of individuals within organisation
to realise technical interest of designers revels itself to be ideological in tcnns of the
aims of the designers.

m
The purposive rationality of Indian management was as odd as with the reality 'out
there' in NCCL. Information systems d~·velopment once again disturbed by sociocultural, economic, and political contexts of NCCL within which it was situated.

Accommod::ting technical inuovations in the fonn of computerised infonnation systems
for work and broader work conditions of employees !cft little thought towards
modernisation effort of the government operating in a fr(:.e-market economy of Sri

Lanka. Yawaklml's purposive rationality, taken for granted social reality of NCCL and
value neutrality of employees actions were not in line with the established social reality
ofNCCL.

Yawakkal's perfonnance at NCCL had been criticised by the employees and the general
public through parliament. Fonner Factory Manager stated that:

After Yawakkal took over NCCL, they just conducted business. There
was no much benchmark. They haven't done anything to improve the
performance of NCCL. No any capital expenditure projects have been
undertaken at NCCL's works which would substantially increase the
value of the plants in the factory and NCCL.

In contrary to what it was at the time of the initial privatisation, the balance sheet of
NCCL was debt-loaded and hence, the net value of the Company substantially reduced
creating a huge financial crisis (Kelegarna, 1997).

In the meantime a dispute had arisen between Yawakkal and foreign investors whom he
brought in. Yawakkal was charged at Colombo district court with the breach of
agreement. Opposition party members brought Yawakkal's matter to the parliament.
Minister was charged on corruption and insincerity of dealing ofNCCL. However, latter
the Minister denied the char:'"S at a parliamentary debate (Parliamentary reports on 19,
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20, 21, March 1996). The government interfered affairs ofNCCL for a fresh evaluation
to be carried out hoping to offer NCCL to a new buyer. After the failure of Yawakkal
management at NCCL, Fonner General Manager remarked:

The government sbould not scled a partner like Yawakkal to sell its
public properties like NCCL. Yawakkal group arc only importers, who
have no knowledge what so ever of the Cement industry. His operations
at NCCL aimed at short-term profits only while selling the properties
owned by NCCL, and not at a sustainable development of NCCL, with
all the related plant rehabilitation, modernisation and training plants.

6.10.2.1 Reflection on Episcdc 6
The attempt to introduce computerised time and attendance information systems proved
that information systems development could not be separated from economic, political
and socio-cultural contexts. Information systems development took economic nature
because it attempted to deprive of income of employees. It took economic crisis of the
state as the selling of NCCL was linked up with the financial difficulties of the
government. It was pelitica\ because employees protestL'<i against the computerised time
and attendance with their counterparts in national unions; the whole matter was brought
to the public attention through the parliament. It was socio-cultural, because employees
faced with erosion of their inherent cultural values in the course of modernity, which
was ascending from free-market model.

The communication infrastructure of 'lifeworlds' of employees which is constituted by
understanding oriented action, is displaced by an objectification attitudes of Indian
management leading to much dissension and further erosion of employees' 'lifeworlds.'

'"
6.1 I Information SysteJI15 Development and Practice after Privatisation: Phase 2b

Information systems development and practice at NCCL changed once again with the

change of ownership from a single owner Company to a larger multinational Company;
G,1\dcnbank. While investigations into the practice, applied in the privatisaticn process
ofNCCL, and the course of actions which followed by Vawakka, l were carried out by

the officials in the government. Goldenbank influenced the Minister and the President to
assert its interest in buying NCCL (Letters dated, 30.3.1995 cited in Parliamentary

Report 19.3. 1996). After the purchase of NCCL by Goldenbank, former Factory
Manager stated that:

Goldenbank had an interest in buying NCCL quite long ago. You know,
from 1990 to 1993, Goidenbank's Management and Consulting Ltd.
conducted a modernisation study strategy for NCCL. It has acquired an
fn-dcpth knowledge of the entire Sri Lanka Cement industry. Goldenbank
would have convioced of Sri Lanka market and fruits ofbuying NCCL.

With this purposive rationality in mind, Goldenbank transferred a series of management
techniques and methods, information technology and systems, and ciperts to NCCL as
steering media to management and control operations to achieve its mtional objectives.
Goldenbank's bid for NCCL was geared towards:

1. The integration of NCCL into Goldenbank's global network of
Cement producers.
2. A sustainable development and expansion plan for NCCL, which
was in line with government policies [of privatising S0Es] and the
development of Sri Lanka.
3. Investments for technical improve,L1cnts and know-how transfer to
the local staff in line with the findings of the modernisation strategy
study [conduct-cd during 1990-1993], and
4. Development and training of human resources to iinprove opernting
performance and efficiency of NCCL (Goldcnbank bid document,

1993)
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This modernisation plan of NCCL was cmanntc<l from the strategic management and

corporate culrurc of Goldcnbank. Clearly, as will be documented later, these
modernisation programs severely affected the working cu!lurc of employees in NCCL.

These initiatives created much dissension in the general interest of employees of
NCCL. Moreover, these modernisation plans conflicted with the locally established
socio-culture, economic, and political structures of NCCL and deeply penetrated into
values systems of employees and consequently symptomatic to further erosion of their

'lifeworlds.'

Goldenbank believed that NCCL could be transformed to an effective and ''efficient
organi~ation following technological modernisation and thereby to realise its rational
. objectives. This belief is attritiuted to the undcrstW1ding of scientific and technical
improvement of management in positivi~t irleology. Habermas (1973, p. 281) cited:

Science as a productive for1,e can work in fl salut:iry way when it is
suffused by scicnc~ as an emancipat01y force. to the same cx:ent as it
becomes disastrous as soon as it seeks to subject the domain of praxis,
which is outsi~e the sphtrc of technical disposition. to its exclusive
contn,1. 11ie dcmythification which docs not break the mythic spell but
merely seeks to evade it will only bring forth new witch doctors.

This positivist ideology is aligned with the government's objective of modernisation
pro,gram of upgrading SOEs through technological improvements. Some senior
managers who were frustlatcd both with Yawakkal management aml poor performance
of NCCL mostly welcomed the purchase of NCCL by Go!denbank. Forme~ Factory
Manager:

This factory was some forty yeas old, its machines, spare-parts
everything obsolete. During corporation time they were not replaced due

to finical crisis r,fthe government. Yawnkk11l did not improve plants due
to his short-siµi1tc<l 11ision, his hidden agenda of selling NCCL.

The VP of Finance stated that, "Goldcnbank is one of the best high-tcch and
infommtion technology solution users in the Cement industr; in the world. We are
fortunate to have a partner like Goldembnnk". They presumed that NCCL could be
transformed through effective design of information systems towards a better
organisation adopting management practice embodi~d in the corporate culture of
Goldenbank whose purpose is geared by narrow technical or tcchnocrati,. images and
11

ideals ofmnnagemcnt of work-process relationships at NCCL.

"

6.11.1 Cement Competition in Sri Lanka in the late 1990s

In the late 1990s, Cement competition in Sri Lanka was switched into a price
competition. Selling price of a Cement bag of all the three loc;,I manufactures (NCCL,
MMC and TC) remained at Rs. 290. When a competitor increases its price of Cements,
other two competi1ors also followed the incre:ise and vice versa. This price competition
was intensified due to availability of low-prked imported Cement. For example, a bag
of imported Cement was sold at Rs. 265-270. Marketing information systems Manager
obsCIVcd the situation.

Cement buyers simply now compare prices of Cement bags when making
their buying decisions. Now we can not keep high profit~ margin, simply
because we arc the leaders. It is true that our locally manufactured
Cement has n rcput:ition among our customers, but that along is not
sufficient. Price of a Cl-:ncnt bag is now very important.

All the three competitor Cement manufactures have introduced imported Cements to the
market using different brand names in addition to their locally manufactured and

marketed products. For example, a brand named 'Sevana' Cement was introdvccd by
NCCL, however it acted against the Company because, marketing infoITTiation systems
manager stated thnt "people have lost their fear of using imported cement because this
Company also marketed imported cements using a different brand name under the name
ofNCCL".

By the end of 2000, NCCL maintained its market leadership holding 40% of the total
Cement market, TC held ! 8%, and MMC held 17% and the balance 25% remained with
the direct importers. NCCL expects to increiu:e the production capacity of the factory
from 480000 tonnes to 600000 tonnes per year.
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competition
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nmket i~

concerned to gain an objective view of the

A positivist view of marketing has been
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through

developing

competitive environment ln which NCCL
operates. This knowledge mainly dcri1·es from
informntion of tl1c demogrnphic. attitudinal
and

infoITTiation systems to realise rational
objectives of the Company such as

behavioural characccrisiics of the Cement

buyers. l! seeks to generate predictive and
explanatory behaviour of Cement bnyers and
how they can

persuade to buy more Cement.

This objective knowledge of marketing has
become

profits and market share. Marketing
Manager stated that "our marketing
objective is to better off the market

the basis for Goldcnbank operations

approach is firmly based on
positivistic view ofth~ world
at NCCL This

h!adership. We are in a competitive
situation now and to edge out this
situation, we need good infoITTiation".

The Company aims to edge out this Cement competition through adopting integrated
infoITTiation

technology

solutions

Goldenbank to NCCL in Sri Lanka

and

tm.'1.~ferring

management

practice

of

230

Goldcnbank has invested nearly Rs. 2 billion to upgrade Cement plant at Singcrh in
2000 after it purchuscd from Yawakkal in 1996. lt is planning to invest another Rs. I
billion for further improvement. Doring the first four years after taking over NCCL,
Go!denbank has earned high profits however the Company was expected to declare Rs.

750- 800 million at the end of 2000.

6.11,2 Rcstri1cturing ofNCCL
6.11.2.1 Organis;ition of Work

Go!denbank adopted a global, but hierarchical!y top-down power structure at NCCL.

Th1: CEO, four VPs, and the Chief Factory Manager make up the senior management.
The CEO has with al! the executive powers to nm the business oflhe Company. Foreign

managers employed in key positions. For example, CEO from Australia, VP,
Manufacturing from Austria, VP, Marketing from South Africa, and the Chief Factory
Manag:~r from the United Kingdom. Tho VPs of Human Resources, Finance and the
Chairman were locally appointed. This change was stimulated by the belief that transfer
of Gol<lenbank management practice together with newly advent technologies will
transform NCCL for an efficient and effective organisation.

6.11.2.2 Vision and Objedlves

The policy ofGoldenbank is designed to adopt Simi!M management practice throughout

l'

its group of companies all over the world (Goldenbank Policy Guide, 1998). '!'he VP of
manufacturing of NCCL, consistent with the group policy, stated that "manufacturing
process of Cement is as s.ume as everyWhere in Goldcnbank group of companies and Sri
Lanka has no option". Following this policy, operations at NCCL were organised
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around n broad "business plan" which comprised of annual plans to be implemented

each year.

According to NCCL's annual plan (2000), the Company vision, overall

objectives and cash-llow objectives arc as follows.

NCCL's Group Vision: to be the leading supplier of Cement and related
materials in Sri Lanka by effectively meeting the needs of our partners.
NCCL's Group Objectives: cost leadership and market leadership.
Cash flow Objectives: Rs. 700 million
M11rket Share: 39%
ROE; 18%

The above ideals fur vision were directly transferred from Goldcnbank to NCCL
without negotiating with employees and employees in NCCL. Training Manager
observed, "certainly these ideals were transferred from Goldenbank than internally
generated". Managers and other employees were not allowed opportunities to
participate in jointly designing the ends of NCCL. In contrast, ends were to be realised
by using computerised information systems as means.

The unilateral transfer of Goldenbank's vision and objectives had ignored nonnative
structures embedded in communication, understanding and shared meaning of
employees actions at NCCL. lt prevented necessary discussions with employees to take
place and to incorporate in the business plan. Rather, order, efficiency and effectiveness
as values aid the reproduction of advantages already vested in Go\dernbank.

For example, some of the terms used in business and annual plans were strnni,ers and
hard to understand to many of the employees including some middle level managers.
Factory Personnel officer commented:

Some of these [new] concepts, I mean, vision, mission, business plan,
annual plan, key performance indicators, etc. etc. were not heard before

JI
,;{

"'
many ofus. We don't know the real meilning of these concepts. Even if
a trans\ntion of these concepts using our language [Sinhala], would give
nothing. [ mean, it is hard to understand lhe actual meaning of these
concepts [vision, mission, business plnn, annual plan etc.]. You know,
why? We were not working in a business culture before.

However, the business plan of Goldcnbank was to be realised by improving efficiency
and effectiveness of NCCL in a competitive market operating within open economic
policies in Sri Lanka. The VP of Finance, "foreign investors are coming here mainly for
making profits than for social services". This push for value for money objectives of

Goldenbnnk pointed in the direction of seeking more and better infurmation.
Information was seen as corporate resource to be used to edge out the Cement
competition and information technology as enabling technology to be employed to
process this information (Goldenbank information technology Policy Guide, 2000).

6.11.2.3 Budget and Cost Centres

As a consequence under new vision of Golden bank call for fully developed centralised
management budgetary approach within NCCL. It was being used as a tool to control
overall operations of NCCL linking to the factory production targets. Financial
Controller explained:

Under new financial management, budget uses as a tooJ for controlling
all the financial IJCrforrnancc of NCCL. Initially, we start with sales
forecast given to us from the marketing department. These figures then
incorporate to production schedule and accordingly factory budget will
prCIJllfe. We use factory budget as a basis for financial calculation. In
budget meetings, we take a grouIJ decision on the best available
information to rationalise figures.

Overall costs of operations in NCCL was highly monitored and controlled through costccntres. Cost centres in the factory were linked to the budget through sales and
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production tnrgcts bnscd on shifts. Various rcrorts were prepared on each cost centre on
monthly basis to monitor and control the ovemll financial performance of the Company.
Financial Controller explained:

We have 70 cost centres, 50 at factory and 20 at head office. The
objective of cost centres is to have a better control over \he Company.
For each cost centre, there is a responsible person [head of each section]
who will, at the end of each month, receive a report showing the budget,
actual and the variance. We identify everything in tenns of costs: people,
material, and capital expenditure, spare parts and so on. The purpose of
budget is mainly to monitor and control overall cost of operations of
NCCL.

Goldenbank used budget as an instrument to provide information for economic decision
making for managers to steer economic activities of NCCL to realise its rational
objectives. Budget and cost centres emerged as a new organisational language, which

was displaced by previously employed dominant culture in relation to the use of budgets
at NCCL.

Today budget gains commercial status rather than a legal document prepared during the
corporation period. It appears that strict control offinandal matters through budgets and
cost centres in the name of improving efficiency and effectiveness is becoming
influenced on carrying out works of employees despite their resistance. For example,
an accountant stated:

Now foreign managers arc tightly controlled the factory matters using
budgets than before. During the corporation time, budget was used as
merely as a statutory document to rC)lort to the public through
parliament. To certain extent, those days, production managers had
freedom to alter budgets to accommodate shop-floor conflicts of
employees, but t<Jday employees' freedom is replaced by Company
culture [Goldcnbank's management practice].

'"
6.11.2.3.1 RcOectlon on Dndgd and Cost Centres as Steering M'Cdia

Budgets and cost centres as steering media are becoming influenced on employees'
lifeworlds by new accounting initiatives introduced by Gldembank to NCCL operations
in Sri Lanka. As consequences, current practice of Goldcnbank's management restricted

communicative actions to take place at NCCL environment. Employees' spiritual
freedom, shared understanding, informal communication, and reciprocal relationships
are being restricted by -dominant management and corporate culture of Goldenbank
leading to colonisation of employees' '!ifeworlds' at NCCL.

6.11.2.4 Retre;:icbment PoUcy

Following its rational objectives, the Company continued to reduce its staff of NCCL.

The high man-hour per Cement metric ton was considered as a major determinant of the
cost of production. The Company policy was to maintain a ratio par with that of
Goldenbank companies in other countries. Push for value for money was ubiquitous in
every management action. The Human Resource Manager at the factory explained the
Company policy as follows.

During the corporation period, man-hours per metric ton was 7-7.5,
which was far ahead with the standard of Goldenbank group of
companies. The labour cost of Cement production during that period
accounted for 15-20%[of the total cost of production]. Afte-,. laying-off
employees, we reduced it [man-hours per metric ton] to a ratio of less
than three, but still our rate is very high. For example, in certain countries
it [the ratio] is about 0.3. We expect to improve the efficiency with a
minimum number of employees to further bring down our ratio.

'"
By the end of December 2000, the number of employees employed at NCCL reduced to
1200 personnel. This number was after a major retrenchment program introduced by

Goldcnbank to reduce employees at NCCL since it was acquired in 1996. 111c Company
strategy for reducing employees purely based on reduction of labour cost in production
following the principles of economic rationality. The number of staff currently
employed is about two times less than the number employed during the previous

corporation period. The Group Human Resources manager stated:
We need to further reduce our work force. We offer a compensation
package worth of Rs. I million per person for voluntarily retired people
depending on their service. Under this scheme, in 1999 along, about 425
people including 188 executives left the Company. Our idea is to keep
the minimum number of employees required to make this company a
profitable organisation.

6.11.2.4.1 Reflection on Retrenchment Policy

The modernisation program of Goldenbank at NCCL left out its significant effects on
employees• lives. The past-track reduction of employees of Go!denbank policy affected
to increase high pressure on remaining employees and increasingly affected their
lifcworlds. 111c objective of running NCCL operations with a minimum number of
employees interpreted to stabilise and legitimise Goldenbank's control and domination
of work.

6.11.2.5 Management Techniques and Methods
6.11.2.5.1 Dialogue

/!

Management techniques such as Dialogue and Green Area Meelings have been
implemented in 1998 with the business plan of NCCL to support the policy of thC
Goldenbank. The Dialogur ~ystem is a method to initiate discussions between sup.:riors
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and subordinates to set targets to be achieved by the subordinates, the focus of which is
human resource development (Guidelines for the Dialogue, 1997). The outcome of the
implementation of these techniques and methods arc related to employees' pcrfonnancc

npprnisnl system. Salary increases and promotions to employees are given on the
su.::~cssful achievement of targets of each employee. The Training Manager explained
the objectives of the Dialogue system:

Dialogue is a top-down, truget-aimed, approach on employees. The
pressure goes from the top to the bottom levels. We have an annual plan
for each year in which we establish targets for each and every employee
of the Company. From an evaluation, we identify whether an employee

has achieved his targets against the standard decided by the management,
which in turn uses as controlling tools to monitor the actual targets
achieved by employees. Accordingly, salary increases and promotions
nre gramcil. A dialogue between superiors and subordinates decides
targets to be achieved by employees on given Company objectives and
these objectives are derived from Go!dcnbank's vision.

However, the way the Dialogue system executed ciid not provide opportunities for
necessary discussions with subordinates. Rather, management used it as a steering
meehmism to extract the maximum output from the employees to achieve the Company
rational objectives. Factory electrical engineer commented that:

Rather than using 'Dialogue' as a method of facilitating employeemanager relationship to improve the perfonnanee of the Company, it is
being used to control employees by the management to achieve its
targets. There is no discussion in setting targets. Goldenbank provides
targets for employees and employees have to work for them.

The Dialogue system was forcefully executed method to implement the parent
Compa;iy policy. Neither the method nor the policy was negotiated or open to
<

discussion. The policy states that

"each Goldenbank Company must implement a

working Dialogue to explain the Company's objectives, to translate them into individual
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goals, and to help each individual to reach those goals which are essential for success"
(Guidelines for the Dialogue, 1997, pp. 2-3). Furthermore, as can be detected on the
quote below, the CEO forced the employees to use the system. In a message to all the
employees, the CEO stated:

I can't underst11te the value and importance of the Dialogue process. For

us, both as individuals and as NCCL group, to achieve our goals, we
must clearly identify our objectives and mouitor our progress towards
them. Dialogue [system] provides the process for the measurement and
management of progress. It provides for regular feedback, allowing for

ongoing coaching and encouragement in the behaviours needed for
success. This document is yours. Use it!

Dialogue as a steering medium acts as social domination of employees' 'lifeworlds.'
The ideology of Goldenbank's management was defined to mean ideas that serve to
legi.timi~(thC underlying social structure ofNCCL, which was still to use the benefits of
Goldembank.

This irrationality of Goldenbank was geared to partial interests rather than to collective
needs of employees. For example, middle and supervisory level managers were under
stressed to achieve the targets of top management. They were also under stress because
they needed to threat subordinates to achieve these goals. The senior managers did not
consult middle level managers and shop-floor employees for their views when setting
overall Company targets. Rather the Company unilaterally decided targets.
electrical engineer disclosed the following about the Dialogue system.

What is happening is, senior managers are forced us [for middle level
managers and supervisors] to implement targets of the Company. We have
to force our subordinates to complete their targets. If not they take
disciplinary actions against us due to non-compliance of senior managers'
orders. Ifwc take disciplinary action against employees, they threaten us at

night over the phones.

An
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According to Habcnnns, the 'lifeworlds' understanding based on collective selfrepresentations of employees of NCCL were dried up by covert strategic actions of

Goldembank management. These actions were reduced to mechanically conceived idea
of economic criteria of profits. In this way suppression of employees by management
have produced a negative result~ such as social instability caused by steady erosion of

standards and values (anomie), withdrawal of legitimation and motivation by employees
to work leading to alienation and psychopathologie~. Steering media such as Dialogue
steered a social intercourse that has been largely disconnected from norms and values of
employees. Above all the purposive rational economic and administrative action have
become independent of their morale-political foundation (Habermas, 1987b, p.154).

Jn Habennas's tenns, the forced social change, the manipulation of employees'
worldviews, desiccation of traditions and the forced acceptance of partially defined
targets through Dialogue combine to distort "the communicative structures'' and "egosecuring structures" upon which mass motivation of employees depend.

It seems that

the management actions Ocfined through Dialogue were no longer effective in
sustaining the legitimacy of the social structures ofNCCL. Rather management actions
affected to cc1lonise employees' 'lifeworlds.'

6.11.2,6 Manager-Employee Relationships

The senior managers consider their subordinate as inanimate constraints, which can be
manipulated in ways that will serve the advantages of both managers and the Company.
The work pince relationships were defined by focusing on closer monitoring and
controlling of employees' behaviour at the factory. For example, when I was
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interviewing the planning engineer at his office, suddenly the Chief Factory Manager

stepped into his office and the following dialogue oc1-'Urrcd.

Chief Factory Manager: Kumarnn [the planning engineer], do you
know plant is closed now?
Phmnlng Engineer: No

Chief Factory Manager: You should know about it ... sec, I went to
the factory, but it was stopped. You don't know what is happening there.
You must inform me immediately about the shutdowns.
Planning Engineer: How ahould I know unless somebody informs me?

The plnnning engineer spoke to several officers, using his national language (Sinhala), {
to discover rcason(s) for the closure of the factory. The Chief Factory Manager did not

allow the planning engineer to explain reasons for the closure of the factory and thereby
to take place communicative actions in the discussion between the Chief Factory
Manager and the planing engineer himself. The result of these instrumental actions of
:iqiior managers appears to be high levels of stress in middle level managers. For

~

.

example, some of the managers have encountered severe <liseases such as eye problems,
accidents and sickness. Moreover, two engineers died recently. It was widely thought
that high stress led to their death. An engineer in the planing division who frustrated by
the coercive instrumental actions of senior management stated:

I am working here because I can't find a similar job. My doctors
advised me not to work under sever prcssun,, which was badly
affected for my eyes weakened. But, how can I do that? The factory
manager issued mo several warning letters. Similarly other managers
also have received warning letters form the factory manager. We are
treated in the factory as slavers [passive objects]. Last year two
engineers were died inside the clinkering mills of the factory. The
immediate reason for their unexpected demise was the high pressure ',
of the senior managers to achieve Company targets, profits.
The rationalisation of work processes through technical and instrumental actions of
management has created pathological side effects, which endangered the symbolic
reproduction of organis~tion, This intense pressure for achievement of Company i,;oals
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and for the utilisation of values which destryocd the employees traditiona\ly established
culture nnd values systems.

Humnn understanding based on shared knowledge in a reciprocally arranged social
structure was being replaced by instrumental and covert stratc1,,ic actions of
Goldembank management. Norm-confonnative attitudes and identity-forming social

memberships were not considered necessary by Goldembank management; instead they
considered peripheral.

"
In.Sri Lanka, legal enactments that deal with privatisation, little mention is made of
employees affected by the privatisation programs which has created a social cost

(Kelegama, 1997, p. 477). After the privatisation, the new Company reduces employees
employing information technology. This act of new companies led to reduce the
employment opportunities for the poor. Those who do not have proper education are in
trouble in this path. For example, a shop-floor employee commented:

Some employees who went for retirement due to the retrenchment policy
of Goldembank have faced grate economic diffkultics due to lack of
income to maintain their families and to survive tli.eir lives. They could
not find new jobs because some of them were old and not acquired
adequate educational qualification to find new jobs.

Many employees bad lost their interest and withdrew motivation to work due to
communication barriers, unrealistic expectations of senior management, and unduly
authoritarian style of management culture at NCCL. The use of instrumental and covert
strategic action by senior management in the course of employee control appears to be
symptomatic to the steadily erosion of 'lifoworlds' of employees. Factory operations
manager stated:

,so

Many t..'lllployccs !'lave lost their interest anrl withdrawn talking to
management. You know, vr of manufacturing is so tough. He never
wants to listen to others ideas. For him, if something is black, then it is
black. !fit is white, then it is white. To him, no blacic arid white.

Various practice such as Dialogue systcr,, act as steering media for the Company to
renlisc its objectives. Training programs arc ideally used to educate employees so as to
improve their efficiency and c!Tectivcncss. However, training programmes, run by the'

Company, were seen to be merely instrumental to inform treating employees as passive

The

··~ objects. It did not provide opportunities to take place communicative actions.

factory personnel officer mentioned that:

,,,,

"

People have lost their interest of learning these practices [Dialogue ,.r
system and daily Grum Arca Meetings] because all these pra~tice are
top-down rather than shared. At the training, executives too :ouldn\
understand these concepts. For instance, a foreign consultant gave
trainir.g on Dialogue system, but hardly any could understand what it is
and whet it is supposed to do in an organisatiun. Most of them [the
executives] could not understand due to their language problems ... in
communication, there i~ no balance. People worL:: according to orders .
and freedom to speak, a basic human right of c:,,:pressing ideas, was taken
away by the Company management. As far ns [ understand, speaking
[human actions] and thinking is interrelated.

Anothe1· practice, Xnown as daily Green Area Meetings, was a participatory approach
introduced by the Company to share the views of employees with the management. The
objectives of daily Green Arca Meetings, held every momi~g are:
(I) to inform senior man.a gem cm <lccisio:is to employees
(2) to review the performance of previou~ day work
(3) lo plan targets for the day Using the reports generated by management infonnatic,n
systems division in the factory

'

(4) to direct employees' problems to the ntlcntion of senior managL'111Cnl.
These meetings arc implemented through the middle level managers. I attended to these
meetings to undcr:'itnnd the manner these meetings arc conducted by the middle level
managers. At meetings, the middle level managers talked about the first three objectives
of the daily green area meetings whilst employees listen to their L1lks.

From my observation, I understood that the Company employs daily Green Arca
Meetings as another steering mechanism to control the behaviour of 1,.'lllploycc to
achieve its objectives. Both 'Dialob,ue' and Green Area Meetings" were too narrowly
foo;:uscd on economic rationality and organisational control objectives of Goldembank
management than to focus on cmployci.'S' practical problems.

6.11.3 Reflection on New Forms of Management Techniques

.,.,_
Generally, new work practice and new forms of scientific management of\'l_GCL have
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fllomised the workforce in a way that invisibly secure control from above. The power is
effectively embodied in the design of management techniques, control, production
targets, and application of information technology r;~Jating to economic calculations
while ignoring the needs of 'lifeworlds', whit-:1 are independcmiy rooted from their
traditicaal values ~ystcms and culture in Sri Lanka. The purposive rationality of
Go\dembank management were shaped and included in the design and development of
information systems at NCCL. The organisation of information technology and the
development of information systems were focused on transferring Golde~bank's vision
to NCCL to control employees' socio-cultural 'lifcworlds.'

cI

''
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.. 6.11.4 Organising of Information Technology Function

,::·

',\

The so,cio-cu'1'tura!, political and economic context has clearly influenced the c11rrcnt
shape of NCCL 's information systems development and practice. Ever since the 1983,
the head office and the foct()ry maintained two computing centres. The primary focus of

these computing centres was to process data processing requirements such as sales,
accounting, payro!l, and inventories of other departments. These data processing units
mediating as servicing units had been in operation until Goldcnbank started its
operations at NCCL. In 1997, the data processing unit in the factory was dissolved.
St~ffwho worked in the far.tory data processing unit was transferred to the head office.

The nnme of the data processing unit of the head office changed to management
information systems and it was kept under the control of the VP of Finance.

Management information systems manager, two information technology managers, four
systems analysts, and a data processing manager were employed in the management
information systems section. The management information systems and d11i~ processing
manages were externally recruited but two former systems analysts were promoted as
information technology managers.

The VP, Finance is professionally qualified in

accounting and finance. With this new changes, some of the employees who served for
the data processing units as systems analysts, programmers, and data controlling
officers left the Company and some transferred to work in other sccf.ons of NCCL. A
retired data-controlling officer stated tiiat:
Those who worked for the data processing units felt the new management
neglected them because Company polky was changed to introduce
software packages for every application. Management would have
thought it was cheap and cost cITectiw. One day former VP of Finance
summoned me to his office and said 'your service is no longer required
by this Company', meaning of which was that he directly insisted us to
get away the Company.

'"
The change of name of data processing to management information systems caused
little to chllnge the attitude of employees towards the use of information systems at
work rather the change diminished the morale of employees who worked in the data

processing units.

The new change is linked up with the economic orientation of Goldcmbank
management and it continues to erode the technological leadership of organisational

infonnntion technology, for better or worse. After changing the name of data processing
units to management information systems, Goldenbnnk introduced several infonnation

systems development projects independently in the late 1996. They included an
('.{

implementation of computerised time and attendance information systems with a
revised shift-plan, development computerised work-order information system for the
factory maintenance, and the development of management information systems for
monitoring and controlling of factory operations.

6.11,5 Implementation of Computerised Time and Attendance Information
Systems

Mana~ement's attempts to control employees' attendance in the factory using manual
systems, punch cards systems, and computerised information systems were radically
opposed by employees long before Goldenbank gained ownership at NCCL in J996.
Computerised time and attendance information systems initiated by Yawakkal
management was delayed due to employees' agitations and the questions raised about
NCCL' selling at the Sri Lankan parliament. After the take over of NCCL, Goldenbank
introduced the delayed computerised time and attendance information systems in the
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latel996. The objective of the introduction of computcrisc<l time 11nd attendance
information systems was to monitor and control employees' attendance to implement
production schedules through a rigidly controlled shift-plan. The newly introduced

shift-plan was scheduled to implement with a minimum number of employees running
each shift. Factory Human Resource Manager commented:

Goldenbank management was not happy with the way employees used to
work. Employees never changed their way of life in the factory. Most of
our employees were not nomially punctual to work. Foreign management
realised that empl-oyee absenteeism and unplanned leaves could be
disturbed for organising factory shifts because the management planned
to run the facto!)' shifts using a minimum number of employees.
Therefore, changing employees' attitudes towards the new shift-plan was
a seriously contested matter by Goldenbank management.
Goldenbank management did not understand employees' behaviour in the context of
existing conditions in the semantic: dimension; NCCL was steered using purposive
rational actions instead.

This disorientation of management prevented initiating

communicative actions between management and employees at NCCL. Management
actions were driven by purposive rational actions to control emp\ayees through
manipulation of their behaviour. Goldenbank adopted taken for granted attitudes in the
public domain of NCCL and intervened NCCL's affairs by introducing neutrality into "'
political action context.

Titis ideology was framed in management actions and included 11s part of the
implementation of computerised time and attendance infonnation systems. The
implementation of computerised time and attendance infonnation systems was
motivated by technical interests of Goldenbank management to predict and control of
NCCL affairs including employees' 'lifeworlds.'
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6.11.5.1 New Work Shift-Plan in Compntcri11ed Time and Attcnd1mcc Information

System: Episode 7
After the successful take over of NCCL, Gol<lenbank's management proposed a new
shift-plan, each shift consisting of 12 hours per day for four days work for

II

week

continuously and the rest of days in the week as holidays instead of previously
employed 8 hours work in a shift. This newly proposed plan was to be implemented
through computerised time and attendance iofonnation systems. The new shift-plan was
entirely based on increasing production targets by controlling employees' behaviour in
the factory. Manageme11t legitimised the introduction of computerised time and
attendance information systems and the new shift-plan in line with increasing
production targets in the factory. Factory Human Resource M.magcr stated:

Employees were entitled to claim 42 days leave annually together with
every full-moon · 1y off from work. Company had some problems of
organising shifts under this leave scheme of employees. Some employees
went on leave without taking prior approval. This had been badly
affected for organising factory shifts. Some of the employees who had to
work long hours to cover absent employees' work also affected to lower
the Cement production.

Management's desire for increasing production through employee control could not
easily be legitimised and rationalised because the new shift-plan was strongly opposed
by employees. The new shift-plan significantly affected to further erode employees'
lifcworlds. Assistant Factory Human Resource Manager stated:

Employees opposed the new shift-plan arguing tlmt working eight hours
a day is a human right and working long hours cause physical and mental
disturbances. Some employees opposed due to their transport prohlcms,
because they ~sed to report to work from remote villages.
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Employees opposed to new shift-plan because working eight hours a day was an
accepted norm both by employees and management since the inception of NCCL.
Goldernbank used the new ~hift-plan to translate employees' behaviour in line with the

demands for improved efficiency and effectiveness. The new shift-plan introduced new
rules and procedures, which were contradictory to the existing work arrangements of

employees.

Employees were sufficiently incorporated their socio-culture within the existing work
arrangement. They controlled the shop-floor work arrangements with the ~e!p of some
production management in the past. They employed their lived experience in arranging
work. In other words, they employed their tacit knowledge in decision making in regard
to the arrangement of work in production shifts. They realised that the new shift-plan
takes away of their control of work. They realised that they would be unable to fulfil
their social life within factory with the proposed shift-plan and the control of senior
management. Therefore, it can be argued that Goldenbank management employed
power in management actions to executive 12 hours of work instead of previously used
eight hours work per day.

However, Goldenbank implemented the new shift-plan despite the employees'
resistance by objectifying their lifeworld~. Instead of changing shift-plan, the seninr
management pushed local managers to use the new shift-plan in arranging employee
shifts in the factory. Senior managers promised additional benefits such as more offdays for employees by munipulating them. Factory Human Resource manager stated:

We explained employees that they benefit if the proposed shift-;,lan' will
be implemented and asked them to work at least three months w!th1.the
new shift-plan to sec how it was going. The Company organised
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transport facilities for employees who were reporting to work from
remote vi!!agcs. W c promised them a more secure economy with the new

ownership.
Goldenbank managcmc,lt realised that changing attitudes of employees towards new

: ,:

"

management culture was uneasy. They stratcgica11y planned to remove unproductive

and old employees to realise its objectives. Factory Operations Manager stated:
Changing attitude is a major problem. Reluctant to change their attitudes
hampers our production targets drastically. What we arc doing is to offer
them a voluntary rctirement scheme so that those who couldn't adapt to
the Company environment can leave the Company. Our strategy is to
reduce little by little unproductive employees.

Goldembank's policies do not adequately address the issues of protecting the older
employees in particular with respect to learning opportunities and guarding against age
discrimination in the workplaLe. The older employees were seen as an unproductive
workforce and incapable employees who couldn't change their attitudes towards the
Company. The Company did not understand employees' ethnocentric attitudes towards
modernisation programs. As a result, many employees have lost their motivation to
work. A trade union leader commented that:

:I
.J

In the name of modernisation of NCCL through infonnation technology,
Goldembank has been engaged in reducing workforce drastically without
ignoring their soda\ life. Most of the employees have lost their
motivation to work as a result of the past pace policy of reduction of
employees. We opposed several times but foreign managers unheard to
our voices and the Company still continues its policy of removing
employees.

The VP of Manufacturing stated:
Machines arc planned to run 24 hours with a minimum number of
employees but it is not happening due to various shutdowns recording
low profits for the Company. Changing attitude of people is a major
problem for them to be punctual. The family concept is very strong here
[in Sri Lanka]. For example, to attend funerals, wedding, taking children

"'
back and forth to schools, and other social occasions, people ask i•:avr:,

which is the biggest problem for running factory shifts.
In the implementation of new shift-plan in computerised time and attendance

information systems, cmpl<'yees had to sign in an office registry in addition to sweeping
their cards on machines. Two data processing clerks together with a human resources

office were employed to produce reports. These personnel in the human resources
department in the factory forwarded those reports for the verification to respective heads
to physically check whether an employee is actually reported for duties. Late arrivals

were penalised according_ to Company rules.

The computerised time and attendance information system was Jinked to Company
performance appraisal system. Group Human Resource Manager commented, "both late
reporters lo work and early leavers have bad marks as their attendance arc linked to the
Company pcrfonnance appraisal system. Incentives and promotions for employees are
granted on the basis of final appraisal of their performance". This systematic use of
instrumental and strategic actions in the form of objectification of employees'
lifcworlds through information systems development to achieve rational objectives of
management were directed towards the colonisation of 'lifcworlds' of employees at
NCCL. Such a goal of Goldcnbank tends to negate and inhibit a balanced social
development. The imbalance social development denies the possibility that management
receive "symbolic guidance" from lifoworlds via steering media, which arc grounded in,
and controlled at, the level of employees' 'lifeworlds' at NCCL.

Employees opposed Goldenbank managers' unrealistic actions. They realised their
traditionally established working culture is being challenged and replaced by newly
introduced changes. A shop-floor employee recollected:
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We oppos\:d both. new shift-plan and time and attendance system.
Foreign managers were attempting to control our factory life more than
ever before reducing our freedom and taking off our factory income.
Wh~l they planed was to reduce our overtime work. On the other hand
we had to work more hours like machines. Company also attempted to
mo~itor our life using computerised system. We never ever in our village
life controlled by others like this. If a person dies during a working day
we can't attend to his funeral because factory is scheduled to run with a
minimum number -of employees. We have to he free to enjoy our social
and cultural life while working in the factory. Because tha'.'s our culture
[emphasis added].

The presupposition uses of "we" and "our" by employees presume the recognition of
their shared acts. As employees speak together, they act together. This ordinary action
context can not understand just only we listen to their words, but listening to people. We
must attend not only to what is said, but also why employees opposed to the changes
introduced by the management. Within villages, employees were not subject to any
control mechanism. Villagers worked as a family in a system of reciprocal
understanding that was governed by trust relationships. Goldenbank management did
not understand this social context of Sri Lanka that produced and reproduced in every
action and interaction of employees' remained unchallenged over many centuries.

The opposition of employees has multiple meanings emanating from their sociocultural, economic, and political contexts. For example, the unrealistic management
actions began to clash with the fulfilment of employees culturally embedded value
systems. They affected to breakdown of collectivity of decision making, loss of their
traditional value systems and the erosion of their traditional culture. Employees
understood that they would ke;;:p away from the management interaction when
·/Jomputers beginning to monitor and to control their behaviour within the factory. They
perceived computerised information systems degrade their personal communication.
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The use of informal r;ommunication is consistent with traditional village culture of Sri
Lnnka.

Employees opposed management actions because it affected to further deteriorate their

main income from the factory leading some employees to earn low income. Some
employees lost their jobs after the introduction of information systems. For example, the
number of employees who worked in the previous time and attendance office reduced
from twenty to two. Ostensibly, employees through unions opposed the proposed shift.

plan and monitoring and controlling of their works through computerised time and
attendance information systems. From these perspectives, it can be natural to believe
that the development and imp!ementation of computerised time and attendance
infonnatioo systems went on within socio-cultural, economic, and political contexts at
NCCL.

6.ll.5.1.1 Rcffection on Episode 7

What is interesting is, with all these changers were taking place in the social action
context of NCCL, management regarded such actions as irrational and unimportant
disturbances to realise their rational objectives. They ignored the collective symbolic
structures of employees' 'lifeworlds'. They did not understand employees' resistance as
a result ofunre~ilvcd steering problems.

Crisis situations in the secio-cu\tura!, economic and political contexts occurred much
owed their objectivity to the fact that they issue from unresolved steering problems
introduced by Go\dembank at NCCL. These steering problems affected and endangered
social integration of NCCL.

Rather than understanding 'lifeworlds' demands,

'"
management rntionaliscd its actions through interpreting tinanci:i] and production
figures to realise its objectives, meanings of employees' actions was interpreted at best

of localised importance or irrational behaviour rather than understanding the behaviour
is resulted from the unsolved steering problems of Goldcmbruik. The adoption of

science-based innovations and tcchno!oglCs by Goldenhank management at NCCL has
often b:en stifled by the employees' percclvcd socio-culhm1l 1ifowor]ds.

6.11.6 Maintenance for Cement Systems (MAC) for Factory Maintenance

As part of the modernisation program of Go\denbank at NCCL, a project named,

'ffiaintcnance fur Cement ( MAC) was introduced at the factory in the late 1996. MAC is
a manual system which has been implemented in other Goldcnbank group of
companies. Simply, MAC project was focused on the maintenance of factory machines
to improve the efficiency of the operations of factory perfonnance. Former Factory
Manager explained the objective of MAC project. "The focus of MAC was to reduce
maintenance cost with the improvement of overall maintenance activities, to reduce net
operating assets, and to improve overall equipment efficii::ncy".

Go!denbank management assumed that MAC 'Could be implemented at NCCL as it had
been in other Goldenbank comp'l.nies. However, employees were strongly opposed the
introduction of MAC proJect through unions. Employees who previously divided into
various political parties united through their national union leaders to protest against the
introduction of MAC project. A union leader recollected:

Employees organised to protest the implementation of MAC project
despite their pretty differences in politics. After the take over of NCCL,
Goldcnbank Company highly controlled us through various systems. We
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have no freedom within factory. Employees in the factory use as slavers
to realise (he Company targets. They reduced u number of employees
employed in cuch shift. We have to carry 01.!I their works too and we arc

now over pressured.
Howeve,, the management ignored employee resistance but expected a massive

attitudinal change from employees. Fonner F.:ictory Manager stated:
;;

'

To introduce MAC, Goldenbank expected an entire attitudinal change

from people, but employees viewed MAC project negatively. It took
nearly three months including a month to select a task force to study the

project. Another two months to give awareness. Company introduced
past-track reduction of employees. Employees were monitored and
controlled through computerised time and attendance information system
[as previously explained]. People thought all these changes were
emanating from MAC project and they opposed to it.

Management perceived employees' resistarrce as disturbances in the social system to
realise rational objectives of Golden bank rather than understanding cultural problems of
employees' lifeworld~. MAC as a steering medium did not match with the established
working culture, socio-economic

and political

context~ of NCCL.

However,

management organised training program for some employees hoping to change their
attitudes towards MAC implementation and to improve !heir condition for use of MAC.
Golden bank perceived social life of employees as a technical issue, and its improvement
was entrusted to technical experts, capable of rational decision making and
management.

Management organised training for a task force selected among employees to

ii

implement MAC project. The group comprised of 12 employees including a systems
analyst. Foreign consultants conducted training on MAC implementation. However, the
way training was conducted could not cultivate new ideas about the use of MAC at
NCCL. It did not provide opportunities to learn MAC concepts by employees. The

'"
training followed an instrumental approach. A planing officer in the factory planing
division stated:

Though training was aimed at changing our attitudes towards MAC
implementation, it did not happen because it was just conducted. Yi£
could not understand many ofthe concepts he [foreign trainer] taught us.
We have never heard of those concepts before. We had problems of his
language [English) [ emphasis added].

The presumptive use of"our" and "we" in planning officer's use of language presumes
the recognition of learning as a set of collectively shared knowledge generation process.

These "our" and "we" words appear as quite ordinary expression, or presumptions

altogether unchallenged the solidarity of employees in the face of practical
communication. What we see here is the practical relevance of use of communicative
actions in training of employees. This use of social grammar of ordinary communication
··<::- ;s still remained unchanged in Sri Lanka's culture.

"English as a mcdiwn of instruction also inhibited learning by employees of con~epts
associated with MAC project. Many of the employees who employed ~: NCCL had
completed their pre studies in schools and universities using national languages such as
Sinhala and Tamil as medium of instructions. This resulted due to the recognition of

swabasha (swabasha refers to a nation's own language) medium education policy
adopted in teaching in 1944 (Rubero, 2001). This adoption of swabasha policy in
teaching students was inspired and convinced by the universally accl'pted principle "the
mother tongue of a child is the medium most appropriate for a child to learn effectively"
(Rubero, 2001). It considered that the mother tongue as the natural medium of education
and the genius of a nation finds fu\l expression only through its own language and
literature. Once a person is socialised in his mother tongue and has been instructed as
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such, he docs not pr0cccd subject to transcendental rules, but at the: ievl.'1 of
transccnJcnta\ structures thcmseivcs because he is concerned with the a priori or

intuitive basis of knowledge as im!cp~11dcnt of experience (Habcrmas, I 987c).

6.II.6.1 Reflection on MAC
The transfer of the purposive rntion~lity of Go\dcnbank carried witl1 it the transfer of
values and institutions embedded in corporate and management culture of the Western

societies. The application of in:;tnuucntal approach in the course of employees' training
towards the use of MAC !nhibiteci to take place employees' discussions necessary for

the inclusion of the requirements of lifeworlds. Raiher, this instrumental approach
further eroded employees' ability to define and take care of thejr own lives further than

J

the erosion of past periods of corp~ration and Yaw~al management at NCCL. 1
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6.11.7 Development of Computerised Work-Order li.forriution System for
Factory Maintenance: Eplsode 8

.

,

..

·· In the MAC proje<:t, one 0ftl1e areas, namely, work-order information systems, required
computerised information systems .:levckpment to imp\c~ent in the maintenance of
factory plants. Simply, the objective of computerised work-order information systems
(computerised work-~,r..lcr information systems) was to design preventive information
systetT,1S for monitoring maintenance activities in the fac, ,.y plants on a scheduled basis.

·,
\\

It was sehif .Cd for
'

.·

I)

week monitoring plan of plums. Thus, infonnation technology

and managemC11t infonnation systems m~n~iers went to Thailand 10 study those
, sy:;tcms use by the si~tcr companies of Goldenbank expecting that the similar systems
could be used al NCCL. The mar>agcrs realised that the eomputcrise.t work-01Jer
.information systems used by Thai .~ompanics did not meet NCCL requirements, becnuse

Thai manufacturing of Cement process was highly automated and equipped with
modem machines and technologies. Hence, the management infonnation systems and
information
computerised

technology
work-order

managers requested
inll1:mation

NCCL

systems

management

in-house

that

met

to

develop
Company

requirements. 1l1c management infonnation systems manager explained insufficiency of
1liai systems to meet NCCL requirements;

We observed the way that Thai manufacturing process and the wny plants
were monitored and controlled. Thai machines were absolutely new. We
realised the same system [computerised work-order infomiation systCTns]
and the approaches used in Thailand would not be effective with our
,;ome forty years old and obsolete machines [emphasis added].

Consider the above three presumptive uses of "we" and "our" in management
information systems manager's expressions, 'we observed', 'we realised', and 'our
some .. , ' recognise the collectively shared knowledge in managerial actions. Realising
the importance of computerised work-order infonnation systems and believing the
.(i
fL~ommendations of infonnation technology and management infomiation systems
.rnan::igers were correct, the senior mamgement decided to develop computerised workorder infonnation systems in-house. This situation could be ronsidcrcd as a culmination
of communicative actions in decision making between employees ::ind Goidenbank
management. H<Jwevcr, a consu!lant from :he parent Company headquarters was
brought in rather lhan trustin!'. loC.J.lly ::iv::iil::ible experts to develoJ,l the rm.'~osed system
in-house.

With the MAC project, a flew planning division wns created with four planning offi~~~' ,

,,

·I'

together wi!h an cngi~'~cr ~:the head of the division to look al\er the irnplcmcntation of
the computerised work-order infonnation systems. A systems analyst was appointed as

'
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the coordinator of the projcc1. ·n1c system development process was largely ad-hoe. The
consultant did not ec,nduct a systematic study to identify inform::..''on requirements of
NCCL rather the head of MAC project provided requirements for the developmen1 of
the system. Foreign eXpL'fl presented himself, as en expert who is in a possession of
knowledge \hat is not available to users and other alTected parties at !>':::CL from the
computerised work-order infonnation systems. Users were not consulted nor tl1ey were
involved in the design and 1hc development computerised work-order infonnation
systems. The consultant dcvdoped the computerised work-order information systems
within three weeks using Microsoft ACCESS database software package and he left the-·
country leaving the responsibility of implementation with the staff in the planning
division of the factory.

The foreign expert fo!!owed purely scientifically rational, technical and instrument&.[
approach to desig'I comroterised work-order infonnation systems while introducing
neutrality into political !letion contexts in which NCCL operates. The foreign consultant
would have assumed that infonnation systems development could be carried out
painlessly to underlying social and cultural structures of NCCL in which infonnation
systems development takes place. However, it is impossible \:0 argue that public domain
is objective and value neutral. For example, the VP-manufacturing whom needed using
the comruterised work-order infonnation systems for maintenance activities in the
factory urged the planaing division to make use of the computerised work-order
infonnation systems deve!opei.1 by foreign consultant and to produce required
management report to monitor and control maintenance activities in the plants.
However, the users could not produce the required report using the computerised workorder information systems, Systems stated:

"

(I
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We had hell of problems using it [computerised work-ord!."r infonnation
systems] including, creating documents for management. We identified a
list of problems, we had, when we were using the system and handed
over it [the list] to the hend of the MAC project. lie then faxed the list to
Edinbara [name of the consultant]. E<linbara came back to work out the
probkms. However, he just gave me a trnining about ten minutes before
he was leaving the country. We experienced another set of problems even
after correcting the earlier list of problems. We brought those problems
again attention to the management.

The group col!cctive!y employing communicative actions identified difficulties
regartling the use of co1nputeriscd work-order infonnation systems developed by the

:'/

foreign consultant. However, senior management, particularly, the VP of manufacturing
ignored such understanding of the users of the computerised work-order infonnation
systems, because he was inculcated with the belief that foreign expertise was superior to
locally available knowledge of information systems development. Instead, he suspected
that the employees who worked in the planning division assuming that these employees
were sabotaging ;Jctory work by not committing to work with the computerised workorder information systems developed by foreign consultants. A planning officer
explained:

Chief factory manager suspected us. He thought that we [users]
sabotaged the computerised wm"k-ordcr infonnation systems since a
foreign consultant developed it. For example, one day, the operation
manager asked us to create wports whilst he was sitting wirh us, but we
could not produce any single report he required. All planning officers
were also fed-up and frustrnted with the computcrisl'<l work-order
information $)'Sterns. Tncn only they [management] realised that the
computerised work-order information systems could not generate
necessary reports for their [management] use. Later, it was given up.

Luter the system was abandoned leaving u huge cost (Rs.30 million) to the Company.
Commenting on the failure of the computerised work-order information systems, the·

'

I'>

pl:mning engineer in the planing division stated:

""
The computerised work-order information systems was designed for
previ.-,1tivc maintcrrnncc of plants. It was sd1cdukd for 13-wcck
monitoring of plants. Bul our machines were nearly forty years old.
There arc frequent shutdowns and stoppages that require ll,1mcdiatc
attention and repairs. We can not maintain them on scheduled basis
because failures !ah place before the scheduled days. Goldcnbank has
not considered these aspects of machines before considering the

development c,fthc computerised work-order information systems.
The purely instrumental approach -:Jfthc consultant denied the possibility to engage in
critical exmninalion, self-reflection, and awareness of the development process of
computerised work-order infonnation systems relating to employees of NCCL. 1be
instrumental approach ndopted by foreign consultant restrained the development of
information systems according to the understanding of local employees about the
factory maintenance activities. For example, plaani;,g engineer recollected, "when
factory systems analyst sought to take part in the design of computerised wor!t-ord~r
information systems, he was told by the head of MAC that his service was ;10 longer
required by the project." The process adopted by consultant in dcvclcping computerised
work-order information systems inhibited a critical awareness of the conditions of
factory machines to be included in the development. Furthermore, making comments
about the failure of the computerised work-order information systems, Former Factory,.
Manager stated:

Goldenbank expected a massive bel,aviournl and attitudinal change from
. the part of employees to implement the computerised work-order
information systems. However, the approach was top-down and the
/·
Company
neglected listening to the voices of bottom-levels. The poor
1
knowledge ubout computer usc of planners was further added to the
\.\. failure of the computerised work-order information systems,

f

'

'

,i i',

i.'.:'°

Both ·Goldcnbank munaJcrncnt nnd consultant assumed that instrumental and technical
'

approaGh used in the development of computerised work-order infonnation systems
would help to implement MAC projce! to trnnsform NCCL towarps a modem
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organisation. However, the developer ncithl'r had an idea about the Company
requirements nor he involved in the implementation of computerised work•ordcr
information systems with the planning officers. The developer followed an instrumental
.. approach which is embodied in the philosophy of positivist science. He concealed the
problems of world constitution of user employees at NCCL.

The positivist designer, taking an c~pert position, iia,'llored the social grammar of
employees that produced a system of knowledge as a shared learning pwcess, which
allowed interaction with other emp)oyees at NCCL. A superficial /1doption of
_instnunental approach and lhc use of power in the process of development of
computerised work-order information systems prevented contesting the nonnative
context of information systems development and its possible consequences for
lifeworlds of employees at NCCL. Both Go!denbank management and foreign
consultant did not understand the fact that modem scientific knowledge and the
knowledge pnssessed by local employees arc grotesquely unequal in leverage.

6.11.7.1 Reflection on Episode 8
The domination of Western positivist science ignored knowledge and wisdom in
employees' lifcworlds in Sri Lanka. They did not believe that they could have anything
to learn from local people or to recognise that there is a parallel system of knowledge to
their own which is complementary, that is usually valid and in some aspe~t superior
than scientific knowledge adopted in positivist science.

From these pcrspccti.ves, it is

important to understand that knowledge producers, knowledge users and knowledge
recipients such as affected parties must communicate, because knowledge products
possess latent socmpolitica! characleristies that surface and activate when changes arc

---------------------------~--~--27[)

implemented in practice. The inner motive that all the parties share is needed to b·:lh'r
understand and effectively employ in information aystems development if it is to be
productive in organisations. However, this shared knowledge in information systems

development was missed out both by '.he managrment ofGoldcnbank and the consultant
who developed the computerised wurk-ordcr information systems. Seen from these
perspectives, transfer of instruw.~nta! science am! technolo!,'Y, management techniques

and methods, and expe!!~' knowledge from the Western countries to Sri Lanka as
steering media prove problematic and unsuccessful in the prevailing socially
constructed Jifeworlds of people in Sri Lanka.

6.~.1.8 Mal'.lagcmcnt Information Systems for Factory Control: Episode 9

After the closure of data processing unit in the factory and the introduction of MAC
project, the planning division was regulated, as the management infonnation systems
unit in the factory, to pro-duce various management infonnatinn sy~tems reports. These
wee to enable factory management to closely monitor and control factory production to
achieve Company target~.

The objective of management infonnation systems development was clearly linked up
with the Company's rational objectives. A system analyst in the head office had
developed a database system using fox prOb'l'amming language. Additionally, using
Microsoft EXCEL software package various reports arc produced. Planning officers
independently operate database and EXCEL systems. Neither database system nor
EXCEL system is integrnted on-line with information systems in other departments,

'
units or head ntlice.

The planning engineer stated that, "our system is not yet

intcb'l'ated but we interface information manually to database and EXCEL systems !Tom

"'
other departments and sections to generate various management information systems

rL-ports required by the factory manugerncnt. Each manager decides what information he
wants".

Both databas.: and EXCEL systems were developed to control the workforce in the
foetory. Similarly, neither users nor other afTectcd parties were involved in the design
and development of management infonnation systems. Systems analyst stated:

Things are different here; !here were no many interactions with the users
and other parties who affected management information systems. We
can't take their priorities into considerations, because managemei,t
requirements are different. Therefore, we develop management
information systems to meet management requirements.

Th~ systems analyst employed an instrumental approach of which was aimed at the
;,,f

production of technically exploitable knowledge in management infonnatiurr systems
development. This instrumental approach discloses reality from the viewpoint of
possible instrumental control over objectified processes of nature. This approach has
regressed behind the level of rel\eetion represented by the worldviews of users and
other affected parties from management infomiation systems development. The systems
analyst ignored the sociol .:ontcxt uf NCCL within which management infonnation
systems dev~lopment occurs. Rather, objectives of Go!dcnbank were included within
the objectivaes of management infonnntion systems, for possible control of behaviour of
employees in the factory. The objective of each management infonnation systems report
produced by the planning division is as follows.

I.

Daily plant maintenance and review reports. Objective is to review the past
perfonnnnce of the maintenance department against the plan, iilentify sources of a
deviation to adapt to daily plant production needs.
··

m
2. Weekly maintenance report. Objective is to review the attainment of last week plan
and to develop the plan for the coming week.
J. Shill hand-over report. Objective is to ensure a smooth trnnsition between shifts,
discussing problems that ncc<l specific focu~ as well as potential problems.
4. Weekly marmgcmcnt review reports. Objective is to review the results of the past
week of all sections, reporting lo the Chief Fadory Manager, identify variance,
analyse them and lake appropriate action.
S. Daily deviation report. Objective is to review day-deviations.

Factory managers in tum use these reports as purposive-rational means to control the

operations at the factory to achieve Company objectives. For example, the Chief
Factory Manager stated that:
I nm looking aftt:r operations both in the factmy and the quarry. I receive
daily, weekly, monthly and annual reports about the operations from the
planning office. I use these rt-ports [as management contro!!ing devices]
to see whether the factory is running smoothly. I closely look at every
movement of the factory .
and tightly control the operations using
management information systems reports. For example, we closely
monitor employees' anival and departure time to work. Thi, is very
essential for us as the fact0111 is scheduled to run with a minimum
number ot employees. l forced supervisors to take <li~dplinary uctions for
late aniva!s, which is their responsibility to make the employees
disciplined. I pressured all the superintendents and other sectional heads
to issue warning letters for them [for the late arrivals]. ]fa person reports
r,.ipeatedly late, 'sack' him.
then employees will realise that this
Comprnly is tough. We have to have disciplinary workforce to nchieve
our targets. The Comp~!'IY hast" make m;:mcy to keep going.

Mrnlagemcnt information systems development at the factory planning division
reflected the prevailing managerial ideo\.1gy of Go\denbank, which strengthened the
instrumental rationalisation of work process of NCCL. Employees arc considered :is
objects to be manipulated by mrnlagemcnt actions. lnfonnation system was used as an
instrument to monitor and the control tif performance of both employees and other
departments. By using management information systems, Goldcnbank management
believes to obtain reliable and objective measures abovt the pcrfonnance of both
employees and other rlepartments.

lnfomiation is used as a new management-

m
controlling device by management to reinforce control and surveillance of the
workforce leading to increased alicr,ution.

Goldcnbank assumed that management information systems development could be
carried out painkssly to the underlying socio-cultural contex.ts at NCCL. The use of
instrumental actions by factory management through management information systems

to control and surveillance of employees in the factory threatened the communicative
actions that had reconciled their traditional way of life. The traditional way of life was
surrounded by the pu:-posivc rational actions of management. A shop-floor employee
commented that:

Earlit:r [during corporation period] we did not see the factory differently.
Factory bd become a part of our every day life. Many things occurred
in a manner we were used to. Trade unions were always with us in our
ewryday life. Our managers used to know our sltuation [traditional way
of life). We fully supported them and they fully supported us. Mutually
we understood each other.

Employees believed that Goldenbank management would not interfere to continue their
customary shop-floor customs and practice. Unlike privatisation of other SOEs (e.g.
Ko.Janey Tyre Corporation) in Sri Lanka, the employees at NCCL did not resist through
prolonged strikes realising that they would be disadvantaged from the instrurnenrnl and
strategic actions of management. However, employees heavily suffcr-:d from the new
disciplinary controls introduced by Goldcnbank management through management
infonnation systems.

In their traditional village culture, naturally villagers employed communicative action in
their evcryd11y affairs. Their everyday affairs and experiences were not SJbject to the
transcendental conditions of action itself. Reality is constituted in a framework that is

"'
the form of life of communicating groups and is organised through ordinary language.

What is real is that which cun be experienced according to the interpretation of a
prevailing symbolic system. Villagers produced their lives both through learning
processes of socially organised labour and processes of mutual understanding in
interactions mediated by ordinary language. In this use of lan!,'ll~ge ~<!dal interactions
and understanding was predominant. Everyone understood the language used in
ordinary ,ommuoication.

However, new control initiatives of Goldenbank through management information

systems suppressed the employees' lifeworlds leading to alienation and to an
organisationul iron cage as referred by Weber (1947). The intro:lucdon of targets made

employees more aware of the prr-ssures for increased controlled leading to loss of
socially organised knowledge. Employees never used to work in the villages under a
sever control by external parties. In the villages, controlled was communicatively
formed. A work-superintendent explained changes occurred in the factory after the \\
initiatives ofGoldcnbank management.

During corporntion period, employees were somewhat free with usual
habit of work. Now the factory is very busy. Attendance, timing, and
targets arc very important priorities of the factory. People normally clon't
'1ike that type of control. They prefer to work freely without such rib>id
control.
During corporation pcrir_d, employees lmd amicable relationship with production
managers because they understood the circumstances of employees. Goldcnbank
managers ignored this cordial relationship between production managers and employees
and the effects of their relationship to the production in ~h,: factory. Rather than
understanding the employees' behaviour and the importance of keeping good industrial
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rclmionship with employees, Goldcnhauk management ignored the demands of everyday life of employees. When employees' everyday life clashed with management
priorities, it considered as irrational behaviour of employees ad became a matter of
investigation and disciplinc. A work-superintendent explained:

When employees are absent the ChiefFactory Manager asked us to take

disciplinary actions against employees. Good example is that about a
month ago one employee in the clinkering division told me Umt he was
absent because he had a tbmily ceremony. TI1c Chief Fa,·tory Manager's
reaction was not like local managers. He is ir.orc scrim.'.S about factory
discipline and wanted us to take disciplinary actions ab,ainst absentees.
Employees now should be serious about their work. They have to select
either factory or family, not the both, because the Company policy is
very tough now.

Another shop-floor employee stated that "now everybody is busy working but ~.e do not
like it. It's very difficult for us to have leave. Now we don't have freedom to talk much.
We do not like it". lbe work intensification through management infonnation systems
had pressured and increased employees distressed in the factory. An operation manager
said, '"the freedom to talk with people had withdrawn here. People do not talk. They
carried out orders with fear psychosis. And negatively respond". It seemed that with the
stiff management control, employees' attitudes have become hardened. As a result.,
employ~rs opposed senior management actions by focusing on thr.ir high salaries and
;',

expensc·s. An accountant COl!Hnen!cd:

Executing the plar,~ of the expatriates proved expen~ivc for NCCL,
which veered betw,;:cn low profi!s. The foreign mangers (according to
local managers) were paid hight salaries a scale higher than local
managers. Their salaries are far ahead with the salaries paid f JT other
employees. lhey were provided luxurious benefits ~·uch as vehicles and
accommodations at the Company cost. The Coinp~ny had to satisfy them
with al! facilities. For example one of VP's te\cp\mne bill for one month
oxceedcd Rs. 200,000, whie!1 means thr Company can pay twenty shopfloor employees of this bill alone. You know, our output is to local
market and we me severely attacked by other rnmpetitors. We could not
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increase prices as the cost increases. I am concerned whether these
additional costs 11rovided substantial returns to the NCCL. My
understanding is they didn't.

6.11.8.1 Reflection on Episode 9

Within this social milieu, therdore, management infonnation systems development was
incapable of being Jegittmiscd at NCCL. Employees opposer! management actim,s
·\\

11s

means of expressing their discontent. Employees' 'lifoworlds' demands were not dealt
with democratic and rational means. Rather they have been suppressed or dictated by
managerial endorsements. Goldenbank pen.:.:::ition abcut management information

systems development was tcclmica\ and instrumental to obtain better and accurate

information to monitor and control work-place relationships.

In developing management infonnation systems, systems analysts adopted an
instrumental approach for realising technical interests and suppo.tcd in realising the
purposive rathmality of Goldenbank management. Management infonnation systems
were aimed to get reliable and objective measures to predict and control ofpcrfonnancc
of individuals and departments and NCCL itself without integrating employees'
!ifeworlds demands in infonnation systems development. It can therefore be concluded
that infonnation systems development at NCCL represented the positivist approach
emanated from the Western cultural and value systems.
6.11.9 Outsourcing information systems: Episode JO

»

'

The CEO.iii NCCL believed that infonnntion and infonnation technology was critical to
\I

sustain.,'.hd in pursuing Company vision. Therefore, in

'I

tiie

late 1999, Goldenbank

considered employing infonnation teclmology for gaining strategic n<l\':!.'l.!ege in the

m
cement market. The implication of this thinking is that NCCL required a sophisticated

computer communications infrastructure for the daily activities. lbis view of
information and infonnation technology is reflected in the infonnation technology

policy and strategy forr.mlated in the 2000.

According to information technology policy, Goldenbank endeavours to develop fully

integreted, enterprise-wide infor.nation system. Goldenbank assumed that the
development of effective information systems could be used successfully to enhance the

coinpetitiveness in the Cement market of Sri Lanka_ and .thereby to achieve sustainable
development for NCCL.

According to information technology policy and strategy, Goldenbank was to
'increasingly use of computer based solutions to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of NCCL. NCCL endeavours to reduce the reliance on manual systems
and to implement fully in1egraled, enterprise-wide infonnation systems with
Go\denbank standards. Jn theory, NCCL relics on e-mail. Calendar and other Groupware applications for improved communication and coordination while looking upon
and managing datfr. as a confidential corporate resource (NCCL infonnation technology
.Rolicy Guide, 2000). The infonnation technology strategy was cast to give much
·- .,. __ concerned on tho e-commerce and fully integrated and automatOO infonnation systems
in all the aspects of operations to talce advantages over co, 1petition. Go\denbank

'

'

management assumed that integrated infonnation infrastructure would provide
management with accurate and reliable infonnation. The VP of Finance stated that:

We wero looking at full} integrated infonnation system on line with
factory, head office and ot!ler locations. Our strategy was to outsource
standard-licensed snftwar: in a!! the applications including

""
administration aml to introduce lu!ly intcwat~,l and automated systems
such ns SAP 10 edge out the competition. The Company, f<.Jllowing i1~
infonnulion tcchr.olngy strntcgy, had introducctl new outsource ,oflwarc
(infommtion systems) for accounting, p;tyroll an1! inventory app!kations
and a Lotus Nntcs ncl W()rk l!,r hoth intcrrwl and c:,;tcmal
communication. Murcowr. lht: Company u~·c~ Goldcnhmik .,p,qcc website for slmring and comparing infonnation with other Cioldcnbank

ii

compm1ies.

lnforrnntion t~'l:hnology poliL'y am! strntq,'Y was highly linked 1rl Company vision and
objectives of cost and market leadership. The underlying belief of Goldcnbank is that it

Suff~rs from unclear, ambiguous and complc:,;: co-ordination probh.'tl1s, which require a
lot of communication and documentation. Gu\denbank parccived that employees in
every location should share infonnation accurately and in a timely manner. Implicit in
this policy and strategy is that information must be systematically gathered on people
and their activities. Thus, infonnation systems development were tied up with and
focused on realising the interests of Goldenbank of monitoring and controlling
performance of employees and their activities at NCCL.

In the selection and the deployment of information technology resources, the Company
relied upon the principles of econi:,mic calculations for obtaining value for money.
Go]dcnbank believed that information systems have a direct impact on the economics of
>.<,

information processing. Prevalent belief in the direct social and economic value of
computerisation (Kling. !996) presumably infonns such counsel. Information and
communication technologies were understood to improve the ~uality and productivity of
information processing and reduce labour cost. For example, VP, FinrJlCC stated:

We have external communication systems. We are now able to
communicate with remot~ areas such ·Js with Goldenbunk and with the
factory people. We internally communicate using Lotus Notes. As far as
cost i~ concerned these 1c :hnologics arc chcup and they serve lot of
moucy lo the Company. The selection and deployment of inf~miation
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technology solution is based on value for money to obtain u grater
economy.

Although Goldcnbank has been grappling with the problem of information since I 996,
albeit with a conspicuous lack of success, cheup and ca~ily accessible infonnation

tcchnolog}'- L'.i\ly appeared on 1hc NCCL scene ntlcr the Goldcnbank has started its ,

~-

..

operationSat NCCL. On the other hand, the dcvelupmcnt of piecemeal information oO
the integratL'tl information systems to support iofonnation requirements of user

&ipartments substantially changed socio-cultural, political and economic climates in
which NCCL operates. Outsoucing of information systems from different vendors and

assigning the task ·or information systems development to external specialists following
\he information technology policy and strategy continued to erode the technical
l~~~..._hip of organisation of information systems within NCCL. In many cases, the
partnership between vendors and NCCL experienced sever problems leading to
information systems failures in user departments at costs.

Following the Company information technology policy and strate!:,,Y, different versions
of application software from different vendor firms were set up in user departments:
"ACCPAC" in the head office's Finance and Accounting department; "ACQUIRE 7" in
the factory's supplies and inventories dcpi!I1ment; and "Shenide" in the head office's
payroll section. These application softwares were products of developed countries.
Though Goldenbank perceived integrated infonnation systems as powerful and
significant forces of modernisation program of NCCL, the developed nature of the
inte!,'l"llted information systems has been uneven and piecemeal. Neither specialists from
vendor finns nor information technology personnel of NCCL conducted formal
)·information requirements elicitation study identifying needs of the Company. 111e

'""
spcdalists from vendor finns excluded users, internal information technology staff am!
other

employees and carried nut information systems development independently

adopting technical knowledge

with narrow ins1rumcntal approaches for the best

interests ofthc Company managcmn1t and the specialists themselves.

User departments purchased their own software and hardware and frequently developed
their own ir.fonnatiun systems. Each department was starting to implement small,
standalone applications on PCs. Many of such systems directly vied with those available
from the market and have no formally linked with other departments. Because of their
very nature, integrated infonnation systems needed to run on large, centralised multiuser systems. However, this did not happen up till the end of 2000.

The practice of piecemeal informMion systems development fostered n boom on the
piecemeal development ot user departments. These piecemeal infonnntion systems in
users' department acted as major barriers on the del'elopmcnt of inteb'filted information
systems. While software installed at different user depanmcn\s was incompatible to link
to function as a unified information systems, these information systems reinforced the
traditionally estaiilished b:.Jreaucratic culture of managers in user depa!1mcnts. The
deve!opmeul of information systems sel"\•ed the needs of some managers at the expense
of employees. The ends of information 5ystems development in user departments were
in question to many employees. Information systems development has not been guided
by the demands of employees' 'lifcworlds.' Clearly, socio-cultural, economic and
political asr,tcts ofNCCL influenced information systems development at NCCL.

Frequently, settings up of small data processing units have been created to satisfy the
neixls of user departments who gcn.!rally felt dissatisfied with former data processing

units. Shifting infonnation technology responsibility from information technology
section to the user departments sc1.mcd like n good .~olulion for all. According to
Habcnnns this situntion can empower users and cmuncipatc them from the power of
information technology staff. These departments welcomed infonnation system~
development within their departments as answers to the applications backlog.

This is mainly because, over nearly three decades, two computing units in the head
office and the factory served for those who were in power. Throughout the history of
NCCL, staff and the data processing units were subject to instrumental use of senior
m:inagcment and politicians. In many instances, infonnation technology staffs followed
narrow instrumental and technical approaches to design and development ofinfonnation
systems. They were considered as legitimate experts in infonnation systems
development. Their main concerned was to develop technical information systems
necessitated by management decision making to monitor and control lifeworlds of
employees at NCCL.

This narrow focus of information systems development within NCCL not only alienated
employees at work but also annihilated wide assimilation of infonnation ·;.)'stems used
in other departments. Its access was denied to overall employees as a w·:1ole. Therefore,
information systems devc!opment did not hnvc any impact of trnnsforming NCCL
towards an efficient and effective orgnnisntion it initially emulated for. Rnther the
development of infonnation systems frustrated NCCL trnnsfonnation.

Though competition for Cement has been changed since 19905, until the end of 2000.
NCCL and its information systems followed rclntively fonnal and stable structures,
Therefore, they can be view!!d as machine-like structures with fixed relationships that
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produce purposeful results (sec Porra & Hirschheim, 2000). lnfonnation systems
function received little recognition in comparc<l to other business functions such as

accou11ting and finance within NCCL.

In the [ale 1999, Goldcnbank transferred the responsibility of information sy.~tcms
development from the management information systems section to external specialists.
The management information systems manager commented that "the monopoly o/
.~

..

infonnation technology division was broken by introducing software packai~"tor'>
·' various applications in user departments". This can be seen as evidence of the
infonnation technology personnel being considered as an inferior organisational class
by Golden bank management (Parra & Hirschheim, 2000) .

.·; . II

\1

Howevef, outsource policy has created poor morale of infonnation technology

(/"'

'

persoru'iel in the management information systems section leading to alienation and
i'<

I',
apathy. \/or example, an analyst who was !,'Teatly suffered from the Company's decision
,.
,:
to outsource infonnation systems function mentioned that \i'we arc now ignored and

' cornered by Goldenbank management". The poor morale of inteTnal information
technology specialists was symptomatic to a lack of information technology vision for
NCCL management.
' . ..J'

The vast array of information systems that developed at NCCL has been developed
largi:!y through the initiatives of particular individuals in user departments. The
expectations of handing over information systems development responsibilities over to
the user departments were too optimistic, because it created much conflict between user
departments and the management infonnation systems section. ln many cases, the
management information systems section was c~eluded from the selection process of

2S3

software and hardware for user departments. Deputy General Manager in the accounting
and finance department stated that "things are quite different here now. We feel
information systems need l(l come up from us". In many instanccs, these ideas led
personnel in the user departments to depend on personnel who initiated and introduced

such information systems, The project manager stated that "in every section, there is an
infomrntion technology person. Others have to depend on them nnd have to accept what
they say correct". An information technology manager in the management information

systems section stated that:

If mister [X1, an accountant in the accounting and finance department,
leaves the Company, then that it would be the end of 'ACCPAC'
[accounting software package] because he initiated, he trained himself
and he is being used it now by him. Information systems became
properties of individuals rather than the property of the Company.

This practice of infonnatmn systems development by individuals in user departments
fostered to maintain power and to dominate over the staff within and outside the
departments. In certain instances, user departments recruited internal or external
information technology specialists. For e,\ample, a systems analyst that worked in the
management information systems section was transferred to the accounting and finance
department by the VP of fianccc to strength the information system in the accounting
and finance department {Gunatunge & Williams, 2000).
/I

F

...

,.

In many occasions, i'Monnntion system~ initiatives in user departments did not occur
following a dialogue bet'Wecn stakeholders, i. e., user departments, and specialists in the
management infonnation systems section and other employees. According to Habermas,
communication brings people and their knowledge together and it provides a forum for
exchanging their intersubjeclive knowledge in a mutually understand manner. However,
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certain user deportments excluded communication with personnel in the manugcmcnt
infonnution systems section and other stakeholders. Management infonnation systems

mnnngcr commented that:

Managers in user department~ are now rcsponsibli:i for buying
infonnation technology products and services from suppliers; they arc
absolutely critical in giving us control of information technology.
Management inforn1ation systems section was just informed about
such decisions by user departments even though it didn't make much

difference.
Similarly, management information systems section had little coordination about the
information system~ initiatives in users' dcpart,ncnts. User departments handled such
infonnation systems developments with external software vendors. Very often, external
specialists from vt:ndor firms appear in NCCL's premises.

Accordingly, user

departments' received little direction by management information systems section in
helping users and ensuring user salisfaction in use of information systems developed by
external specialists.

The lack of relationship between user departments, information technoiugy personnel in
the management information systems section and employees in other departments
affected creation of mutual confidence, understanding, trust, hannony, and successful
commtini,;ation.
Moreover, Goldcnbank management deemphasiscd the work carried
,,

,,

out by inl'ernal information technology personnd. As a result, when technical problems
ar:~::. in User departments, a systems anali;st stated that "information technology people
do not actively involve in correction of tho\le problems because they were not involved
',

in developing such systems".

;,- _,_
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The Management infonnatiun ~yslems manager wmmentcd on being informed about
such prohicms by user (kpartmcnt.~. "infom1ation technology people in the management
information systems section used to contact cxtcnml vendors who supplied software and
hardware for user departments to correct every minor problem in users'. In some
situations, users requests wcn: negle<"tcd". For example, management information
systems manager continued:

Recently, secretary to the CEO had informed the management
information systems section that she had problems in reading her e-mail
account, but about n week, information technology staff had not attended
to correct her problem. What happened was that she had brought the
matter to the attention of the CEO? After few days, CEO sr,,1ghttcd at me
telling that I'm not serious about information technology functioning at
NCCL.
This practice of many information technology personnel in the management information
systems department impaired the speciality of the information technology people within
NCCL as being experts. TI1c project manager slated that "most of the information
technoloi,,y personnel were not acquired adequate infonnation technology skills and
business skills. As a result, information systems development was not gcucrated
innovative solutions".

What is interesting is that the new organising of management

information systems function, information technology, and information technology
application in information syskms has ignored the existence of such socio-politics
between management information systems section, user departments, and other
involved parties in systems development. Personnel within NCCL were not considered
as valuable and cnp'lble human assets in solving business problems and opportunities
through informatim1 systems development.

Following Company information technology strntcgy and policy, software selection for
various departments at NCCL wns made purely relying on rational criteria such as
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obtaining information for rational decision making and controlling. This belief of
mnnngcmcnt was aligned with the idea that informa(ion systems produce fu~l lo the
organisational dcci.~iun making {Lyytincn, 1992). Scvcrnl factors conlrihutc tu this
belief: reduce cost to access and mnnipululc information, a foster decision cycle, which
pennits more alternative to be explored, and higher infonnatiun quality such as
accuracy and timeliness, which allowed for more informed decisions. The Deputy
General Manager of accounting and finance stated:

Now we can make good decisions [rational) and have a better control all
over the operations at NCCL. After introducing ACCP AC, the culture of
the Company has changed, for example, now only a single person is
doing works of five persons.

In this role of infonnntion systems have substantially shaped the prevailing managerial
ideo]~'ID' by strengthening the instrumental rationalisation of work processes at NCCL
leading' to increased a\icr~Mion of employees. According to Haberm as, the application of
infonnation technology has not addressed social needs that arc recognised as justified
by an informed democratic consensus. It ignored the effects of application of
information technology on workforce. For instance, an accountant who works with the
ACCPAC system at the head office stated:

Now we don't have social-life within the Company. All arc busy with
targets, because poor perfonnanees affect our promotions and pay
increases. We don't have a lunchroom to share our feelings and
sentiments with others but we used to have one before [during the
corporation time].

Information systems were employed to monitor the perfonnnnce of individuals and
other organisational units without considering their everyday life. This belief about
infonnation systems s,.;rves several objectives of management: information systems
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provide a means to direct attention to important aspects of organisational pcrfonnancc;
and infonnntion systems r,rovide nn explicit contract or implicit rules to evaluate the
perfonnanee of employees and compensate accordingly (Lyytinen, 1992). By using
infomiation systems, Goldcnhank management believed that it would get reliable and
objective measures to rcwiml employees and shapes their perceptions and behaviour
townrds the implementation of modernisation programs ofNCCL.

Increasingly, these new idras ofinfonnation systems were fused with instrumental and
strategic rntionality of management actions and reinforced the existing traditional power
bases of senior managers to control and surveillance of the workforce leading to
increased alienation and apathy rather than developing motivated workforce within
NCCL. The Project manager stated that:

People use information as power to control others. Some managers
have created their own power bases within the Company. You sec,
more people you call, you love them. [ don't get information. Giving
information is considered as something that you favour others. You
know why, still truditional bureaucracy remains unchanged here.
Some senior managers who have been worked for the corporation time
still remained in the Company and they became more powerful than
before because of setting up small computing units within their
departments.

At present, throughout the Company remains the traditional state corporation culture
where the focus was to target functional objectives using information systems set up
within each department. Many of them have not been exposed to working in a changing
business environment. Factory Human Resource Manager stated. "We have to go
outside and sec what is happening there". Introduction of new information systems in
user departments supported to growth of bureaucratic infighting and the Joss of
flexibility through the entrenchment of the status quo (Alvesson & Willmott, 1992a).

'""
6.11.9,1 ReOeetion on Episode 10

lnfonnntion systems development and practice did not match with the needs of various
stakeholders and it ignored the inclusion of their value choices as design objectives of

infonnation systems following their socio-cultural 'lifeworlds.' Information systems
were not developed considering the social context of Sri Lanka. Changing information

systems development from management infonnation systems to user departments
therefore did not chanr,c the direction of information technology development for the
betterment of employees and the NCCL itself.

Overall, the present information systems development supported the purposive
rationality of Go!dcnbank. This techno-scicntific and economically rational approach,
while considering others as objects, appeared to be ignored information systems
development as a socially valuable function, normally acting in the genera! interests of a
larger stakeholder group. The results of information systems development have caused
little to change NCCL towards the use of information systems and the transformation of

NCCL towards a modem organisation through effective information systems
development.
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CHAM'ER SEVEN
SUMMARY, THEoR1sATION AND CONCLUSION

7.0 lnlroduction

In this chapter I present a summary of each episodic analysis of infonnation systems
development and practice at NCCL, then I summarise major findings of the research. I
present an account of theorising information systems development from communicative
actions whilst adressing problems of application of Habermas's communicative actions

in organisatiens in Sri Lanka. Finally, I conclude the chapter with some
recommendations for successful information systems development and practice in

organisations in Sri Lanka, conclusion for each research question, overall conclusion for
the study with some recommendation for future research.

7.1 Summary
7.1.1 Episode I: Budget as a Steering Medium

In this episode, the Ministry of Industries and Public Treasury controlled both the head
office and the factory affairs at NCCL. Preparation of budgets at NCCL emerged from
the consideration regarding political and management accountability of funds towards
the public through parliament.

Budgets were produced for production and costings

concentrating on improving efficiency of operational perfonnance ofNCCL affairs.

'""
lnitially, factory rnuoagcmcnt used budgets as a steering medium to control shop-flour
work than as a nmms tu wport tu head office. Senior munagcmcnt used budgets to
achieve the purposive rationality of the government. As part of the implementation of

budgets, employees' shins became ttie focus of factory life. Senior management
legitimised the use of budgets by employing production targets in line with improving
factory efliciency. Thus management assumed that budgets would improve the
efficiency of operations and thereby fulfil NCCL's political and managemcnl
accountability to the public through parliament.

However, employees found it hard to accept the managers' justifications ofbudgets and
their instrumental actions. Budgets appeared to clash with employees' socio-cultural
'\ifcworlds.' Employees interpreted budgets and shifts as threat, tn their identity within
NCCL. Employees opposed the formal control of their '\ifeworlds' through budgets.
They opposed management use of budgets as a controlling device: in the factory. They
questioned the legitimacy of formally defined budget targets and shifts operation by the
management. In Habermas's terms they questioned the contextual validity claims
(comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness) of management actions through
the representation of their unions. They wanted, instead, managers to use their everyday
life in the village ns a way to communicate about budgets and shift planning within the
factory. They were culturally and ethonocentrically free from the control of modern
management techniques and methods such ns budgets and shifts. In villages, employees
didn't need formal controlling systems because human interaction within village
occurred
structures.

through

well-understood

and

reciprocally established communicative

"'
Rcco!,'llising employees· resistance towards budgets an<l rcllising their legitimate
lifcworlds needs the factory management gradually developed opportunities that

allowed employees to ful fi1 their traditional commitments to ~odo-culture nnd economic
conditions.
Factory managers understood employees' resistance as something that required worthy
consideration to achieve industrial hannony and to improve relations with employees

nnd thereby to achieve frictory efficiency. They understood efficiency had to be viewed
not only as scientifically and teclmically defined rules and procedures, (as the case in
positivist approach), but also on a whole series of human decisions and value
judgements for which the rules of meanings were tacit nnd located in the employees
socio-cultural '\ifcworlds.' By npplying Habermas's work, it is argued that factory
managers used efficiency in a balanced way by applying tacit rules and meanings of
employees' lifewor]ds to meet the requirements of both groups - management in tho
head office and the employees in the factory. In other words, factory management
accommodated value choices in budget guided through the exercise of human reasons
when they found difficulties in implementing budgets in the factory.

Factory mnnagcmen\ considered employees' '\ifcworlds' within the factory's everyday
concerns. They tacitly .accommodated the underlying rules of meanings of employees'
actions emanating from their lifcworlds in implementing budgets in the factory. Factory
management considered the practical relevance of ~c of budget and incorporated value
choices of employees within budget controlled operations. In Hnbcrmas's term, it is
argued that the factory management integrated demands Jf lifcworlds within steering
media The budget was legitimised by the inclusion of tacit knowledge of employees'
lifeworlds.

In other words, r,roduction managers in the factory cmploy.-.-1
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communicnti·Jc actions tacitly to in1cgratc employees' 'lifcworlds' in hutlgcl. In this
way, by cmploying.';ommunicativc acti.i;,s in budgets, it can he argued that the budget
us a steering mctliub did not colonise 1•mployccs' '!ifcworltls' in the initinl phase of its
u~e in \li'i:'..'control at th.: factory.
By allowing employees' 'lifcworltls to be tacitly includl't! in budget, production
managers and employees maintained cordial relationships while supporting each other
and reporting to the head office. However, both rational bureaucracy and the influence
of politicians annihilated further communication action in managerial planning and
stymied communicativt: rationality as an institutionalised practice within NCCL. In
other words, these dual characterislics, bureaucracy and influence of politicians on
NCCL

affairs,

hindered

NCCL becoming

an

effective

organisation

using

communicative rationality as an institutionalised practice.

NCCL formal\y- foliuwed the statutory corporation model of the British nationalised
industries, which formally embodied a philosophy of bureaucracy, scientific and
rati(i~al legal concepts. The government adopted these natural, scientific and rational
planning and decision making concepts to transform NCCL into :m efficient
organisation. If this transformation were to be successful, then NCCL would be
characterised by more efficient organisation practice.

Management actkms at NCCL were guided by these bureaucratic ideals and were
institutionalised as norms and normative structures within NCCL. 'Lifcworlds of
employee~ were not allowed to evolve n.1tural!y. Above all employees' 'lifcworlds:,-, ,;

"

were suppressed by the purposive rational actions of the government's plans of
modernisation of NCCL and objectified through management actions.

Senior
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mamigcmcnt hml 1i1tlc illlcrcst regarding the lifcworlds' problems in the factory. Senior
management could not sec foctury lifcworlds' problems us their concerns because they
blinded by narro,vly focused scientifically rntional managt'tllcnt approaches uod
bureaucratic rationality principles and acted in the interest of politicians. The senior
managct1,.::"lt, on the other hand, as being bureaucrats did not want to sec their
diminishing pm11Cr c.,;:ercL~cs against the employees.

The underlying problem of the management ofNCCL was that the government Minister
held the exclusive power of the control and access to resources. The Minister often
arbitrarily inlluenced and changed NCCL activities, including budget decisions for his
interest rather than the interests of NCCL. The senior management and the Board of
Directors had minimal 'power or their power was weak in the eyes of political power of
the Ministers of ruling governments. They were unable to properly advice and guide the
Jl/,foister, but vice versa.

Both bureaucracy and political domination coexisted and frustrated NCCL becoming as
a better organisation through effective planning by employing communicative actions.
Thus budgets could not establish clear objectives agreed upon by all the parties through
communicative actions. Budget served the partial interest of the govenunent Ministers
rather than serving it to wider interests oftbc community. Though production managers
in the factory and employees wanted communicative rationality to be institutionalised
within NCCL, they were prevented against the power of politicians.

Generally, nrnnagemcnt and employees had minimal p(lWCr to cl1angc the decisions of
politicians and they were unub!e to properly manage NCCL becoming cffcc\!w
organisation.

'·.!:2 Episode 2: The Punch Card System

In the episode 2, NCCL affairs were eontrol!ed by the new financial control fC~ulations

'

introduced by the government in the late 1960s to improve the efficiency of SO Es. The
punch card system at NCCL was introduced following these new financial control
regulations of the government to control employees' attendance and discipline at the
factory. With the introduction of the punch card systems, infonnation processed via
manual systems was rq,laccd by the semi-automated systems.

Senior management at NCCL legitimised the introduction of punch card system in line
with the government objective of improving efficiency in SOEs. The managemr,nt
considered the punch card system as an efficient and effective steering medium to
cont,'01 omployees' attendance to implemenl budget and work shifts to achieve the
efficiency ofNCCL. It is argued that the NCCL management introduced the punch card
system to change the employees' working culture within NCCL and to reduce the
operational cost and thereby to improver the overall efficiency of performance of
NCCL.

Senior management assumed that the introduction of the punch card system

would change employees working culture and thereby transformed NCCL becoming an
efficient organisation.
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The decision to inlrnducc 1hc punch eanJ system was taken by the Chainnan of NCCL.
Factory management used the punch card ~ysWrn> to monitor and control employee

attendance tu maintain u discipline(! workforce. In other words, NCCL managers
assumed that the employee tlisciplinc could be achieved through the introduction of the
punch card system, bcc,iusc infonnation aboul employees become transparent when
these semi-automated systems rccordctl their time and attendance.

The punch card systems influenced the way employees interpreted management control.
Employees interpreted the punch card systems as another steering medium (controlling
tool) emanating from the new financial control ret,'11\ations of the government. They
interpreted that management attempted to further control their socio-cultural lifcworlds
within NCCL.

They interpreted the punch card system as a threat to their existence

within organisation. They questioned the legitimacy and the validity claims of
managements' actions.

Employees opposed the external control by the management using technically designed
information systems through their unions. Culturally and ethonoccntrically employees
could not adjust to the past pace technology introduced by NCCL management.
Employee control using the punch card systems was antithetical to their traditionally
established culture. Employees wanted managers to stop the control of their lifeworlds
using technical information systems and revert back to the manual information systems.
They wanted managers to employ their everyday life within the punch card system
while considering their 'lifoworlds' concerns.

29/o

Thuu!lh employees opposed the decision to implement the punch card system, the
Chaimrnn who introduced the system did nol change his decision and forced factory
management tu u.,c the system in controlling employees' attendance in the factory.
Using Hahcnnas's words, it is argued that the punch card system as a steering medium
colonised the lilcworlds of employees in the factory. The punch card system constituted
constitutional character of colonisation of employees' 'lifcworlds' as explained by
Habcnnas.

Through the punch curd system, rnanag=cnt introduced new set of rules for attendance
col1.trol of employees' shifts {recording, time of shift starts and off, shift allocation and
so forth). Senior management viewed the punch card system as a universal contro!ling
tool to discipline the employees' behaviour within the factory. They used the punch card
information to predict and discipline e,.nployee behaviour to realise the objectives of
both the senior management and the govirrnment. However, the punch card system, as a
steering medium, did not support social integration in NCCL. The new rules stemming
from the new working patterns and the efficiency were not matched with the rules of
meaning emanating from the tacit knowledge of employees' 'lifeworlds.'
Senior management did not integrate employees' rules of meaning emanated from their
social context within punch card system. Jn other words, steering medium (the punch
card system) did not meet the demands of employees' lifeworlds. Rather it objectified
employees' 'lifeworlds' leading to distorted communication.

The major effect on control and new work disciplines of management arose from
discretion being taken away from employees and scheduled into the punch card system.
Previuusly, employees were sufficiently incorporated their socio-culture withiu

management techniques such as budgets using communicative actions. rroduelion
manngcrs by including employees' 'lifL'World~' in budgets maintained good industrial
relationship. Aller the introduction of !ho punch e..i.rd system, such relationship were
blurred because formally processed infonnation via the punch card systflm were
available to organise formal work shins to achieve production targets in the hudget.
Senior management did not use communicative action lo define efficiency through
information system in a balanced way for the benefit of themselves and the employees.

As a result the introduction of punch card system exacerbated refationship between
mllnagement and employees. Inability of management to integrate 'lifeworlds' demands
with steering medium of the punch card system alienated employees leading to loss of
their cultural traditions, customs, and value systems. Rather than integrating cmployee3'
'lifeworlds in information systems, the senior management objectified their processes to
achieve the objective of the Minister of the government. The design purpose of the
punch card system supported the objective of government at the expense of the demands
of employees' lifoworlds. Thus the punch card system benefited the partial interest of
the government and the senior management than it would be benefited for the
divergence interests of a large group of participants.

In the design and development of the punch card system, management did not allow
employees to reflectively understand and critically examine the punch card system.
Management did not understnnd the meaning of employees' resistance in the semantic
dimension. Managers, instead of stopping it responded to employees' resistance by
pushing ahead with the punch card system without employees being participated.

""
Resistance of employee!- was connected with a va~t array of socio-cultural, economic
nnd political conditions op1:rnling in Sri Lanka. The management outflanked what they
perceived as resistance by employing thcir power, resources, and authority in decision
making in regard to thc punch card system. The punch card system rcinforccd the
worsening industrial harmony and alienated employees within the factory. D1ispite
senior managers having power in terms of decision making, they failed to achieve their
desired objectives. Senior manager could not successfully lransfonn NCCL becoming
an effective organisation following the efficiency as defined by them. Rather efficiency
required defining in a balanced way by integrating the requirements of 'lifoworlds.'
The discussion about the punch card system call for the development of information"

,,

systems need to consider value choices of a wider participants stemming from their;

'

social context

7.1.3 Episode 3: Budget with the Punch Card System

1;!{; episode 3 begins when the new government swept into power in 1970. It introduced

/I

'

\gal framework to control public finance through a parliamentary Act No. 3S of 1971.
Budget and the punch card system introduced in a context of financial crisis of the
government. The Act required having budgets and financial procedures to introduce
economic rationality to improve the efficiency of public corporations. In this way, the
government introduced commercial nonns into NCCL affairs. 1l1c senior management
introduced new financial regulations to change organisational culture and values and to
improve efficiency of overall operations at NCCL.

,,,,
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Consequently, budget implementation with the punch card system urose as

II

legal

necessity within NCCL.

Senior management legitimised the use of new budget control and the punch card
system as new management techniques and strategies to improve the operational
efficiency and the overall performance ofNCCL. In this new approach to control SOEs
by the government, the public Treasury had empowered exclusive power of limiting

public spending and consequently cutting money approved from the Treasury to NCCL.
By implication, the Sri Lunkan government wanted to transform NCCL into an internal
mal"ket. If this view of government were to be successful, then more efficient SOEs in

Sri Lanka would foreshadow NCCL.
Following these new regulations, within the factory, budget set targets for production
on employees' shifts. The punch card system monitored employees' attendance. Senior
managers simultaneously employed both the budget and the punch card systems as
steering media to closely monitor and control production targets by arranging employee
shifts in the factory to achieve efficiency.
Production management and employees in the factory interpreted new budgetary
controls were an improvement of previous budget systems (as explained in the episode
1 and 2). Production managers found it difficult to implement both the budget and the
punch card system as defined by the senior management following new rules stipulated
by the government through the new financial control regulations. These systems
appeared to clash once again with employees' everyday life within the factory.

These new controlling systems influenced the way employees interpreted management
actions and information systems. Employees' opposed managers' instrumental actions

""
and information systems through their unions. Employees interpreted new controlling as
threats to their survival and socio-cultural integrity within NCCL. They interpreted new
controlling as a way of suppressing their 'lifcworlds.' They interpreted that the new
controlling systems would threat to worsen their living patterns and maintaining their
traditional village culture. Tiley thought that their personal communication was

d..::grading by the improved budget and the punch card systems.

The resistance of employees was coiled with economic crisis of Sri Lanka during this

peiiod, which resulted high political tensions. They opposed newly proposed controlling
systems, because these technical and economically rational systems continued to erode
employees' traditional cultural values and customs and living conditions. These new
controlling systems substantially affected lower the factory income of employees.
Employees questioned the legitimacy and contextual validly of management controlling
systems, which were aimed at, improved surveillance of work. They opposed the uso of
modem management techniques such as budgets to formally control their factory
'lifoworlds.'
Employees sought ways to protect their socio-cultural integrity and 'lifeworlds within
NCCL. What they wantc,d was to consider their socio-economic problems in budget and
shift arrangement in the punch card information system. They wanted to legitimise
infonnation systems through their participation.
By using Habemias's approach, it is ar1,'Ued that the government steered NCCL by using
steering media of budget and the punch card system in a direction which was not
amenable to employees' 'lifeworlds.' Thus these steering media had constitutive
character of colonisation of 'lifeworlds.' These two management-controlling systems
reinforced the management power to control employees' discipline in the factory.

'"'
Senior management, instead of stopping employees' resistance rcspomlcd by pushing
ahead with new controlling systems without employees' purticipation. They ignored
employees' everyday life:. Managers believed that the new controlling systems would
better explain and prcdit·t employees' bchuviour within the factory. Politicians and
senior management dccmphasiscd and ignored understanding the meaning stemmed
from employees' resistance. Employees' resistance towards the new controlling systems
was associated with meaning stemming from vast webs of socio-economic, political and
cultural contexts.

The most problems within NCCL were related to uncoupling of steering media with the
requirements of employees' 'lifcworlds. The government, often the Minister of
Industries remained exclusive right in decision making and influenced on information ,.,:/
systems development at ll. e expense of employees' 'lifeworlds.'

Politicians introduced government objfctives, through the senior management,
following Western techniques with thci\" embedded value systems such as improving the
efficiency, without recognising the i<lio3)''Tlc-rasies in Sri Lanka's social context. The
way efficiency was interpreted by the senior management was associated with
scientifically and technically defined set of rules and procedures with economic
rationality in the positivist approach. Employees interpreted efficiency differently
following their socio-culture, particularly their village cultures.
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Village life evolved over centuries. At village level, the control remained in social
relations. Villagers were averted to modem past pace technology and their momentum
for change was subverted by these modem technologies. Village life and work was

governed by trust and mutual undcrstunding within a system of reciprocal understanding
ofhuman interactions. This culture was fused with Buddhist thinking.

Fonnally processed information using budget and the punch card system was not
needed to control their lifcworlds. Information and control was inscribed in lifoworlds
understanding. These social rules of meaning were produced and reproduced in every
social interaction and relatively remained unchanged free from the domination of
Western values systems. However, these social value systems were contradicted with
the modern intCTprctation of efficiency.
The modernisation program for Sri Lanka was introduced following independence in
1948. As part of this modernisation programme. SOEs were established following
Western values systems, bureaucracy, management techniques and methods for
modernising S0Es in Sri Lanka. NCCL was instrumental to use of these ideas of
modernisation and change. Politicians used these SOEs to provided employment
opportunities for their political supporters than the declared objectives of the
government's socio-economic development in the political manifestos. In the minds of
politicians, establishment of SOEs could be understood as traditional kingship rather
than vehicle for mobilising Sri Lanka for socio-economic development. Politicians were
more interested in political survival than actually transforming NCCL towards a better
organisation using information systems. Their ability to access resources and implement
and change infonnation systems through senior management provided social
domination of employees' 'lifoworlds.'
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ManJgcrs used fonnally processed information via modem Western based management
controlling techniques such as budgets and the punch card system to control cmploycc!l'
'\ifewor!ds' of which were based on tacit rules of meaning emanated from their socio-

cultural contexts. Trade unions while acting as medium to protect employees'

'lifoworlds' and helping for mobilisation of socio-economic development were provided
',·,

access to exercise of the kingship for politicians.
Within these considerations, it is ari,,ued that, the rational planning model of the

government imported from the Western countries were failed within state control model
o(socio-economic development of Sri Lanka because they were not integrated with the
needs of broad socio-economic and political circumstances of local communities.
Consequently, information systems development within the state control model of
socio-economic development, which followed these concepts, did not include the social
contexts of Sri Lanka. As a consequence, information systems development and practice
did not assist to transform NCCL towards a better organisation.

7.1.4 Episode 4: Wang Computerised Systems for Management Accountability

In the episode 4, information systems development and practice at NCCL followed a
m~;ket-based appror.ch under the open economic policies introduced by the right
centred political party that formed the government in J977. The government assumed
that the introduction of market principles would create competitive services and
operations for NCCL. The belief of this ideology was that NCCL should be financed
partly by the internally generated funds to imprcve the political and management
accountability o fNCCL.
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In this new approach, senior management developed and implemented management
budget in which information was considered as the currency to be aided in decision
making to improve the dficicncy and effectiveness on which a new market system for
NCCL was to be developed. Senior management considered that information
technology and computerised information systems as means (techniques and strntcgics)
to be used to solve their problems.

In Haberrnas terms, senior management employed information technology and
information systems as steering media at NCCL to achieve the purposive rational
objectives of the government. It is argued that the senior management introduced
market principles through

information

technology and

information

systems

fundamentally to change the NCCL's socio-culture and to improve efficiency and
effectiveness.

The information systems were introduced in a context of financial crisis of the
government and thus limited public spending and reduce;! money from the public
Treasury to NCCL. The Chainnan took a decision to develop computerised infonnation
systems to provide better and accurate information for decision making. The
computerisation project was introduced in line with the objectives of the government
and it reinforced and strengthened instrumental and strategic approaches to management
of NCCL. Senior management legitimised the introduction of infonnation systems in
line with improving efficiency and effectiveness ofNCCL and assumed that they could
fulfil the political and management accountability to the public through the
representatives of parliament.

JOS

The Chainnan taken a strnng force with numerous resources for decision making which
should have sufficient to change NCCL through computerised infonnation systems and

thereby to transfonn NCCL towards an efficient and effective organisation. If the
computerised information systems development were successful, then NCCL
management would believe that by using computcrise<l infonnation systems they were
doing well in their jobs and government's open economic policies were represented in

information systems to aim at efficiency and effectiveness. However, computerised
information systems was not succeeded and constrained by various socio-cultural,
economic and political factors.

NCCL followed an ad-hoe approach to develop computerised information systems.
Developers {both internal and external) did not include value choices of infonnation
systems users and other affected parties as design ideals. Rather the information systems
development reflected only the interest of senior management to fulfil the demands of
the government's Ministers.
Developers followed purely technical and instrumental approaches in design and
development considering users and other beneficiaries as empty vessels to be
manipulated by systems developers. Thus by employing instrumental approaches to
design and develop infonnation systems, they objectified 'lifeworlds' of employees at
NCCL. They did not allow users and other affected parties to critically reflect and
rationally include their value choices as design ideals in infonnation systems.

This

approach is antithetical to the historically established socio-cultural and value systems
of employees at NCCL.

'°'
The new infommtion sy!>tcms introduced new langl"'';c, rules, procedures, schedules,
work and shifts arrangements, recording and reporting trnnscctions and so on for work.
Employees opposed the introduction of information system drawing meaning from their
social context. The senior management used efficiency following scientific and

technical rules for predicting and controlling the employees' behaviour and NCCL
operations. They were contradicted with the ways employees interpreted efficiency
drawing meaning from their social context. As interpreted by employees, efficiency iS),

"
dependent on whole serks of human decisions and judgements for which .rules were

tacit and located in the Jived experience and historical contexts of employees. Jn such an
environment human b;/ernc!ions arc socially interpreted because social reality is
historically constructed. In such an environment, these staff members were opposed to
translate their hwnan intentions and actions to improve e"'fficieney in a way it was
interpreted and used by the senior management.

"
,,
Ii,

Employees opposed the computerised information systems through unions because
these systems threatened and clashed with their historically cst:iblished socio-cultural
values. Employees saw the introduction of infonnation systems to change their political
and economic climate in which NCCL operates. The adoption of a infonnation systems
approach significantly affected and shaped employees' work and life within NCCL.

Culturally and cthnocentrically they were sceptical to the modem Western
technology and ~ubverted to the fonnal control via computerised infonnation
systems. They interpreted that the modem infonnation technology degraded their

,,

personal communication. They interpreted that the new computerised infonnation
systems would control their working culture and worsen their already living and

)07

economic conditions. They qL,.cstioncd the validity claims of the systems
dcvclopmcnl and imph!mcnlation. ·nicy instead, wanted mmiagcmcnt to consider
their lifcworlds in systems development and legitimised the system development by
their participation. They wanted management to integrate their 'lifcworlds' concerns
with the design and development of computerised infonnation systems. In other

words users, employees wanted systems developers to use communicative actions to
integrate their tacit knowledge in information systems development.

Most problems in infonnation systems development appeared at NCCL were related to
,'i

laCk of fit between the expectations of senior management and the rest of the

'
employees. From these perspective it can be argued that NCCL management used
computerised information systems for the benefit of them rather than benefiting it to a
larger stakeholder group. The information systems development constitutccl force of
power by senior management and information technolo!,>y staffs. Jt did not incorporate
value choices of other people, which is the rationale for the infonnation system and
provide the legitimation for its implemeotation as it provides opportunitie:1 for
reflectively understanding the objectives ofinformation systems development.

Information systems developers and senior managers did not understand resistance of
employees to computerised information systems. The resistance was linked up with
their socio-cultural and economic contexts. It is argued that computerised information
systems as steering media did not integrate tacit knowledge stemmed from the systems
beneficiaries such ..,,,
~s employees' '!ifeworlds in such a way to make mutual
~
understanding, negotia.tion and relationship possible.

'

,,
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Hnbermns insists that the ignorance of trndilit>ns, the manipulation of worldvicws and

the forced social change all combine to dislorl "the communicative structures" and
"ego-securing" structures upon which mass loyalty and generalised motivation of the

people depend. Within this interpretation, it is argued that information systems
development at NCCL did not represent knowledge from wider participants and were
not guided by the interest~ of their views other than the interests of some politicians and
senior management. Using Habennas terms, it can be argued those information systems
as steering media did not socially integrate the needs of 'lifeworlds.'

The management used infon.nation systems as means without resolving the objectives
(ends) ofinfomiation systemt' development whose were problematic to many employees
at NCCL. Senior management and systems developers considered that ends of
"infonnation systems development were neutral and therefore value free.
Practical problems such .as employee resistance were interpreted as unimportant and not
the concerns of the senior management. The management responded resistance using
covert strategic actions such as offering high salaries and promising additional benefits
for employees rather than understanding the actual meaning of resistance .from the

,'i
seinantic dimensions.
According to Habennas, management employed irrational and repr,essivc forces in
infonnation systems development. Using Habcnnas's tenns, this irrational and
repressive impact of "rationalisation" and "development" can be explained as a new
fonn of ideology- "technocratic con~ciousness".

Therefore, it can be concluded that

the computerised infonnation systems contained constitutional character of steering
media. According to Habennas, information systems de;•dopment distorted ethically
loaded images of the good life <>ud dominated employees' everyday communication and

'!ifeworlds.' The effect of this domination is the high level of anomic and alienation al
NCCL employees.

The NCCL history revealed that the focus of iofonnation systems development and
practice (in this episode, computerised information systems for accurate infonnation of
political and management accountability) based on the reasoning of human actions
arising from the Western positivist ways of thinking. The application of positivist ways
of thinking in information systems development seemed problematic in other countries,
particularly in a developing country such as Sri Lanka, where the reasoning of human
aciions arising from particular social context and reality oflhat country.
It can be summarised that the market•bascd model within open economic policies of Sri
Lanka used the imported positivist approach in information systems development and
practice at NCCL to gain objective power over the self-understanding of socio-cultural
Jifeworlds. According to Habermas, this positivist thinking in information systems
development rendered inert the frame of reference nfinlernction in ordinary language.

NCCL management ignored the social context in which information systems
development was functioned. Senior management by assuming that infonnation systems
development could be objectively carried out, cmp!oy~es' 'lifeworlds were viewed as
cybernetic control systems within NCCL, relying upon the information systems as the
control mechanisms.
In other words, alternative ways of perceiving the value of technical innovation, often
manifested in the deployment of infonnation technologies in the social context of Sri
Lanka, were largely ignored and tended to be ignored as unimportant. Thus the process
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of information systems development separated the process of generating knowledge

from the prnctin1\ application of that knowledge.

In other words, NCCL management ignored the use of communicative rationality in
information sysl~ms devt!lopmcnt as a system of reasoning arising from particular

historical experience and related to socio-cultural lifoworlds of Sri Lanka. As described
in chapter six, there were·numerous ,;; . .,mples where the use of positivist approach h,

information systems development was challenged by the social context ofNCCL.

In spite of the many calls for a new organisation and new forms of work through
efficiency and effectiveness, the possibility of transforming NCCL remained severely
constrained by socio-cultural, economic and political constraints in Sri Lanka. In its
hi~tory ofNCCL, attempts to change NCCL towards a better organisation have focused
on reengineering, downsizing, employing hieratical control, and operating efficiency
rather than reinventing new form of organisation through the development of
information systems using communicative actions. The pervasive use of information
systems was further aggravated by poor infrastructure facilities available within Sri
Lanka.

Politicians on thu other hand used information systems to preserve their political whims
and fancies. They were interested more on political survivals than the aet"Ja!
transformation of NCCL. Trade unions acting as a medium between employees and
management struggled to protect employees' 'lifoworlds' were also provided to access
to exercise of kingship for politicians. Senior management used rigid bureaucratic
approaches to control work. The traditional bureaucratic ways of organising work and

m
control were repacked by infonnation technology.

lnfonnation technology and

infommtion systems used as instruments (steering media) to control and dominate over

their \ifoworlds rather than using ii in an innovative way to organise and control work.

The use of rigid bureaucrncy, power and domination of both politicians and senior
management together with their instrumental and strategic approaches, poor
infrastructure, and lack of experience hampered to effectively take place systems
development activities at NCCL. For the NCCL to be transformed into a better
organisation using infonnation systems required a range of remedies. These included
breaking of rigid bureaucratic ideology, changing of instrumental and covert strategic

approaches, elimination of political domination, provision of a better infrastructure
with adequate training, and use of communicative action to critically reflect and
rationally include value choices of a wider membership at NCCL. However, this did
not happen at NCCL.

More importantly, as previously been asserted, information systems development at
NCCL was not opened to a wider community to critically reflect and rationally
include their ide...Js as deign objectives in information systems development. NCCL
adopted non-reflective positivist approach in information systems development and
practice. As pointed our by Flood (1991, p. 305) this "non-reflective positivist
position is epistemologically untenable". As a result many information systems
development projects were abandoned and some were marginally benefited for
NCCL to become an effective organisation. Thus the marker-based model with open
economic policies did not help the government to transfer NCCL becoming an

m
efficient and effective orgnnisation through the development of computerised
information systems.

7.1.5 Episode 5: Compulerised Preventive Maintenance Information System for
Management Accountability

In episode 5, information s.ystems development and practice at NCCL resulted from the

open economic policies of the government, as was the case in episode 4. The objective
of limiting government funding forced NCCL to partly generate necessary funds
internally. The improvement of 'factory maintenance was central to this political
objective. NCCL management initiated development of a computerised preventive
maintenance information system for the factory maintenance in an attempt to realise the

government objective of limiting funds. NCCL management, by devdoping such an
information system, assumed that it would fulfil the political and management
accountability towards the public through parliament. Therefore, it can be argued that

the senior management introduced market principles through computerised preventive
maintenance information systems (both technology and information systems) to change
NCCL organisational culture by improving efficiency and effectiveness.

The computerised preventive maintenance information systems was aimed at
monitoring breakdowns of plants and machineries and taking corrective actions to
effectively control production targets and employee-shifts. The senior management
introduced information systems in a context of financial crisis of the government as
means to obtain accurate and objective information for decision making about the
plant maintenance to predict and control the behaviour of employees at the factory.
Senior management legitimised the introduction of computerised preventive

m
maintcnAncc infonnation systems in line with improving the efficiency aml
effectiveness of NCCL. In liabennas terms, the proposed computerised preventive
maintenance infonnation systems was effectively a steering medium to control the
foctory plants and machineries and the behaviour of employees.

Senior management employed information technology personnel in the factory to
develop the computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems. If it were
successful, the senior management would have believed that the information systems

reflected government's objectives and market principles and NCCL was
characterised as an efficient and effective organi~ation in the public sector. However,
this did not happen and the development of computerised preventive maintenance
information systems was thwarted by socio-cultural, economic and political
atmosphere ofNCCL.

Initially, maintenance engineers, being users,

were opposed the proposed

computerised preventive maintenance information systems development. Engineers
viewed the computerised preventive maintenance information systems as a threat to
their already established engineering culture within NCCL. They feared that their
jobs would be taken by information technology personnel and by implication their
professional recognition. They interpreted that the senior management used
information technology and information systems to control professional people and
their perceived engineering culture.

They interpreted that the computerised

preventive maintenance information systems ns a new controlling too! emanated

,,l'rom the reforms ofth~ government. Engineers opposed the control of their work vin
computerised information systems because they thought their jobs would become
more transparent when form~'.ly processed information were avnilnb\c in the hnnds of

'"
senior management and thus easy for them to control engineers' work in the factory.
Engineers assumed that they would be more disadvantaged as there was no formal
method of evaluating their performance.

The senior management pushed the computerisation works by using covert strategic
actions such as increasing salaries of information technology people to get computerised

preventive maintenance information systems into their hands. System analysts
employed instrumental approach in systems development assuming user employees as
passive objects to be manipulated by using the power of expert knowledge. The system
an~lyst would have believed that the infonnntion systems development was neutral and

therefore value free.

He assumed that the users would not question bis role of

involvement as a developer of computerised preventive maintenance information
systems because he believed that his analytical knowledge was superior to the
knowledge of user employees regarding the maintenance work. The system analyst
sought to obtain co-operation of engineers using the authoritative power of senior
managers and his expert knowledge.

Following Habermas's theories, it can be argued that both the senior management and
the information technology personnel employed th.::ir power and irrationality in the
development of computerised preventive maintenance information systems.

B::ith engineers and other employees questioned the truth, legitimacy, and sincerity of
computerised preventive maintenance information systems. They questioned the hidden
agendas of information systems development by senior management through systems
analysts. Employees opposed the maintenance system through their party unions while
engineers supported employees to defeat the management initiatives following the

government objectives to control their work.

The computerised preventive

maintenance information systems development was failed because engineers and other
employees were strongly opposed to it.

Maintenance engineers opposed the development of computerised preventive
maintenance information systems because the senior management did not consult them,
instead information technolob'Y personnel. They thought they ignored and degraded by
the senior management. As a result, they refused to their right to participate in giving
information for the systems analyst to develop the computerised preventive maintenance
in~ormation systems initiated by the senior management.

Maintenance enginee•,s questioned not only the legitimacy of information system but
doing systems analyst of engin~ers' wcrk (professionalism of information technology
personnel). Engineers believed that the systems analyst lacked knowledge about the
factory maintenance activities. Instead, engineers wanted to legitimise the computerised
preventive maintenance information systems development by their participation. They
wanted to remain the control of computerised preventive maintenance information
systems in their hands.

After the failure of the computerised preventive maintenance information systems, the
senior management responded to engineers' resistance by way of giving training for
both the senior maintenance engineer and the information technology personnel at an
outside organisation. The training was aimed at demonstrating a software package for
maintenance work to be used at NCCL's factory. During the training, these personnel
understood that the demonstrated sy~tem did not help NCCL's requirements and agreed
to develop a system in-t.ouse. These members developed more loyalty to each other as

31'

time went on. The same process occurred during the design and development stage. In
Habcnnus's terms, these team members were employed their intcr;ubjective knowledge
ir information systems development.

Engineers supported systems analyst to design and develop maintenance system when
their involvement and participation were recognised by the senior mnnagcmcnt. Both

information technology personnel and engineers employed shared knowledge to
develop

information

systems. The development

of computerised

preventive

maintenance information systems was legitimised by engineers who supported to
de.velop it. Seen in this light, it can be argued that cornputeriscd preventive maintenance
information systems, as steering media did not colonise the 'lifeworlds' of engineers
who supported to develop the system by way of including their needs in the system.

Using Habennas's interpretation, it can be concluded that the steering media fol!owcd
the demands of maintenance engineers who participated in the design and development
of computerised preventive maintenance information systems. According to Habermas,
the development of computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems followed
communicative action.

However, a question remained "did the developed information ~ystem by information
technology personnel and maintenance engineers benefit of the rcsi of the employees,
including engineers who did not participate the design and development of
computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems?" In. other words, how do
we know whether the computerised preventive maintenance information system was
used as a service for all the employees at NCCL? l11is question raises moral issues of
information systems development {Klein & Hirschheim, J996): whether the infonnation
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systems development was included the real and genuine social needs and value choices
of employees emanated from the society'! Or whether the development of computerised
preventive maintenance infonnation systems was fused with technocratic, scientific,

rational and bureaucratic ideals of both the systems analyst and engineers who
participated am! developed the system?

This situation can be understood by r{'bring to the resistance of employees. The
,\;,

,''

development of computerised preventive rriii;;;';C:1ancc information systems was not
widely opened to include value choices of other inakcholdcrs such as employees and

other enb>ineers who did not support the development of computerised preventive
maintenance information systems. The development of information systems by allowing
only of few people to participate doesn't mean that the information systems serve the
wider interests of all the employees. It doesn't me:in that the dev~lopment of
information systems is neutral and value free and it does not disturb the symbolically
established social structures in organisations.

The effect of computerised preventive maintenrnce information systems was that it
shaped and influenced the employees' 'lifeworlds' leading to withdrawal of their
motivation tO work aod increased expression of alienation. In this understandiog of
employees' resistance, it can be argued that the development of computerised
preventive maintenance information systems reinforced the power of maintenance
engineers within NCCL.

It was fused by engineers' culture which was framed by the highly institutionalised
scientific and bureaucratic ideals of which engineers were understood as their own
culture and rational. They were blinded and objectified by Western scientifically

rational and bureaucratic ideals from the inception of NCCL. They under~1ood these
ideals as rational approaches to management and control of work. They understood
these unreflcctivc rational upprouches as their own nonnativc Htructurcs. They
employed the same ideals in the design and development of computerised preventive
maintenance infonnation systems as the design ideals of their own and as legitimised
nnd rational.

In this light, following Habennas, it can be ar!,'lled that the infonnation

systems development represented irrational and repressive forces of management to
control employees' life within !'!CCL.

A~cording to Habermas, the infonnation systems development protected the engineers'
scientific and bureaucratie culture and rationalised work procedures while maintaining
power of engineers over the production employees and activities within the factory,

Initially, maintenance engineers were opposed to the project because they were not
included in the design and development phases, not because they didn't like the
computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems. What they didn't like was
the development of the computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems by
infonnation technology personnel for their use alone. They wanted to protect their
perceived scientific and bureaucratic culture, often perceived as rational and legitimised,
to control work and employees.

Employees opposed the engineers' fonnal, scientifically rational control approaches
long before the introduction of computerised information systems and they interpreted
that the new computerised preventive maintenance infonnation systems would threaten
ITlore on their lifeworlds within the factory. Hence, it can be argued Iha: the system
analyst and engineers developed computerised preventive maintenance infonnation
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systems to scive the interest of themselves and the govcmmenl, rather than the common

interests of all the employees at NCCL. The maintenance system dominated and
objectified the 'lifcworlds' of these employees because they were nul allowed to
critically self-understand the effects of the control of their work using information
systems.

The new information systems did not enhance the social integration bccau.se,
information systems as steering media did not design following the nc«ls of employees'

socio-cultural 'lifcwor!ds.' In Habermas terms, NCCL management did no use

co~unicative actions in the devclopmcn; of computerised preventive maintenance
information systems. Rather computerised preventive maintenance mformation systems

as a new controlling device reinforced control and surveillance of workforce leading to
an organisational ''iron cage"(Webcr, 1947) with increased alienation and anomie.

Moreover, information systems development at NCCL was !irked to highly
institutionalised and politically manipulated domination of politicians. The politicians
were effective in manipulation for achieving thdr politically motivated interests than
the development ofNCCL using infonnation systems. They :1Sed trade unions as a baso
to achieve political power and advancement. They wanted trade ~mion multiplicity to
serve their leadership interests (Jayasekara, 1.05.2001 Daily news). The domination of
politicians, institutionalised scientific and rational bureaucracy, instn:mcntal and
technical approach of systems analyst all together disturbed the modernisation program
of NCCL using computerised infornation systems. NCCL nrk,!)ied non-reflective
positivist approach in infonnation systems development.
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The infonnulion systems development did 1101 adequately address and inlcgra1c the
ls~ues arose from employees' socio-cultural value systems and economic conditions.

The npp!icatinn of technology did not address social nec<ls that were recognised as
legitimised by employees.

,,
As a result, as

II

whOlc, infommtion systems development was failed at NCCL.

1

Therefore, ·NCCL was not benefited from the computerised information systems and
could not change towards an efficient and effective organisation using information
technology and information systems development under the open economic policies of
th7 government. Rather, NCCL experienced financial crisis internally unable to support
its activities.

7,1.6 Episode 6:Computerlsed Time and Attendance Information System after
Privatisation ofNCCL

\\
Episode 6 begins with the change of ownership ofNCCL following the privatisation of
SOEs introduced in 1977 within the open economic policies of the government. In
1993, 90% ofNCCL's shares were sold to Yawakkal, ,m Indian businessman, with a

strong resistance of employees and the general public. The government legitimised and
h

rationalised the privatisation of NCCL in line with improving the production capacities
through modem machines and infonnation technology.

Consequently, Yawakkal management introduced various changes after L'1e tokeovcr of
NCCL. One of these changes wos computerised time and attendance information
systems aimed at increasing production through controlling employees' attendance and
shifts in 1hc factory. It can be argued that Yawakkal management introduced the
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computcrisL'ti time and nltcndunce infonnation systems t:1 change the socio-culture of
NCCL

Ynwakka! management legitimised the computerised time and attendance information
systems under the heading of efficiency. Information technolob'Y and information
systems were seen as means (techniques and strategies) to control and discipline the

employees in the factory. [nfonnatilln was seen as un instrument to aid decision~making. ):1

Information technology and information systems were introduced· to gai(; objective
power about the performance of employee behaviour and NCCL performance.

Jn

Habennas terms, computerised time and attendance information systems was a steering
media to be used to steer NCCL for realising Yawakkal's objectives of making short
tenn profits. However, the computerised time and attendance infonnation systems
created much dissension in part of employees in the factory.

Yawakkal believed that the high overtime cost paid to employ'!~s. irregularity of their
attendance, informal arrangements in production shifts, low commitment of employees,
their everyday social and cultural events caused l~w production and increased cost of
production resulting low profits.
'·:,,
'0.--,·

/'
I}

/j

As a result, utilising ef,;plict>,(pr6J~~tively turned to his close attention. Ya.:;,.akkal
re-established production control using shifts expressed through budg'!ts. He wanted to
change employees' behaviour and discipline within factory through the computerised
information systems. Yawakkal strategically used the local managers to push ahead with
the computerised time and attendance infonnation systems by increasing their salaries
and leaving confidential. Rather than understanding and addressing the apparently
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peculiar practical problems of employees, and their socio-cultural values and
'lifcworlds' through infornmtion systems <lcvclopmcnt, Yawakkal concentrated on
achiuving proper control of production through control of employees' attendance and
production shil\s.

The Barcode Automation Lanka Limited (BALL) was selected to purchase software and
hardware for the computerised time and allcndance information systems. NCCL senior
managers believed that the la.:k of experience of the consultant from BALL caused to

the failure of the time and attendance system. However, the employees opposed the
computerised time and attendance information systems because it appeared to threaten

their socio-cultural values and lifcworlds. They questioned Indian management's
instrumental and covert strategic actions. In Habermas's explanation, employees
questioned the legitimacy and of the introduction of computerised time and attendance
information systems to control their social life within NCCL.

Employees opposed the system becau;,e the new management introduced formally
defined shifts instead of previously used informally arranged ad-hoe shifts. They
realised that they cou!d not earn more income through informally ammgrd work shifts.
They realised tlmt they could not fulfil their social and cultural obligations and use their
everyday life within the factory. They interpreted that the computerised time and
attendance infonnation systems as a new controlling system introduced by Yawakkal
management to control their day-to-day life within the factory following the open
economic policies introduced by the government.

Employees interpreted the computerised time and attendance information systems as a
system of domination aimed at social control of their values and '\ifeworlds.'
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Employees' culturnl relativism and ethnocentric attitudes appeared against the
technological domination of their everyday lives. They interpreted the ~"Omputcriscd
time and nllcndancc information systems as an improved controlling system (i.e.
steering medium) of the previously introduced punch card system. Instead of supporting
the computerisation project, they opposed the project through their unions. They did not

seek the support from the politicians, as they knew that the ownership of NCCL
remained with the Yawakk.al management. They did not want to close the factory using
computerised time and attendance infonnation systems development as a major reason.

The employees realised that the closure of the fuctory affected their factory income, thus

rendering then incapable of maintaining their family's living. What they wanted, was to
stop Yawakkal management ar.tions and to use manual system for recording their
attendance and use such infonnation for arranging their shifts in the factory.

Before privatising NCCL, employees were relatively free in organising their work as a
family. In fact, employees contro\led their shifts. They understood each other and their
problems. They helped each othcr working in the shifts with infonnal arrangements.
Some production managers tacitly employed employees' socio-culture and 'lifeworlds
within budgets to achieve industrial peace because employees were opposed to any
formally controlled information systems. This can be understood by referring back to
the previously analysed episodes. The resistance towards formal control of works
through computerised infonnation systems was stemmed from their traditional culture.

Within village employees were infonnal\y contrnlled. Employees were inherited from a
culture where authority und control were largely inseparable. Control was stamped and
inscribed in thdr culture within well-understood social structures. They worked

11s

a

family. They used participatory approaches in solving their problems. In Habennas's
tenns these societies experience crisis when external control overloads their social and
symbolic structures and

undennincd their identities.

In Habermas's

teITTJs,

communication was taken place reciprocally within this well-established traditional
societies or simply socio-cultural systems.

The infonnation systems development under the Yawakkal managerm:nt failed because
the consultant from the BALL adopted instrumental approach in developing the system.
He did not understand resistance in their meaning or semantic dimensions. He worked
wi~ the internal systems analyst to translate the objective of Ynwakkal through
technically developed information systems, often borrowed from the Western countries,
which was incompatible with the demands of the employees' socio-cultural lifeworlds.
Employees were considered as passive objects to be manipulated by both Yawakkal and
experts knowledge. Employees' knowledge was categorically excluded from the
development of computerised time and attendance information systems. in Habennas's
terms steering media did not follow the needs of employees' lifcworlds.

Yawakka\ management promised additional benefits for employees from the
computerised time and attendance information systems through systems analyst and
pushed ahead with the project from the support from the senior managers. However,
employees ignored the promises of the senior management and continued to work
according !o the way they were used to work on shifts. The instrumental and technical
approach used by both external consultnnt and internal systems analyst in information
systems development did not support the social integration because these experts
overlooked an inclusion of socio-cultural lifcworlds of employees. They did not
understand the constitutive polit'.··~ involve in information systems development. These
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experts could not legitimise llnd rationalise information systems as a strategy to

maintain compliance and social cohesion in social systems because information systems
were not legitimised using reasons of employees. Developers did not follow the tacit

rules of meaning cnrnnatcd from employees' resistance in developing computerised time
and attendance infonnation systems. Therefore, according to Habcnnas, computerised
time and attendance infonnation systems

included constitutive characters of

colonisation of lifcworlds.

Employees followed tacitly accepted set of rules stemming from their socio-culture to
organise shifts with the negotiation of some production managers in the factory. Th~\\e
.
w
tacit rules were operated within employees' socio-cultural lifeworlds. This approach t6'work was different from the forrna!ly introduced shifts and the shift arrangement
through the employment of computerised information systems. The introduction of
computerised time and attendance information systems appeared to degrade the
informally operated social structures (often symbolic) of employees and communication
with managers.

Experts did not understand this social grammar which was produced and reproduc~"<l in
every employee interaction. They did not learn ltssons from the previously failed
information systems to develop the computerised time nnd attendance inforrnation
systems. Rather, information systems continue to be developed within an environment
bound by the social contexts. Thus information systems development was devoid of the
social reality ofNCCL and followed the non-reflective positivist approach.

The computerised time and attendance information systems dcvelo'p,:nent was not
represented by collective value choices of all the employees as collective id~ntity within

'
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NCCL. As n result, experts were unable to change the altitude of employees to use the
computerised time and attendance infonnation systems. l{ather the experts' power
suppressed employees and their 'lifoworltls' with increased expression of alienation.
Computerised time and attendance infonnation systems were developed to fulfil the
interest of Yawakkal. In this way, infonnation systems development at NCCL reflected
the market principles and modernisation reforms of the government.

Yawakkal management was inflamed by political crises that linked to broad economic
issues of NCCL and employees themselves. Employees opposed Yawakkal
management focusing on their high expenditure and mismanagement of NCCL affairs.
NCCL was heavily debt burden after the privcrisation. As a result of a dispute between
Yawakkal and foreign investors whom he brought in, he was charged with the breach of
agreement. Yawakkal management's affairs were criticised by the public through
members in the parliament. The government had intervened for reselling ofNCCL to a
new buyer after the problems that the NCCL bad experienced after the takeover of
Yawakkal.

The above discussion suggests that the information systems development is not free
from the interaction of broad issues of sub-systems of socio•culture, economic and
political contexts operating within a country as explained by Habennas. Inability to
fulfil the responsibility of one sub.system creates problems in other systems according
to Habennas. In other words political and administrative systems need to steer sociocultural sub-system in a way commensurate with the needs of 'lifcworlds' in those
socio-cultural sub-systems.

m
Jn this episode, Habcnnas's arguments were clearly evidenced. The government
privatised NCCL as part of the open economic policy introduced in 1977 which was

aimed at socio-economic development of Sri Lanka. NCCL was privatised in a contcx.t
of financial crisis of the government. The government used the money earned from

NCCL's selling to bridge th1.: annual budget deficits on the advice of the World Bank. In
privatising NCCL, the government considered only the economic aspects and ignored
the political and social considerations of the employees (Kclegama, 1997). In other

words, the government directly allowed Yawakkal to operate as an entrepreneur in an ..
open market following the market principles and economic rationality in which NCCL;,1
w:i.s to be transfonned towards an efficient and effective organisation.

The new ownership, Yawakkal being an individual partner, ~ought short-term profits at
the ei.pcnse of employees, customers and NCCL itself. He manipulated some
government ministers to buy NCCL. After the purchase, he strategica!!y used NCCL
resources to pay the government money, which was considered as illegal by the
procedures stipulated for privatising of SOEs.

He increased the prices of Cement

hardening customers. He sold some shares to foreign investors at higher prices. He
employed information technology and information systems together with other covert
strategies as means to realise his self-interest by controlling employees' behaviour at
NCCL.

The NCCL experienced financial crisis and unable partly to fulfil its obligation such as
meeting the demands of employees and customers. Employees were experienced severe
hardships under the Yawa.kkal management. Steering media were insufficiently linked
with the cultural values and lifeworlds of employees at NCCL. The instrumental and
strategic actions of Yawakkal management created Cl'tiflicts and dissatisfaction amon~

J2H

NCCL employees including senior management and customers. Information systems

continued to erode and objectified employees' culturu! values in the efforts of

modernisation prob>ram intro1faccd by the government through information tcchnolob'Y·

Employees' unrest protested against Yawakkal management through unions, whicl1
resulted calling for the government rcintcrvention of NCCL affairs. The result of the
reintervention of the government was that NCCL transforrcd to a multinational
Company. The whole effort of the government modernisation program through

information technology at NCCL was failed due to uncoupling of value choices of
wi~er stakeholders in information systems dP.velopmcnt. This points out the need of
articulation of tacit knowledge of wider stakeholders and inclusion of this knowledge in
the development of infonnation systems to reflect the social reality ofNCCL.

7.1.7 Episode 7: Implementation of Computerised Time 1md Attendance
Information System

The episode 7 begins after Goldenbank, a Multinational Company, purchased NCCL in
1996. The Company is considered as being one of both high-tech and information
technology solutions users in the cement industry all over the world. After th<!
acquisition, Goldenbank transferred a series of management techniques, methods, and
experts' knowledge 'a,._~ information technology and information systems to NCCL as

'
steering media.

These steering media were emanaleri 'from the strategic management and corporate
culture of Go\denbank. The integration of NCCL to Go!denbank's global network of
Cement through information technology was central to its strategy and success.
Fo\lowing Habcnnas, it em. be argued that Go!dcnbank introduced infommtion
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technology and information systems to change the socio,culture and to improver the
operuting performance of services and cfticicncy by way of reducing operational costs

ofNCCL in line with the privatisation of SO Es introduced by Sri Lankan government.

NCCL was sold to Goldcnbank when there was competition for Ct.:ment in Sri Lanka. It
was sold during a period of unsolved steering problems of previous management, i.e.
employees were objectified using unrealistic bureaucrntic, scientific and technical
approaches of management. Indeed, the selling was related to financial crisis of the
government. Goldenbank considered information as corporate resource to be used to

ga!n competitive advanta_ge over other cement company's competition.

Information technology and information systems were employed as means of
techniques and strategics to process that information. The management assumed to gain
objective view about employees and overall performance of NCCL hy employing
resources and authority to make decisions through information systems. According to
i.i

,,,'i
·.'!

Habennas, this thinking is largely attributed to the understanding of scientific and
technical improvement of management in the positivist ideology. These scientific and
technical improvements were reflected in independently carried out information systems
development projects at NCCL.

In the late 1996, Golde[lbank reintroduced the previously delayed (during Yawakkal
period) computerised time and attendance information systems with a new shift-plan.
Like Yawakkal, Goldenbank assumed employees' way of life; their irregular
attendance, absenteeism, unplanned leave, social and cultural ceremonies, and informal
shifts arrangement disturbed the organisation of factory shifts and thus realising its
rational objectives of profit~.

JJO

The new shift-plan included work of 12 hours per shift for four <luys continuously
instead of previously employed eight hours per shift. The new shifts systems were
scheduled to implement with a minimum number of employees running each shift. It
can be argued that GoldcnbMk introduced infonnatiou systems for both rationalisation
of work and cost displacement (sec Davis, 1992).

Management legitimised the introduction of new shift-plan through the redesigned of
computerised time and attendance information systems in line with improving
production targets to improve the efficiency and effectiveness at NCCL. Goldenbank
management thought that the intrnduction of computerised time and attendance
information systems would help to discipline employees in shifts and thereby increase
production targets to achieve their r<1.tional objectives.

Employees perceived that Goldenbank management had introduced a new social order
to control their work within factory.

They understood computerised time and

attendance infonnation systems as nn improved management technique to control their
work and life within factory.

The computerised time and attendance infonm1ti,m

systems influenced the way employees interpreted management style. The autocratic
style of Golden bank management and their t(X:hnological modernisation were opposed
by NCCL trade unions.

"

Employees opposed both the new shift-plan and tb·~ implementation of it through the
computerised time and allendance information systems. The new shift-plan included the
hidden agendas of Goldcnbank management of running production shifts with a
minimum number of em~loyees and removing excess employees. In Habermas's words,
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Go\denbank munagcmcnt employed covert strategic actions in computerised time and
attendance infonnation systems to realise its rational objectives.

Employees opposed the new shift-plan nnd the computerised time and attendance
infonnation systems due to nn objectification of their lifeworlds. Employees perceived

that the computerised time and attendance infonnation systems significantly affected to
further erode their lifeworlds and Jiving conditions of their families. They realised that
their traditionally established working culture was being chullengc<l and replaced by the
domination of computerised time and attendance infonnation systems. They wanted,
in~tead, participation in the process of decision making regarding the new shift-plan and

its implementation through the oomputerised time and attendance infonnation systems.

Employees employed their shared acts in everyday communication within NCCL.
According to Habcnnas, the sanity, well-being, and the very identity of each individual
ultimately depends on shared, or at !cast, reciprocally communicable, selfunderstanding, upon "ego-defining structures", that join up individuals inner worlds in
such a way as to make mutual understanding, negotiation and relationship possible.
Goldenbank management did not understand this mutually operated everyday acts and
interactions of NCCL employees. They did not understand the meaning of employees'
resistance fo·, the proposed changes through the computerised time and allendance
infonnation systems.
'i')

As previously been asserted, traditionally, within villages, employees were free from
rational and objective controls of modem organisations. They opposed fonnal control
via infonnation systems. They believed that the new computerised time and attendance
infonnation systems disturb their everyday life within the factory. These lived

m
C)[pericnccs of employees encouraged their spiritual freedom because they were

reciprocally understood in villages within a system governed by trust relationships. This
communicative structure remained unchanged over centuries within villages.
Goldcnbank management did not understand this social contex.t which remained

unchanged in Sri Lanka's society.

Employees opposed the computerised time and attendance information systems because,
senior management introduced new norms and procedures for work through
computerised time and attendance information systems. These new norms and

procedures were clashed with their socio-cultural value systems. They found it difficult
to fulfil their social and cultural obligations. They found they could not socialise their
life with the rest of the people.

The computerised time and atteodance information systems affected to breakdown of
collective decision making. They believed that the computerised time and attendance
information systems keep away from the interaction with the management. They
believed that their personal communication was degraded by the iotroduction of
computerised time and attendance information systems. Employees' opposition was
li~d up with their poor standard of living in the villages. They opposed the
computerised time and attendance information systems, because it affected to further
worsen their family income and some leading to unemployment.

Goldenbank maoagcment pushed local managers without employee participation to use
the new shift.plan together with the computerised time and attendance information
systems system for controlling work rather than understanding and chant,,jng the new
shift·plan and the computerised time and attendance information systems. They
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interpreted employee resistance as irrational and lack of collaboration. Rather senior
management promised additional benefits such as more off-days for employees and

employees by employing covert 3tratcgic actions. Rather than understanding employees'
socio-culture and economic conditions and their peculiar practical problems within

factory, they strategically removed unproductive employees offering compensation.

,,

Goldenbank did not address the issues of protecting thl• older employees within
information systems dcvc!opment. The older employees were s,~en as unproductive and
incapable work force. Goldenbank management overlooked understanding the social

p~blems such as the poverty problems of Sri Lanka. Rather than improving the quality
of employees' living standards using information systems, it added a social cost to the
society resulting unemPloyment.

Following Habermas's thinking, it can be argued that Goldenbank management
employed power iliegitimately in the development of computerised time and attendance
information systems.

These irrational and repressive forces of rationalisation and

development of co1:iputerised time and attendance information systems embodied the
technocratic consciousness ·;n the positivist approach.

The computerised time and

attendance information systems reinforced and strengthen management power to control
and surveillance of employees in the factory. According to Habennas, information
systems served the interest of Goldenbank rather than the common interests. As a resuit,
the computerised time and attendance information systems worsened industrial
relationship tctween management and the employees leading to social instability caused
by steady erosion of standards and values (anomie) and ilpathy.

The consequence of the introduction of computerised time and attendnnce information
systems wns that it insutllciently linked with the needs nf employees· 'lifcworlds.' The
objcetive of computerised time and attendance information systems was linked lo the
economic criteria of profits. The design ideals were disintegratrd by the value choices
of employees.

· Using Habennas·s terms it can be ar1,iued, Golderbank used computerised time anc\
attendance infonnntion systems to steer NCCL's employees in a direction which was
not commens!.lrable to the needs of their socio-cultural sub-system, i.e. lifeworlds.
ln~ormation systems developmt:'nt comprised of constitutive characteristics of
colonisation by steering media. Goldenbank management did not change the idea of the
imple;nentation of the computerised time and attendance information systems, which '
implies that th~ information systems objectified the employees' 'lifeworlds' and
distorterl communication. The des;gndJ ideals entailed the use of narrow. technical or
teehr.ceratic images an/j ideals of management uf work-process relationships at NCCL
to realise interests of Goldenb:mk. It can be e<)nc\udcd that power was embodied in the
design of computerised time and attendance information system~ relating to economic
rationality at the expense of employees' 'lifeworlds' The senior management at NCCL
system11tically ancmpted to gain objective power of socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' selfundcrstandiug using infonnation systems.

The design of computerised time and nttcndnncc information systems did not reflect the
valu{: choices of employees at NCCL. The developers adopted instrumental approach in
developing computerised time and attendance information systems assuming employees
as objects to be m~:1ipulated. They used positivist approach to develop computerised
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time and attendance information systems. This non-rdlcctivc positivist way of thinking
did not considered employees' interactions in the ordinary lang;uagc.

Employees were not allowed to critically reHcct an<l self-understand management
controls introduced through computerised time and attendance information systems

using their tacit knowledge in socio-cultural 'lifcwor!ds.' These developers suppressed
employees' knowledge grounded in their socio-cultural 'lifcwor!ds'. In other words,
they did not employ communicative actions in developing computerised time and

attendance information systems considering the socio-culture of Sri Lanka.

The systematic use of narrow instrumental and strategic actions of Goldenbank
management ignored an inclusion of value choices of other stakeholders \llithin
computerised time and attendance infonnation systems.

Acconling to Habermas,

ignorance of value choices of other stakeholders denies the possibility that the
Goldenbank management receive "symbolic guidance" from 'lifeworlds' via steering
media which were grounded in, and controlled at, the level of employees' socio-cultural
lifcworlds.

As explained in chapter six, it can be concluded that one of the reasons why information
sys\ems·were not successful at NCCL was the lack of integration between management
expectations and that of employees' 'lifeworlds.' Information systems development did
not buttress social integrntion. Rather, its development endangered the social
integration.

Seen in this light, it carr be argued that the Goldenhank used computerised information
systems to consciously control the employees' lifoworlds without being linked their
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needs to information systems development to 1calise its objectives. One significant
feature was that information technology used to control work than it was being used as
an enabling technology to trnnsfonn NCCL towards an efficient organisation.

Information technology was not used as an enabling technology in which interests of
employees were met. It can be concluded that Goldenbank management experienced in

difficulties in transferring NCCL using computerised information systems because of

the lack of integration of socio-cultural '\ifeworlds' within information systems
development.

Integrating e.nployees' knowledge is not a secondary issue or a side issue - mobilising

employees' views and having their socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' in development of
information systems. According to Habermas, this lack of integntion of employees'
lifeworlds within information systems development can be firmly tied to the counterfactual ideals of a reconstructed practical rationality in which reason becomes active in
politics. Information systems development is validated by human reasons. It can be
argued that information systems development were successful if employees were given
opportunities to have their voices amplified and to include their value choices in
systems development.

7.1.8 Episode 8: Computerlscd Work-Order Information Systems for Factory
Maintenance

i
In the late 1996, Goldenbnnk introduced its globally usJ~ MAC technique

"

iO; NCCL as

steering medium to improve the efficiency and the effe(:'i:jveness of the operations of
factory performance. As part of the MAC implementation, one of lhe riiodu!es, namely
work-order system required to ~~veltp computerised work-order information systems to
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monitor maintenance activities of plants on a scheduled basis. As e:i1plnincd in chapter
six, the integration of infonnation technology and information systems were central to
Goldenbank's success al NCCL In 1997, management announced that lhc CWOS had
failed. Both MAC and computerised work-order information systems were abandoned
and manual systems were reintroduced. Following Habcnnas, it can be argued that the

management of G.oldcnbruik introduced both MAC and computerised work-order
infonnation system.~ to change the socio-culture and to improve the perfonnance of the
factory by way 0frcdudng operational costs at NCCL.

The introduction of MAC and computerised work-order information systems were
ostensibly related to the control of employees' social life. Information technology and
information systems were employed as means of techniques and strategies to gain an
objective power of the behaviour of employees as well as performance of NCCL.
Information and objective knowledge came to play as important roles in the production
process, the organisation of work, and the everyday life of employees within the factory.
According to Habermas, this way of thinking of 'llanagement is largely related to the
understanding of human behaviour in terms of science and technology in the positivist
ideology.

Goldcnbank management spent nearly Rs. 30 million with some strong resources and
power in decision making which should be sufficient to design and implement
successful information systems. If it were successful, Goldenbank management would
have interpreted that the information systems reflected its economically rational
objectives; profits. The government would have believed that NCCL was doing well
using the modem information technology introduced by Goldenbank. However, when
developing computerised work-order information systems, Goldenbnnk overlooked the
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social context in which both NCCL and information systems development was

functioned.

As explained in chapter six, MAC nnd computerised work-order information systems
were introduced in a context of poor performance at NCCL. By the time that MAC and

computerised work-order information systems were introduced, NCCL's plants and
i' ;,

machines were some forty years oltl and had some frequent shutdowns due to
unexpected

breakdowns. Jn this context, senior management legitimised the

introduction of MAC and computerised work-order information systems under the
heading of improving efficiency and effectiveness ofpcrfonnance of the factory.

Employees' unions opposed Goldeobank's decision to implement MAC through
,;omputerised work-order information systems. They were frustrated with various
instrumental .:.!'Id strategic actions introduced by Goldenbank after the privatisation of
NCCL. Rather than understanding the behaviour of employees, Goldenbank
management expected a massive behavioural change of these employees to implement
MAC and computerised work-order information systems. Goldcnbank pushed the
development of computerised work-order information systems with an expert it brought
from the parent Company in Sweden, without relying on the knowledge of NCCL
employees to develop it.

Goldenbank assumed those experts in the Western countries and their lcn,owledge i•.1
information systems development was superior to locally available knowledge.
Consequently, they assumed that technically sound information systems would
transform NCCL towards an efficient and effective organisation. Using Habennas's
tcrrt1s, it can be argued that Goldenbank perceived that social life of people as a

technical issue, its knowledge could be objectively understood and its improvement was
entrusted to technical eKpcrts, capable of rational decision making. Goldenbank used
instrumentnl and ~tratcgic actions, both in the MAC and computerised work-order
information systems, unbalanced by communicative actions. Employees opposed these
steering media because they realised that their way of life: social life, freedom and
socio-cultural 'lifeworlds" were highly monitored and controlled by Goldenbank
management after the privierisation ofNCCL.

Rather than understanding employees' socir,-cultural 'lifewor!ds in which meaning for
nctions for communication was supplied, Goldenbank interpreted employees' resistance
as irrational. The resistance of employees were considered as localised importance and
assumed that their knowledge was not important in systems development. Both senior
management and the eKpert ignored the participation of user employees during the
systems development process. It can be arb'lled that Goldenbank used power irrationally
with associated technocratic consciousness in the design and development of
computerised work-order infurmation systems.

Information techno!o&,Y and information systems were used as means assuming that
ends of systems development were agreed upon by employees at NCCL. As explained
in chapter six, major problems that employees eKperieneed were related to the ends of
information systems development.

These ends were represented the purposive

rationality of Goldcnbank, often transferred from the headquarters, than the collective
interests of employees at NCCL. According to Habermas, this positivist ideology
render~ inert frame of reference of interaction in ordinary language to gain objective
power over the self-understanding of socio-cu!tura! !ifcworlds lending to Iron Cage of
Weber ( 1947).
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User employees were opposed to computerised work-order information systems due to
their inability to work and generate necessary management reports. Other employees
were opposed the hidden objectives (covert strategic actions) of management: control of

work and their everyday life within factory through computerised work-order
infonnation systems. According to Habcnnas, steering media did not buttn:ss the social

integration because it did not integrate the needs of 'lifeworlds' of employees.

Goldenbank management and experts took for granted that the NCCL project was just
another infonnation systems development prjcct. They assumed that the development
an~ implementation of computerised work-order information systems was value free
and neutral. They sought to gain objective truth and knowledge from the development
of computerised work-order information systems. In this view, power dissolves truth
and the employees became the object rather than the subject of politics. Habermas, says
that social integrations is not at the disposition of the imperatives of power
augmentation. Goldenbank, perceived, information systems as cybernetic systems to
control the production process. According to Habermas, they did not understand the fact
that the truth and knowledge arc interwoven with political contexts and can emerge only
from freedom to dialogue and exchange. They did not understand the fact that the true
knowledge could be found by allowing employees' to work together and to critically
self-understand information systems using their knowledge in the socio-cultural
lifcworlds. Hence, it can be argued that the use of positivist approach in infommtion
systems development separated the generation of knowledge from the creation of
knowledge in the lifoworlds of employees.

Through MAC and -computerised work-order information systems, Goldenbunk
introduced new rules and procedures for work and management. These new rules and
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procedures were emanated from the similar management practice adopted by
Goldenbank group of companies throughout its worldwide operations. Goldcnhaok had
transfCO"ed these steering media to NCCL without employees' being participated. The
result of this unilateral transfer was that many employees could not understand the
meaning of these steering media.

These changes were introduced new work and practice within NCCL. Introduction of
MAC and computerised work-order information systems were carried out new
procedures for identifying, recording, controlling, ar.:I responding maintenance work.
~ey were also introduced new working culture in terms of organising production
process such as rearrangement of employees in each production shift. Every hum:m
action was monitored and controlled using formally processed information.

All these

changers were different from the previously existed social order ofNCCL. Naturally,
the new information systems were disturbed the employees' social and work life within
NCCL with increased alienation and apathy.

Employees drew meaning for communication from their socio-cultural lifcwor!ds. They
used their tacit knowledge for organising work and shifts. They employed ordinary
language in communication. They translated

their tacit knowledge

through

communication drawing meaning from their socio-cu!ure. Employees' tacit knowledge
was informally operated within a system of well-understood communication structures.
The everyday communication wa;; embedded in every action and interaction. Simple
words in everyday use can have broad-ranging and deep meaning and interpretations.
These meaning arc very important for human life and affairs. Similarly, these meanings
have implications for infonm:tion systems development because they carry tacit
knowledge about the socio-culture of Sri Lanka.

m
The cfticicncy as understood by employees was dependent on a whole series of human
actions und communication for which rules were tacit and located in the lived
experience of their socio-cultural lifcworlds. Their communication, work arrangcmcnt,

social and tultural life were related one another and economic circumstances. 'Ibey
understood how local managers included their implicit background knowledge within

budget implementation and shifts arrangements when NCCL was operating as a
corporation. They understood how industrial harmony was achieved between local
managers and themselves using communicative actions in the past.

In. this example, user employees expericnl.ed problems of using computerised workorder information systems because they were not participated in any of the activity in
design and development of information systems. The new rules of meaning introduced
for employees through MAC and computerised work-order information systems were
carried different meaning from their daily practice of life. It is now clear that the
resistance of the employees including users carried meaning emanated from their sociocultural contexts.

What thi:~e employees wanted was to consider their value choices within information
systems to protect their socio-cultural values and traditions as well as to overcome
economic problems. They wanted to participate in decision making process associated
with the design and development of computerised work-order information systems. The
failure of information system revealed that Goldenbank was unable to fulfil the needs of
socio-cultural lifcworlds of employees at NCCL.
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7.1.9 Episode 9: Managcmcnl Information for Factory Control

In this episode, information systems were developed to produce daily, weekly, monthly,

and yearly management information for management decision making. Preparation of
management infonnation systems reports emerged from the consideration regarding
effective control of production process through increased employee discipline in the
factory. Factory management used management information systems reports to control
shop-floor works to achieve economically rational objectives of the Company.

Go\denbank employed information technology and management information systems as
means of strategies and techniques (and Jegitimise<l the implementation of management

infonnation systems in line with improving the efficiency and effectiveness of factory
performance. It can be argued that Goldenbank introduced information technology and
management information systems to change the socio-culture and to improve efficiency
and effectiveness following market principles under the open economic policies
introduced by Sri Lankan government.

[n management information systems development, the systems analyst used
instrumental and technical approach without considering the views of other
stakeholders. The rntion!ll objectives of Go!denbank management were included as
objectives of management information systems development. Employees who worked
in the planning and computing divisions were also subject to the authoritarian control of
senior management. Their power was minima! to change the decisions of Goldenbank
management. Thus senior management initiated objectives of management information
systems and informed the personnel in the planning and computing divisions.
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Consequently, these personnel developed management information sy.~tcms to support

the information ne.!ds of factory management und the NCCL.

Factory management in tum used management information systems reports to closely

monitor and control of employees' behaviour in production process. According to
Habennas, science and technology fused together into a new production force as an
independent variable with.out considering the socio-cultural lifeworlds of employees at
NCCL. Thus, Goldcnbank steered NCCL employees using management information
systems that has been largely disconnected from norms and values. The systems analyst
us~ power illegitimately in developing management information systems assuming that
other stakeholders as passive objects to be manipulated. The instrumental and technical
approach has regressed behind the level of self-reflection represented by the worldviews
of employees. Above all purposive rational economic and technical actions have
become independent of their morale-political foundations.

According to Habennas, this irrational and repressive impact of rationalisation and
development comprised of technocratic consciousness of Goldenbnnk managemer.:.
Employees' socio-cultural Iifcwor!ds were consolidated and objectified into norm-free
structures, processes of exchange and power. "Norm-confirmative attitudes" and
"identity-forming" social memberships were considered as unnecessary and impossible
in management information cystems development; they were considered peripheral
instead. Thus it can be concluded that management information systems served the
interests of Go!dcnbank management to realise the rational objectives rather than
common interests ofNCCL employees.

Employees' opposed management infonnation systems through their unions. Employees
realised that their social life was s:ipprcssed by increased use of purposive rational
actions of Goldenbank management. For the factory managtment, employees' way of
life was unimportant. The only thing that mattered was an increase of production
matters. Though employees realised that their everyday life was being controlled, they
did not resist through continued strikes because they were aware that they would be
economically more disadvantaged if the Company removes them from work. They were
aware of how the Company reduced employees both in the head office and in the
factory.

'
Employees'
opposition towards management infonnation systems was connected with
vast array of socio-cultural and economic problems. They believed that the Golden bank
management would not interfere to continue their customary shop-floor practice. They
,'

wanted managem~n.! to consider their socio-cultural 'lifeworlds' within management
information systems and use as institutionalised practice. They wanted to use
11

communicative actions in management information systems development.

I,'

);

As explained in chapter six, they used communicative actions in their day to day
interactions through the use of ordinary language. This ordinary language carried deep
meaning and intcrprctadon of their social life. These meanings were carried widespread
socio-culture of Sri Lanka in which employees drew meaning for communication.
According to Habennas, all the interactions that arc structurally possible in such a
society are enacted within the context of commonly experienced social world.

Rather than understanding this commonly experienced social world of employees and
including their needs within management information systems, factory management

'"
responded initiating disciplinary actions to control employees' everyday life. Employees
were punished through disciplinary 'lctions. The intensification of work through
management

information

systems

increased

employees'

dislres.~,

alienation,

psychopathologics, apathy and anomic resulting in withdrawal of motivation to work.
According to Habcrmas, Gol<lenbank dcni1:d lhc possibility of getting "symbolic
guidance" from lifeworlds to effectively change NCCL towards a better organisation
because management information systems were not integrated the needs of socio-

culturn.l '!ifcworlds' of employees at NCCL.

It _is therefore clear that Go\denbank management could not legitimise management
information

systemri development because, management information

systems

development was not incorpornted needs of lifeworlds of NCCL employees in a
democratic and rational way. Put this in different way: management information
systems did not include value choices of employees at NCCL considering their social
context Management information sy3tcms represented non-reflective positivist ideology
of Goldenbank management. Thus NCCL could not transfer towards a better
organisation through effective infonnation systems development.

7.1.10 Episode 10: Outsourcing Information Systems

Episode 10 emerged as a result of an information technology policy and strategy
introduced by Go\denbank late in the 1999. The Company aimed to develop integrated
on line information systems to coordinate overall performance of NCCL. As part of
information technology policy and strategy, information systc~11s development activity
for NCCL transferred to external organisations. A decision to outsource information
systems function was taken by the CEO of NCCL considering unsatisfactory

"'
performance of internal management infonnation systems function including its slaff
and high operational costs of NCCL activities. It was thought by Goldcnbank
management that the introduction of outsource information .'>)'.~terns in various user
departments might produce a more accurate and timely information. Using Habcnnas's
terms, it can be argued that Goldcnhank intrcducc outsource information systems to
change the socio-culture and to improve the performance of NCCL in a free market

operating within Sri Lanka.

Goldenbank legitimise.i its decision to outsource information systems alone the line of
ecoriomic calculations of costs and profits. The Company sought value for money for
their investment and perceived that outsource information systems in user departments
would help to better understand the performance and coordinate NCCL operations. If
the systems had worked, Goldenbank management would have been praised for saving
Company money and claimed that they were doing well at NCCL with the support of
outsource information systems. Accordingly, the government would rationalise its
decision to privatise NCCL. However, Go\dcnbank could not develop integrated
inforr.mtion systems. Various socio-cultural, economic and

political

contexts

constrained its development.

In developing technology or information systems application and/or its functions should
be intcJligible to the stakeholders as a whole (fJein & Hirschheim, 1996). This means, a
~hared vision about infonnation systems needs to develop between information systems
users, creators, and beneficiaries such as management and employees. Jn the case of
NCCL, acquisition of many information systems has been based on poor or non-existent
requirements of user employees, other employees, and customers.
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Regarding the integrated information systems major problems occurred in the social
context of NCCL For example, certain user departments wc~c unwilling and poorly

motivated to share infonnation across departments. These problems are occurred
1(

through structurally induced systems imperatives. Information systt.'ris development at

NCCL failed because of institutional forces whkb inhibited dramatic changes in work
','1

habits. These problems were emanated from the h;iitorical contexts oftechno-scicntific,

~f
·,-,

economic and bureaucratic style of mwu1gemcnt culture employed during the

·,,1

/1
ii
((

corporati0n regime. Since the inception ofNCCL, man~gers imposed distorted forms of

'

rationality upon themselves by continually reproducing the normative, objCctifying

\',,1
".,\

sti:uci'tes that distort communication.
:1

\i

t
.;'

According to Habermas, these s~lf-imposcd objectifying organisational processes were

perceived as legitimate and even se\l··willcd ·~ecausc ideology ofmanagemenr;1,as itself:,'
',

I

',

built upon distorted corrununication. This distorted fonn of ideology, often perceived as
NCCL 's culture, apptared as major obstacle to develop sham:! vision of information
,systems for NCCL and other privatised organisations in Sri Lanka. What is pcrcl!ived as
1
organisational culture by NCCL management is still stimulated by the beliefs of
positivist ideology? This culture separated knowlcdsc creation from the knowledge
gr.neration consideri,,g
,, the socio-cultural lifcworlds of people in Sri Lanka.

The current practice ignored or refused to deal with the issues of value choices of
participants in information systems development. Rather, the information systems were
stamped by narrow instrumental and strategic objectives of monil<>ring and controlling

'
performance of departments and individuals. Organisational members such as
employees' everyday lives were controlled using technical information systems in
11nprecedented ways. For example, the heightened surveillance attitude of accounting
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and finance department created much depression and alienation in employees in other

departments.

The transfer of the responsibility of information systems development to external
specialists of software vendors further eroded info1111ation systems development

function at NCCL. Many of lhc specialists from vendor companies did not have
knowledge about the social contc:d of NCCL. They,wcre just products of technically

oriented educational institutions of both in the public and the private sector
organisations.

Majority of systems developed by external specialists did not meet the information
requirements of user departments. Users were unhappy and found it difficult to use
technical information systems developed by external specialists. Users were neither
consulted nor they were participated in the development of information systems. As a
result, some information systems development projects initiated in user departments

J'-'

were abandoned and previous manual procedures were reinstated.

Since the introduction of information systems in the late 19.60s at NCCL, information
!,i

systems development served the expectations of tho_se who had pov,:er to control
information technolOb'Y function. Both inside and outside of information technology,
there apparently existed a set of belief about infonnation technology that had little
relationship to what was actually happening in NCCL. Though NCCL's ownership was
changed from the state control to free market control model, information tecllnology
function excluded categorically as important factor in changing NCCL towards nn
effective organi~ation.

During corporation period, politicians and senior managers' hold the power on
infonnation technology function. lnfonnation technology remained under the control of
.,-.

accounting und tin:incC\?epartmcnt. lnfonnation technology people who worked in the

'

data processing units have had minimal power to influence or change the decisions of
politicians and senior management of NCCL. During Ya•vakkal period, the accounting
and finance department controlled infonnation tcchnolob')' in the same way as it.,
controlled during the corporation time: Indian management and senior management

I\

ho!d the power on information technology function. Today, infonnation technology
appears to exist in the same way: information technology remained under the control.of

VI:' offinanee of Goldcnbank man.igcment.

Over the last three decades, information technology was not assigned a major role
within NCCL. During corporation period, infonnation technology development
represeriied only the interests of some government politicinns and senior managers.
During Yawakkal and GoldC11bank periods, information technology supported the
interests ofYawakal and Goldenbank management. Therefore. information technology
supported partial interests; i.e. those who were in power. Over the history of NCCL,
information teehr.ology was assigned lower organisational position and the position
today remained unchanged. The fact that there was a separate organisational unit
responsible for information technology activities has led to the emergence of cultural
gap between information technology section and the rest of the organisation (see

Peppard & Ward, 1999).

Since the late 1960s, NCCL has introduced several information systems,projccts.. iJn the
late! 960s, the first project consisted oft he introductio~ of the punched card Systems. In ..
the 1980s, the second project comprised of inlroductk,n of computers in application
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areas such ns sales, inventory, payroll, and accounting and factory maintenance. In the

1990s. the third project constitutctl of setting up of PCs in certain user department~.
.Finally, in the late l 990s, the fourth project consisted ofthc introduction ofm:tworks for
both internal and external communication. However, the some senior managers and the

majority of middle level managers, and other employees still negatively perceived
information technology. There was no declared commitment to address this negative
relationship (i.e. cultural gap) between infonnation technology section and the rest of
the organisation and the employees. The history ofNCCL failed to exploit and leyeragc
information technology for the betterment ofNCCL.

This is mainly because information systems development was aimed at controlling
employees' lifeworlds. Therefore, the growth of information technology function was
stagnant or negative within NCCL since the late 1960s. Since the introduction of
computerised information systems at NCCL, information technology innovation by
information technology personnd was suppressed by political domination, domination
of senior management and the highly institutionalised bureaucratic, scientific and
rational culture ofNCCL.

The negative perception regarding information technology development caused outside
parties in other departments to perceive information tcchno\ogy

~'3 systematic failure

stands in stark contrast with the view inside ofinfommtion technology seeing itself as a
significant contributor to modernise NCCL. 111c history of NCCL revealed that NCCL
missed out some important opportunities in transforming NCCL towards a better
organisation using communicative actions in information systems development
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It was succulently clear that the overall lnfonnation systems initiated in user
departments were focused on narrow deployment oftcclmo-scicntific and economically

rational approaches to obtain an objective power of information for prediction and
control of individual's behaviour and the performance of departments at NCCL at the

expense of communicative rationality. Ti-wugh information sy5tcms were developed in
different locations, they were operationally linked to monitor and control the sociocultural lifeworlds of employees at NCCL.

Generally, both internal and external information technology personnel applying their

expert knowledge dominated over employees' everyday life.

The infonnation

technology specialists adopted an "all-knowing" position in information systems
development while considering user employees, other employees and customers as
inmate objects who don't have their own ends. These personnel were categorically
excluded from the design and development ofinfonnation systems.

This understanding about infonnation systems development is related to the positivist
ideology. The positivist experts considered that understanding of employees' sociocultural values as irrelevant and unimportant-they relied only on technical solutions and
rational decision making regarding information systems development.

According to

Habennas, in this way, these positivist designers transformed socio-cultural lifeworlds
into instrumental ones and instrumental reasoning became a normative force that
displaced the purposeful discourse between subjective selves. NCCL's employees'
\ifcworlds were increasingly governed by objectifying instrumental rationality at the
expense ofintersubjectivity, communicative action.

I
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Employees' lifcworlds were more methodically arnmgcd and monitored ever than
before. lnfommtion systems were often correlated with their management \c:chniqucs
and methods as means, but means were not rclated to their socio-cultural and economic

problems, cods. Entls were taken for granted and means were assumed to be
unproblematic.

Thus, it can be argued that infonnation systems development was

focused on rationalisation of work processes at the expense of other interested parties.
Following Habcrmas, it can be argued that Go!dcobank's rational and carefully
designed

approaches

to

information systems

development continued to

be

systematically eroded socio-cultural lifcworlds of employees at NCCL.

7.2 Reflection on Current Practice of Information Systems Development at NCCL

It seems that NCCL today acts like any other private entrepreneur after the privatisation.
its every aim is to succeed in the ~arket and its services and practice are tailored with
Goldenbank's corporate and management culture. Ironically, these practices were
implemented through information systems while ignoring the social context ofNCCL in
Sri Lanka.

Present information systems development and practice reflects market-

oriented policies of economic rationality and priorities to encourage efficiency and
effectiveness of NCCL. As a result, commercial values received prominence over the
traditionally established socio-cultural values systems at NCCL. This represent~ an
"effort to extend the commercialisation of information into every existing space of the
social sphere" (Schiller, 1987, p. 25).

Employees were treated as commodities in a market to be sold out. This means, that
according to Habennas, the CJrrent information systems development approaches have

"
.been brought into boing with an unmatched capacity to shape the symbolically
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established socio-cultural value systl'ffiS which NCCL's employees inhabit from their
traditional socio-cultural value systems; lifcworlds.

Such an approach is oppressive because it :locs not allow participants to inquire actively

and self-understand about the world constitute of infonnation systems development.

The underlying belief w~s that Go\denbank management practice need NCCL 's
individuals to accept and adapt their behaviour accordingly. From this perspective,
using Habermas's terms, we can argue that employees are blind to the interests of those

who are in power and inadequately sec themselves as acting freely on behalf of the
disadvantaged employees at NCCL. The high oppression left out of hopes of m~y
employees leading to loss ofmotivation and disestablished socialisation process within
NCCL. Infonnation systems as steering media did not support social inteb,ration. They
were not aimed at solving employees' socio-economic problems by the end of 2000. As
a result, many employees decided to leave the Company. A trade union leader stated:

Many :6nployecs have decided to leave the Company taking
compensation package because they have lost their interest in rcmaint at
NCCL due to high oppression of Go\dcnbank management. We arc
highly monitored and controlled ever than before. They control
behaviour of employees using computerised information systems. We
lost everything: our freedom, socio-cultural value systems, joys and
pleasure within NCCL. I myself decided to leave this Company.

Many employees at NCCL had shared the expression made by trade union leader
regarding the high oppression of Gn!denbank management. Management information
systems manager who frustrated with the domination of senior management announced
his resignation in the late 2000. Meanwhile Go\denbank declared Rs.750-800 million
operating losses at the end of 2000. Economically employees had not benefited from the
privatisation of NCCL in tcnns of real income (Kclegama, 1993) and the infonnation
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technology introduced by Go\dcnbank management. Rather Goldenbank management
through computerised information systems increasingly controlled the socio-cultural
lifeworlds.

lt scL-n1s that Goldcnbank lacks a broad vision of issues related to poverty,

unemplo;;ment and lifcworlds problt::rrd of employees at NCCL. Information systems
were not developed considering the soci::! context ofNCCL.

To build a strategy there must be first an awareness of objectives ofinfonnation systems·by the parties who involved in information systems: information systems developers,
users, and beneficiaries such as management, employees, and customers. Information
systems as a strategy must be benefited to plurality of interests of a wider community so

that both organisation and society benefits from the application of information
technology (sec Klein & Hirschheim, 1996, 1991; Hirschheim et al., 1996; Hirschhcim
& Klein, 1989; Lyytinen & Hirschhcim, 1988; Lyytincn & Klein, 1985). For example,

systems analysts working in the marketing department stated that "it seems to me that
this Company has not yet identified the type of information systems for the benefits of
all of us". Clearly, many of the objectives of the various stakeholders were in conflict
with the current practice of information systems development at NCCL. The current
practice of information systems development reflected non-reflective positivist
approach inscribed by the vision ofGoldenbank management.

It seems that dependent form of values of modern Western societies transferred to
NCCL through various steering media represented in information systems. They were
not created by the socio-cultural value systems of Sri Lanka. The information systems
development as means did not match with the ends of wider membership. Thus, it can
be concluded that infonnation sy~tems development and practice at NCCL requires
approaches that take into account wider social contexts to g~ar towards promoting

cooperation for improving living standards of people and the socio-econOr,,ic
development of the co,mtry.

7.3 Mnjor Findings from NCCL Ca$C Analysis

The case analysis uncovered that information systems development at NCCL functioned
within broadly related but interlocking socio-cultural !ifcworlds, economic, and political
and administrative systems. These social structures formed the contexts for NCCL i.nd
information systems development. The ten episodic analyses revealed how information
systems development was shaped by and shaped NCCL reality through socio-cultural,
ec~nomic, and political contexts in Sri Lanka. This holistic nature of information
systems development can be summarised as follows.

Firstly, information systems development at NCCL was socio-cultural because
employees wanted to protect their socio-cultural integrity anO. · 'iworlds from economic
problems, formal and external management controls, and domination. Employees drew
meaning for their everyday actions from lifeworlds contexts. These lifcworlds were
carried tacit knowledge of employees. This knowledge was suppressed by the adoption
of Western scientific, technocratic, economic, and bureaucratic rationality in
information systems development and practice. Information systems development did
not meet the needs of employees' lifcworlds. They opposed formal and external control
of management resulting failures of information systems development. Thus, it can be
concluded that infonnation systems development wns shaped by socio-cultuml
lifoworlds of Sri Lanka.
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Secondly, infomwtion systems development was connected up with socio-economic
development or Sri Lanku before and after privatisation of NCCL. It wus economic,
bccuuse infonnation systems development was aimed at modernising NCCL and
improving economic criteria of efficiency and c!Tcclivencss of performance. It was ulso
economic because infonnation systems development wus connected with employees'
work and life, living conditions, unemployment, and poverty. !n sort, modernisation of
NCCL through effective infonnation systems development was failed leaving
unresolved conflicts between government, management, and employees. Thus,
information systems development did not assist to change NCCL towards a better
organisation and therefore unable to resonate broad agenda of socio-economic
development while meeting the economic expectations of the government, employees
and NCCL itself

Thirdly, infonnation system~ development was political because the government was
involved in ch11I1ging NCCL thrcagh information technology and infomiation systems
in both phases of socio-economic development. Information systems development was
political because employees were opposed systems development through trade unions
and trade unions were linked to national political parties. !t was also political because
politically manipulated apparatus, institutionalised rational bureaucracy, and scientific
an~ rational decision-making hampered infonnation systems development. As a result,
NCCL could not trnnsfonn towards a better organisation through effective infonnation
systems development.

Finally, ):jnfonnation systcr.~,s development and practice led to unanticipated

consequences of personal ·,mG~ie and conflicts at NCCL. It also created disorder in

3'8

socialisation of employees leading to alienation, apathy, repression, psychopathological
deceases, distress, and depression. Therefore, management was unable to rationalise and
legitimise information systems development as steering media (means) at NCCL. As a
consequence, management experienced conflicting dilemmas in transforming NCCL
towards a successfo[ organisation through effective information systems development.
Seen in this light it can, therefore, be concluded that information systems development
at NCCL was operated within a vast array of economic, political and socio-cultural

intricacies ofSti Lanka.

7.4 Theorising lnform11tion Systems Development from Communicative Actic~s

In this section, I explain and critique how Habermas's theory of communicative actions
can be used as a rational approach for information systems development in
organi.;ations in Sri Lanka. Firstly, major problems of the positivist approach are
discussed. Secondly, communicative actions and tacit knowledge arc e:i1amined.
Thirdly, relationship between tacit knowledge and lifcwor!ds is e:i1amined. Fourthly, the
relationship between communicative actions, tacit knowledge and social conte:i1t of Sri
Lanka is discussed. Fifthly, the relationship between lifcworlds, systems and
information systems development is c:i1plained. Shthly, the relationship between human
development, communic!ltive actions, and information systems development is
examined. Finally, the relationship between communicative actions and innovation in
information systems is cx·fllaincd. Critiques of the Habcnnasian interpretation of events
have been woven throughout this chapter to provide a counterbalance and critical
appraisal of this perspective.
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7.4.1 F11ll11cy of Scientific Neutrality or PosltivM Approach

It appears that positivist ways of thinking influenced information systems development
nnd practice at NCCL over a period of 1958-2000. The position at present in NCCL is
that information systems development and practice still functions as an imperial and

force manner c1;forcing its views and exerting its power, confident in assumptions of its
own superiority. The increasingly rigid positivist ideology that has dominated and still

dominates current information systems development and practice at NCCL is

destructive of !ifoworlds in deeper manner within the organisr.tion.

,,
This positivist approach used for information systems development at NCCL continues
to be non-reflective. It can not be considered as a rational approach for knowledge
creation in information systems because, it ignores alternative ways of knowledge
creation perceiving knowledge as a system of reasoning arising from social contexts of
Sri Lanka. The analysis of ten episodes presented in chapter six revealed how social
context:. in Sri Lanka influenced and shaped information systems development projects
at NCCL over about five decades.

As Western idea spreads across the world r.nd positivist thinking, technology, and
politics are imposed upon, or taken on by NCCL, information systems development
1!

":

fo!lnWed suit. The fact that positivist approach itself bas not been ,.:;hown to be
applicable cross culturally or to be free of social context gets obscured its over
attachment to Western cultural values. The prestige of positivist approach rubbing off
knowledge in other socio-cultures in developing countries including Sri Lanka (Schiller,
1995; Chambers, 1980).

'"'
In the positivist approach, information systems development being presented and
accepted as a part of science is assumed to he ;;cicntific activity with objective methods

-_ 'rotknOw!edge acquisition that is free from socio-cultural contexts. As such this
scientific and objective view of ir.formation systems development in the positivist
approach was seen as being universally applicable to all people in all countries,
irrespective of their socinl contexts, although this was clearly not so.

Control of the natural and social world to improve the human i:onditions has become
cornerstone of Western management ideology (Williams & Standing, 1994; Sandberg,

1985; Kraft, !977; Braverman, 1974). This control nature is dominant in infomrntion
systems (Alvarez & Klein, 1989; Gurstcin, 1989; Briefs, 1987; King & Iacono, 1984).
As such information systems were perceived as superior lo non-western equivalents. It
content was not questioned; it was taken on trust without critically reflecting upon the
adoptability in other social contexts such as in Sri Lanka. However, this controlling
nature of information systems and technology may not be appropriate to non-western
equivalents (Williams & Standing, 1994).

NCCL case revealed that NCCL

management used information systems to control work and dehumanise the workplace
relationships.

In the pace of We.,tcrn knowledge, knowledge in other socio-cultural contexts in Sri
Lanka was,,considcrcd as localised importance. However, NCCL case analysis revealed

,,

that infonnation systems development is much more than scicmific and technical
control and involved considerations of social activities in workplace. Therefore, the
significance of research in un:'~rstan<ling organisation~[ issues in different socio-
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cultural contexts, otlcn in non-western countries, can not be underestimated (sec
Wcns\ey, 200!; Avgcrou, 2000, !996; Odcdra-Stmub, 1996; Kiangi & Tjipangandjara,
1996; Lind, J996; Korpela, l 996; Williams & Standing, 1994).

Information and communication technologies arc pushed on to developing countries as

steering media by economic and political forces allied to Western powers (Avgcrou,

Jfooo;
,'i

.. ,ij

Lind, I 996; Williams & Standing, 1994).

The promotion .. of info1mation

techr1ology, techniques, mctl,.!<is, skills, expert knowledge, information systems and so
on originated in developed countries go hand in hand with the positivist knowledge of

tht West (Avgcrou,

1996). The dominance and control of global organisations is greatly

facilitated by advances in information technology and international communication
(Walsham, 1991). This situation has created imbalance of world information flows, the
doi;,.ination of third world culture, and the dominance of advanced countries in the
developrrient and transfer of information technology (Stover, 1984).

The types of knowledge that is promoted via positivist approach, with its cmphasi~ on
science and information technology that have developed within Western cultui-es and
with models suited with Western political systems deemphasised, if not ignored, the
importance of social context in organisations in developing countries such as Sri Lanka
for infommtion systems development.

Although positivist approach as a superior approach is too much part of its Western
culture to be plucked out and traru,ferred into other non-western cultures as it stands it
\I has within it modules of theory and practice they may be usefully offered to people of
a'1i nations and cultures. The positivist approach has after all amassed over the past years

·--------------
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enormous of knowledge. It has developed unprecedented ways of managing !:uman life.

'
It devdopcd ways of managing organisations through effective information systems
dtvclopmcnt. It has dc,.,clopcd methodologies, methods, technology, techniques,
systems, and expertise knowledge, and so on for information systems to improve
performance in organisations. It has rapidly become the infrastructure upon which

.. business is conducted and has penetrated all economics ano we\! being (Oded~a-Strau.b,
1996). It can use as im11rovcd infonnation syst,;ms for the planning and implcmcritation
of rural devc\opmcm projcc!s in developing countries (sec Bhatangar, 2000; Mesa &

'

Duncan, 2000). There is a mountain of knowledge without which it would not possible
to devdop infonnation .~ystems for organisations in all over the world.

,\-,
0

However, NCCL case uncovered that poG!tivist app~ach has failed in\nformation
.

Ji

I'

sYstems development in organisations.. in Sri Lanka. Thereff::, what, is neces~~r}' is to//
uiiderstllnd the socio-cultural context of Si Lnnka to articulate ~cit knOwJedge and ma.kc
use .of that knowledge in infonnatiori systems development to innuvate new information
systems relevant to organisations. The development of approprfatc infonnation systems
is more important than adoption of positivist knowledge in systems development
as the
.. ,,
,;,
NCCL case revealed. Focus sl1ou!d be give:, to ;:nowledge creation based on social
::·-;/

context of Sri Lanka tha.'l assimilation ofWt1sterri positivist knowledge (Gunai'!a.rdena,
2001; ,V'ijesekcra & Wijeseker!!, ·'.999).

ii,,
\\

{'

.,--

i)

,,,,,)

,·;,;

R~.~arches on deve;..,J)ment literature relating to deve]opjng counnies suggest cha!
.:
ii<
'
;1
'
/;::= -'
,
de.velopmcnt programs must be aligned with !he needs· Of the peoPlc of those countries
' .
..,-\
'·

(sec \:;~~bar, 1995; Todaro, 1994; Sadi~, 1992; Dahl & Rabo, 1992). For example,
Escnhm1 (!995) examined theoretical ide~:. and practical interventions that have
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constituted development in developing countries. He argues that lhe adoption of free
market rationality principles and its institutions, and the cognitive instruments of
(')

sciCnee and technology in developing countries were socially constructed than naturally
chosen. The point made facobar here is that the development programs must be
developed fo\l~11:ing historically derived value systems that sustain social systems in
developing couDtrics. Habcrrnas's theoretical framework provides a rational approach to
articulate such historical values in social context in organisations in Sri Lanka and make
use of them in systems development.

Similarly, studies relevant to transfer of informatior. technologies from developed
countries to developing countries suggest that transferred technologies tend to be
adapted to the social context, rather than being used in the same form as in the context
0

where they were first developed (Wenslcy, 2001; Avgerou, ! 9!16). lnfomrntion systems
development r~'.!ires creativity and is largely driven by, ofkn, informally, by the
intere-sts of an organisation's participants (Ciborrn, !991).

History of infonnation

systems development at NCCL revealed that the prevailing positivist approach was too
!imitul in scope, unable to cope with social conte:d of the systems development process,
and therefore jeopardising efforts ,1\ improving organisational pr.rformancc bY
introducing information technology. lnfonnalion systems development involves much
more than the narrow h!chnical designs; it is an organisational technology in Westney's

)!

terms(l991).

'I

/,!/
,,

Succes~ful information system3 'development is more a matter of judgement of wh~t

l','
organisational challges arc frasibie and desirable and how they can be realised, than the
adoption of some techniques, mctl:mls, skills, a'ld expert knowledge and information
technology. It involves much more than automating jobs, controlling employees. and

3M

work place relations (Zuboff, 1988). It involves social empowerment of people (Zemakc
-· & Schanf 1989; Lawler, Ledfo~'!. & Mohrman, 1989; Zubof, 1988; Lawler, 1986). It can

' and transfom1 conditions to lead to abettcr quality oflifc (Nath & Scholar, 2000).
act

Orlikowski (1996) and Rohitratana (1998) assert that computer technologieS' are
technical insofar as they are instrumental for particular ends, but this use is
simultaneously social insofar as the ends are interpreted. This relegation of computer

technologies needs to consider the approprillt'eness tct organisations technology
(Avgerou & Land, 1992). While acknowledging Orlikowski's & Rohitratana's

inierpretation of computer technologies, it can be ar!!lJ_E<!. that interpretation of ends
alone does not make computer technologies social because it lacks the critical
component of systems development.

'

//
1

This use of technology is necessa_:1 to critically analy~e and reflect upon. This i~_done

'
from the standpoint of emancipation, i.e., an interest in "an equal distribution of power
and chancesJr, satisfy personal needs and in liberating people from domination by other
people (see Hirschheim & Klein, 1994, 1989; Flood 1990b; Flood & Ulrich, 1990;

,,

Hahennas, 1987b; Klein & Ljytincn, 1985). This is necessary because the inevitability
of values choices in the application of information systems. Historical evidcnCe shows
that technology is not neutral (Burns, 1'981; Briefs, 1980; Cooley, 1980; Braverman,
:(

1974).

For example, Mowshowitz (1984) arb>Ucs that"... a technology which requires the
mastery of a certain know-how and therefore favours the intcrc>ls of certain group~ in
society at the expense of others . , .", He continues to say that the mere fact that
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computers can be used to improve the quality of !iii: or to increase citizen participation
in government docs not mean that they will be so o5ed" (Mowshowitz, 1984, p. 85). He
asserts that "the neutrality thesis is every bit as naive as the stork fable of human birth".
Therefore, following Habennas, it can be argued that infonnation systems become
social if and if only if the ends of systems development arc rationally decided by force:
of better aq,'llments. Following Habennas, il can be statecl that in this manner can
appropriate and innovative infonnation systems be developed for people working in
organisations,.in Sri Lanka. Foll wing Founcault (1982), it may be argued that u~ing such
a Habcrm~iian method will probably result in new forms c,f power and control that

",
would mitig~\c against human development.

'

7.4.2 Communicativc\'Actlons and Tacit Knowledge

The central question is

"how can the power of technical control be brought within

the range of the consensus of acting and transacting citizens?" (Haberrnas, 1987a). Put
it differently, how can the power of Western knowledge take over and make it part in
our socio-cultural tradition to serve the needs of people in Sri Lanka? Or what
institutional arrangements stimulate managers and employees to innovate successful
information systc,ms that support the people doing the work'! For example, Japnncse
firms select an appropriate technology t!wt ho!ps them achieve perfonnancc goal in a
wax that supports the people doing the work. They use tacit knowledge that employees
already possess (sec Bensaou & Earl, l 9!J8; Nonaka, 199! ). 1l1us, tacit knowleclgc plays
an intogrn! part in infonnation systems development (sec Wcnslcy, 2001 ). Habcnnas·s
t~.cory of communicative nctions provides theoretical insights to explore such tacit
knowledge in Sri Lanka '8 socio-culture and to innovate successful information systems.

'.166

NCCL case analysis revealed that socio-cultural knowledge was represented in
employees' everyday actions.

7.4.3 Tacit Knowlc~gc and Lifoworlds

Polnnyi {1983) in his famous book titled, "The Tacit Dimension" a:;scrts that "we know
more thnn we enn tell"(p. 4). The true knowledge residing in the recognition of what
one does not know rather than what one knows (sec Wensley, 2001, p. 2). Episod7 4 of
NCCL: "We know more ...", provides relevant empirical supporting for Polanyi's
assertiOn. This means "knowledge involves an embedded skill and can not cosily be
articulated" (Hedcsstrom & Whitley, 2000, p. 48). Tacit knov·\ng is the fundamental.
power of the mind which crates explicit knowing, lends meaning to it and controls its
uses (Polanyi, 1983, p. 18). Polanyi argues that sharp division between tacit and explid~
knowledge docs not exist (ibid, p. 16). Even if knowledge ·has been ar1iculated into
words or mathematical formulas, this explicit knowledge must rely on being tacitly
understood and applied (Hcdesst~om & Whitley, 2000, p. 48). "Tacit thought.funns m1.
indispensable part of all knowledge" {Polanyi, 1958, p. 20). Hence, all knowledge _is
either tacit or rooted in lacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1983, p. 7). He emphasises the
knower's active participation in any act ofknowing (ibid, p. 4~.

'

This tacit knowledge is embedded in lifeworlds of mdividua\s. They are part of a. socioct:lture ofn society. To understand tacit knowled~c, one must need to fully understand

/:'
the 1ifew1?rlds /'.r a society. This lifcwor!ds is not anything else but socio-cultures which

'
provide substrnt~'m for generation of meaning in human actions. These meanings carry
\I

mount.of knowledge about socio-culture of a society. Therefore, to fully undcrst'and
/

'
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how such tncit knowledge operates within lifcworlds, one need to fully understand the
socio-eolturc of a society nod how socio-cultures intlucnced in shaping meaning of
lifeworlds in societies. llse of such tacit knowledge provides an indispensable
opportunity for continuous lnnovation in infonnation systems (Wensley, 200!; Dietz &
Lyytinen, 1998; Bensaou & Earl, 1998; Negwenyam.:i & Klein, 1994; Nonaka, 1991).
Such use of tacit knowledge would accord with Foucault's (1982) perspectives,
although Foucault might assert that such knowledge might be used to new forms of
control.

7.4.4 Com?1unlcative Aelions, Tacit Knowledge and Social Context in Sri Lanka

For Sri Lank.ans, use of communicative actions in information systems development is
not an insurmountable dilemma mainly for three reasons.

" I

The fact that communicative rationality is based on human reasons, in getting at the
;'(

true and rational . .knowledge, appear to be consistent \'lilh traditional culture and
value systems of Sri Lank.a. Traditionally, communities in Sri Lanka used
communicative actions in political decision making. People used these cultural
values in everyday communication. They provided meaning for their daily actions 11
and social interactions.
)'

(r"'"/.·
The present day efficiency and effectiveness of management were built into the ·
cultural lives of people in the traditional societies in Sri Lanka without nny formal or
external control (Ariyaratne, 1999).

Socio-cultural values such as working

collectively and sh3ring with one another, participation, trust, respect, infonnal

""
communication um! mutual umlcrstunding were parts and part of social actions and

·,:interactions. They arc still remained relatively unchanged in Sri Lanka. NCG.,
employees used these socio-cultural values in everyday communication and
interactions with managers. Some manager~ tacitly employed such socio-cultural
values when they were confronted with p~·;blems in their everyday life. These sor:io-

culturu] values carried mountain ofknow.1.Cdge about our society. By looking at these
socio-cultural values, one can undcr~tand how thinking process is functioning in the

minds of people in Sri Lanka.

7.4.4.1 Tacit Knowing

Jn ordc~ to fully' understand the tacit knowing of people, we need to understand the
minds of people which create explicit knowing, lends meaning to it and control its
uses (Polanyi, 1983, p. 18). In order to understand minds of people in Sri Lanka, one
needs to understand the Buddhist teaching, because it had a tremendous influence on
shaping our thinking process and the way we s<'t about doing things (Ariyaratnc,

1999).

In Buddhist way of thinking, mind is supreme; it is the forerum1'!r of everything. It is
nOt a physical organ of the brain. It is the consciousness itself. This consciousness
was formed by the core concepts of Buddhist thinking over thousands of years.
These concepts have been influenced in fon:iil:;; meaning for lifoworlds, The
thinking process of pcnplc is guided by these !ifoworlds. Understanding !ifcv-.'Orlds
means, we understand the thinking process of people. Understanding thinking
process of people mcnns, we understand the socio-culture of Sri Lanka.
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Buddhists believe the oim of living is not lw1•ing hut being. Fromm (1979) describes
these having and being modes referring to two poems that describes a flower:
Tennyson's reiatiOnship to a flower is in the mode of possession or of having;
Basho's relationship to flower is in the mode of being. He says, "by being I refer to
the mode of existence in which one neither bas anything nor craves to have
something, but is joyous, employs one's faculties productively, is one with the
world" (pp. 26-8). In contrast to the Western culture, Buddhist cultures is a culture
of being and not culture of having (Amamsckern, 2001 ).

Humanism and selflessness arc supreme virtues which should be practiced in our
sojourn in Samsara (Samsara refers to the eternal cycle of birth, suffering, death, and
rebirth)";)bid, 2001).

For Buddhists, craving is the major cause of, existence of

human life. The supreme state of being Nin·mw (Nirvana refers to the incff~;1~-~ultimate in which one has attained disinterested wisdom and compassion) is the
ultimate goal of human life (Sekhern, 1995). According to the Buddha, the
emancipatien (i.e. awaken) involves the elimination of illusion that craving for things
l~ads to happiness (Fromm, 1979, p. 48). Craving and happiness are related to
objective reality of the world. Therefore, egoism and individualism are illusions
created by human being (Amarnsckera. 2001). These are essential aspects of the life
oftlie Western world.

Buddhists believe in an agreed-upon consensual truth. For Buddhists, unconsciously
understood lifcworld~ include the myths of objcctiVe reality of the world. The

'I

enlightened truth involve; an elimination of objective reality of the \~mid. It involves

(r

,,;

,·.

,,,,

JW

core Buddhist thinking that guide's consciousness. Knowing this knowledge involves
elimination of illusions that control the \Juth to be emerged explicitly. Attaining selfenlightenment implies not only a systematic thinking upon a given subject, but also a
systematic development of the higher qualities that tend to produce supramundanc
wisdom which in its tum makes enlightenment possible (Sckhcra, 1995, p. 6). It is
the tacit knowledge intuitively operates in individual's mind. It involves conscious

awareness of the truth nbout the true Jifcworlds of human beings.

Understanding of lifcworlds gives the idea of more dynamir.: forces penneating
-through every cell of individuals conscious and unconsc.ious being guiding their
thoughts and actions (seep. , .

"thinking and speaking" is interrelated). These

thoughts arc shupcd by individual socio-culture and expressed through human
actions. They arc not absolute truths, something one could feel secure (as the ease in
positivist approach), b•Jt the self-affinning process of human reason (Fromm, 1978,
p. 48). The case analysis revealed that the world of employees could not be separated
from themselves. [t was also revealed thnt there wa£ no wall separating one from the
rest of the world as in the posit:vi,t approach. Individuals were part of the world as
the world was part of them. In sort, they lived in their world of consciousness.
Therefore, "the world is nothing more or less (han a projection of one's self. To
understand the world, we must understand onc'\7clf' (Flood, 1999, p. 82).

Enlightenment by a person means to know thi' truth in its nakedness. This means
knowing penetrates the surface and to strive critically and actively in order to
approach truth ever more clo,scly (Fromm, 1978, pp. 47-8). Knowing in this way
becon',cs part of the process of productive thinking (ibid, p. fP). Knowing means

m
knowing about the truth of the reality. "!t is an intuitive looking inlo in which we
discover one's mind. Knowing the essence of things is to know one's sclr' (Flood,
1999). Incorporation of knowledge in lifcworlds in information systems development

means, we allow the truth - the tacit knowledge that sustains in socio-cultural
lifewodds in Sri Lanka to be emerged.

2. Another factor that uses of communicative actions in systems development makes
possible is ancient knowledge and technology. Traditionally, societies in Sri Lankii.achievcd impressive achievements using ancient knowledge and technology. Among

these, the complex networks of massive-scale artificial lakes, intricately laid out
irrigation canncls, excellences in nautical construction, and complex town and
country planning were few examples (Gunawardena,,·2001; Silva, 1981; Wijesekera
& Wijesekera, l 998).

This knowledge is the best remains in our ancient civilisation (Wijesekera &
Wijesekera. 1998). This ancient knowledge was used before the enlightenment that
took place i11 the l 7'h century and the positivist knowledge in the Western countries.
The ancient societies used readily available socio-cultural knowledge, skills and
re~ources to achieve excellences. TI1cse were inscribed and embodied in cultural
values. Therefore, what is necessary by NCCL management to take deliberate efforts
to explore this socially valuable knowledge in our society and make use of that tncit
knowledge in developi[lg successful infonnation sy$t1.-ms?

NCCL case analysi~ showed that employees rducte:11 to use modem fast pace
information lcchnology and formal and external control based on modem

m
computerised information systems. This doesn't mean that Sri Lankans are totally
·dvcrtcd to use of infonnation technology. Buddha was not against any social custom

"

"iind tradition if they arc harmless and useful to society (Sckahera, 1995) (I

use

Buddha's teaching here, because as ! explained previously, thinking process of the
majority of Sri Lankans was shaped by Buddhist teaching). This n:001'.niscs the
"essential intc,Telatedncss, and interdependence of all phenomena • physical,
psychological, social, and cultural" which transcends current disciplinary and
conceptual boundaries (Capra, 1982, p. 285). Jn this context, employees would
support information systems dcve!opmcnt if the proposed designs

rum;

their

_economic, psychological, and socio-cultural Iifcworlds' needs. NCCL case analysis
revealed that employees wanted management to consider their practical problems
and develop information systems to meet the needs of their lifcworld~.

The need of use of indigenous knowledge, skills and resources has been emphasised
in information systems literature (see for example, Fox, 1998, 1991; Broding &
Schonberger, 2000; Suchman, 1987; Hirschheim, 1986). Suchman (1987), argues
that designing computers that can

interact with humans,

the system of

commnnication "must incorporate both sensitivity to local circumstances and
resources for the remedy of troubles in understanding that inevitably arisc"(p.28).
This means "instead of looking for a structure that is invariant across situations, we ..
look for the processes whereby particular, uniquely constituted circumstances arc
systematically interpreted so a~ !o render meaning shnrLx! and action accountably
rational" (ibid, p. 67). Thus Habcrmas's communicative actions provides vi~icle for
exploring this indigenous knowledge in lifcworlds of people in Sri LJnka for the
design of innovative information systems.
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J, The analysis of ten episodes revealed that for Sri Lankans used infonnation

technology and information systems us strategics and techniques to transform NCCL
towards a better organisation in line with the objectives of the govcmmc)t's
modernisation programs introduced in two phases of socio-economic ilevch;ipmcnt.

However, ill1bnnation technolob')' and infomrntion systems did not assist NCCL to
achieve this social task due to narrow deployment of positivist approach.

The

problem that Sri Lanka grappling with over a half century (after thc'.indepcndcnce in

,'

19480 was how to develop its economy to alleviate poverty and improve the quality
of life of peoples (lndraratna, 1998; Co\ombage, \998; Ratnayaka, 19,98). Even
though the application of information technology has been failed in NCCL and some
other organisations (see chapter one and four), today central focus is placed on tile
II,

'-"·--

improvement of information technology sector and infonnation systems development
to achieve this social task (Budget Speech, 2001). The prevalence bcljef is that
infonnation technology is related to direct socio:economic development.

In order to address this social task of socio-economic development, it is essential to
innovate s..?ccessful infonnation systems relevant for organisations in Sri Lanka. To
develop innJative infonnation systems, what is necessary is to articulate the sociocultural knowledge, lifcwoilds, and include that tacit knowledge in infonnati.on
-~ystems development. Th.is knowledge consists of tacit understanding of socio·
cultural lifcworlds. I nfonnation systems a:; '"!leans must be guided by needs of socio·
cultural lifcwolds. In NCCL case, employees were opposed infonnatio.'/ systems
,;..-,,

devC!oµ'ment because they were not economically and socio-culturnlly benefited
'

from the modem knowledge transfc.i:td from Western countries via information

m
tcd,no]ogy and information systems. 1bcsc employees opposed modem information
technology based information sysh:ms because they were clashed with their thinking
process.

Such an assertion would align with Foucault's (1982) project of

und.i.m~ding power and control as a panoptican created by modem technology. car;!
using Habermas's communicative action create empowerment of and by itself!

Founcault would pi:rsumable have grave doubts.

I\_
1fS Lifeworlds, systems and Information Syst~ms Denlopment

AC.cording to Habennas, if political and administrative sub-systems steer social
'"1·,

intercourse in a manner commensurable to the needs of Hfeworlds in socio-cultural subsystems, then reasons bccome active in political dccision-fDaking {Wilson. 1_?97).
Panicipants become ncth·cly involved in designing their future. Information systems
become easy to impkment within organisations because they' arc committed, w dew lop
their own future.

Once this poiitical decision··making becomes norms and institutionalised, it lays
foulldations in shaping organismional culture in a similar way that the pcsithist
approach established its roots for shaping organisational culture. Consequently. policy
makers ruid senior man.igcment would receive symbolic guidance from the lifeworlds ·
for the management of org.inisations (Pusey, 1987). Organisations become joint
optimisation of meeting plurality of hum(lll interests {Emery, 1959)., Jn this way,
\\
"
th~ries become ,.'l'actica! if thcv serve human interests and thereby become "a cause

.

determining the )t·il!" (Kant, 1964, p. 128).
-,c:·'

'
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Episode J one of NCCL case revealed that how production managers in the factory

fu\fil!t.'tl the needs of employees' lifcworhls by informally adjusting opcrational
budgets. [n this way, production managers achieved a good industrial harmony by
meeting the needs cf both senior management in the head office and the lifeworlds of
employees in the faclory. However, this prnctice had not considered within formal

decision making and actions. This prnctice was not institutionalised due to the
domination of politicians, over attachment to the rational bureaucracy, and narrow
deployment of scientific and economically rational decision making. Narrow
deployment of positivist approach hindered transferring NCCL towards a successful
organisation.

7.4.6 Human Development, Communicative Actions, 11nd Information Systems
Dcvclop.ment

Central to Habcrmas's theory of communicative action is its htiman focus and
development of societies (see Habcrmas, 1987a, 1987b). One of the objeetiv1os of
communicative action is to facilitate human participation in decision making process in
systems development and increase their level of understanding and knowledge. These
are necessary ingredients in development in any society (Wuema, 1996).

The, basic objective uf human development is to enlurge the range of p~Jp!c's choices

•/

. ·11

and make development more participatory and dcmocl''atic (Human Deve.1.opment
Report, 1991). l/NDP defines development as follows: development of the people, for
the people and b)' the people (cited in Waema, 1996, p. 8). Similarly, if we focus on
transferring c:ganisation through inform.ition systems development, it must be of the

,,'

,,,,

31(,

PL'Ople, for the people llnd hy the people. Jt i~, the co-operation of 11/1. l'urtkipation

or

pL-ople and their involvement is an essential aspect nf this kind of infnrmatitm systems
development. lt allows sharing of knowledge. Bo1 this alone is not sof!icicnt. lfwe
need to achieve human development, '.hen we r,;ust pul people at lhc centre of
devclopmc11! process in free and open comn1unirntivc inlerm:tinns. By allowing people
to freely and unintcm.iptedly comm11r.ic;1tc then only hoth human development and
' dGvelopment of societies c:in he achiel'cd. lliis means that sharing of knowledge is an
interactive process of making the right information uvailahlc to people at the right time
in a comprehensible manner to enable them to act judiciously- enriching the knowlc,Jge
.. base in the entire mechanism (Nath & Scholar, 2000).

TI1creforc, free and open

1icommunication plays a significap.t ·role in information systems development and
.development of societies (Habc~:s, 1995, 1987a, 1987b, 1979).

Human communication is recognised as central problem of "how understanding
possible in general" (MaCanhy, 1982, p.60). It is related to thinking process and human
actions. These actions are carried monument of knowledge that human possesses.
Understanding true knowledge in human actions req,iircs free am! open communication
'0
(Dietz·& Lyytinen, 1998; Williams, 1996; Klein & Hirschheim, 1996, 1991,1987:
Mingers, 1995; Lyytincn, 1992; Steff & Grimes, 1992; Power & Laughlin, !992;
1, M,organ, 1992; Alvesson & Willmott, 1992a, 1992b; ForcstC'i;Jt9.7"\ Murray & Ozannc,
-

'

1991; Keys, 1991; Young, 1989; Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 19~sv/ughlin, 1987; Steffy
~ Grimes, 1986).

.•()

These authors promoted Habcrmas's theory of communicative action as basis
invcstigatiflg,communicativc infraslruC,lu~c in organisations and societies because it is
~

~-

,.

"
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based on "consensual n.{)nns", which define mutual cx.pcctntions about how participants

in u given situation should behave in terms of communication (Lyytincn & l [irschhcim,
~,988). It is based on participatory and dcmnnatic way of developing i11fbrmalinn
systems {llirschhcirn & Klein, 1994, 1989), putling people al the centre of the
i.lcvclopmenl process, which provides legitimacy and rn1ionalily for instito\iona!

"
arrangcmc:1\s and pruclicc because actions nrc guided by human reasons (Habcmrns,
i,'._,

1979, 1987;, 1987b).

lnfonnation systems d-evclopmcnt involves decision about moral value judgements

because design choices of information systems are made to serve some human interests

\\'·<'.~\. the expense of others (see Klein & Hirschhcim, I 996; Hirschhcim & Klein, 1994,
' ',\

1989). Habennas's theory of communicative actions provides a rational way to
appropriate how such value judgements arc made. His theory assures that only
legitimised infonnation systems can be developed by giving all the participants equal
'I

chances to communicate their interests about information systems (Klein & Hirschheim,

1996).

,_

'\,}..,

\)

Habermas's communicative rationality, therefore, is concerned with the ultimate
fundamentals of "good communication" {Klein & Hirschheim, 1991). It provides
"symbolic interaction" through the cxch~nge of meanings in !an1,'llage and other media
such as sing-systems (Mingcrs, 1995; Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Silverman, 1970). The
use of language tend to take an important fenture the need to expose as closely as
possible the true meaning and social reality behind words of communication {Keys.

I/

/

1991). Through the use of language. mutual understanding about the worldviews of
systems development is achieved (Lyytincn & Hirschheim, 1988). It tries to reflect and

I

critically l.'llarninc the conditions anti scope of our practical, tacit koowlcdgo of how to
engage in organisational coff~crsations and constitute our social world (Dietz &
Lyytincn, 1998).

NCCL cnse analysis revealed that infonnation systems development were conflict to

.,,~--·

many employees, because they werC'oot given opportunities to participate in systems
development. Several authors have recogr,iscd the importance of participation in
systems development success (sec for example, Mumford, 1997; Mumford &
Breekman, 1994; Hirschheim & Klein, 1994, J989; Land & Hirschheim, 1983).

The case analysis also revealed that information systems were developed to support the
interests of those who were in ;~~'er, Jnfonnation systems were mainly to fulfil
technical interests of systems developers, senior manages and some politicians.
Infurmation systems development was aimed at controlling employees. However,
employees wanted management to consider their practical problems in systems
!1

development. ':They v..anted to free from the domination. Within this context,

,,

Haberm8.S's ideal speech situation enables various stakeholders to resolve these
conflicts and mutually designed ends of systems development.

In an i~·speech situation, every assertion and utterance of the comrn.unicative
I,

participant is carefully checked against the four validly claims of comprehensibility,
truth, legitimacy, and sincerity refcning to the three worlds ofobjective, intersubjcctivc
and subjective worlds.

It is an in-depth study about human communication and

communicative patt~ms of societies. It is n methodology that aimed at no in-depth
investigation of true and rational knowledge latent in socicties,'.Thc nor.roach provides a
(.'

-. \\

i)
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relentless dedication to appropriately balance the positivist knowledge with sociocultural lifoworlds (subjective knowledge) in societies. It provides an intersubjectivc
account of humm1 knowledge (Mingcrs, l 995), and rcconstrm::tivc form of knowledge

(Dietz & Lyytincn, 1998).

What lessons can organisations like NCCL in developing countries learn from
H·;bcrmns's theory of communicative actions, particularly from his ideal speech
situation in information systems development? It allows participants to work in a free
and distortion free environment because infonnatioo systems can be made rationally by

the force of better Ufb'llments than by the forces of power and politics or some other
blind appeal to social convention (Klein & Hirschhcim, l 996).

The NCCL ease revealed that use of power in systems development predominated.
Organisational processors were objectified by narrow deployment of purposive rational
actions. Therefore, Habcrmas's approach enables organisati,)nal stakehold,;rs to inspire
criticism, to facilitate learning, and to raise the overall le\'el of competence in systems
development (Lyytinen & Hirschhcim, I 988). It can be argued that if senior managers'
thinking is focused on rational discourse under conditions of relative power symmetry
and iiltional action, then organisational members become free from domination of
purposive rational actions. Such an assertion could be challanged from n Foucaultinn
(1982) standpoint, but this docs not mean that attempts to nmeleriate the sitution would
not be of some benefit.

Using debates in the ideal speech situation, a design ideal can be justified by human
reasons (Lyytincn & Hirschhcim, 1988; Klein & Hirschheim, 1996). For example,
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management at NCCL understood its culture as objective, scientific, technical, nn<l
bureaucratic. This culture required decision-making be based on rationality, i.e., the
knowledge about existing structures was oficn objectified. The case analysis revealed

that this rationality wns fundamen:.au; as odds as with true and legitimate rationality of
NCCL The power structure of NCCL made such rationality more difficult am]

forbidden.

Habennas asserts that rationality means being able to provide and alternatively, to
expect adequate reasons for statements, decisions, and actions. Thus rationality relics

directly on communication characterised by discussion and argumentation. The validity
or inadequacy of reason is contextually defined. However, NCCL case revealed that
decision-making and actions related to infonnation systems devclcpment were not
guided by human reasons based on discussions and arb,uments. Therefore, Habermas's
ideal speech situation provides opportunities for :;:!l foe participants in systems
development to get into discussions and arguments nnd critically self-understand the
design ideals for information systems development. His ideal speech situation provides
a vehicle for reflective learning which is an essential aspect of human development in a
society (Williams, 1996). It enables participants to talk about the social structures of
work and consequently to increase the level of self-confidence ub6ut the systems being
developed.
Debating interrelated issues, aims to induce learning between people that nurtures a
fuller appreciation of e11ch other's mental model (Flood, 1999, p. 88). It helps to free
participants from inner compulsions, wmecessary linguistic or conceptual bias,.-

"
unwarranted prejudice, and false beliefs about information systems development
(Lyytincn & Hirschhcim, 1988). The rational discourse in the ideal speech situation

stimulates critical thinking and encourages sharing of ideas and collective problem
;

solving (Klein & Hirschhc::im, 1996).

·~..

7.4.7 Communicative Actions and Innovation of Information Systems
,c;.,,~~°""->

Social scientist h'nve been emphasised the importance of the fonnation of the structure
of an organism for innovations in systems of nutional development (Porter, 1990;
Lazonick, 1993; Amsden & Hiknio, !993, Perez & Soetc, 1988). These authors have
emphasised the importance of innovation in developing countries to reduce
technological disparities in those countries (Amsden & Hikino, 1993). This can be
achieved through alquiring the capacity for participating in the generation and
improvement of tcch:1ologies, rather than in simple use of them (Perez & Soete, 1988).
Because it provides opportunities for participants to rcflcclive\y !cam and innovate
creative infonnation systems to suit their social milieu.
;,

;/
Since the inception, information syst_~~.clCvelopment neglected the social taik it could
play in mobilising NCCL towards a better organisation. As the case analysis revealed,

/r in
\(

both phases of socio-economic development, the social context of infonnation

systems development wns not critically analysed and reOected >Jpon. It was taken for
granted. From this perspective, the soci,al reality was found, observed or modelled rather
than interpreted or re-created.

This culture annihilated momentum of change hy

employees through innovative infonnation systems. Therefore, infonnntion systems.
development was unable to legitimise and rationalises as means of transforming NCCL
towards a better organisntion.
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7.4.7.l Innovation through Reflective Learning

Information systems development should be considered as a learning process in which
organisational premises should be questioned (sec Robey, Boudreau & Rose, 2000;
'\.F_lood, 1999; Newman & Noble, 1990; Scngc, 1990; Argyris, 1982; Argyris & Schon,
1978; BatCS()_n, 1972). Leaming is an important clement in innovation in information

'

systems deve~9pment because social behaviour of individuals is expressed through
social rules and practice that sustain in social culture ofa society (Stacey, 1996). These
expressed thougbt represent the Ub'TCCd upon truth of social bch~viour of people in that

society. The social rules of meaning arc the tacit knowledge operating within sociocultural lifeworlds in a society. By allowing participants to critically reflect upon
through a process of learning, the true and rational knowledge could be found.
Participants in a society could be motivated to learn more productively in the generation
of technological innovation if changes were made in critical nspects of their social
surrounding that generated the learning of new behaviours propagating continuous
improvement in living conditions (Corea, 2000).

'1
"
assf'Ssment of technology

Habefmas's communicative actions enable participants to engage in a critical

~,.-.,·

',

being intro:.lueed while innovating new knowledge for
,'

information systems development becJusc the process involves reflective learning and
creative thinking (Williams, 1996). It allows participants to learn new ways of
conceptualising existing activities and identify new potential information systems
supported work structures (Torvinen & Jalonen, 2000). It enables participants to
cooperatively aware tacit knowledge in the socio-cultural lifeworlds in Sri Lanka.
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Whtn participants arc ungagcd in reflective learning, then the content becomes part nf
their own individual systems of thought, enriching and widening it. It stimulates
participants' own thinking processes. l'm1icipants would lean relating lo lhc world
around them. They undcrslaml the hnlis1ic nature of information systems development.

New 11ucstions. new ideas. new perspective arise in their minds and leaning bcC(Jmc an
active and alive process of knowledge creation /Steier, 1991). Once the social
environment is created favouring such Jcaming, thinking process works spontaneously
in the minds of people and they can know more deeply. Rcllcction must remain an

ongoing process.

Cooperative learning by participants allows to critical understa1,d and reflect upon
mental construction of c.ach individual. In this way, the generated knowledge becomes
"forward-looking" (Murray & Ozanne, 1991 ). It allows truth to be emerged and liberate
peop\c from power, politics, domination, illusions, false beliefs, alienation. and
dehumanisation at workplace. Such critical thinking facilita!es lifcworlds to be evolved
as true knowledge tacitly operating in societies. Flood (1999) writes:

./

If successful, the process may at some stage bring about changes to
orgPnisntional rules and practice. Changes might be considered an
emergence resulting from spontaneous self-organisation of
interpretive beings around an issue. The dynamic is not directed by a
central authority and docs not result from formal rules and practice
(Flood, 1999, p. 87).

Hence, notwith~.atnding critquc from other persu, '' "C:, (e.g. Founcault ( 1982)), it may
be argued that there is a compelling basis for usu1g principles of communicative action
in information systems development in organisations in Sri Lanka.
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7. S Critique of the H11b<=<masi11n Pcrspeclivc and Rcfiections on Problems of Applying

Communlcath·e Actions

Communicative uction is nn approach that seeks to incorporate multiple interests of
participants in

II

rational way. When applied to information systems development, the

approach requires negotiation and debate between lhc participants regarding <lesigi1
ideals of information system>. This is done through an ideal speech situation. Although

the traditional cultural n1lucs in Sri Lanka support the use of communicative actions,
some existing cultural, economic, social, and linguistic barriers limit t! ~ application of
the principles ofidcal speech situation.

7.5.1 Cultural Probl~·ms

I. Respect. At a debate, stakeholders are required to criticise existing management
ideology and issues regarding information systems development to find out true and
rational knowledge. TI1is means, debate involves dashing of Western and Sri
Lankan cultural values. Such a debate, if conducted in Western societies, can be
considered as constructive and beneficial (Moores & Gregory, 2000). They may
consider that a debate may help the trulh to emerge and be considered as beneficial
to all the parties. But the social standing in organisations in Sri Lanka does not
support such a debate. For example, systems analyst said," I didn't want to create
conflicts with my superiors, bcc~.use our culture is to respect them" (p. x).

2. High Power Distance, Related to respect is high power distance between superiors
and subordinates in organisations in Sri Lanka. This was evidenced in NCCL case

)85

analysis. In such a situation, management expects subordinates to carry out their
decisions rather than changing them (p. X "people carry out orders ... "). These

social relations have become fixed through the history or interactions (Clegg, 1989;
Foucault, 1982).

!n such a context, realising agreed upon truth and rational

knowledge through a critical debate i~ problematic because debate involves
changing established power relations of supi:riors in fovour of disadvantaged
groups. Case analysis revealed that many senior managers did not want to loose

their power.

3. Social Attitudes. Another aspect of ideal speech situation is its aim of changing
social attitudes of people so that principles of criticism and logical analysis are
elevated above social nonns of confonnity and acceptance of customs and traditions
(Klein & Hirschheim, 1996). The problem is whether these principles of criticism
and logical analysis could be implemented in the present context of organisations in
Sri Lanka. If successful, the change involves, changing the way of understanding
the world by people. It involves radical transformation of social behaviour of
human. At present NCCL is managed by a multinational organisation. Majority of
senior management comprised of people from Western counties. TI1eir thinking is
guided by the positivist ideology. This ideology has been influenced in fonning
lifeworlds understanding and thinking process of the people in those countries.

4. Agreed Upon Trnth. In ideal speech situation, participants arc required to critically
reflect upon the design ideals of infonnation systems development. This is done
through an open debate. For Habennas, the outcome of the debate is an agreed upon
truth by all the participants who take part in the debate. Rational design includes an
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inclusion of this agreed upon truth, the value choices of participants, as de~ign ideals
of the infonnation systems being developed. However, there arc few questions arise
from this agreed upon truth.

(a) Different Realities. of the World nod Knowledge. What is being reflected in
the agreed upon truth1 How do we know whether the agreed upon knowledge
represents the truth of the reality; true representation of the minds of people in
the debate? Western managers and local people understand the reality of the
world differently. If the outcome ,:,f th.:: debate represents the reality of the
world, how do we know this reality represents true knowledge in the service of
a!l Ute parties? Toulmin (1982) acknowledges that "all of our scientific
explanations and critical readings start from, embody, and imply some
interpretive standpoint, the question is which of our positions are rationally
warranted, reasonable or defensible - that is, wel!-founded rather than
~roundlcss opinions" (p. I 09). 'Illis meUtodological dilemma appears in
Habennas's theory of communicative actions when applying to organisations
managed by multinational companies operating in Sri Lanka.

(b) Power Reinforcement. Another question is, how do we know the agreed upon
truth by participants is in the benefit of all the people in organisation~ Or
whether the agreed upon truth and the designed system would reinforce the
power of some people those whu already control and dominate the work force?
It is revealed that the designed of maintenance infonnation system reinforced the
power of engineers. It strengthen bureaucracy and scientific rational control
exerted by engineers over other employees and employees (p. x). 1l1e agreed
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upon truth by engineers and systems analysts to design maintenance system did

not resonate with the broad agenda of libcrntion of repressed munagcrs, mu!
employees. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1992) ar1,'llc that "all premisses arc ultimately

based on sunniscs which serve the purposes of a metalanguage for grounding
and dosing an argument. Related to this issue is the emancipation of human
being from physical (natural or technical), psychological, or social conditions nr

forces.

(c) Emancipation. Majority of Sri Lankans understands emancipation as full

realisation of the truth of the life. It is the awaken of the mind; the
enlightenment, which involves the liberation from all the suffering of human

life. It is achiev"d in once in the life. It is really an achievement of
supramundane status ofhuman life. Once this is achieve<l it will not be changed.
NCCL case revealed that agreed upon truth by engineers and systems analyst
had been changed. 111c managers changed it for their advantages (episodes X
and X).

Therefore, this agreed upon truth can not be considered as true

emancipation of people. Sri Lankan people understand the concept of
emancipation broadly than Habennas. As Tsoukas {1992). argues Habennas's
approach has failed to provide an adequate metaphysical platform for
emancipating people in organisations.

5. Profits over Social Values. Another situation is whether Goldcnbank management
would change their values in favour of employees at NCCL. At NCCL, these
managers represent as employees of Go!denbank group of companies. The aim of
the Company is to make profits, Consider the ful\owing statements made by three
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senior managers.

·nw vr Finance: "foreign investors are coming here mainly

for

making profits than StJcia! services". llle Factory manager: "this Company has to

make profits In alive". ·n1c v1~ Manufacturing: "manufacturing process of Cement is
as same as everywhere in Goldcnbank group of companies and Sri Lanka has no
option".

6. Stiff Attitudes. The above assertions are not simply the assertions of individuals'
concerns but the multinational Company itself. The senior managers at NCCL
implement the decisions of multinational Company but not the decisions of

managers themselves. Changing altitudes of a multinational Company is extremely
difficult, because it has its own records of experience in J, ,i,1g; business in the world.
Ifthe Company does not make progress in profits, ;l may close down operations at
NCCL A project manager revealed that "if people do nut change their attitudes
towards the Company and adjust their behaviour to suit the needs of the Company,
the Company would have nothing but to close the factory". In such a situation, it is
hardly to believe that a multinational Company would change its rational plans and
purposive rational actions.
7. Change of Knowledge, Another situation is that the rational and true knowledge,
supported by the forces of better argmnent may not remain constant. This implies
the fact that communicative actions can transfer between communicative actions and
strategic actions. Episodes X and X provide empirical supports to show that an
agreed upon knowledge represent an agreed best understanding of what has been
produced at a particular point of time. This knowledge is changed when participants
get more infonnation. Similarly, liberated people become rcvictimised from later
instrumental and strategic actions of management. This difficulty exists in applying
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Habennas's communicative actions in systems dcvclupmcnt in organisations in 8ri

Lanka.
7.5.2 Economic Problems

I. Economic Problems and l<"car of Criticism. Related to cultural barriers are the
economic and political environments in Sli Lanka. Case analysis revealed that one

of the reasons for resistance to computerised infonnation systems was related to
economic problems of employees. Generally, in Sri Lanka, getting a job is difficult

due to high unemployment rate. On average, standard of living is very low
_ compared to developed countries. There is a high-income disparity. Poverty level is
very high. Economy i!l slowly progressing. In these contexts, local managers, and
employees would not criticise senior management's actions openly because of the
fear of loosing their jobs and income. Rather than criticising management actions
they carry out orders of management (seep. 9). In the worst case they decide to
leave the organisation (seep.).

2. LMug and Poverty Alleviation than Emancipation. Though Sri Lankans are
aware that they are being controlled and suppressed their social behaviour by the
management, their economic problems such as poverty, and unemployment arc
considered as important detenninants in living and maintaining tbeir families. These
ideas were empirically supported. In episode X: "I am working here because, I can't
find a similar job. My doctors advised me not to work unde1· sever pressure....".
Even though employees didn't like the way information systems were developed
(positivist approach), they did 1;ot continue their strike prolong periods because they
were aware that it would affect to their employment and family income. ln episode

'"
X:" .... We 11rc poor people seeking extra money for our living. We really only
0

work here
_',_("~

/'

rJmoncy....

We want.:d to work and cam hut not that way". In this

.

.. co)l,ext, they remain in the organisation even though they tlo not positively
contribute to the implementation of the rntional plans of companies through

infonnotion systems development.
'i;

3. Forced Social Ch,-.~ae and Control. Goldenbank aware of all of these situations.
Employees also aware that they were being suppressed and alienated by the strategic
and°;instrmnental actions of management. Employees wanted management to

consider their \ifrworld and economic problems. In spite of the opposition of
employees towards the development of information systems, Goldenbank
management forced employees to use their techniques and methods (p.). Habennas
\l

.:·

has poorly understood the way multinational companies operate in developing·

'
countries and the way they control the social behaviour of people in organisations
(( and the whole community in Sri Lanka. These situatioos can not be easily changed

,\

through a rational debate.

7 .5.3 Habermas's

Intcrprcb-.tion of Power: Power as External Force and

Dominalion of Lifeworlds

Habermas's framework assumes that someone or some group is thought to have power
and to use it for some particular purpc.se. This means power is conceived as a rcso11r.::C;

'
to be possessed, a capacity, a property of actors. At NCCL, employees had the minimal
power to change the decisions of some politicians and management. This means power
used consciously as an external force and allowed domination to occur over socio-

"'
cultural lifcworlds. It Uistorlctl socin-culturnl lifcworlds of employees at NCC!...
Employees experienced unin1cmlcd cunSCl[UCnccs such apathy, anomic, depression,
ps}'.chopathological dicscs, and alienation at work. These social rcprod!.lctions were

,, '

[''

1

rCS,..,t~d from the covert strategic and inslrumcnta! actions of management.

Jn sum, at

NCCL there was and still is c,;isted an um..-qual distribution of power relationships
between management and employees. Thus NCCL case supported Habcnnas's

interpretation of power in organisations a_nd societies. However, some other aspects of
power also discovered from the case analysis.

7.5.3.1 Some Problems of Power - Other Variants of Power Including Critiques of
the Habermasian perspective

'

\\

I. Power In Social Relations. In all the three phases of NCCL's ov.nership,\~1
management employed sufficient resources for innovating successful information
systems. However, the NCCL case analysis revealed tlmt employees often vented

their agitation towards the development through their trade union actions.
Computerised information systems changed the rules of tacit knowing of employees
resided at the deepest \eve! of their understanding of the world; the socio-cu\tura\

lifeworlds. It can be argued that the opposition of employees acted as a major barrier
to develop successful information systems at NCCL. They opposed because
computerised

information

systems development

changed

their

ways

of

understanding the world and relationship between work and the life. Jn other words,
the computerised systems challenged the locus of their knowledge; the world they
drew meaning for their daily actions and interactions. These kinds of power
relations are recognised by Clegg (1989) in his "Circuits of Power" who asserts that
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changes in the technology or production and discipline can alter the balanoi·OJ

empowerment and discmpowcrmcnt (pp. 211-39).

,,
2. Power for Mutual Coovt~icncc. The fact that power is not only external but also
an attribute of specific relationship is also recognised by Giddens (1985) who says

that power relations arc inherent in soda! relationships and may provide for mutual
convenience of association. Similarly, Foucault (1982) and Clegg ( 1989) assert that
power relationships in organisations may be conflictual and co-operative as well as
both restrictive and enabling. For Foucault power always resides in the system or in

,,

· the culture we have inherited, and that power necessarily influence and controls us,
albeit often in deleterious woys (Giddens, 1985).

3. ~owcr and Traditional Culture. Giddens's and Foucault's interpretation of power
relationships also supported from the case analysis. These kinds of power re\atlons
exist in trade union activism in organisations in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, particularly
the leadership ofnational trade unions represents people from the elite groups. They
are either related to major political parties or representators of the government.

I(
Organisations' unions are related to these national unions. Trade unions are
representing as vehicle for social and economic justice, in the workplace's
problems, they also provided for access to political and exercise of traditional
kingships. The exercise of kingship is tooted from the traditional culture of Sri
Lanka.

4. Micro Politics and Power. The existence of micro power and politics in
organisations also discovc1ed t'rom the case analysis. In NCCL, people use

infonuation as power and that power was intimately connected tu knowledge. There
existed eonllicts between inter departments interactions: hctwccn the infonnation
technology staff in the head otlicc and thal of in the foctory, between internal and
cxtcrnnl information technology personnel, between user departments and internal
infornmtion technology personnel, and between user departments and external
infonnation technology personnel. Connicts a!so exi~t~xl intra (within) departments:
between information technology personnel and the VP of Finance and infonnation
technology, between information technology personnel in user departments and their
superiors. These power conflicts arc resulted from the interactions of people.

5. Power and Historical Roots of Organisations. The power struggles appeared at
NCCL are rooted from the historically established bureaucratic, techno-scicntific
and rational

planning approaches. Consider the assertion of management

information systems manager: "we need certain amount of power which others don't
have ...". As Introna (!996) ar!,'UCS that individuals and societies arc mutually
constituted and all the heather to known social types are social formations have been
marked by central organising principles which inevitably entail certab power
relationships. This means power in social relations can not be removed and resided
within the systems. Such identifications are essential in the analysis of power in
organisations. Foucault (1982) writes " ... there cannot be a society without power
relations is not to say either that those which are established are necessary, or ...
that power constitutes n fatality at the heart of societies" (p. 223),

6. Power and Entrenchment of Relationsilips. At NCCL, user departments were
given power to initiate their own information systems. Many user departments

"'
welcomc<l this idea. However, the intniduction of information systems in certain
user departments reinforced already exercised power by mam1gcrs over other

departments and employees

(episode 10). Westrup (1995) notes that the

actunlisation ofHabcnnas's ideas to over come communicative distortion may lead
to entrenchment of specific power relationships which arc further reinforced by the

fonns of technology already deployed within the organisation.

7. Change of Power. Hnbermas'5 approach is aimed at changing the status quo in
more radical way to empower the disadvantage groups. However, changing power

· altogether is not easy. Establishing such power-independent social relationships that
encourage ideal communication is problematic due to the existing organising of
work at NCCL. It is unlikely t~i have to deal with the power resistance of those
benefiting from the current situ!!'.tion (Mingers, 1992). Therefore, understanding
power in social relations is crucial. It requires understanding of Clegg's (1989),

,,

Giddens's (1985), and Foucault's (1982) analysis in addition to Habennas's
explanation of power in social relations.

7.5.3.2 Education-Problems

I. Level of Education. Related to power are educational levels of the participants.
Critical debate requires participation of a wider membership. Generally, this
'

includes

participants

from

multinational

Company,

politicians,

managers,

employees, customers and the community members. If successful, the idea of such a
debate is to get wider community participation so that their value choices can be
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included as design ideals of information systcms. However, achieving such an
agreement is imprneticnl due to level of education of participants in a debate.

2. Literacy and knowledge. Although Sri Lanka has the second highest literacy rate
in the South-Asian region, it can not be taken for granted in information systems
development. High literacy docs not imply that all the people arc highly
knowledgable in information technology. Due to the advaocement of the
information technology, designing relevant infonnation sysiems for organisations
has become a challenging task. Its approaches, methodologies, methods, techniques,
- systems, and tools are highly developed and can not be understood to average
people. Knowledge about these aspects is essential at a debate to emerge the true
knowledge. As outlined in chapter three, most of the people in Sri Lanka do not
aware of the modern infonnation technology. In such a context, the outcome of the
debate may not represent the genuine truth agreed by all the parties.

3. Genuine Interests. On the other hand, most of the people arc suffering from
economic hardships and malnutrition. In order to debate, first they must understand
what their genuine interests arc or should be. Education levels of these community
members are different from that of the people representing from elite groups.
Economically and socially they are disadvantaged. In such a context, debate can not
take place in a perfectively symmetrical manner. People will not argue all possible
objections and implications of information systems. At best they breed confonnity.
Therefore, realising true and rational knowledge could be problematic under these
circumstances. Rather it may preserve the status 4uo. Related to education are some
linguistic baniers of people in Sri Lanka.

3%

"
7.5.4 Linguistic Problems

According to Habermas linguistic barriers exist because the rationality of human
communication tends to suffer from conflicting and ambiguous meaning, difficulty in
expressing complex matters, limits of the human brain to comprehend lcn!,'1hy reports
and other factors which impede mutual understanding (Klein & Hirschheim, 1996).

I. Meaning and Understanding. At NCCL, many employees could not understand
the meaning of various concepts related to information systems development ('"we
heard the term 'fiel-ds' in our paddy fields ... "). Majority of employees could not
understand the various concepts introduced by management through steering media.
These concepts were originated from Western societies and disseminated to
I.\

developing countries. These steering media carried cultural values embed in
Western societies of the modernity.

2. Language and Understanding. At NCCL, majority of employees could not
understand English language as a medium of communication, because they had their
education in national lan!,•lmges such as Sinhala and Tamil. As n result, they could
not understand the meaning of various concepts carried through steering media.
Even a translation of the meaning of these concepts into national languages did not
make much difference in understanding those concepts by employees, because those
meaning comprised of entirely new meaning emanated from the Western countries.
These meaning did not resonate with the way NCCL employees understood the

world. Brietly, these meaning clashed with the way those NCCL employees
understood the constitutive of the world; their socio-cultural lifcworlds.

3. Language, Thinking and Expression. Due to lack ofundcr5tanding of the meaning
of concepts carried through steering media, employees could not fully express their
views at training progrnms ond communication.

This created a gap between

understanding the actual meaning of concepts and expressing their thoughts. For
example Whorf ( ! 956) asserts that the language one uses will detenninc the breadth
and depth of ideas that can be communicated. This means that what one can think of
· is constrained by the language that one has to express these thoughts. The intimate
connection between language and thought is also central to Wittgenstein (1953).
Maturana (1988, !978) and Maturanna and Varela (1987, 1980) show that
perception and cognition are inevitably subject dependent, but that language is
intcrsubjectivc - based on common experience and implicit agreement (Mingers,
1995, 1989; a!so see Winorgard, !987, Winograd & Flores, 1986).
4. Mutual Understanding and Language. Thus use of person's own language of
understanding and expressing thoughts is vital in human communication. At NCCL
the language difficulty exists in designing ideals for infonnation systems
development, because people can not fully express their thoughts using English. As
a result, there exist problems in reaching mutual understanding of participants in
communicative interactions. This problem was and still is remained as a major
barrier in transfonning NCCL towards a better organisation through infonnation
systems development.
5. Langunge as a Medium Power. Another factor that discouraged debate at NCCL
wa5 fear to talk with senior managers. 'CT!is means that the existing environment
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docs not encourage discussions. for example, an operation manager stated that "lhc
freedom to talk wilh people had withdrawn here. Employees carried nut orders with
fear psychosis". Habcnnas's asserts that repressed parties can be free only through
the use of language, hccausc nrgumcnts presented at discussions arc checked against
the four validly claims. However, at NCCL, senior managers used language itself as
a medium of power. At present, the situation is complicated because NCCL is
controlled by a multin.ational organisation.

7.6 Conclusion
7.6.1 Recommendations for Sueccssfnl Information Systems Development

I.

Cooperation. Collaborative work of politicians, govemment·officinls, senior
and middle level managers, information technology staff, other employees, and
other beneficiaries such as customers is essential to share their knowledge for
systems development. Information systems development is a group effort than
an individual ooe. It involves much more than designing a technical system.
Group spirituality must be encouraged within organisations and their value
choices must be included as design ideals of infonnation systems development.
Once group spirituality is recognised and become institutionalised practice,
people develop loyalty to each other. People don't see differently between
themselves and the NCCL.

Information systems development should be understood as "problem-posing"
activity (Friere, 1986). In problem-posing activity, "individuals develop their
power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in
which they find themselves; they come to sec the world not as a static renlity,

)09

but as a reality in process, in transformation" (ibid, pp. 70-l).

Then on!y

individuals sec themselves as conscious beings able to act and change the
existing views regarding systems development. TI1cy can reflectively understand
the reality of infonnntlon systems development and trnnsform thoughts through

actions.

2.

Socio-cultural Lffcworlds and Tacit Knowledge. Socio cultural values such as
working collectively, sharing knowledge with others, mutual understanding,

informal communication, trust and respect arc part and parts of Sri Lanka's
socio-culture. What is necessary is to understand the importance of this sociocultural knowledge and include that tacit knowledge in information systems
development.

Mana;;ement can make use of such tacit knowledge to innovate

successful infonnation systems. Once these social values have been introduced as
institutionalised practice, they become built into human actions. Most of the
problems outlined in the previous sections can be over come if infonnation
systems arc developed following societal nonns, expectations, and values which
arc used to engage in a search for understanding {Golcs & Hirschheim, 2000'1.
The true representation of mindsets of individuals in infonnation systems is an
essential aspect of success in any infonnation system because knowledge only
has value if it is applied considP.ring the local : ,:iditions that make up that
knowledge - thus people must be able to use that knowledge.

3.

Local Knowledge. Infonnation systems must incorporate local knowledge. This
means, infonnntion systems must be designed to meet the local conditions
considering the locally available, knowledge, resources, techniques, method~.
and approaches to suit the needs of the people in that country.
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4.

Inslitutiooal Arrangements for Reflective Learning. Opportunities for rcllcctivc

learning through social intcrnction must be introduced. Once socio-cultural lifcwor!ds

((

ore introduced ns institutional planning and decision making, creative thinking
becomes active autonomous part in human minds. It is necessary that NCCL
management to remove all the barriers that inhibit tacit knowledge to emerge out by

employing communicative actions. This requires not only listen to the words but also
listen to the problems of people.

s._ Attitudinal Change of Managers. This involves educating managers about the

implications of their current approaches {Nord & Jcrrnir, 1992), and changing their
attitudes towards the use of communicative actions. However, the end aim of this
endower is to incorporate tacit knowledge in socio-cultural lifeworlds in systems
development to create new information system that benefit to large stakeholder
groups. The history of information systems development at NCCL revealed that they
were failed because information systems development was not developed according
to the needs of socio-cultural lifoworlds .
•

Learning from Failures, The present management can learn lessons from the past
failures of information systems and reflect upon them (see Lyytinen & Robey,
1999). It is really the breakdown of communication and the intelligence systems at
NCCL. The present problems are the reproduction of the wrong application of the
positivist approach in information systems development in the past. In contrast to
the positivist approach, problem-posing approach to systems development involves
forward looking, imaginative, and practical (Murray & Ozanne, 1991). This
approach helps NCCL to develop relevant information systems that fits with the
mindsets of people in Sri T,anka.
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m,sodo-culturally Rclcv11nt

Information Systems. Since the inception of

information systems development at NCCL, whether they were manual or
computerised, management used as an external force to control work and
dehumanised the workplace relationships. If the present management is truly
seeking to transform NCCL towards an effective organisation through the
application ofinfonn.ation technology, then they must first understand the problems

of the positivist approach and changed their attitudes and approaches according to
the needs of socio-cultural lifcwurlds in Sri Lanka.

· NCCL must adequately include socio cultural norms, expectations, values that
represent mindsets of people. It also requires use of locally available information
systems methods, techniques, tools, and expertise, which are valued and understood
by people in Sri Lanka. Real change through infonnation systems needs to spring
from social contexts and historical experience of Sri Lanka. NCCL must understand
the holistic nature of infonnation systems development. Such an understanding
supports management for both the transfonnation of NCCL and socio-economic
('\_

development of Sri Lanka through the development of innovative infonnation
systems.
8. Use of Languages. Use of local languages in systems development process
encourages participants to think and express their views as they occur within their
minds (see, p. X and 7.5.4 above).
9. Academic and Training Institutions. Collaborative work by NCCL management
with academic and training institutions to change of academic curricula in training
institutions both in the public and private sectors. This involves changing the
dominant mode of teaching; i.e. positivist approach to communicative actions. So

"'
those trainees become creative thinkers because their training involves reflective
learning (if introduced). Rc11cctivc learning involves an illumination of the truth of
the world. It involves the true understanding of the self of a person.

7.6.2

Conclusion about Research Questhms: Implication for Information
Systems Research

"

This research empirically studied five research questions:

'

Firstly, What impact the state co/Jira! policies had on Information Systcmfdevelopment

and practice in the orga11isa1ional socio-c11lt11ral /ifcwor!ds? The implications of state
control policies (phase Ja) on infonnation systems development have been discussed
and analysed in episodes 1-3 and state control policies with open economic policies
(phase lb) in episodes 4-5. These implications are further summarised in section 7.1.

The research discovered that governments' policies often innuenced in shaping
institutional planning at NCCL and in tum these policies were included as objectives of
information systems development. In all the five episodes, development of information
systems emerged from the consideration regarding political and management
accountability of funds towards the public through parliament.

NCCL introduced information systems as steering media of techniques and strategi..:s to
formally control workplace relationships and improve the efficiency and effe:tivcness
of performance. Generally, information systems as steering media (means) did not
resonate with the needs of lifeworlds. R~thcr, information systems engendered and
clashed with historically established soc " cultural lifeworlds of employees. As a result,

'°'
employees, through their unions, often resisted governments' rcfonns. Therefore,
NCCL could not transfonn towards a better organisation through information systems

development. Therefore, it can be concluded that state control policies had clear

implications for information systems development at NCCL.

Setondly, What impac/ the 1wo-classical economic policies had on Information Systems
development and practice in the orgo11isational socio-cultural lifcwor/ds? The impact

of privatisation of NCCL and introduction of open economic policies have been
discussed and analysed lc-nb>thY in episodes 6-10 and summarised in pp. XX. In episode
6, · information systems were emerged from the considerations regarding change of
ownership from the government control to an individual business entrepreneur; namely,,
Yawakkal (phase 2a). In episodes 7-10, information systems were emerged from the
considerations regarding the change of ownership from Yawakkal to Go!denbank
Company (phase 2b). Under the both ownerships, NCCL focused on improving
efficiency and effectiveness while changing social behaviour of employees.

Yawakkal introduced computerised information systems as steering media to achieve
economic rational objectives. These rational objectives represented as objectives of
information systems development.

Goldenbank transferred various management

techniques, methods, steering media and corporate culture to NCCL. Goldenbank vision
and objectives were taken as objectives of information systems development. In both
cases, lifeworlds needs were not included as objectives of information systems
development.

In both cases. information systems development could not assist to improve efficiency
and effectiveness of NCCL due to the resistance from employees. They opposed
information systems development. As steering media, information systems engendered
nnd clashed with the socio-cultural !ifeworlds of employees at NCCL and did not
resolve employees· economic problems.

As a result, NCCL could not transform

"
towards a better organisation through information systems development. Thus, it can t,C
concluded that neo-classical policies and change of ownership of NCCL from the state
control to a single owner and a multinational Company had clear implications for
information systems development.

,,
Thlrd1y, What approaclles taken by the management'/ into consideration

when

developing and implememing Information Systems in the oi}anisation? The ten
episodes discussed and analysed in chapter six and consequently summarised in section
XX revealed that information systems development at NCCL followed non-reflective
positivist approach. Information systems, methods, techniques, tools, and expertise wer,;-·
transferred to NCCL from the Western countri<:s. It can be concluded that these Western
techno-scicntific,

economically

rational

approaches, rntiooal

bureaucracy,

and

instrumental and strategic rationalities inhibited transferring NCCL towards a better
1.1

,'•

organisation through effective information systems development. This non-refleL1ive''
" positivist rationality often contradicted with the rntionality emanated from the
conditions in the social context of Sri Lanka.

i•,

Fourthly, How much are c11/tura/, social, economic, a11d orga11isatio11a/ con/e.>:/s taken

by the ma11ageme111 in/o cons1deratio11 /11 Information Sys/ems developme/11 and practice
in the organisation!' And Why? The ten episodic analyses revealed that information

4()5

systems development did not consider within broad social contcxL~ of Sri Lanka.
Nonethclcs.s, the section 7.3 explains how social contexts of Sri Lanka influenced and
shaped infonnation systems development at NCCL

In both phases of socio-economic development, information systems development were
subject to the domination of those who were in power. lnfonnation systems were used

as external forces to control and dehumanise workplace relationships. Therefore, it can
be concluded that information systems development within stalli control phase (phase I a
and lb) supported to maintain state capitalism and information systems development
wfthin open economic policies (phase 2a and 2b) supported to maintenance of market
capitalism. In both phases, information systems development supported to the
preseivation of the status quo. NCCL could not change towards a successful
organisation through effective information systems development.

Finally, How do such findings contribute to the theo1y and pl'acticc of lnfor\~iation

Systems developme1J1? The case analysis revealed that ignorance of social contexts led
to unintended dilemmas and consequences. It led to the growth of bureaucratic
infighting, objectification of lifeworlds, the maintenance of the status quo, increased
expression of alienation, personal anomie, depression, apathy, psychopathological
decease, strikes, withdrawal of motivation to work, failures of information systems,
poor performance, losses in operations and conflicts at NCCL. If I were look back
reflectively, these unintend::d ~·onsequenccs of information systems development and
practice resulted due to the inability ofmanagement to develop successful information
systems considering the tacit knowledge of socio-cultural lifoworlds of employees al
NCCL,

406

As explained in section 7.4, Habermas's critical social theory can be used as a theory,
though it has some prohlcms, out1in6d in section 7.5, to overcome or to minimise the
occurrences of above mentioned unintended consequences of NCCL. Generally, his
theory can be used to guide information systems developers, managers at NCCL, policy
makers in the government, owners nfGoldembank, and infonnation systems researchers
to innovate successful infonnation systems considering the social soci! context of Sri
Lanka. In particular Habennas's theory can be u~cd helped other organisations in Sri
Lanka and organisations in other developing countries since his theory focuses on
holistic nature to informati.,m systems development and practice in organisations (sec
section 7.3).

Haberrnas's critical social theory helps policy makers in the government, managers and
other employees in the organisations, and researchers in information systems to
understand the wholeness of information systems development and practice within
broad socio-cultural, economic and political contexts of a country rather than just
focusing only on organisational level analysis. Thus, findings of this re-search sheds
new light in infonnation systems research and addresses a long felt need and lacuna of
information systems development research both in the developed and developing
countries.

7.6.3 Research Contribution to Knowledge In General

In this research I investigated infonnation systems development and practice in a
privatised state owned industrial enterprise (NCCL) in Sri Lanka over a period between

1958-2000. Objectives in my st11dy were: I. To understand the approaches used by

organisations in Sri Lanka for information systems development. 2. To understand how
these approaches contradict with organisational, socio-cultural, economic and political
realities of organisations in Sri Lnnka. 3. To provide a theory to understand infonnation
systems development practice in Sri Lanka. 4. To make recommendations for successful
infonnntion systems development and practice in organisations in Sri Lanka.

Making contributions to the knowledge of information systems practice and usage in Sri
Lanka, and by readers' generalization to developing countries in general, the research
discovered that infonm,tion systems development at NCCL existed within broadly
related b:.!t interlocking socio-cultural, economic, and political and administrntive
structures. These social structu1cs formed the contexts for NCCL and infonnation
systems development. The analyses revealed how information systems development
was shaped by and shaped NCCL reality through socio-cultural, economic, and political
contexts in Sri Lanka.

Both the state control policies and the neo-classical economic policies had impacts on
information systems development and engendered socio-cultural lifoworlds of
employees. Information systems development followed positivist approach with values
embedded in the Western societies. The techno-scientific, economic and purposive
rational approaches together with highly institutionalised bureaucracy and political
apertures contradicted with the social reality of NCCL. These consequences prevented
NCCL becoming successful organisation through immvative information systems
development.
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As little ur no prior research as has done, to the author's knowledge, this study has
found that :nt:,nnation systems development requires rcprcs1:.1tation of the mindsets of
people in the country. This representation can be achieved if information system~ arc
developed foll_.wing socio-cultural norms, values, and expectations which arc used to
guide the lhinkin.~ process and understanding the reality of the world by the people in
that country. Lift:worlds of peopl;, represent such socio-cultural values, norms, and
expectations. They represent the mindsets and tacit understanding of the world by the
people. Misn,'Presentation of lifcwot!ds's knowledge or understanding in information
systems lead to clashes and difficulties such as those manifested in the episodes
sketched in chapter six and management tend to experience difficulties in realising their
objectives in organisations.

Making a substantial contribution to research in dL·ve\oping countries, it is clear from
the case analysis that Western positivist-based knowledge, related to information
systems devolopmcnt and usage, can not be directly transferred to organisations in Sri
Lanka and that such knowledge alone can not be considered as adequate for information
systems development. It is also evident that information systems, its technology, tools,
methods, and expertise are socially construcu.•d from the experiences emanated from
social contexts of Sri Lank than imposed upon from the experiences of Western
positivist thinking of modernity. The NCCL case revealed that information systems
development becomes effective only when it is truly appropriated by the knowledge of
participants in the social contexts in Sri Lanka.

NCCL must take their employees more seriously. It must understand the mindsets of
people. Understanding of mir1dsets of people means understanding the socio-cultural
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\ifcworlds of people in Sri Lanka. Thnt knowledge represents the best available
knowledge for information sy~lcms development to innovate successful information
system~. !fin formation systems were developed using such knowledge, then employees,
management, NCCL itself and the whole society would benefit from the developm~nt of
infornmtion systems. Such an endeavour would enhance the socio;'.feonomic
development by alleviating poverty and increasing living standards of pc~Ple in Sri
Lanka. Such findings would enhance the theory and tbc practice of information systems
development in organisations in developing countries.
7.6.4 Future Research Opportunities

Several issues discussed under the limitations (sec section 4.2 of chapter one) are seen
as possible extensions and opportunities for future research.

Firstly, further research could be undertaken to change social attitudes of managers and
other employees to make them critically aware of the problems of current informatioo
systems development und practice and change into communicative actions. In this
research setting, the researcher is required to activity involve in the infonnation systems
·development projects and change the socinl attitudes of participants. The aim would be
to use communicative actions in information systems development o.nd to incorporate
tacit knowledge of participants in information systems development projects.

Secondly, more in-depth and cross sectional research design can be included
participants representing from owners of the multinational company, customers,
suppliers, managers other employees at NCCL end cr,mpetitors and studied within the

Refen,nc,•
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historical and social contexts of Sri Lanka. Paral!cl conclusions for success or failures or
infom1ution systems development am\ practice cun be made comparing the results with
similar type of organisations.

Thirdly, more in-depth case studies could be undertaken in other privatised industrial
organisations, service oriented organisations such as insurance and hotel industries. !t is
also possible to study information systems development and practices in privately
owned companies. All these research need to study within historical and social contexts
of Sri Lanka employing critical social theory. The aim of such holistic researches
would be to find out whether there arc real differences within the industry and inter
industry pertaining to information systems development and practices. Additionally,
within these research, problems (such as cultural, economic, J",wer, educational,
linguistic and so on) of the application of Habennas critical social theory could be
further studied and analysed.

Fourthly, another possible extension of future research would be to critically study
organisations that have succeeded in both developing and implementing infonnation
systems across social contexts in Sri Lanka. Apparent successes in infonnation systems
development and implementation can be made by iterating theory with empirical data in
the studied organisations and these success stories can be used to enhance the
productivity offailed organisations both in the privatised and private organisations.

Fifthly, the socio-culture as national culture as stated in the limitation can be further
explored and analysed. Is it uniquely national socio-culture or a blend of Asian and
Western? Is it uniquely the national ~ocio-culture or socio-culture embedded in
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organisational values nnd practices? How these socio-cultural clement truly make

impact on success on organisations and how is it powerful as teams b innovating
infonnation systems dcvdopmcnt'l These areas could be explored further in future
research.

Finn!ly, a further research can be conducted in other developing countries using the
similar framework and thus conclusions can be made whether conclusions made in this

study replicate in other developing countircs.

Refen:nce
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